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The thesis of this dissertation is that the
reconstitution of human subjectivity, theoretically and
concretely, is necessary to adequately address the global
ecological crisis and ongoing social and political
domination and exploitation. Initial attempts to
constitute this new ecological subject exist in the
radical ecology movement (recognized by Rudolf Bahro and
Herbert Marcuse in the 1970s)
,
examined here through three
primary branches of the radicalized environmental
movement: deep ecology, social ecology, and ecofeminism.
Aspects of this radical ecological subject are revealed in
a critique based on the work of the early Frankfurt School
IV
theorists--Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and Herbert
Marcuse. Adorno's understanding of negative dialectics,
or non-identity thinking, is the primary source of
categories for the analysis. Jurgen Habermas's critique
Adorno is rejected, and Habermas's "communicative
action" theory is also found to be inadequate for radical
ecological needs. Adorno's use of the concept/term
"mimesis" provides a lever for prying open radical
ecology's treasure of insights as well as its limitations.
Each branch of radical ecology is examined with reference
to its methodology or epistemology, its understanding of
subjectivity, and their respective politics.
Deep ecology's deep questioning method, proposed by
Arne Naess, is found to differ little from traditional
philosophy and inadequately supports its claims about
possibilities for identification with nature or the
creation of a political identity or agency capable of
adequately addressing ecological and social problems, this
despite the successes of its political descendants,
including Earth First! and Dave Foreman. Social ecology,
elaborated by Murray Bookchin, expands the idea of
subjectivity beyond its ability to provide the critical
conceptual framework necessary to resolve the ecological
crisis. Bookchin' s critique and interpretation of the
early Critical Theorists also fails. Ecofeminism, a
diverse set of perspectives, must be approached cautiously
while attempting to salvage consistent theoretical
v
categories which, combined with critical theory's
insights, illuminate potentials for development of a
future radical ecological subject. Useful categories
include "feminist standpoint theory," the "ethic of care
psychoanalysis and other insights from the works of Luce
Irigaray, Nancy Hartsock, Sara Ruddick and Drucilla
Cornell
.
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INTRODUCTION
The thesis of this dissertation is that the
reconstitution of human subjectivity, both theoretically
and concretely, is necessary to adequately address both
the global ecological crisis and ongoing social and
political domination and exploitation. Subjectivity and
its relation to the destruction of nature has been a
central concern in the more philosophical works of
"radical ecology," a term used here to include the texts
of deep ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism. ^ This
work will examine recent radical ecological attempts to
reconceptualize subjectivity, the methods or methodologies
used which provide the bases of the respective
conceptualizations, and the resulting claims about the
possibilities for social and political transformation.
The contrasting views of deep ecology, social ecology,
ecofeminism and other forms of radical ecology have
developed in an atmosphere of mutual critique. This has
resulted in a steadily increasing sophistication,
including a more open acknowledgment of both the many
differences between these views as well as their basic
agreements. However, even including their increasing
subtlety and complexity, these attempts to develop a
radical philosophy of ecology continue to fail to fulfill
their claims to provide an adequate philosophical basis
for radical ecological activity.
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This dissertation attempts to more fully engage the
tradition of critical theory, the "Frankfurt School," with
the discourse of radical ecological philosophy.
Specifically, the work of Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer,
and Herbert Marcuse will be drawn on to provide leverage
for a critical evaluation of the relationship between a
radical ecological subjectivity and the domination,
exploitation and destruction of nature. Since there are
significant differences among these "first generation"
critical theorists as well, care must be given to
acknowledge these differences and the subsequent impacts
they may have on the critique of radical ecology.
Critical theory proceeds out of the Western philosophical
tradition, challenging that tradition on its own terms
through "immanent critique," a process most fully
developed in Adorno's work. One of the central themes of
the early critical theorists was the development of the
concept of "the domination of nature." The philosophical
texts of radical ecology in its various facets have
concerned themselves with many of the same themes as those
of critical theory. In several instances Adorno,
Horkheimer and Marcuse have already been appropriated by
these more recent philosophies, although until now only
marginally. This dissertation will argue in favor of a
further elaboration and extension of the insights of
critical theory into radical ecology's self-understanding.
Simultaneously, it is argued, critical theory can be
2
developed by introducing insights from the philosophies of
radical ecology. This should result in a richer
understanding of both the current system of domination and
exploitation, and insights into possibilities for its
social, political, and ecological transformation.
Subjectivity and Ecology
Rudolf Bahro's work, although it does not belong to
any of the three main categories of radical ecology
examined here, provides an opportunity to formulate some
of the central issues and concerns of radical ecology in
the context of the actual historical engagement between
critical theory and a contemporary ecological philosophy.
Bahro's lh.e Alternative in Eastern Europe was described by
Herbert Marcuse as, "The most important contribution to
Marxist theory and practice to appear in several
O
decades."^- Marcuse claimed Bahro's analysis was
applicable to both actually existing socialism (a much
smaller category now than in 1977) and late capitalism.
Marcuse perceived in Bahro's work the possibility of a
fundamental shift in the understanding of Marxism: "A
decisive result is that historical materialism makes a
genuine advance: the relationship between base and
superstructure is redefined, the focal point of the social
dynamic is shifted from objectivity of political economy
to subj ectivity . to consciousness as a potential material
force for radical change." 3 It is a concern for
3
reconceptualizing subjectivity that marks the nexus of
several contemporary philosophical developments, with an
implied consequence of providing opportunities for the
establishment of a new agent of social-political
transformation. Exploration of alternative conceptions of
subjectivity in the philosophical literature of radical
ecology may contribute significantly to the development of
the project of social transformation.
The various branches of radical ecology develop their
respective critiques of existing society from a broad
range of philosophical positions. For example, individuals
who identify with the philosophy of deep ecology proceed
from traditions as diverse as Buddhism, Native American
culture, Spinoza, Heidegger, Marcuse and Foucault. Murray
Bookchin, self-identified anarchist and prime-mover behind
social ecology, has frequently relied on Kropotkin's idea
of "mutual aid," while making Hegel's work a central
methodological component of his project. Bookchin has
also claimed to have been strongly influenced by
Horkheimer and Adorno, although some of his harshest
criticisms are aimed in their direction. Ecofeminist
positions encompass perhaps an even broader range of
traditions than either deep ecology or social ecology,
although a general tendency until very recently had been
for the ecofeminist debate to be split into opposing camps
on the question of "women's spirituality." In this
respect, ecofeminist debates echo those in feminist theory
4
generally which circulate around the questions of female
subjectivity, embodiment, and "the feminine." Beginning
from these diverse perspectives, these radical ecological
philosophies attribute social and political conflicts and
contradictions to different origins, however, they all
recognize the "ecological crisis" as a fundamental
contemporary problem, and "nature" as a central analytical
category. These analyses of existing structures of
domination, exploitation and destruction have led to
corresponding proposals for the reconstitution of the
concept of subjectivity. The respective understandings by
these philosophies of the relationship of a transformed
subjectivity to "nature" serve as the basis for new value
systems with specific implications for ethical and
political activity. Additionally, although not always
explicitly acknowledged, this results in a reconstituted,
specifically political subject, a necessary step in the
transitional phase of any project seeking a
"revolutionary" transformation of the existing social
structure. What is required of critical social theory at
this historical moment is an exploration of these attempts
to constitute an "ecological subject," and the relation of
the ecological subject to social transformation.
Ecology and Methodology
One crucial aspect of any critique of the
philosophical currents of radical ecology is that of
5
methodology. Methodology, and epistemology, have been a
primary concern in all attempts to develop an adequate
philosophical understanding of present
historical/ecological conditions. One example is the deep
ecologists' methodology-based distinction between "deep"
and "shallow" ecology. The deep ecology method was first
suggested by Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess, but most
succinctly explained by deep ecologist/ecophilosopher
Warwick Fox, "This sense of deep ecology is predicated
upon the idea of asking progressively deeper questions
about the ecological relationships of which we are a part.
Naess holds that this deep questioning process ultimately
reveals bedrock or end-of-the-line assumptions, which he
refers to as fundamcntdl
s
/ and that deep ecological views
are derived from such fundamentals while shallow
ecological views are not ." 4
Social ecology also is based on a specific
methodological approach, what Murray Bookchin calls a way
of "thinking ecologically" which develops through
"dialectical naturalism." This is his idiosyncratic
appropriation of Hegel's dialectical method loosely
combined with the theory of evolution: "Conceived as a
naturalistic form of thinking--as dialectical naturalism--
dialectics may be distinguished from Hegel's empyrean,
basically anti-naturalistic dialectical idealism and the
wooden often scientistic dialectical materialism of
c:
orthodox Marxists."
6
Feminism has always viewed as problematic the
relationship between epistemology, ontology and
methodology, and this has carried over into ecofeminism.
Early ecofemmist arguments frequently developed out of
anthropological research into prehistoric societies. It
has been extensively argued that these societies were at
least matrilmeal, if not fully matriarchal. Assertions
about these (perhaps) goddess worshipping societies have
been the basis for (re) establishment of some contemporary
goddess religions and the subsequent development of
elaborate rituals and myths. Ecofeminist concepts and
theories have now moved beyond a direct association with
goddess religions, but these origins still form an
important component of many ecofeminist practices, and
continue to attract much criticism. Although self-
identified ecofeminists have recently introduced other
theoretical perspectives, drawn from the larger feminist
context, (including the tradition of critical theory),
ritual and myth as methods of "woman's knowing" remain at
the heart of much of ecofeminist philosophy, and its
critique. Of course the concepts of myth and mimesis were
also important in the work of the first generation
critical theorists. It is even arguable that the
relationship of reason to myth and mimesis is the very
heart of Adorno's work, including the early collaboration
with Horkheimer on the pivotal text of the Frankfurt
School, Dialectic of Enlightenment . 6 It is clear from
7
this brief overview of radical ecology that questions of
philosophical method, of interpretation and
representation, will be at the heart of any critique of
philosophical ecology.
Questions of philosophic method were also very much
in the forefront of Theodore Adorno's work. Adorno of all
the critical theorists was perhaps most scrupulous in his
attention to philosophic method. Adorno, not
uncritically, borrowed the form of the "constellation"
from Walter Benjamin
.
7 The philosophic constellation, a
configuration of concepts "near" the object, is assembled
to reveal what is normally concealed when concept and
object are simply equated as they are in various forms of
the "correspondence" theory of knowledge. Correspondence,
or philosophical identification of concept with object,
repeats the process of false reconciliation of humans and
nature characteristic of idealism and positivism. A
fundamental tenet of dialectics is that the object is not
simply a thing but has a history of development and is
always caught-up in this process. The manner of
representing this process marks the differences between
Hegel, Marx and their philosophical descendants, including
the early critical theorists.
Adorno's critical theory most consistently attempts
to sustain the tension between concept and object,
avoiding a false identification or reconciliation, thereby
creating a space for critical reflection. At its creative
8
best this results in the simultaneous development of
dialectical method and awareness of possibilities for
achieving critical or autonomous subjectivity. The
ecology movement has, at its best, also attempted to
incorporate the idea of self-development into its
political practice. It may be philosophically and
politically fruitful at this historical moment to attempt
to bring these two streams of social theory, critical
theory and the philosophies of radical ecology, together
m the context of their common, self-developing, and
emancipatory project. Adorno's employment of philosophic
constellations to illuminate relationships of ongoing
importance to Western philosophy (such as those between
concept and object, subject and object, humans and nature,
and so on)
,
will be re-presented and developed throughout
this work. However, some initial indications of Adorno's
understanding of "negative dialectics" or "non-identity
thinking" will emphasize the issues surrounding the
concept of subjectivity: "Cognition of the object in its
constellation is cognition of the process stored in the
object. As a constellation, theoretical thought circles
the concept it would like to unseal, hoping that it may
fly open like the lock of a well guarded safe-deposit box:
in response, not to a single key or a single number, but
to a combination of numbers ." 8
Adorno's representation of the "constellation" in
this example may seem overburdened with metaphors of
9
things and mathematics which might indicate the absence of
subjectivity. But this is only one moment in the
constellation’s formation. He also emphasizes the
dbiectivity of the subjective dimpn<n elsewhere: "The
subjectively created context— the
' constellation ’
—becomes
readable as a sign of an objectivity: of the spiritual
substance. What resembles writing in such constellations
is the conversion into objectivity, by way of language, of
what has been subjectively thought and assembled." 9
Ecological Subjectivity and Green Politics
Two fundamental problems have continued to haunt the
ecology movement. First, there continues to be a
"fundamentalist versus realist" conflict, most publicly
evident in the decade of the 1980s among the West German
Greens, but also affecting the U.S. green movement.
Fundamentalists tend to distance themselves from electoral
politics because they believe politics is "part of the
problem not the solution." Electoral politics, it is
argued, reinforces the prevailing tendencies toward the
acquisition and accumulation of various forms of power
which are then used in the domination and exploitation of
both humans and non-human nature. These "fundis" argue
that any involvement with electoral politics inevitably
results in contamination of principles and cooptation into
the existing system, and therefore inadvertently
legitimates domination and exploitation. Realists on the
10
argue that some
other hand, in Germany the "realos,"
participation in electoral politics is strategically
necessary and tactically beneficial. Participation in
electoral politics, they contend, lends legitimacy to the
Green Movement as well as being necessary for the
transition to an ecologically sound society. in the U.S.
this factionalization has been characterized as
"municipalism" versus "Statism" by the social ecologists
who come from a fundamentally anarchist tradition.
The second green political problem concerns the
question of diversity within the movement and the
compatibility between philosophies. Questions of
difference and commonality, unity and diversity, are
® cqnen t ly dismissed or avoided within the radical ecology
literature by claiming that benefits and strengths may be
obtained through a tolerant eclecticism. Specifically and
most explicitly, deep ecology tends to pride itself on its
belief in the possibility of "many paths up the mountain."
At the political level this becomes an argument for and
about the structure and meaning of "pluralism." What must
be questioned about this "deep" understanding of political
pluralism and philosophical eclecticism is the assumption
of a unitary, transcendent, or metaphysical meaning
accompanying the journey of individuals toward self-
understanding. Are the various philosophical and spiritual
traditions in fact aiming at a common understanding, or
are there important differences, generating not creative
11
tension but philosophical contradiction and political
conflict? This question indicates a need to address the
possibility of philosophical contradiction beyond simple
adoption of a laissez faire attitude. The acceptance of
eclecticism by deep ecology has been viewed by its critics
as relativist, subjectivist, and nihilistic at best, and,
at worst, as one more manifestation of its alleged
fundamentally fascist tendencies. At a practical level,
radical ecology's philosophical eclecticism and pluralist
politics conflicts with the green ideal of consensus
decision-making. This has been a continuing stumbling
block for the U.S. green movement.
Intentions
The basic structure of this work will be to take
three major areas of radical ecology (deep ecology, social
ecology, and ecofeminism) and examine them in turn. This
will occur first, on the basis of their methodology, then
on the resulting explicit or implied understanding of
subjectivity, and finally, with respect to their views of
the possibilities for social and political transformation
generated from a reconstituted subjectivity. The common
direction of this radical ecological project can be viewed
as an attempt to establish a new "ecological subject." If
the project is to be philosophically and politically
coherent, its critical or theoretical configuration should
anticipate (as well as be informed by) its political
12
content. Manifestation of actual social and political
means of transforming society should be consistent with
the idea of the ecological subject, and the ecological
subject must be theoretically adequate to meet the
challenges of social transformation. The ecology
movement's actual political practice has included a method
for representing the various aspects of items under
consideration by the group concerned. This practice is
what has generally become known as the process of
consensus (or "consensus-seeking")
. This is
simultaneously a decision-making process, a means of
community building, and, as leading practitioner Caroline
Estes believes, "It is unifying, it is sharing, it is
caring, it is non-dominant, it is empowering ." 11 The
processes of consensus— seeking, and philosophic
representation through constellations, have an important
similarity: the attainment of their emancipatory goals can
only come about through a recognition of differences . 12
Estes: "Built into the consensual process is the belief
that all persons have some part of the truth... and that we
will reach a better decision by putting all of the pieces
of the truth together before proceeding. There are indeed
times when it appears that two pieces of the truth are in
contradiction to each other, but with clear thinking and
attention, the whole may be perceived which includes both
pieces, or many pieces ." 13 Although unlikely to frame the
position in the same terms, due to his opposition to the
13
totalization of thought and its political counterparts,
whether in the form of fascism, Stalinism, or mass
culture, Adorno too had moments when there existed hope of
reconciliation: "Utopia would be above identity and above
contradiction; it would be a togetherness of
diversity The idea of a changed philosophy would be to
become aware of likeness by defining it as that which is
unlike itself ." 14
Adorno s concern for the relation of aesthetics and
critical thought had an impact on his beliefs about the
relationship of form and content, revealing itself in his
own philosophical works in the question of style. In
Minima Moralia Adorno elucidates the attributes of the
properly written philosophic text, where the text's basic
soundness can be judged by "whether it causes one
quotation to summon another ." 15 He explains that the
philosophic text should resemble a spider's web, the
spinning/weaving activity anticipating its object.
Thought is then nourished on the objects opened by the
illumination of philosophic conception. The unfolding of
the object imparts vibrations to other objects hovering
nearby, generating resonances which enrich experience.
A sympathy for the arachnid perspective, its
sensitivity to the movements of the objects of its
experience, is one motivation for this work.
14
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PART I.
CRITICAL THEORY MEETS
THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT
17
CHAPTER 1
CRITICAL THEORY AND THE ECOLOGY MOVEMENT
The historical relationship between critical theory
and philosophies of radical ecology was first staged with
Herbert Marcuse's comments on Rudolf Bahro's work. 1
Bahro's personal, philosophical, and political journey is
revealing not only for its establishment of contact
between critical theory and the ecology movement, but also
to emphasize the historical importance of attempts to
theoretically reconstitute "subjectivity." Any green
alternatives to existing society will be strongly affected
by the manner in which subjectivity is theoretically
reconstituted.
Marcuse extended Bahro's analysis in The Alternative
of "actually existing socialism" of the mid-1970s to apply
to "late capitalism" as well. Marcuse viewed Bahro's
analysis as an internal development of Marxism, advancing
Marxism's understanding of historical materialism by
emphasizing subjectivity as a potential material force for
transformative change. It might be argued of course that
theorizing the "revolutionary subject" has been the
primary concern of "Western Marxism" at least since
Lukacs, and it was certainly part of the Frankfurt
School's concerns, appearing in the form of an exploration
of the absence or elimination of the revolutionary subject
under Stalinism, fascism, and mass culture. However,
there are at least two objections to this view. First,
Bahro's specific idea of "surplus consciousness" is not
explicitly theorized by the early Frankfurt School.
Secondly, most interpretations of Adorno's work, and much
of Marcuse's, have emphasized the fundamental elimination
of potential or actual revolutionary consciousness, when
understood as an effective agent of historical change
.
2
Bahro and Marcuse argue that the key for
understanding why a shift in Marxist categories is needed
is the increasing "intellectualization" of labor.
Developments in the production process have resulted in
surplus consciousness, "an energetic mental capacity that
is no longer absorbed by the immediate necessities and
dangers of human existence and can thus orient itself to
more distant problems ." 3 Surplus consciousness, Bahro
argues, is increasingly available for the transformation
of subjectivity, from its egoistic characteristics within
commodity culture into a configuration which creates the
possibility that some individuals become consciously aware
of a need to identify with and enhance the "emancipatory
potential of the life instincts." Marcuse attempts to
develop his own critical theory by appropriating Bahro's
understanding of the proletariat, traditional Marxism's
"collective subject" of historical transformation. A
consequence of a changed revolutionary subject is a shift
in the source of system crises which, although retaining
the central problem identified by Marx, the accumulation
19
of capital based on the profit motive, now additionally
includes ecological limits to the expansion of production.
What must be explained by Marcuse and Bahro is the
necessity for this fundamental shift of Marxist
categories, and the simultaneous movement of both
subjectivity and the ecological crisis (crises) to center
stage in this revised critical theory.
Marcuse’s analysis begins with the reevaluation of
the relationship of the interests of the working-class to
the general interests of humanity. Late capitalism's
capacity to compensate labor sufficiently to limit the
more radical demands for satisfaction of "emancipatory
interests" is viewed by Marcuse as "the central historical
problem of revolutionary theory in our time."^ The
availability of a nearly infinite variety of commodities
in the forms of material goods, and the status symbols of
career and conspicuous consumption, work against a
potentially revolutionary subject's radicalization of
needs. There is no revolutionary demand for "happiness
and gratification" because consumer culture is able to
compensate for this loss.
The historical development of the system of
production has required an increasing shift of labor to
its subjective component, but it is in the realm of
subjectivity that emancipatory needs eventually develop to
a level where they may potentially exceed the system's
capacity for compensation. Surplus consciousness develops
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in all strata of society as the productivity of the system
reduces the intensity of struggle for mere existence.
Bahro argued that there develops a "dim awareness"
throughout society of a more gratifying alternative to
commodity culture. This dim awareness is brought more
fully to consciousness by what Marcuse labels catalyst
groups
,
including "the student movement, women's
liberation, citizen s initiatives, concerned scientists,
etc . " 6
Even though "surplus consciousness" is available at
all levels of society, Bahro identified the
"intelligentsia" as the potentially revolutionary subject
in the "actually existing socialism" of the late 1970s.
Marcuse elaborates on this point from the context of late
capitalism, listing two reasons for the leading role of
the intellectuals. First, "knowledge is power."
Increasing intellectualization of the production process
results in the increasing importance of the
"intellectualized strata." Second, the compensatory
interests of this segment of production cease to be of
intense daily concern. In capitalist countries,
intellectuals do not generally have as luxurious a life as
other elites, however, they at least have the "privilege"
of education; "Which can open the otherwise closed horizon
of knowledge that transcends the existing state of
things." 6 Due to the elitist structure of production
under both socialism and capitalism, the privileged
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position of the intellectual tends to be elitist as well.
This helps explain Bahro's own elitism in The Alternativp
where he turns to a fundamentally Leninist position,
advocating a vanguardist transformation of the actually
existing socialisms of the mid-1970s. ^ Before continuing
this saga which includes Bahro's later embrace, then
abandonment, of the West German Greens, a further
examination of Marcuse's analysis will help illuminate
methodological and other theoretical implications for
developing the critique of existing society.
Marcuse's Analysis
Marcuse asks, is it still possible to develop a
theory of revolution, one more suited to the conditions of
late capitalism? He answers that theory requires a
fundamental revision of traditional Marxism's concept of
class. Marcuse enumerates the components of Marx's theory
of the proletariat, the class of potentially revolutionary
consciousness, the revolutionary subject. Marcuse first
emphasizes the non-identity between the "proletariat" and
the "working-class." The working-class of late capitalism
generally is not in the condition of extreme immiseration
described in detail by Marx in the mid-19th century.
Neither is the working-class, defined as those individuals
in immediate or direct engagement in the process of
material (object) production, any longer a majority of the
population. Marcuse claims the traditional definition of
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the worker is part of an untenable reduction of the
category of labor, the identification of "labor" with
manual labor. Intellectual labor under late capitalism
remains in the same essential relationship to production
as manual labor. White-collar workers, salaried employees
and those who are "unproductive" are working-class to the
extent "they do not share decision-making power over the
means of production." 8
Marcuse (and Bahro) argued for a broadening of the
concept of class so that it includes all strata of the
production process without fundamental decision-making
power over production. How can the concept "class
consciousness" then be revived? Marcuse has to this point
only reestablished the identification of the proletariat
with the majority of the population; this "collective
worker" has the characteristics of "the people" rather
than that of a class, and a fundamental historical problem
with this formulation is that popular consciousness tends
to be characterized by "conservatism and fascism." 0
Revolutionary subjectivity, Marcuse argues, is not that of
a particular class as traditionally defined (the
industrial proletariat)
,
but is the "consciousness of
individuals from different strata." 10 Potentially, these
individuals may recognize their common interest and
constitute a unified "collective intellectual", which was
present (in 1978) as unorganized groups and movements.
23
It is at this point that Marcuse discusses the
relation of subjectivity to what Bahro called surplus
consciousness. In addition to surplus consciousness,
Marcuse asserts that the other component of subjectivity
is that of emotions, or "instinctual structure." Although
surplus consciousness is the basis for the potential
development of a radical critique of existing society and
an understanding of how present conditions can be changed,
this conscious understanding can be bought-off
(compensated) before radical consciousness is translated
into transformative action. The emancipatory interests of
the subject, Marcuse argues, are a vital need "anchored in
the instinctual structure of the individual." Here, where
the analysis deals with the "life instincts" is where
crucial differences between the two theorists' positions
begin to appear and where possibilities emerge for further
theoretical development, through an alternative,
reconceptualized relation between subjectivity and nature.
Marcuse's subsequent comments on Bahro are
essentially a recapitulation of the primary arguments in
Eros and Civilization . -1 He argues that emancipation as a
socio-historical process is linked to subjectivity and its
"erotic basis." He distinguishes Eros from sexuality and
sexual liberation which have been used in the form of
"repressive desublimation" to reinforce class society.
Eros, or the life instincts, borrowing from Freud, are the
counterpart to the instincts of destruction. Eros drives
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for "emancipation from socially determined surplus
repression, for gratification and intensification of the
life instincts .” 12 For the full unfolding of the life
instincts, liberation from capitalism, the performance
(reality) principle, is necessary, that is, realization of
the life instincts requires revolution. Nature, according
to Marcuse, demands liberation in both its internal and
external aspects, both subjectively and objectively. He
is hesitant to accept a natural physical limit to
capitalism; "The kind of nature that is suitable to
capitalism may very well turn out to be an insurmountable
^ -iltit of capital ." 13 Here he speaks of an "unmastered
residue" that might possibly block further capitalist
development. These comments on the "natural limits to
capitalism" are not couched in terms of wilderness,
rivers, or animal species, but in the terms of Nature as
"counter-image" to capitalist production processes. What
primarily concerns Marcuse here are the "psychological
roots" of the ecology movement; "Nature, experienced as
the domain of happiness, fulfillment, and gratification,
is the environment of Eros--the antithesis of the
performance principle applied to nature ." 14 He also links
the performance principle to patriarchal domination, a
gesture that begins to incorporate the women's movement
into the analysis as well. For Marcuse it is the
instinctual structure, specifically Eros, that grounds the
potential for transformed consciousness.
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It is also within this nexus of relationships,
between economics, nature, feminism and life, that
philosophies of radical ecology in their various
contemporary forms attempt to elaborate a new concept of
subjectivity. Marcuse's analysis helps establish an
initial framework for evaluating the different theoretical
positions which have been developed by deep ecology,
social ecology, and ecofeminism. The ultimate ground for
Marcuse's argument is personal experience, and it is the
interpretation of that experience which provides the
theoretical basis for transformative action: "The
instinctual structure becomes emancipatory only in union
with an emancipatory consciousness which defines the
possibilities and limits of this realization and absorbs
that which is merely instinctual into itself ." 15 Marcuse
rejects the assertion that emancipatory potential can be
obtained through unmediated experience, and instead
charges the "cult of immediacy" (which he associates with
"escapist movements of the New Left") with being
fundamentally reactionary. (This charge has recently been
revived against the most politically active group of
individuals who identify with the philosophy of deep
ecology; Earth First!.) After forcefully stating the
reactionary nature of political action based on immediate
experience, Marcuse again addresses the process of
capitalist domination and exploitation of both internal
and external nature. If experience must be mediated to
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prevent its reidentification with the logic of domination,
where is revolutionary consciousness initially to be
developed? The "social process of revolution" begins,
Marcuse responds, with individuals for whom emancipation
has become a "vital need." Marcuse contends that these
individuals have already "advanced beyond the Ego." 1 ^
This philosophical position requires a specific
understanding of instinctual structure, the primary drives
of Eros and destruction. Marcuse claims Eros and Thanatos
"already imply other human beings." The instincts are
always already more than individual experience, "they are
drives of the individual, but of the individual as
’species being .'" 17 Marcuse's brief re-presentation of
his previous works continues with the claim that the
"journey inwards" (Bahro's expression) of the Ego will
encounter others (society) and the Other (nature), not as
limits to the Ego, but as "powers constitutive of it."
Marcuse asserts that should the "journey inwards" stop at
the "unmediated Ego" this Ego will return to the fetishism
of the commodity world, a return to the given, the
presently dominant, established culture. However, the
initial motivation for the journey inward, the desire for
immediate experience, comes from a "comprehending
subjectivity that goes beyond the Ego." 1 ^ The Ego trapped
in capitalist society must rely on an unmediated
experience of the life instincts in order to bring
emancipatory interests to the level of conscious vital
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need. Why is this not a tautological argument? How can
experience occur withp^ the mediation of the Ego which is
formed in consumer society? How can experience unmediated
by this Ego be called anything other than "immediate", and
therefore, according to Marcuse's argument, be anything
other than reactionary? Because, Marcuse claims,
immediate experience is always already mediated by a
dimly aware subjectivity which then uses experience as a
"verifying criterion ." 19
Summarizing, Marcuse develops Bahro's idea of
surplus consciousness" (that which is not captured in
commodity culture) a consciousness which makes available
to the individual a dim awareness of the possibility of a
different more gratifying existence. The reality of a
possible alternative social existence is then confirmed in
"immediate experience." A similar understanding of the
structuring of experience occurs in traditions deep
ecologists adopt as possible paths to an ecological
consciousness. These alternative traditions are stated in
very different, frequently religious, terms. (A similar
turn to religious terminology is a surprising aspect of
Bahro's later statements.) Marcuse's remaining analysis
may help shed light on ecological activists' current
strategies. He argues that the overwhelming power of the
"established apparatus of domination, " makes it necessary
to turn scattered resistance into a virtue. The strategy
of local and regional bases of rebellion is an
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acknowledgment of the inability to centralize oppositional
forces, but it is also a strategy that "anticipates the
objective tendencies toward disintegration in the existing
society. "2°
The Red and the Greens
Rudolf Bahro, in a 1980 introductory essay to a
collection of his speeches and articles, attempts to
present reasons for Marxist socialists to become Greens.
At this stage, his thinking is still identifiable as more
socialist than green by the direction of his reasoning,
revealed in the initial question of why socialists should
be green, rather than why greens should be socialists;
"The ecology movement and the Green party are of such
great importance for us because they act as a catalyst for
a new political self-conception and practice on the part
O -1
of the left."^ x This statement condenses many issues
which have haunted the development of green politics
throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. What is the
relation between "the Left" and green politics? How is
the new political subject to be understood or
reconstituted? What does it mean for the ecology movement
to be a "catalyst?" How do ecological insights into the
human-to-nature relationship challenge the assumptions of
socialist theory? In 1980 Bahro, released from East
German prison, moved to West Germany where he saw himself
as something of a theoretical and political maverick.
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although he maintained a leading role in West German Green
Party politics. Initially he emphasized the tentative and
schematic nature of his attempts to address the ecological
crisis from a socialist perspective. Socialism
Survival originates in this transitional period which
coincided with the emergence of the West German Green
Party (Die Grunen)
.
The political atmosphere at the time was dominated by
several important developments: the shift to the right in
the West with the elections of Thatcher, Reagan and Kohl;
the prospects of the Soviets going to a launch-on-warning
system in response to the introduction of Pershing II and
cruise missiles into West Germany; and the increasing
political activism of the "new social movements." It was
from this background that Bahro explained the position of
the ecology movement relative to general social change and
to the rethinking of socialist politics: "The different
currents of this new social movement cannot be
artificially separated. They merge at least partially
into one another, since what they speak to in the
individuals involved appears not in isolation, but in
association. Often, the distinction is made only
according to which motivation is decisive for the
particular individual. The ecology movement seems to
bring together the greatest number of motivations, adding
• 9 9them together and tending to integrate them. ^
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This indicates not only a recognition of the
historical importance of the new social movements for a
transformational politics, but also the centrality of
ecology to that politics. Bahro also emphasizes the
importance of personal, individual motivation for
transformative political action. These observations place
the efforts toward a fuller theoretical understanding of
the relation between subjectivity and ecology high on the
agenda of the contemporary debate over the possibilities
of social and political resistance. Bahro
' s analysis of
the relationship between socialism and the ecology
movement was initially presented in an economisticly
oriented language not significantly different from that
which might be used by any capitalist of enlightened self-
interest, a language radical ecologists label "reform
environmentalism." This reform position is the simple
recognition that, "If the whole enterprise of expanding
industrial production is continued.
. .we shall be faced at
the end of the day with a production machine that is
grinding to a halt for want of supplies of materials, yet
without whose operation the given population cannot be
maintained ." 23 This is an expression of the basic
understanding of the limits to growth which result from
physical (un) availability of production materials, the
increase in world population, and the ever increasing
level of commodity consumption. Bahro* s solution, like
many others, is partly based on a theory of basic needs,
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which he contends are "quite rpli^hiw a . .4U L e ably ascertained by
anthropology." 24 it is hp-rp in anere l a theory of needs that
economics and ecology confront each other directly, and
where a reconstituted ecological subject might contribute
a new perspective on "needs."
Bahro, when speaking from the Marxist-socialist
tradition, addressed the confrontation between economics
and ecology m terms of working-class interests, but he
later argued that the working-class perspective should be
transcended m order to establish a new basis for analysis
and action. It was Bahro 's repeated return to the
centrality of the ecological crisis that transformed his
analysis of working-class interests into an analysis of
general human interests. Bahro converts from red to green
when he states, "Yet ecology, this concept that originally
denoted 'only' a discipline in natural science, refers in
the present connection to human interests, and interests
of humanity, that strike deep into the social space, and
in this comprehensive sense it precedes and goes beyond
economics . "-5 Bahro again, but more radically, rejects
the traditional analysis that identifies working-class
interests with the revolutionary subject, the site for
Marxists of the theoretical and practical resolution of
social contradictions. This theoretical shift has
practical political implications; "The organizing factor
which can bring the alternative forces together and give
them a social coordination (as must be desired) will in
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the future not be any particular interest, but rather a
long-term human interest ." 26 with this Bahro redefines
universal interest" and his Marxism must be rethought:
"What is really radical is to think from the standpoint of
the interests of humanity as a whole Here it is
apparent that the ecological position is also the radical
socialist one. To sketch out a project for this, a
counter-project to the blind calculation that prevails in
the system of power, is equally in the general interest
and in our own personal interest, i.e. it is also our own
most basic concern.
Catching the Green Spirit
Bahro makes some interesting and surprising initial
attempts at conceptualizing the ecological subject. His
theoretical development after his move to West Germany
seems at first to take Marcuse's work as its point of
departure. He rejects Marcuse's "one-dimensionality
pessimism" and contends that there still exist "free
energies" which alternative movements can tap. The
question of the subject again arises in the context of the
production system, here involving the physical constraints
preventing substitution of commodities for individual
identity. Bahro believes it may be possible for
industrialization to continue to intensify but it will
bring with it added threats to species survival. Bahro
comes to believe the tendencies of domination were not
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initiated in social but rather in "natural" history.
Bahro states that there seems to be a general tendency
toward self-destruction; its modern universal form—
"extermmism." 28 He argues that human beings must
overcome what he claims is the primary biological-
evolutionary tendency of our species; acquiring knowledge
for the mastery of external nature. His solution: the
human species must oppose its own evolutionary tendency
with a counterforce capable of reconstruction or
demolition of "enchaining structures, for their
disintegration, even for an exodus from them. "29 Bahro
nominates the human "genotype" as the opposing force.
What does he mean by "genotype"? "As I see it, the
genotype is that social power present in every human being
which the old prophets always evoked under the name
God." Bahro seems to argue, on the one hand that the
human species basic characteristic is a tendency to
dominate nature, but, on the other hand, there is also an
inherent tendency to preserve life through social
knowledge. He is calling for a conscious shift of
emphasis in what he believes to be the basic biological
predispositions of the human species.
However unresolvably contradictory these "genetic"
statements may be, from the early 1980s forward Bahro'
s
statements are increasingly couched in religious
terminology. The philosophical implications of this turn
are captured in his explanation of the "God genotype":
34
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"The place of God is where the development needs
original nature converge, above all of course an inward
place .' 31 with this turn, Bahro abandons all traditional
Marxist conceptualization, claiming Marx was "not
materialist enough." Marx did not understand that
"beneath" human consciousness is "human nature as a
whole," and beneath that "nature." Marx misunderstood
nature, viewing it as too passive. Alternatively, Bahro
spiritualizes nature, leading him to conclude, "history is
primarily psychodynamic." This means that now the basic
transformative goal is the overcoming of that aspect of
human nature which has "an aggressive warlike quality ." 33
The means to overcome human nature, Bahro now believes, is
the institutionalization of the insights of the inward
journey of those like "Buddha and Christ." He disavows
his work in Ike. Alternative because, "In essence my
concept of emancipation was then still located within the
framework of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on the
communal appropriation of totality for the full
development of individuality ." 33 Bahro believes his
earlier writing was "not the development of theory but the
reconstruction of the Gospel ." 34 The Gospel, he says
ambiguously, in this case was East German Marxism. Bahro
can no longer be a Marxist, he says, because to be a
Marxist in the West means "to assent to the fact that a
definite political-theoretical conception has been firmly
established and still requires firm adherence ." 33 He
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instead identifies himself as a populist utopian
socialist, although he intends to continue to appropriate
"particular elements of Marxism," but no longer the
"overall structure." He confesses = »n L r to a "regression" in
his thinking, indicating this is due to "the objective
situation itself." 36 He understands his contribution to
social change to be his shift of emphasis toward "the
prophetic level, " toward the "transformation of
subjectivity" not only individually, but with a political
goal. The development of humanity will consist of "an
inward journey rather than external expansion." The
political aim is "the 'reconstruction of God'... the
recreation of spiritual equilibrium, within those levels
of nature neglected by Marx where human consciousness
comes into contact with the external world." 37
In the early 1980s, Bahro claimed he could
participate in Green Party activities because the Greens
were "a grouping beyond the anti-religious
Enlightenment." 33 Following his conversion, Bahro
' s new
prescription for social organization has been small self-
sufficient communes (usually no more than about 3000, no
less than 100 people) that provide basic physical and
social needs. This requires a change in values "such as
can only succeed through what up till now has been
described as religious experience." 39 In an apocalyptic
tone he observes that coming changes will be greater than
all other historic change. He is concerned that the
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resistance to this spiritual change is too great at the
present: "Probably we need, in order to lower the
threshold of inhibition, a 'materialist' concept of God
(which besides I do consider possible)
. The individual
departure to God—to regaining one's original self, to
experiencing unity with the Whole-and the collective
departure into the kingdom of God (it has historically
many names) are two sides of one and the same thing, which
in the final analysis only go together." 40 After having
aided the early development and success of the West German
Green Party in 1980, in December 1984, on the occasion of
an address to a Greens convention, Bahro compared the
Greens to the Nazis, at which point he was marginalized
within the Party as "an eccentric and troublesome one-man
A -1
band. In the spring of 1985 he resigned from the
Greens, ostensibly for their parliamentary vote supporting
a bill allowing the use of animals for medical research.
Critical/Ecological Methods
The explication of the philosophic journey of Rudolf
Bahro was not performed as a definitive statement of
radical ecology, green politics, or any corresponding
understanding of subjectivity, but as a representation of
those aspects of radical ecology that have become
problematic for the green movement generally, and for the
various philosophies of radical ecology to be examined
here. Bahro* s statements are an indication of the
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insightful but problematic nature of much of radical
ecological philosophy. Fundamental to all of these
theoretical developments are the Western philosophic
tradition's concerns with the relations between human
beings and non-human nature and the relevance of this
relationship for interpreting history. Within the Marxist
tradition this has been expressed in the various attempts
to develop the concept of historical materialism. Western
philosophy s concerns with history, nature, and human
nature have been stated predominantly through a
dichotomous conceptual framework in which one term obtains
a hierarchically superior status. This "bipolarity" can be
observed in the philosophic treatment of, for example, the
following paired concepts: subject/object, self/other,
mind/nature, spirit/matter, masculine/feminine, man/woman,
human/animal, and so forth. The Western philosophical
tradition's fullest self-reflexive development and
critique of these structures occurred in the texts of
Hegel and Marx and their philosophical descendants. This
"dialectic" tradition achieved its most advanced
development through its immanent criticism in the work of
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse.
Habermas and the Ecology Movement
Marcuse's comments on Bahro were made in 1978. After
Marcuse's death in 1979 a new generation of critical
theorists would have to address the problems generated
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from within critical theory and those resulting from
ecological crises. The generally recognized successor to
Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse is Jurgen Habermas,
although his position relative to the first generation
critical theorists is not unproblematic
.
42 Habermas has
reformulated much of the work of the early theorists and
while doing so also directly addressed the philosophical
basis of the ecology movement, prompting responses both
from other critical theorists and from radical ecology
philosophers
.
43 One of the significant difference's
between Habermas and earlier participants in the tradition
of critical theory is revealed in his position on the
relationship of the human species to external nature.
Thomas McCarthy wrote what is still the best
introduction to Habermas, and has also translated some of
Habermas's major works
.
44 McCarthy's extensive work
includes persistent criticisms of Habermas, original
insights, and useful summaries of other critics' work.
Examining the various criticisms will permit an update of
the relationship between critical theory and the ecology
movement first established in the Bahro-Marcuse encounter.
These criticisms also illuminate the inadequacies of
Habermas's version of critical theory for addressing the
ecology crisis. Habermas's turn to a "communicative" or
"discourse" ethic may have cost critical theory much more
than was gained. After examining the adequacy of the
Habermasian version of critical theory the question will
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remain whether elements of the tradition of critical
theory can be reclaimed and reconstructed to form a new
framework, one able to combine insights from both critical
theory and the ecology movement. Most importantly it can
be asked if a new conception of revolutionary
subjectivity, a new ecologic al, subject, can take on the
tasks of social transformation without succumbing to the
power of the given, the system of domination. Can the
ecological subject resist given society and liberate the
potentials for an ecological future, or are all attempts
to transform existing society to something qualitatively
different fated from the outset to be consumed by the
machinery of domination, exploitation and oppression?
Critical theory in the hands of Habermas has been
radically transformed, the focus of its concerns
fundamentally shifted. In the context of the attempt to
develop the perspective or standpoint of an ecological
subject, three especially important aspects of Habermas's
transformation of critical theory can be identified.
First, and most fundamentally, is the question of the
shift in methodology by Habermas, which results in a
"dualistic" theory. Habermas's position terminates in a
philosophical position that denies the possibilities of
acquiring "knowledge" of nature in any other manner than
"instrumentally .
"
Second, Habermas views the "new social movements,"
except for feminism (although it is not clear which
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feminism is being referred to here), as "defensive"
movements, that is, they do not have the character of
progressivism he attributes to early bourgeois and later
labor movements. As a defensive movement the ecology
movement, as well as alternative and countercultural
movements, are viewed as primarily defending earlier ways
of life against various threats, specifically, the
economic and administrative "colonization of the
lifeworld. "^5
Third, as a further consequence of Habermas’s
methodological changes, the connection with possible
ecological themes can only occur indirectly via an
idiosyncratic understanding of the democratic
possibilities opened under communicative or discourse
ethics. This connection between radical ecological and
radical democratic positions is not made explicitly by
Habermas himself, but has been attempted by some of his
followers. It can be shown that these three aspects of
Habermas's version of critical theory (the necessarily
instrumental relationship to nature; the characterization
of the ecology movement as defensive; and the availability
of only indirect possibilities for relating critical
theory to ecological concerns) make this an inadequate and
unsuitable point of departure for developing a conception
of an ecological subject with liberatory potentials. The
alternative to Habermas is a return to the concerns of the
earlier Frankfurt theorists, particularly those of Theodor
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Adorno, which provide a more fruitful and adequate basis
for conceptualizing an ecological subject.
Knowledge of Nature
Habermas has repeatedly claimed that the only
relationship between humans and nature which yields
"knowledge" is an instrumental relationship
.
46 He
believes nature must be viewed as an object for the
potential benefit of humans if the relationship is to
yield information beneficial for the self-preservation of
the human species. He claims this is an anthropologically
necessary relationship. Other "attitudes" may be adopted
toward nature, but they will not yield knowledge that
allows the human species to "progress" at the level at
which modern science or "morality" has progressed. 4 ^ In
response to criticisms of this position, he replies,'
"While we can indeed adopt a performative attitude to
external nature, enter into communicative relations with
it, have aesthetic experiences and feelings analogous to
morality with respect to it, there is for this domain of
reality only one theoretically fruitful attitude, namely
the objectivating attitude of the natural-scientific,
experimenting observer ." 48
This position is largely a result of Habermas's
adoption of a fundamentally Kantian framework which seeks
the transcendental or quasi-transcendental conditions
which form the basis of knowledge. Habermas does attempt
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to Shift the transcendental argument from its idealist
origins to a materialism that responds to Marx. This
fundamental shift away from the problematics of the early
Frankfurt theorists*, who relied on a largely Hegelian-
Marxist analysis of society, is also at the heart of
Habermas's rejection of much of the earlier work of
Marcuse and Adorno specifically. 49 This transformation of
critical theory's concerns is especially evident as it
relates to the early theorists central concept of the
domination of nature and their attempts to conceptualize
the possibilities for a "reconciliation" with nature.
These issues are also central to the ecology movement and
any attempt to develop a philosophically adequate concept
of ecological subjectivity.
McCarthy has sustained his criticism of this aspect
of Habermas's work for nearly two decades now. McCarthy
summarized his argument against Habermas's instrumentalist
view of possible theoretically fruitful relations to
nature in the work Ideals and Illusion . 50 The two
fundamental criticisms Habermas attempts to assert against
the early Frankfurt theorists are: (1) any attempt to
develop a "philosophy of nature" will necessarily be
unable to provide knowledge at the level of modern
science; (2) any attempt to articulate a perspective of
reconciliation with nature inevitably leads back to
C 1
metaphysics. McCarthy's early critique of Habermas's
conception of cognitive possibilities, in the context of
43
an analysis of Knowledge and H 1 irn^
/ claims
Habermas's understanding of "cognition" and "knowledge"
requires a more explicit defense than was made at that
time. On what grounds could such "attitudes" toward
nature as the mimetic, poetic, playful, mystical or
fraternal be denied "cognitive content "? 52 Habermas's
response in later works was to attempt to define the
meaning of the "progress of knowledge." He cited the
example of modern science as providing the only adequate
progressive attitude toward external nature
.
53 McCarthy's
response was that one can imagine alternative attitudes
toward nature that at least complement our understanding
of nature, for this his example comes from Habermas's own
philosophical backyard in the form of Kant's "Critique of
Teleological Judgment." McCarthy uses this example to
dispute Habermas's claim that a philosophy of nature would
necessarily revert to a form of metaphysics that would
claim "a validity independent of and prior to science,
that is, the form of an Urspruncrsphilosophi e .
"
54
Ecocentric theorist Robyn Eckersley has also
challenged Habermas on the assertion of the "progressive"
aspects of modern science. She gives counter examples;
"The farming and fishing techniques of many traditional
cultures are often more 'efficacious' from a long term
point of view than the modern agricultural, forestry, and
fishing techniques that have so often replaced such
traditional techniques ." 55
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There is also an abandonment, in Habermas's
formulation of critical theory, of the dialectical
perspective of the subject-to-object or history-to-nature
relationships that motivated the earlier Frankfurt School.
As Henning Ottmann notes in his criticism of Habermas's
position, "A will to control, whose legitimacy is based
upon our need to survive and which is itself a threat to
our survival, becomes dialectical. The technical interest
in mastery over nature encounters nature taking revenge
upon the boundlessness of the will to control.
Combined, these criticisms can be viewed as a
fundamental challenge to Habermas's assertions about the
necessity of an instrumental relationship to external
nature, and the progressivity of modern science. There
are at least complementary attitudes toward nature that
can yield "fruitful" results that go beyond reliance on
"science" as the sole productive or "cognitively fruitful"
means for interacting with nature. In the contemporary
context this is more than simply one among other
criticisms of Habermas's version of critical theory. It
obtains the status of a fundamental challenge when the
ecological crisis has assumed such enormous implications
for the modern way of life. This form of crisis may
threaten society's continued existence, and it certainly
threatens the existence of other natural species, as well
as the basic integrity of the planet's ecology. At
minimum these criticisms indicate the responsibility of
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the social theorist to investigate the question of
whether, "it is possible to envision a philosophy of
nature constructed after the transcendental turn as a
nonfoundationalist
, fallibilistic attempt to conceive of
nature as a hatnm_na,turans that gave rise to, among other
things, a species capable of communicating in language and
thereby of giving its intraspecific relations the form of
a moral order. Of course, this attempt would have to be
constantly renewed in the light of our historically
changing scientific and moral experience
. This
envisioning of a new "philosophy of nature" can be seen as
the theme of the philosophies of radical ecology as
^-^tiscted in the disparate attempts of deep ecology,
social ecology, and ecofeminism. Various critics and
commentators have been all too eager to conflate
contemporary philosophical positions within the radical
ecology movement with Romantic philosophies of nature, and
nature idealism. One of the responsibilities of radical
ecological theorists is to reveal the differences between
those older philosophies of nature and contemporary
philosophies of ecology.
It is not surprising that Habermas, given his
position on the possibilities of cognitive relations to
nature, does not see the ecology movement as residing
within the categorial framework of the tradition of
movements of liberation. He believes the ecology movement
is more correctly understood through the categories of
46
early romantic and escapist movements, thus deserving
classification as a "defensive movement." in his general
discussion of the "new social movements" Habermas
categorizes only the feminist movement as progressive: "I
will differentiate emancipatory potentials from potentials
for resistance and withdrawal. After the American civil
rights movement--which has since issued in a
particularistic self-affirmation of black subcultures
only the feminist movement stands in the tradition of
bourgeois-socialist liberation movements. The struggle
against patriarchal oppression and for the redemption of a
promise that has long been anchored in the acknowledged
universalistic foundations of morality and law gives
feminism the impetus of an offensive movement, whereas the
other movements have a more defensive character .
"
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It is understandable that Habermas would consider the
ecology movement defensive if we look at his brief
analysis of "Green problems ." 59 He divides these problems
into two categories, the first he labels "largely
abstract, " such as industrial destruction of ecological
balance, scarcity of nonrenewable resources, and
"demographic developments." Keeping with Habermas's
basically social democratic (in the German context)
leanings, he views the appropriate response to these
perceived problems as a call for technical and economic
solutions, "which must in turn be globally planned and
carried out by administrative means ." 50 The second area
47
of green problems make us aware of the "inflexible limits
to the deprivation of sensual-aesthetic background
needs. "61 These "aesthetic" problems are the degradation
of the urban environment, despoliation of the countryside
through housing developments, pollution, impairment of
health, and so forth. These "aesthetic" problems generate
a defensive reaction whereby groups try to restore or
protect a previous way of life. Habermas briefly
discusses attempts to theorize ways of addressing the
assaults on the lifeworld, theories which result in
proposals for alternative institutional structures to
those of modern Western society. He basically dismisses
these attempts and links alternative movements to
philosophical antimodernism and neo-conservatism. The
problem with the movements are, he asserts, that they
confuse the "communicative rationality" of cultural
modernity with the "functionalist rationality" of economic
and administrative action systems, the systems guided by
money and power. Speaking of those attempts to develop
alternative institutional structures, he writes, "However
unrealistic these ideas may be, they are important for the
polemical significance of the new resistance and
withdrawal movements reacting to the colonization of the
lifeworld. .
.
(The confusion of lifeworld rationality with
system complexity) explains the fronts--which are out of
place and obscure the real political oppositions--between
the antimodernism of the Young Conservatives and the new
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conservative defense of postmodernity that robs a
modernity at variance with itself of its rational content
and its perspectives on the future." 62
Habermas and Radical Ecology
Despite these seemingly unambiguous categorizations
of the ecology or green movement, others have attempted to
integrate Habermas's version of critical theory with a
vision of ecological rationality. Early in his career
Habermas recognized that ecological questions would be one
source of crises for advanced industrial systems,
"Ecological balance designates an absolute limit to
growth." 63 He speculated on the possible forms of the
manifestation of the encroachment of economic growth on
ecological balance and rightly indicated the high level of
empirical uncertainty about ecosystems and technological
development, but even in the early 1970s he had recognized
the danger of what is now called global warming. His
summary of the issue was brief but allowed him to
conclude, "Nevertheless, these reflections show that an
exponential growth of population and production--that is,
the expansion of control over outer nature--must some day
run up against the limits of the biological capacity of
the environment." 6 ^
Timothy Luke and Stephen White have taken these
observations as there point of departure in an effort to
develop their implications for a Habermasian version of a
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critical theory of the global ecological crisis. However,
even though their analysis of the developing
"information
society" is well presented, there is little persuasive
argumentation for how this version of critical theory can
adequately address the ecology crisis. They acknowledge
that Habermas has not dealt in any detail with the ecology
crisis or with the current transformations resulting from
global capitalist restructuring. Their comments are a
useful supplemental analysis of current capital
developmental trends, and include implications for
comprehending how global restructuring involves the
production of the type of subject, in the form of client
and consumer, now necessary for the reproduction of the
mode of production. This cogent analysis of present
production conditions however does not lead to a
persuasive argument for combining Habermasian critical
theory with the insights of radical ecology.
In Luke and White's view, a shift in capitalism has
occurred since the 1940s which may be represented as a
gradual replacement of the centrality of industrial
production with that of information production. They
label this new form of production "informational
capitalism. The specificity of the analysis and its
potential for illuminating the essential aspects of
current capitalist restructuring make it compatible with,
but more specific than, other recent attempts to
characterize the present condition under various labels,
50
such as "post-industrialism,"
"post-modernism,"
"techno-
capitalism," "the instrumental mode of symbolization," and
so on. Luke and White document the
" informations lizat ion" of capitalism since the second
World War with a variety of statistics and examples, and
attempt to show that this "qualitative shift" is still
occurring. The shift has resulted in contradictions
between two phases of industrial production. These
contradictions in turn open opportunities for the
emergence of an ecological transformation of society.
They claim that U.S. transnational corporations have
forged a transnational industrial regime since the 1940s
using previously untapped natural resources, labor
reserves, and consumer markets. In order to administer
this truly global economy it was necessary to shift from
an emphasis on traditional industrial production to
informational-knowledge production activities. They claim
an ironic effect of this shift in production has been the
development of new interests by those who guide
informational capital; the technical experts, managers,
and professionals. These newly developing interests at
least partially parallel the political agendas of
ecological activists.^ 7
Especially the U.S. economy, but also the Japanese
and German economies are dominated by informationalized
production of "words, images, and audio." The
"informationalization" of agriculture and industry takes
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place through biotechnology, genetic engineering,
robotics, and computer assisted production generally.
This conversion is not entirely frictionless however since
it consumes vast amounts of capital, requiring the
transforming corporations to endorse images and lifestyles
they borrow from the alternative and ecology cultures.
This results in corporate support for "voluntary
simplicity," "frugality," "conspicuous conservation,"
small is beautiful," and so on. ^ This corporate
strategy creates a fundamental challenge for the green
movement, the necessity of distinguishing its claims from
the needs of capital restructuring
.
69 Luke and White
further claim that this capitalist transformation is also
having the effect of restratifying the labor force along
the lines of technical competence. Those who benefit from
the restructuring, the experts, managers and
professionals, are the crucial market for the new
informationalized economy: those who are technologically
incompetent are urged to follow the lead of the radical
ecologists and become frugal and conserve resources. This
necessary reduction in the material standard of living
runs counter to the earlier consumerist ideology at the
high point of industrial production. Restratification
along lines of technological competence, claim Luke and
White, "must also result in contradictions with many of
the egalitarian-democratic myths underpinning mass
7 n
electoral politics."
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The use Luke and White make of Habermas's idea of the
"colonization of the everyday lifeworld" is of special
interest in the present context, since the authors claim,
"Through the production, circulation, and consumption of
information, advanced corporate capital has directly
modified the processes of cultural reproduction and
identity formation in modern society. This claim
depends on a method of interpretation explicitly based on
Habermas's work, but the same observations could be
extracted from the work of virtually any of the critical
theorists or even from most post-structuralist work. in
fact, some of the assertions by the authors could be read
as summaries of the early Frankfurt School studies of the
"Culture Industry." These observations about the
structure of advanced capitalism are not so important in
themselves but are an indication of the continuation of
effects identified more than a half century ago,
Under corporate capitalism, all individuals qua
consumers become capital assets. This mobilization
of consumers through the colonization of their
fragmentary consciousness directly boosts the
productivity, profitability, and power of corporate
capital's increasingly intensive, automated, and
monopolistic industries .... The first principle of
this order is the fragmentation of consciousness
through experts' definition and design of the
lifeworld. In turn, consumers can exercise their
"free choice" over the predesigned alternatives,
which will deliver the need satisfactions required to
fulfill their need definitions as they have been
socialized under this colonizing regime to define
them.
^
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Nearly the same claims were made by the earlier
critical theorists, for example, by Adorno in Minima
If the descriptive claims of the authors can
be established through the perspective of critical theory
generally, why should Habermas's schema be of special
value, and what is the specific link between Habermas and
radical ecology? Afterall, the observation that modern
industrial society creates ecological crises is not unique
to Habermas or critical theory
.
74 There are two levels at
which Habermas's efforts must be related to "green
problems." First, supporters of Habermas must show the
logical connection between his version of critical theory
and a possible resolution of the ecological crisis.
Second, at the practical or political level, the claims of
the ecology or green movement as such must be shown to be
compatible with Habermas's theory of communicative action.
The appropriateness of Habermas's theory for the
ecology movement is questionable, as indicated in the
observations above. How can his views of the ecology
movement as "defensive, " as a social movement of reaction
and withdrawal, categorically related to what are
generally viewed as primarily regressive, Romantic, and
escapist movements, be squared with Luke and White's
claims? They assert that "communicative ethics, when
allied with the insights of radical ecology, can also help
project the tentative outlines of an alternative model of
modernity, which is both ecologically sound and more
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democratic .
"
75 What exactly is the basis of this alliance
other than temporal coincidence? Habermas's theory of
communicative ethics is based on an analysis of social
development and learning processes that drive the theory
to claim the only fruitful relationship to nature is
instrumental, and that democratic legitimacy is solely
dependent on strict procedural qualifications. Radical
ecologists are, nearly by definition, those who protest
the ins trumental i zation of nature, and it is not clear
whether the procedures of consensus-seeking used by some
greens meet the abstract procedural standards of
discourse ethics. ^ Luke and White's interpretation of
the compatibility of Habermas and radical ecology is not
shared by many, neither from the perspective of radical
ecology nor critical theory. One reviewer of one of the
author's more recent works even labels it "a superficial
interpretation of Habermas's treatment of new social
movements."' But, contrary to the evidence, if we assume
there is no a priori dismissal of the ecology movement by
Habermas, how would his version of critical theory ally
itself with the insights of radical ecological activists?
Logical Connections
In light of the earlier stated criticisms of
Habermas's position that the instrumental mode of
cognition alone produces knowledge with regard to external
nature, it would seem to be questionable whether it is
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possible to open a path between Habermas and radical
ecology. McCarthy's criticisms, and many of the other
relevant criticisms, were developed before the Luke and
White article was published, so it is odd that these
criticisms are not addressed. It must be assumed that the
authors accept Habermas's response to the critics,
especially on the relationship of knowledge to nature, as
adequate . 78
Since Habermas has not systematically dealt with
either the issues of ecological crisis or the development
of the informational economy, as the authors readily
indicate, the extension of the theory of communicative
action to the ecology movement must explicitly indicate
the connections between them for the argument to be
persuasive. Luke and White rely on two aspects of
Habermas's theory to support their speculations on the
possibility of an ecological continuation of modernity.
First, the ecological crisis, although not entirely
replacing Marx's analysis of capitalist crisis, is viewed
as a potential threat to capitalist reproduction and
therefore an impetus for transformation. Second,
Habermas’s theory of communicative rationality is used as
a criterion to test the democratic potential of the
radical ecology movement. Habermas seeks to maintain the
differentiation of rationality into the "separate value
spheres" which has taken place in "modernity." Habermas
has argued that the fundamental problem of modernity is
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the colonization of the moral and aesthetic-erotic spheres
by an instrumental reason which should correctly be
utilized only in relation to external nature. The
different forms of rationality should be confined to their
proper objects, or appropriate value spheres, reaching a
"balance" with each other, instead of the present
condition where the instrumental mode of rationalization
has colonized the other spheres. The appropriate
"balance" can be determined through the process of "coming
to an understanding" governed by "validity claims"
established through a philosophically proper understanding
of the quasi- transcendental status of communicative
ethics
. Luke and White explain what they believe to be
the potential of Habermasian critical theory,
The increasing breakdown of the ecosystem, entailed
by an infinitely expanding industrial civilization,
may come to play a role as significant in reorienting
human life as the one Marx felt the internal
breakdown of capitalism would play. Ecological crises
might function as the material catalyst for an
economic and political transformation that could
reverse the state-corporate colonization of the
lifeworld and create forms of life in which the
potential of modernity could be utilized in a more
balanced fashion
.
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It is the potential of modernity, in the form of a
theory of communicative action, that followers of Habermas
embrace. How do the positions of radical ecologists fit
into this scheme? Is it even appropriate to use the term
"radical ecologists" as if to imply the acceptance of a
common self-understanding by those who use the term to
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identify themselves? The two aspects of radical ecology
Luke and White find compatible with communicative ethics
are what would be labeled within the categories of the
theory of communicative action as the "democratic" aspect
and the "aesthetic" aspect. The democratic aspects of
radical ecology (relevant in Habermas's scheme to the
moral sphere of rationalization), are the activists’
proposals for the institutionalization of participatory
democracy, "Given the traditions and material level of
Western industrialized societies, it is fair to say that
the criteria of a communicative ethics would be met well
by the sort of participatory and decentralized
institutions proposed by radical ecologists ." 88 This
seems to be unproblematic as far as it goes, but there
have been serious disagreements within both the German and
U.S. Greens about what constitutes democratic procedures.
This fact alone reveals a basis for the frequent criticism
of Habermas's problematic and complex procedural
understanding of communicative ethics
.
81 What is to count
as the "unforced force of the better argument" especially
in the truly substantive context typical of radical
ecological activity, where not only the competence of the
participants is of importance but also where the
necessities of time and historical circumstance must be
considered? What is "unforced force" when the concrete
interests and capacities to participate are themselves
central issues? Are we not in fact always left with some
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form of "compromise" except at the most abstract,
analytical level ? 83
The authors, following Habermas, suggest that a
balance between sphere’s of rationality is the best that
can be hoped for. Certainly it is unreasonable to hope
for anything like a "reconciliation" with nature as was
thought by the early critical theory, if this is
understood as a sort of universal pacification. For the
followers of Habermas, at best, "The aesthetic sphere
could expand as the need for nondestructive ways of
tending to nature became increasingly imperative ." 83 They
reject the "mostly misguided" attempts to "resubjectify
nature, liberate animals, or accord rights to trees."
They wish to retain modern "decentered" consciousness,
consciousness differentiated into the three principle
spheres of Kant/Habermas
; practical reason, theoretical
reason, and aesthetic judgment
.
84 The current challenge
is not to cast about for ways of obliterating the
cognitive-objectivating attitude toward nature (out of
which science and technology arise)
,
but rather to rethink
the way in which that attitude relates to the aesthetic
and moral-practical attitudes at the level of everyday
practice ." 83 However, according to Habermas this seems to
limit the possibilities of relating to nature to a very
narrow range. In Habermas's reply to McCarthy's and
others' criticisms mentioned above, he only allows that,
"While in our dealings with external nature we can indeed
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have feelings analogous to moral feelings, the norm-
conformative attitude to this domain of external nature
does not yield any problems susceptible of being worked up
cognitively, that is, problems that could be stylized to
questions of justice from the standpoint of normative
validity. On the other hand, the discussion from Kant to
Adorno concerning natural and artistic beauty could
provide grounds for the thesis that the expressive
attitude to external nature opens up a domain of
experience that can be exploited for artistic
production ." 86 It is therefore unclear how Luke and
White's "ecological path to modernity" can have anything
other that the traditional dualistic relation to nature,
as object for domination and object for aesthetic
contemplation. In Habermas's critical theory there is no
logical relation between humans and nature that directly
shifts perspectives from a logic of domination to an eco-
logic
. Habermas has admitted as much with the observation,
It is just as difficult to answer the basic objection of
ecological ethics: How does discourse ethics, which is
limited to subjects capable of speech and action, respond
to the fact that mute creatures are also vulnerable?
Compassion for tortured animals and the pain caused by the
destruction of biotopes are surely manifestations of moral
intuitions that cannot be fully satisfied by the
collective narcissism of what in the final analysis is an
anthropocentric way of looking at things ." 87
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What do Luke and White identify as "ecological" about
their alternative path of modernity? They emphasize the
ambivalent potential of informational capitalism, which
Produces for an ecological future society;
but certainly does not guarantee it. With capitalism's
historical ability to appropriate attempts to negate it,
it seems that the truly ecological future will occur only
with great effort, "In beginning and being grounded in a
modern welfare state that tends toward an increasingly
extensive administration of economic and political life,
any meaningful ecological critique also must recognize
that transnational capital, at least at first, inescapably
will moderate, limit, and define its revolutionary
thrusts.” 88 The first generation of critical theorists
are assumed by Luke and White to be too "pessimistic"
generally but especially toward science and technology.
Too pessimistic to have been willing to view such
phenomena as computerization and cable television as
anything but "new instruments for more effective
domination.
”
89 Luke and White basically argue for an
ecological future on the basis of a specific vision of
"decentralized, democratic communities." 90 They analyze
the "concrete objective basis for ecological action" by
projecting six "trends" which, unfortunately for these
authors, have not all continued beyond their now
recognizably anomalous appearance in the late 1970s and
early 1980s. One of these basic "trends" (which seems to
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have disappeared in the 1990s
"spatial-practical settings,"
exurban existence." 91 it is
) is the transition to new
forms of a "new mode of
curious that they extend the
content of this idea, which comes from an overly
optimistic reading of brief demographic changes, with
concepts originating in Murray Bookchin's idea of
"municipalization.
"
This is curious or even ironic since
Bookchin has systematically rejected Habermas’s position,
and for well argued, philosophical reasons. Bookchin’s
ideas about restructuring society come primarily out of
libertarian and socialist anarchist traditions, not from
either Marxism or American pragmatism. Like so much of
academic and socialist discussion, Luke and White's
approach does not so much approach the problem of the
ecological crisis as a fundamental challenge to the
traditional philosophical positions, as it views the
ecology crisis as a new opportunity to revive old
traditions or theories of democratic social change. Their
"path" to modernity is the appropriation of radical
ecological insights for furthering now traditional modern
goals, which are basically humanistic or anthropocentric.
These goals basically revolve around the attempt to
enhance the power of the human species. "In the process
of elaborating new ideas and forms of life, ecological
activists can help initiate in broad segments of society
the kind of reflective processes, based on Habermas's
notion of communicative ethics, that have the potential to
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demystify, decode, and repossess the material packages and
behavioral scripts being produced by informational
capital .
"
92
It is true that "The new form of ideological struggle
thus centers on the different meanings being reassigned to
acts and artifacts in modern industrial life by
informational capitalism, " but which side of the
ideological struggle do the Habermasians really end up? if
embedded in the ideas and practices of radical
ecologists ," 93 is a perspective and an approach that can
serve as "concrete guideposts for an alternative future
where instrumental reason would be less imperial and the
basic structure of society would be more in accord with
the criteria of democratic legitimacy Habermas has derived
from his communicative ethics ," 94 why do radical
ecologists need Habermas? Does a Habermasian approach
"serve as a corrective for some of the more romantic ideas
of the ecological movement ," 95 or does it simply close off
attempts to go beyond the differentiation of value spheres
and the resulting modern form of consciousness? Habermas's
approach provides only an abstract, process-oriented
conception about the necessary conditions for uncoerced
discourse. It does not make possible the direct
confrontation with the central ecological problems now
facing the world, such as global warming, species
extinction, ecosystem collapse, and so forth. It only
allows for the extension of the instrumental acguisition
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of relevant Knowledge from nature, or its appropriation
through the productron of artworks, „hich at best might
induce reflection on social problems. Only a
hypothetical, indirect possibility for addressing
potential ecological catastrophe is illuminated in this
approach. There is no compelling reason radical ecologists
should adopt the critical theory of Jurgen Habermas when
he, at most, has provided an abstract philosophical
justification for what has been for many years an already
successful concrete practice (consensus decision-making)
.
White has claimed that Habermas's work, "Can at best
give us a minimal ethical orientation for politics ." 96
There is no logical necessity connecting the logic of
communicative action with the resolution of ecological
crises. It would seem philosophically more promising to
return to the concerns of the earlier critical theorists
and their more direct attempt to overcome the "domination
of nature." Rather than continuing within the theory of
communicative action, radical ecologists should examine
Habermas's break from the idea of a "reconciliation" with
nature. Was the framework of the early theorists
prematurely abandoned, leaving behind undeveloped
potentials? Can the "aporias" of critical theory be
overcome an infusion of radical ecological insight?
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CHAPTER 2
THE CRITICAL, ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE
The philosophies of radical ecology offer
alternatives to what they variously label "reform
environmentalism," "shallow" ecology, "liberal" ecology,
and so on. These philosophies claim to establish a
sufficient basis for radical ecological practices intent
on a basic societal transformation. The goal of this
reorganization of society would be to enhance and develop
the potential of non-dominating, non—exploitative
relationships between and among humans and non-human
nature . This radical ecological critigue of both existing
society and "environmentalism" in many ways parallels
critical theory's early critique of "traditional theory."
This chapter will explore some of the limitations of
environmentalism and versions of critical theory.
Radical Ecology versus Reform Environmentalism
The terminological distinction between "radical" and
"reform" environmentalism originates in the writings of
some self-identified deep ecologists. It is analogous to
the category distinction critical theory makes between
"progressive" and "affirmative" thought. The radical
ecological texts speak for themselves here to reveal the
differences between the "radical ecologist" and what can
provisionally be called "environmentalists." Part of the
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difficulty in developing an adequate concept of the
"green" movement is its political and philosophical
instability or immanent dynamic. The ecology movement can
be interpreted through the dynamic tension which has
developed between its various self-conceptions. These
must be retained but brought more fully into conscious and
critical awareness by any effort which attempts to develop
an adequate conception of ecological subjectivity and
politics
.
One of the earliest attempts to understand the
emerging green movement was Spretnak and Capra's Green
Politics :
The Greens consider themselves the political voice of
the citizen's movements, that is, ecology, anti-
nuclear-power, peace, feminist, and others. Most
members of the Green party are also activists in one
or more of those movements, and this diverse
orientation is reflected in the wings, or factions,
of the party: the visionary/holistic Greens, the Eco-
Greens, the peace-movement Greens, and the radical-
left Greens. A great deal of overlapping occurs with
any categorizing of Green identities and some people
say there are no actual factions, but clearly there
are different priorities among the four clusters . 1
Classifications of the various elements within the
greens are constantly shifting, as each analysis attempts
to impose a different typology on the elements of the
movement as a whole. Lack of identity, of full coherence
or consistency (self-sameness) within the movement, should
be viewed as an indication of the adequacy rather than
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inadequacy of the movement's attempt to address its
"object," the ecological crisis/crises. in the spirit of
critical theory, at least in that version most closely
associated with Horkheimer and Adorno, it is necessary to
critically evaluate the fragmented object in a "non-
systematic" way. As Adorno never stopped proclaiming,
what is not actually in harmony or reconciled with itself
is not adequately conceptualized by merely abstractly
reassembling its fragments into a balanced whole.
Therefore, critical analysis or interpretation, from a
critical ecological perspective, should not hold its
purpose to be the establishment of a seamless web of
philosophic or ecological truth and balance, but instead
should assist the objects of its concern to "speak" of the
suffering and contradiction that actually exist. Hope
lies in a future which reveals itself in the immanent
release, from within the object, of its potential for
contributing to an "ecological mode of living."
Another early example of the effort to trace the
development of the green movement, especially in the
United States, was Brian Tokar's The Green Alternative:
Creating an Ecological Future : "Early environmentalism
developed on a somewhat separate track than the other
movements of the sixties. It often had origins in
mainstream efforts to conserve natural resources for
longer-term use and in the efforts of wealthy elites to
keep their part of the wilderness free from development
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and from the intrusions of other people. "2 So there ls
some truth in the perception of an elitist and "romantic"
bias in the early environmental movement, but by the mid-
1960s the increasingly obvious signs of environmental
destruction and potential catastrophe resulted in a shift
in ecological awareness:
"Environmentalism could not hold
on to its exclusiveness and its undertone of elitism for
very long. People looked back to the nature writings of
the 19th century and discovered that, for people like
Thoreau and John Muir, the protection of nature was
intimately intertwined with social activism and a critique
of industrial society.” 3 By the early 1980s it was
beginning to be possible to distinguish between
environmentalism and a more radical perspective,
Ecological issues are often approached in a ratherpiecemeal fashion, as environmentalists tend to
champion their own pet issue in relative isolationfrom all of the others....A Green perspective
encourages people to uncover the underlying causes of
environmental problems in the habits and assumptions
of the societies that have created them. At the same
time, Green approaches to social issues need to be
thoroughly informed by an ecological sensibility.^
Critical theory presently has a complex and often
antagonistic relation to radical ecology. The above
observations by "greens" may help to clarify Habermas's
understanding of green problems and the ecology movement.
To the extent that the elitist and single issue
perspectives dominated early environmental efforts
Habermas's characterization of the movement as "defensive"
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IS correct, but this is not now an adequate analytical
response to the developing self-awareness of the green
movement. Habermas acknowledged the volatility of
ecological crisis and the responses to them. 5 His earlier
observations were also limited not only in time but in
space, since his comments were mostly directed toward
events in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Other commentators on the green movement have taken
the seemingly paradoxical position that the West German
Greens had lost much of their Green or ecological content
very early in their organizational life. Andrew Dobson
distinguishes between "shades of green" providing the
basis for his claim that the West German Greens quickly
came to be dominated by the lighter shades of green.
Dobson's light greens are what the deep ecologist would
call "reform environmentalists," and are elements of the
green movement oriented toward the critical theory concept
of affirmative" politics. Affirmative politics
strengthens the given system of domination and its
fundamentally instrumental logic. 6 Dobson argued that the
"shades of green" analytical strategy, "Help(s) us to
understand the apparently heretical suggestion that the
West German Green Party is not a party of ecology in the
sense in which I think we ought to understand the
word the less visible but more fundamental
manifestations of the Green movement are greener than the
West German Green Party." 7
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If critical theorists are too analytically rigid, and
Identify the aliynent* of the Green £arii££ ^ the
movement, they will have largely missed the importance of
"radical ecology." i„ his major work, which served to
support the fundamentalist position of some greens, Murray
Bookchin attempted to distinguish between ecology and
environmentalism. Bookchin refers to his own form of
ecological philosophy as "social ecology" (examined more
closely in later chapters (6,7,8) as one of the central
elements of a critical theory of radical ecology)
.
Bookchin discusses the modern uses of the term ecology and
its original use by Ernst Haeckel to characterize his
investigations into the interrelationships between
animals, plants, and their inorganic environment.
Bookchin claims the early understanding of ecology has
been replaced by a "very crude form of natural engineering
that might well be called environmentalism." 8 Bookchin'
s
definition of "environmentalism" succinctly captures the
meaning associated with the term by contemporary radical
ecologists of various hues, "By 'environmentalism' I
propose to designate a mechanistic, instrumental outlook
that sees nature as a passive habitat composed of
'objects' such as animals, plants, minerals, and the like
that must merely be rendered more serviceable for human
use. Environmentalists then would tend to characterize
nature as a collection of natural resources or raw
materials to be put into use for exclusively human
79
purposes
.
It can be seen from this characterization that
Habermas's position cannot be developed in a way
compatible with the position of radical ecologists.
Habermas’s theory fundamentally violates the radical
ecological dismissal of the human/nature conceptual
dichotomy. This dichotomy is inherent in Habermas's
philosophical view, limiting "knowledge" about nature to
its instrumental aspects.
There has been, within radical ecology, an ongoing
tension between Bookchin's thought and that of individuals
who identify themselves as deep ecologists. The fusion
and confusion of radical identities is part of the
subterranean tension of the green movement. The
difference between social and deep ecologists is not
always readily apparent, even for as trivial a reason
(among others) as the fact that Bookchin's work has been
published in a collection of various authors under the
title of "Deep Ecology ." 10 in the same work, Arne Naess,
the generally recognized originator of the term "deep
ecology, " reiterates his distinctions between his
philosophy and that of "shallow ecology." Naess's
terminological distinctions are represented through
examples of the different slogans each type uses, but the
distinctions ultimately can be defined on the basis of
deepness
,
"The term deep is supposed to suggest
explication of fundamental presuppositions of valuation as
well as of facts and hypotheses. Deep ecology, therefore,
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transcends the limit of any particular
including systems theory and scientifi
a science of today,
tie ecology. Deepness
O f. normative and descriptive premises qnpsHnnoH
characterize the movement ^
Challenging the various self-understandings of
radical ecologists are positions which can only be
unsystematically clustered together under the heading
ecofeminism. " There are a wide variety of understandings
of ecofeminism, but they generally have developed out of
the intersection of feminism with the ecology movement.
Just as the feminist movement lacks philosophical and
political unity or common self-understanding (or even an
agreed understanding of the possibilities of a "self" to
understand)
,
ecofeminism cannot be reduced to a single
definition. However, certain definitions have been
offered in an attempt to function within what is deemed
the "masculine" form which is argumentation, "We will
begin by defining ecofeminism. .. I will present one
perspective. Ecofeminism is a value system, a social
movement, and a practice, but it also offers a pol .it i r.a 1
analysis that explores the links between androcentrism and
environmental destruction. It is 'an awareness' that
begins with the realization that the exploitation of
nature is intimately linked to Western Man's attitude
toward women and tribal cultures....' Other
ecofeminists emphasize other aspects of the contiguity of
feminism and ecology. Spretnak, who has written
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extensively on the "spiritual" aspect of ecofeminism,
emphasizes the roots of ecofeminism in radical or cultural
feminism. This tradition has attempted to theorize out of
women's bodies and women's experiences, "Our sources of
inspiration at the time were not Thoreau, John Muir, or
even Rachel Carson (though we have certainly come to
appreciate those beacons since then) but, rather, our own
experiential explorations ." 13
Another general tendency, especially among U.S.
greens, has been the rejection of political thought which
has virtually any connection with Marxism, or the Left
generally. This phobia has even been extended to
"Eurocentric" thought. After explaining some of these
rejections, John Rensenbrink, political science professor
and green activist, summarizes the U.S. Greens, "The
Greens are the harbingers of a new, more seasoned
politics .... they turn away from protest to concerted
action through sustained organization for the
transformation of society and its politics. They directly
challenge the industrial mode of production, whether run
by comrades or capitalists ." 14
This sampling of radical ecological self-
understandings should begin to illuminate the elements of
a constellation named "ecological subjectivity," or what
can be called the concept of an ecological subject. This
ecological subject-object is caught within a web or
forcefield rippling with crosscurrents and tensions both
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internally and In relation to the anti-ecological society
it is a part. The ecological subject finds itself opposed
to a modern subject which perceives itself m opposition
to nature, a nature that can only be hnown in an
instrumentalist sense, a nature which serves as a means to
the self-preservation and development of the human
subject. The current ecological subject itself is divided
between that aspect which believes it is possible to
reform the present system of industrialization and social
domination, and its more radical incarnation. This more
radical ecological subject is itself also internally
fragmented into various elements. The fragments of the
radical ecological subject sometimes resonate
sympathetically, but more often are in a societal and
movement-wrenching struggle over self-definition and self-
understanding. One of the central questions for the
radical ecological subject is whether the tradition of
critical theory has any potential for initiating a
sufficiently heightened self-awareness so that at least a
partial resolution of its internal tensions becomes
possible. The further hope is that the heightened self-
awareness of the radical ecological subject might itself
release hidden potentials which could further the
realization of an ecological mode of living.
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Critical and Traditional Theory
To speak of "critical theory" or "the Frankfurt
School" is generally to mislead. Any attempt to suimnarize
the work of the individuals associated with these
categories, collectively or individually, will necessarily
an exercise in futility. However, by examining the
relationship between critical theory and traditional
theory, especially as the critical theorists themselves
represented the relationship, the potential fruitfulness
of a more intimate relationship between critical theory
and radical ecology may be perceptible. One of the
central texts in the tradition of critical theory is Max
Horkheimer's "Traditional and Critical Theory."
Horkheimer begins his essay with the question, "What
is theory?" and answers with a description of what the
scientific response would be, something like; "The sum
total of propositions about a subject, the propositions
being so linked with each other that a few are basic and
the rest derive from these. The goal of such a theory
is a universal or systematic science that attempts to
encompass all possible objects of study under its
deductive framework, these "objects" include human
"subjects." Traditional theory arose with modern
philosophy and Descartes’ and other philosophers'
development of the scientific method. Although this
conception of theory, based on deduction through
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propositions tending toward complete mathematization,
originally was oriented toward non-human objects, it has
become the standard model of theory for the social
sciences as well. But Horkheimer does not leave his
question in the hands of the self-understandings of the
scientists. He indicates the extent to which scientific
method does not have a transcendental or a priori status
but rather how science is part of society as a whole and
how the interests which dominate society dominate science
and scientific theory: "The fruitfulness of newly
discovered factual connections for the renewal of existent
knowledge, and the application of such knowledge to the
facts, do not derive from purely logical or methodological
sources but can rather be understood only in the context
of real social processes ." 16 These real social processes
include capitalism. Critical theory does not accept the
belief that facts are simply present and must be accepted,
that behavior merely adapts to their necessity. Instead,
theory and the perception of facts are viewed as caught up
in history, as products of development:
The objects we perceive in our surroundings--cities,
villages, fields, and woods--bear the mark of having
been worked on by man. It is not only in clothing
and appearance, in outward form and emotional make-up
that men are the product of history. Even the way
they see and hear is inseparable from the social
life-process as it has evolved over the millennia.
The facts which our senses present to us are socially
preformed in two ways; through the historical
character of the object perceived and through the
historical character of the perceiving organ. Both
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This leads Horkheimer to an observation about the
relationship between humans and nature that would be
consistent with the observations of radical ecologists
(and the early Marx), "The distinction within this complex
totality between what belongs to unconscious nature and
what to the action of man in society cannot be drawn in
concrete detail." The possibility for a strictly dualistic
basis of knowledge is eliminated.
Borrowing from the Marxist tradition, Horkheimer
explains how the world cannot adequately be characterized
as a harmonic whole, but is better represented as
constituted through suffering and antagonism, including
the antagonism resulting from class differences. The
critical theorist takes these influences on the
development of theory into account;
The identification, then, of men of critical mind
with their society is marked by tension, and the
tension characterizes all the concepts of the
critical way of thinking.
. .Reason cannot become
transparent to itself as long as men act as members
of an organism which lacks reason. Organism as a
naturally developing and declining unity cannot be a
sort of model for society, but only a form of
deadened existence from which society must emancipate
itself
.
18
Who is the subject of critical theory? "Critical
thinking is the function neither of the isolated
individual nor of a sum-total of individuals. Its subject
is rather a definite individual in his real relation to
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other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a
particular class, and, finally, in the resultant web of
relationships with the social totality and with nature. "19
These observations serve Horkheimer to distinguish
Cartesian or scientistic thought from dialectical thought
(although dialectics itself must still be distinguished
into its various varieties), "The acceptance of an
essential unchangeableness between subject, theory, and
object thus distinguishes the Cartesian conception from
every kind of dialectical logic." 20 Horkheimer rejects
identifying the emancipatory interest of escape from such
a society, with the given situation of the proletariat, or
the proletariat's self-perception of its interests. The
critical theorist has a much more complex responsibility
than simply accurately representing an oppressed class's
given interests. The theoretician's "presentation of
societal contradictions is not merely an expression of the
concrete historical situation but also a force within it
to stimulate change." 21 The function of the critical
theorist is then, at least partially, to stimulate change
by changing the awareness of individuals, particularly
those with the potential to act in the interest of
emancipation of society as a whole. Similarly, the
radical ecological theorist's function is to stimulate
that change in self-awareness of the potential ecological
subject who, through its actions, can help bring into
existence the ecological society.
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Horkheimer speaks of the future dissolution of the
society of domination and oppression as coming about
through the "association of free men." The future,
emancipated society will only be achieved after
preliminary stages develop what are now only tendencies.
This may result in many transitional moments, but the duty
of the critical theorist is to persist in the theoretical
development of those tendencies, even in spite of the most
discouraging of existing circumstances:
with
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every reaction except belief in fulfillment. It isnot the arbitrariness and supposed independence offantasy that is the common bond here, but its
obstinacy. Within the most advanced group it is thetheoretician who must have this obstinacy
.
With regard to the theoretical compatibility of
critical theory and radical ecological theory, from the
perspective of critical theory it can be argued that
theory is only critical when earlier thought is taken up
and transformed within the contexts of new historical
circumstances and new needs. Transformation of earlier
critical thought retains the interest in freedom: "The
historical significance of his work is not self-evident;
it rather depends on men speaking and acting in such a way
as to justify it. It is not a finished and fixed
historical creation.
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One of the problematic aspects of critical theory for
a radical ecological subject is the element retained from
the Enlightenment: instrumental domination. This element
remains in the work of all the theorists except, perhaps,
Adorno. It is an element of the domination of nature
appearing frequently in those constructions of concepts
around the idea of freedom, and in the relationship of
freedom to the rational mastery of nature. This element
of domination was present from the beginning, in those
initial conceptions of the project of critical theory
Horkheimer elaborated.
In its original conception, Horkheimer
' s version of
critical theory followed the Marxist understanding of the
development of productive forces,
But the critical theory of society is, in its
totality, the unfolding of a single existentialjudgement. To put it in broad terms, the theory says
that the basic form of the historically given
commodity economy on which modern history rests
contains in itself the internal and external tensions
of the modern era; it generates these tensions over
and over again in an increasingly heightened form;
and later a period of progress, development of human
powers, and emancipation for the individual, after an
enormous extension of human control over nature, it
finally hinders further development and drives
humanity into a new barbarism.
This position would later be modified with the
collaboration of Adorno, in the Dialectic of
Enlightenment /' where the dialectic of progress and
barbarism is presented as having existed from the very
beginnings of civilization.
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Critical theory itself is viewed by Horkheimer, in
this early essay, as an extension of the modern, and
enlightenment projects, "A consciously critical attitude,
however, is part of the development of society: the
construing of the course of history as the necessary
product of an economic mechanism simultaneously contains
both a protest against this order of things, a protest
generated by the order itself, and the idea of self-
determination for the human race, that is the idea of a
state of affairs in which man's actions no longer flow
from a mechanism but from his own decision . "25
The traditional philosophic form of the problem of
emancipation, or freedom, is to contrast this concept with
its opposite, necessity. In traditional philosophic terms
it is the understanding of the concept of necessity in its
relation to nature that is of greatest concern to the
radical ecologist, and central to any further development
of critical theory. Horkheimer attempts to clarify the
differences between the positivistic, or scientistic,
understanding of necessity and a critical understanding of
the concept. For the scientist there is a strict
separation of the object of study from the subject who
proceeds scientifically:
There is nonetheless a decisive difference when it
comes to the relation of subject and object and
therefore to the necessity of the event being judged.
The object with which the scientific specialist deals
is not affected at all by his own theory. Subject
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Horkheimer calls this the "Cartesian dualism of
thought and being," and concludes that, "Necessity for
them refers not to events which man masters to his own
purposes but only to events which he anticipates as
probable ." 27 Here it can be seen that Horkheimer 's
understanding of freedom is that of the rational mastery
of necessity, rather than simple adaptation to the ongoing
processes of the world, whether economic, social,
political or natural. For a subject who does not separate
itself from the society of which it is a part, and who
does not strictly separate knowledge from action, "If he
encounters necessity which is not mastered by man, it
takes shape either as that realm of nature which despite
the far-reaching conquests still to come will never wholly
vanish, or as the weakness of the society of previous ages
in carrying on the struggle with nature in a consciously
and purposefully organized way ." 26 The future emancipated
society will have carried out the rational mastery of
nature and society as far as possible. Rational mastery
of nature will therefore change the understanding of
necessity itself, and be viewed as freedom rather than
domination. Total domination is the state of present
affairs where nature retains substantial power to inhibit
social development, and social life is controlled by an
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Both elements in this concept of necessity—the powerof nature and the weakness of society
— areinterconnected and are based on the experienced
effort of man to emancipate himself from coercion bvnature and from those forms of social life and of thejuridical, political and cultural orders which havebecome a straitjacket for him. The struggle on twofronts, against nature and against society's
weakness, is part of the effective striving for afuture condition of things in which whatever man
wills is also necessary and in which the necessity ofthe object becomes the necessity of a rationally
mastered event.
fn other words, "natural" necessity and "human reason"
would coincide.
A fundamental question for a theory which develops
with the changes in historical situations is to what
extent will it have to be self-modifying. In the relation
of theory to historically changing situations, the theory
must change emphases, but not its fundamental self-
understanding, "The historical development of the
conflicts in which the critical theory is involved leads
to a reassignment of degrees of relative importance to
individual elements of the theory, forces further
concretizations, and determines which results of
specialized science are to be significant for critical
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theory and practice at any given time.’’ 30 Horkheimer's
presentation of critical theory as interdisciplinary and
social scientific, and his leadership in the late 1930s
and early 1940s can be best understood as involving the
ongoing development of his original understanding of the
project of a critical social theory. it is this
understanding that Habermas has relied on as a
justification for a claim to the historical legacy of the
Frankfurt School. He has attempted to return to an
interdisciplinary approach which relies on empirical
research from the social sciences as well as
methodological and critical concepts reconstructed out of
a variety of philosophical traditions. 31 The legacy of
critical theory would be challenged if radical ecologists
attempt to appropriate the insights of the earlier
critical theorists for their new or additional purposes.
It is in the relationship between theory and practice
that the work of the various critical theorists can be
differentiated. The various understandings of this
relationship result in different possibilities for a
transformed world. In conceptualizing the relationship
between humans and nature, including internal nature,
critical theorists necessarily must present their
understanding of the methodological or conceptual
possibilities of interpretation. The constellation
"critical theory" addresses and readdress the capacity to
know and represent its own self-understanding. It must be
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self-reflexive if it is to be "adequate" to its own
concept. The tradition of critical theory has
appropriated the conceptual framework of Hegelian and
Marxist dialectics, but only to transform it. It began
with a critique of the lack of self-ref lexron on the part
of traditional or positivist understandings of theory.
However, in its criticisms critical theory also examined
its own foundations. The problem for critical theory
became the attempt to find some foothold for its own
project
. If critical theory is itself part of history, and
history is tending toward a barbaric totalization of
thought, how does critical theory confront the implication
of its own inescapable inclusion in the logic of
domination? On what basis can it make the critical
judgement that the world should be otherwise? And if the
world should be otherwise, what indications are there of
the actual possibility of a future without domination,
either an emancipated" world, or a world that includes
the ancient philosophical idea of the "good life "? 32
Horkheimer
' s collaboration with Adorno on the
Dialectic Qf Enlightenment, generated a new phase of
critical theory, one critics generally characterize as
"dark" and "pessimistic." An extreme of pessimism has
been the most common interpretation of Adorno's version of
critical theory. It is this pessimism, resulting from the
"totalization of critique, " that Habermas has taken as the
basis for his departure from the "philosophy of the
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subject, " his "linguistic turn" or change of paradigm to a
"theory of communicative action. "33 If radical ecologists
are to draw on the tradition of critical theory, it is
crucial to determine if the earlier tradition still has
potential to offer concepts which might lead to an
adequate understanding of the various problems related to
the ecological crisis of the planet. "Adequacy" can be
measured in this case by whether destruction of the global
ecology can be halted and reversed. Might a turn toward
Adorno's version of critical thought be more fruitful,
illuminating the potential of the ecology movement, than a
turn toward Habermas or other members of the tradition?
How might Adorno's thought make it possible for the
ecology movement to become more self-aware and potentially
more effective? And fundamentally for critical theory, is
it possible to develop a "politics" out of Adorno's work?
The generally accepted view is that Adorno's thought
eliminates the possibilities for political action except
in some extremely esoteric, aesthetic and philosophic
forms. This consensus must be challenged and the
potential for generating concrete politics from his
thought, as a result of a changed historical situation and
additional critical concepts, must be demonstrated.
Specifically, Adorno's thought must be shown to be able to
address the assertions by Marcuse that the ecology and
feminist movements contain revolutionary potential.
Adorno's thought must be shown to contain the capacity to
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address the ecological probl
of industrial production and
has identified as capable of
ems produced by the dynamics
capitalism, problems Habermas
generating or contributing to
a legitimation crisis."^ Can Adorno's thought generate
a different set of conceptual alternatives not reducible
to the Habermasian response, which has been found to be
inadequate, simply calling for further development of
technological and administrative (bureaucratic)
domination?
Paradigm Shifts
Habermas developed his version of critical theory in
opposition to what he saw as the shortcomings of the first
generation of critical theorists' reliance on the
"philosophy of the subject." Habermas criticizes the
tradition of critical theory that follows from the
tradition of Hegel and Marx, claiming it does not provide
a sufficient categorial framework to understand
intersub j ect ivity
. According to Habermas, the heritage
from German Idealism forced thought toward categories of
self expression which rely on a notion of an "essential"
human nature which is then objectified through labor.
This objectification of the "essentially human" results in
a sub j ect - ob j ect dialectic that is only able to understand
intersubjectivity as a process of objective mediation
between subjects. Habermas argues that the reduction of
human action to a process based on a laboring subject (his
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description of both Hegelian and Marxist dialectics) does
not adequately address the other uniquely human
characteristic; communicative interaction. To adequately
address this second dimension a "linguistic turn" is
needed to analyze communicative activity. it is within
the structure of everyday language that Habermas detects
the potential for normative guidance of human interaction.
Contained within the structure of speech is an a priori,
or
"quasi-transcendental,
" assumption of validity. Action
m the form of speech oriented toward mutual understanding
has within it an implicit claim to truth. Based on this
"quasi-transcendental" truth claim embedded within
language Habermas develops the normative framework of
discourse ethics
.
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As previously indicated, there are fundamental
problems with the theory of "discourse ethics" and its
relation to the global ecological crisis. The Habermasian
framework of critical theory does not provide an adequate
way of conceptualizing the human to nature relationship.
It claims the only "theoretically fruitful" attitude
toward nature is that of instrumental rationality, in
Habermas s categories: purposive-rational cognition.
Additionally, it is doubtful that the formalistic
structure of his argument can be retained when faced with
the requirements of actual discursive confrontation. The
"ideal speech situation" does not have sufficient
normative purchase to make it a politically effective
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basis for actual situational discourse. The conditions
necessary for the normative aspects of discourse ethics to
prevail occur in a very restricted universe of expertise
and competence. The possibility of the transference or
mediation from expert cultures, in the spheres of science,
law and art, to that of everyday life activities has not
been convincingly established. Rather than turn to a
problematic theory of communicative ethics, if critical
theory is to serve the practice of radical ecology it will
have to address Habermas's critique and dismissal of the
earlier positions within the tradition. Specifically, the
basis for the rejection of the works of Adorno and Marcuse
should be more closely examined. Additionally, the
significant differences between Adorno and Marcuse must be
addressed and resolved if possible, particularly on the
two crucial issues of the possibility of a revolutionary
subject, on the one hand, and the conceptualization of a
"reconciliation with nature," on the other.
The central question for radical ecology and critical
theory is whether it is possible to relate to nature in a
way other than that which can be characterized as
domination, or as the deep ecologists call it,
"anthropocentrically." To answer this question it is
necessary to determine the status of the logic that
supports science and technology. Habermas rejects the
possibility of scientific or technological development by
any other logic than that of instrumental rationality.
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Marcuse on the
gratification"
other hand has argued that a "logic of
can replace the logic of domination and
thereby transform all aspects of society including science
and technology. Critical theorists who have returned to
the first generation of the tradition to develop concepts
to address the ecology crisis not surprisingly have nearly
always returned to Marcuse
.
36 Marcuse has claimed.
The very concept of technical reason is perhapsdeological. Not only the application of technology
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! scientific, calculated, calculatingcontrol. Specific purposes and interests ofdomination are not foisted upon technology
subsequently" and from the outside; they enter the
very construction of the technical apparatus.
Technology is always a historical-social project: init is projected what a society and its rulinginterests intend to do with men and things. Such apurpose’ of domination is "substantive" and to this
extent belongs to the very form of technical
reason
.
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Marcuse challenges Weber's claim that technical
reason can be assimilated to reason as such. On the
contrary, the use made of science and technology by the
institutionalized forces of production, and the resulting
growth in material production, is used ideologically,
argues Marcuse, to claim that technical rationality is
equivalent to reason. This results in a system of
domination being presented as having ontological status by
those who control production and ideology;
In this universe, technology also provides the great
rationalization of the unfreedom of man and
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Habermas does not disagree with Marcuse as far as it
is true that the specific historical forms science and
technology take depend on variable institutional
arrangements. What Habermas argues is that the basic
logical structures on which science and technology are
based are necessarily purposive-rational (instrumental ). 39
Scientific-technological
"progress" is not a "project" of
a specific historical constellation of forces, but "if
based at all on a project, can only be traced back to a
project of the human species as a whole, and not to one
that could be historically surpassed ." 40 There is no
other logic to base science and technology on except
purposive-rational logic.
Habermas sees the problem not as the need to
challenge the fundamental logic of science and technology,
but as the historical expansion of purposive-rational or
instrumental logic into areas it does not belong,
specifically into the "moral sphere." Here Habermas is
guided by the fundamentally Kantian notion of the
separation of reason into different value spheres with
correspondingly different criteria of validity. This
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strategy is a requirement imposed on Habermas
as a result of the conclusions he reached in his critique
of Marx. Habermas claims Marx did not adequately
differentiate the category of "sensuous human activity."
Habermas argues this concept should not be collapsed into
the categories of objectification borrowed from German
Idealism, but separated into two irreducible moments;
labor (purposive-rational activity), and social
interaction (communicative action)
. The logic of
purposive-rational action is the proper sphere of science
and technology and is necessary as long as the human
species must appropriate external nature for the purposes
of self-preservation. The forces of production expand
control over nature through the use of technical
knowledge. The claim to truth of technical knowledge is
validated through success or failure. However, the
species also reproduces itself through social interaction,
adapting inner nature" by means of normative structures
of socialization. The normative structures under which
this process takes place also require justification, that
is, they must be justified through the discourse of
"right." Therefore the idea of emancipation cannot be
viewed as equivalent to scientific-technological progress,
but must include the rationalization of social
interaction; the extension of communication without
domination
.
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For Habermas the subject-object relationship and the
subject-subject relationship follow two distinctly
different logics and should be rigorously separated
analytically. it is precisely the extension of the
subject-object relationship into the sphere of
communicative action that is the problem. it is this
expansion of purposive-rational thought to the moral and
aesthetic spheres that Habermas addresses in his theory of
communicative action. His theory of discourse ethics,
based on a universal pragmatics of language, hypothesizes
the "ideal speech situation" in an attempt to develop a
normative basis for reversing the "colonization of the
lifeworld by instrumental rationality.
One result of this analysis is to view the
rationalization" characteristic of modern society as an
irreversible process. Any attempt to unify the different
and irreducible logics of the various value spheres would
almost unquestionably result in a "de-differentiation"
leading to what Habermas believes would be a regression of
rationality behind the level achieved with modernization.
This view of the possibility of a unity of value spheres,
which Habermas believes can only be achieved through an
unfortunate return to a level of worldviews typical of
pre-modern society, has a devastating impact on the
conception of a "reconciliation with nature." It is
precisely on this point that he initiates the charges of
mysticism and metaphysics against the earlier critical
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theorists and those who read Marx through the lenses of
the early philosophic manuscripts:
I think I have learned from the tradition ofHegelian Marxism, from the history of critical
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tinctions we can no longerreat m good conscience. All this is not reallvn argument, but more an expression of skepticism inthe face of so many failed attempts to hale one'sake and eat it too: to retain both Kant's insiahtsand, at the same time, to return to the "home"
( Behausung. ) from which these same insights havedriven us. But, perhaps, McCarthy or others willsome day succeed in formulating the continuitiesbetween human history and natural history so
carefully that they are weak enough to be plausibleand yet strong enough to permit us to recognize man'<piace m the cosmos (Scheler), at least in broad
outlines
.
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The task facing radical ecology, and any critical
theory that seeks to be relevant in the age of global
ecological crisis, is the attempt to formulate "the
continuities between human history and natural history."
Reconciliation and Otherness
Habermas attempts to return to Horkheimer's original
version of critical theory through the development of a
theory of communicative action. This is an attempt to
respond to what he sees as the dead end of totalizing
critique, what critical theory became after Adorno joined
the Institute for Social Research. Dialer. fir, of
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is critiqued and revealed as encapsulating a
Philosophical position Horkheimer and Adorno are forced to
occupy, a position which leaves them no place to turn for
a normative grounding of critique. They cannot provide a
Dustification for moving beyond a society and a social
theory that have closed in on themselves. Is Habermas
correct in his analysis of the aporetic character of early
critical theory, or are there still potentials within that
theory which have been unexplored? Is there also still a
developmental potential within early critical theory that
can challenge the "linguistic turn" and its own
problematic structure?
Habermas's analysis of what he feels is the version
of critical theory too strongly influenced by Adorno
begins by tracing the development of the critigue of
instrumental reason. Because instrumental reason is
traced back, m Dialectic of Enlightenment and subseguent
work by Adorno, to the beginnings of the history of the
human species, the fundamental problem for critical social
theory becomes finding some aspect of reason that can
ground the critique itself. Critical theory undermines
its own claims to insight when it relentlessly criticizes
the reason it itself uses for interpretation of the
extension of instrumental rationality to the whole of
society. The basis for securing the critique of
instrumental reason is Adorno's and Horkheimer 's adoption
of the concept/term of "mimesis," an idea representing the
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possibility of approaching the other of nature without
domination. Possibilities for transcending the total
critique of reason are then found in the aesthetic realm
Where the mimetic relationship to the other is produced or
reproduced indirectly. Habermas rejects this solution and
attributes it to a long line of thought within Western
philosophy, 'The aponas of the negative-dialectical self-
transcendence of philosophical thought give rise to the
question, whether this situation is not merely the
consequence of an approach that remains rooted in the
philosophy of consciousness, fixated on the relation of
subjectivity and self-preservation ." 42 Habermas answers
the question with a "paradigm shift," from the "philosophy
of consciousness (or subject)" to that of "communicative
action .
"
Habermas's critique of the earlier critical theorists
emerges from an examination of what he believes to be
their relationship to a "scientistic tendency" in Marx's
writings. Habermas claims Marx tends to
reductionistically view his project of the critique of
political economy as a form of natural science, making it
a mere extension of "scientism" which ideologically
dominates both capitalist and state socialist societies.
Scientism is problematic since it has become the
methodological and philosophical basis for the extension
of instrumental reason into all spheres of society. A
"scientistic" self-understanding "identifies the limits of
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obnectivating knowledge with the limits of knowledge as
such resulting in science and technology adopting the
additional role of a legitimating ideology. « Marx viewed
the application of science and technology to the process
of production as not only part of a system of alienation
of labor, but also as the basis for the development of the
forces of production to the point where they could provide
an opportunity for the transcendence of the capitalist
system. The material abundance provided by the
development of production capacities under capitalism
required an equivalent rationalization of the relations of
production, those property relations affecting the
distribution of material wealth. Adorno, Horkheimer and
Marcuse saw the extension of technical rationality into
all spheres of human existence, including the "relations
of production, " as the basis of the domination of both
internal nature and the relations between individuals.
This expansion of instrumental rationality resulted in
Adorno's claim that, contrary to Hegel, "the whole is
false." The progressive function of science and
technology which Marx's theory depended on is in this
critical view reversed, and instrumental rationality is
therefore viewed as merely a more complete domination of
human labor. Technical rationality's use in the relations
of production eliminates the possibility for the
development of revolutionary subjectivity, in fact
reducing subjectivity itself to a mere function of the
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production apparatus. There is then no possibility of the
development of consciousness to the point where it has the
"power to burst the system. "44 This results in ^
collapse of resrstant subjectivity and the development, in
Marcuse s terms, of the "one-dimensional" society.
Marxist dialectics collapses.
problem for critical theory then becomes finding
a basis for opposition to the total system, both
theoretically and in the form of an actual or potential
subject of social transformation/revolution. This has
been a problem of central concern for "Western Marxism"
since the 1920s. Although Horkheimer and Adorno rely
heavily on his theory of reification they do not accept
the understanding of human nature as stated by Lukacs,
While the process by which the worker is reified andbecomes a commodity
—so long as he does not
consciously offer resistance to it—dehumanizes him
and cripples and atrophies his "soul, " it remains
true that precisely his human nature is not changedinto a commodity. He can, therefore, inwardly
objectrvate himself completely against this existence
of his. °
It is precisely the view that the commodity form
reaches into the deepest regions of subjectivity that
prompts the Frankfurt School, beginning in the late 1930s
and continuing for at least the next two decades, to
develop its theories of fascism and mass culture. The
prophesied revolution of the proletariat had not taken
place in the advanced capitalist countries, and where
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socialism had ta
totalitarianism
.
ken hold it had developed into Stalini
The consciousness of the proletariat
St
had
not become revolutionary, rather it was regressive and
barbaric; "Horkheimer and Adorno investigate empirically
the psychic mechanisms by means of which the revolt of
inner nature is refunctionalized into strengthening the
forces against which it is directed .
6
It is Adorno who carries out the relentless critique
of existing society to its logical conclusion, and it is
this conclusion, Habermas argues, which results in the
undermining of the critique itself. Adorno is fully aware
that the critique of reason must necessarily result in the
turn of critique back on itself. This results in the
critical self-reflection of critique: "That element of
truth encountered through concepts, beyond their abstract
compass, can show itself only in that which is suppressed,
despised and discarded by concepts. It is the utopian
hope of cognition to open up what is conceptless by means
of concepts without (thereby) assimilating it to them.
Such a notion of dialectic raises doubts as to its
possibility .
"
47
It is here where negative dialectics has carried
through its relentless critique to the point of
challenging its own foundations that Habermas elaborates
the inadequacies of its response. The fundamental
question for critique as extended through negative
dialectics, and for any radical ecology that attempts to
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adopt this interpretative structure is, '.How then can we
explicate the idea of reconciliation's For lt , £ only
with the idea of reconciliation that there can he any hope
of overcoming the false totality created hy the extension
of instrumental rationality to the point of total
domination
.
Habermas reads Adorno's call for a reconciliation
with nature as a mystical-metaphysical regression, and as
an opportunity for revealing the superiority of his own
theory of communicative rationality:
The paradox in which the critique of
1
^
S
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Umental reason is entangled, and whichstubbornly resists even the most supplelalectic, consists then in this: Horkheimer andAdorno would have to put forward a theory ofmemes is, which, according to their own ideas, isimpossible
. Thus they are only being consistentw en they do not attempt to explicate "universal
reconcriiation" as Hegel had done, as the unity
of the identity and nonidentity of spirit and
nature
,
but let it stand as a code, almost inthe manner of hebensphi losophie. At most, we
can circle around this idea, drawing on imagesfrom Judaeo-Christian mysticism; the formula ofthe young Marx regarding the dialectical
interconnection between the humanization of
nature and the naturalization of humans alreadv
referred back to this tradition.
Habermas chides Adorno for not developing a theory of
mimesis. Adorno, with Horkheimer, called for being
"mindful" or "remembering" nature in the subject, a
process which might result in the recognition that the
"truth" of culture and enlightenment is their opposition
to domination
.
50 Habermas asks how the idea of
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reconciliation can be related to the "mimetic impulses" in
a way that is not merely intuitive. Can this idea be
not simply through an attitude of "mindfulness"
but discursively, in the form of a concept. The problem
is that the reduction of a mimetic impulse, which is the
foundation of a concept of reconciliation, to a
specifiable meaning is the reproduction of the activity of
identifying thought itself. To define mimesis is to
return the subject to the bonds of instrumental reason.
Habermas distinguishes between Marcuse and Adorno on this
point with reference to their later works. Marcuse
attempts to escape the paradox, while Adorno "no longer
wanted to get out of this aPoria."51 By embracing the
paradox Adorno is only able to "gesticulate" toward
expressions of the truth in autonomous art, since the
truth cannot be represented directly in philosophical
discourse. Because the truth of the mimetic relationship
is non-conceptual
, negative dialectics becomes an exercise
m "models" that gesture toward what lies outside
themselves. When Adorno moves out of "discursive thought"
to the "mindfulness of nature, " Habermas charges him with
abandoning the "goal of theoretical knowledge" and
interdisciplinary materialism" originally articulated by
Horkheimer as the project of critical theory. This
articulation of the critical theory tradition, as a
dedication to interdisciplinary materialism, is what
Habermas views as the basis for the authenticity of his
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own project. His interpretation of the eariy Horhheiraer
is offered as the source of legitimacy for viewing his
theory of communicative action as an extension of the
tradition. Be that as it may, Habermas still goes on to
claim he is reconstructively following the intentions of
Adorno's more theological, mystical version of critical
theory
.
Habermas claims the name "mimesis" is the name of
what has been destroyed by instrumental reason. He
believes Adorno cannot provide a conceptual framework to
explain what is lost when instrumental reason first
dominates nature and then is extended to the domination of
society and its individual members. Curiously, Habermas
claims the term mimesis also calls forth certain intendpH
associations. It is here that Habermas's analysis
suppresses that which is of the most interest to the
radical ecologist, in order to justify Habermas's own
project. He claims that "mimesis" calls for a concept of
imitation, which designates a relation between persons in
which the one accommodates to the other, identifies with
the other, empathizes with the other. Habermas claims
the intended association with imitation, and its
implication with interpersonal relationships, cannot be
reduced to the "cognitive-instrumentally determined
subject-object relations." The mimetic capacity is
impulse and "counts as the sheer opposite of reason.
He then argues that the "rational core" of mimesis can
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only be "laid open" if there is a shifr +-t to the paradigm of
linguistic philosophy where cognitive-instrumental
rationality can be demonstrated to be properly understood
as Eatl of "communicative rationality." Habermas further
quotes Adorno where the latter is providing some
indication of the relationship of reconciliation and
freedom, "The state of reconciliation would not annex what
is unfamiliar or alien with philosophical imperialism;
instead, it would find its happiness in the fact that the
latter, in the closeness allowed, remains something
distant and different, something that is beyond being
either heterogeneous or proper. Immediately following
this quote Habermas asserts, "Adorno describes
reconciliation in terms of an intact intersubjectivity
that is only established and maintained in the reciprocity
of mutual understanding based on free recognition ." 55 He
then continues his analysis, increasingly bringing out the
structure of his own theory.
Habermas's explication of the term "mimesis" as well
as the idea of reconciliation is done with an eye toward
bridging the gap between his own project and that of the
earlier critical theorists. What is of analytical
importance here is the displacement of Adorno's text at
the hands of Habermas, and the resulting repression of key
elements. In Habermas's interpretation of mimesis he
links it to imitation and conceives of this as an
mtersubj ect ivo phenomenon, but in the same gesture he
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excludes the non-discursive elements of the Idea of
mimesis. If the point of Habermas's analysis is more than
a mere reductivist dismissal of Adorno's thought; if
instead it is an attempt at what he labeled in his
reappropriation of Marx's theory of historical materialism
as a "reconstruction," then it must be evaluated on its
adequacy to this concept, a concept which has become
increasingly central to Habermas's project as a whole. 56
As represented in Habermas's work reconstruction
"signifies taking a theory apart and putting it back
together again in a new form in order to attain more fully
the goal it has set for itself." 57 if Habermas's
reconstruction of critical theory is to be challenged, it
must occur from several directions or levels
simultaneously. First, it must be challenged on its own
terms, showing that it is not adequate to the tasks it
sets for itself. Second, to avoid a charge of simply
repeating the problems of totalizing critique, and
therefore arriving in the same aporetic fix as Adorno, an
alternative version of the tradition of critical theory
must be rescued from that supposed dead end. This might
be achieved by developing those concepts and
constellations within Adorno's thought. In addition to
the concepts and non-concepts of reconciliation and
mimesis, other terms of importance in this alternative
reconstruction of critical theory will be "exact fantasy,
"
suffering, nature, history, and, of course, domination.
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There is considerable precedent for this alternative
version of critical theory. 58 It can be viewed ^ ^
further development of the immanent critique of critical
theory itself. it is sympathetic to the attempt not only
of the early critical theorists, but the recent general
trend of contemporary thought to overcome the "subgect-
ob] ect" dualism attributed to Western philosophy as a
whole. Criticism of this attempt to overcome philosophical
dualisms and their hierarchical structure is at the heart
of Habermas's general critique of contemporary efforts of
critical social theory of all kinds, not only those of the
early Frankfurt theorists. He expounds on this in his The
Bhilosoptucal pisconrsp of Modernity
,
condemning all
efforts which have not made the turn toward the theory of
communicative action, or attempted to complete the
"unfinished project of Enlightenment." 59
A two step, immanent critique of Habermas can be
assembled from various sources already unconvinced by his
efforts. Habermas can first be charged with unjustly
dismissing Adorno's efforts to develop the concepts of
mimesis and reconciliation. Rather than viewing "mimesis"
as the opposite of reason and therefore irrational
(thereby repeating the subject-object dualism at the level
of the description of reason itself, as mind or spirit,
opposed to nature), this term can more adequately be
viewed as a representation of the "pre-rational .
"
60 A
more consistent analysis of mimesis would indicate the
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multiple meanings of the term that develop
USe ln 61 The
from its early
term is used not
only as placeholder for nature, which comes to be
dominated by instrumental rationality, as theorized in the
work of the early critical theorists, but alaa as the
stand-in for the non-dominating relationship of humans
with nature, a relationship not reducible to communicative
or discursive conceptualizations. It is this non-
dominative relationship which the term mimesis represents
in the work of Adorno. This non-dominative relationship
is not reducible to a model based on intersubjective
recognition, as Habermas asserts. Martin Jay quotes from
Adorno's works on music to develop this double notion of
mimesis, "Through its pure materiality, music is the art
m which the pre-rational mimetic impulse asserts itself
irreducibly and appears simultaneously in constellations
with the march of progressive natural and material
domination . " 62
The attempt by Habermas to reduce mimesis to a
"rational core" of communicative rationality is
unjustified. Adorno argued against the reducibility of a
non-dominating experience of the relationship between
subject and object to any model based on
intersubjectivity. Adorno's work is more plausibly viewed
as an attempt to explore the possibility of representing
philosophically the conceptually unrepresentable
experience of non-domination. Negative Dialectics and
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are more adequately understood as
explications of a receptivity to nature or otherness in
its different forms, a "sensuous receptivity" that is
still possible, at least for Adorno, in the relationships
of, at least, autonomous art. An understanding of sense,
or receptive experience, is explicitly imbed by Adorno to
the rejection of metaphysical understandings of the
subject and subjectivity. it is in the rejection of the
idea of a constitutive subject, the central concern of the
"philosophy of consciousness," that Adorno also rejects a
philosophy which asserts the possibility for an exhaustion
of meaning by the subject's self-constitutive activity,
"The concept of sense involves an objectivity beyond all
'making': a sense that is 'made' is already fictitious.
It duplicates the subject, however collective, and
defrauds it of what it seemingly granted."^
The resurrection of Adorno's perspective from
Habermas's unwarranted reductivist termination thus
includes a defense against the further charges of
mysticism, and any concomitant philosophical regression.
Habermas believes this regression would be the unavoidable
methodological consequence of a revival of the theoloai ral
concept of reconciliation. From his earliest work, before
the dark" turn of the Dialecti c of Enlightenment
,
and the
death of Benjamin, when it would seem that the Kabbalistic
influences on Adorno would be at their most unguarded, he
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explicitly rejected the metaphysical understanding of
concepts such as reconciliation;
Authentic philosophic interoretat-inn hWith a fixed meaning which already lie^h
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The operations of mimesis in any possible humans-to-
nature reconciliation are not reducible to the conceptual
structure of discourse, regardless of how communicative
rationality is construed. Neither can the meaning
resulting from the interpretation of the non-dominating
experience of subject and object be legitimately dismissed
as theological. The complex relationship between
interpretation and the sensuous experience of the subject,
even that found in the experience of autonomous art,
cannot be reduced to the traditional terms of modern
aesthetic rationality, of the harmonious reconciliation of
subject and object. The experience of the possibility of
a non-dominating relationship with "nature" must be
represented very differently;
All making in art is one long struggle to say what
that made object itself can never be and what art
itself can never know: that is what Geist or spirit
means in aesthetics. And this is where the idea of
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Adorno and Radical Ecology
The task facing a radical ecological entry into the
tradition of critical theory must take these insights of
Adorno and build on them. Included in this project must
be a critique of Habermas which can be staged as immanent
to the tradition of critical theory itself. This has been
initiated elsewhere, including several confrontations with
Habermas by Fred Dallmayr. A few preliminary gestures can
help set the stage for the more extensive critique to
follow. The above quotes from Adorno can be viewed not
only as textual evidence to contradict Habermas's reading
of Adorno, but simultaneously and implicitly as a counter-
critique of Habermas from the perspective of an
alternative version of critical theory. Dallmayr
challenges Habermas's reading of the "discourse of
modernity," especially his characterization of Hegel, and
Nietzsche. ^ Habermas, rather than having escaped the
"aponas of the philosophy of the subject" is shown to
repeat the same problems, the antinomies and polar
oppositions, of traditional metaphysics.^ Habermas
concludes his analysis of the discourse of modernity by
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asserting
-the difference between life _world and
(communicative) rationality cannot be bridged or
reconciled in modernity. "68 The increasing
differentiation of society into independent spheres with
their own logics or rationalities requires not the
reconciliation of these rationalities at the level of
"worldviews" and the everyday life-world, claims Habermas,
instead modern society requires a "balancing" of the
spheres, that is, the appropriate containment of the
rationalities of the economic and
bureaucratic/administrative systems (which are mediated by
money and power, respectively)
. This "balancing" can be
accomplished through the proper development of other
spheres of rationality, those of morality and aesthetics,
by the formal process of reaching agreements or consensus
about the respective processes themselves. Dallmayr
contends that this "solution" is absent of substance and
fails to provide any support or grounds which might
motivate participants in these discourses to even desire
consensus rather than simply continuing the trend of
modernity toward increasingly instrumental and strategic
action:
Little or no substantive changes seem reguired
to accomplish this task or to correct
pathological trends.
. . .As it seems to me, modern
cleavages (Ent zwe iungen ) and pathologies exceed
the capacities of a balancing mechanism. In
light of rampantly possessive lifestyles and the
predatory thrust of technology, exiting from
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These objections can be viewed, from the perspective
Of Adorno's negative dialectics ^ •l i , as pointing to Habermas's
entanglement in identity thinking. He collapses the
potentials of Adorno's discussions of mimesis and
reconciliation into a framework that loses its substantive
content. This content can then be returned to the
communications theoretic framework only artificially from
the outside. The theory of communicative action repeats,
against its intentions, the process of metaphysics, of
identifying thought. Nature maintains its position as
material to be dominated, and subjectivity is to be
reduced to normalcy, equivalence, consensus. Nothing
escapes the desire to reduce all otherness to the self-
sameness of the identifying subject.
However, having brought Habermas's theory of
communicative rationality within the framework of immanent
critique and ideology critique, revealing its complicity
m the logic of domination is not the same as adequately
addressing his critique of negative dialectics. Beyond
indicating possible alternative conceptualizations of the
constellation whose elements include mimesis and
reconciliation is the need to address Habermas's charge of
a residual "utopianism" which remains even after the
totalization of critique. This is the real thrust of
Habermas's charges of mysticism and metaphysics, which
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result from his analysis of the earlv ur y theorists' attempts
o develop an understanding of the possibility of
reconciliation of humans and nature in its various forms.
The concepts of reconciliation and redemption required
some vision of a future society, when conditions of
domination and oppression would be overcome. if
instrumental rationality has extended itself completely
mto all relations, to the point of evaporating all access
to a subjectivity which could resist, what can ground the
hope for a future society of true freedom and happiness?
What grounds critical theory's own claims to access to a
critical consciousness? Does not Adorno’s position remain
abstractly utopian, relativistic, aporetic? Previously,
any historical, material critique found a transformative
or revolutionary subject to pin its hopes on: "Marx was
able to avoid the charge of utopianism in his day by being
able to identify the subject of revolutionary activity
with a class which, he argued, had the potential power to
transcend conditions of domination ." 70 The genesis of the
Frankfurt efforts was the response to the aftermath of the
Russian Revolution, the rise of fascism in Germany, and
mass culture" in the U.S., all of which seemed to deny
the possibility of revolutionary subjectivity.
The challenge to radical ecology is to develop an
interpretive framework that can adequately address the
problems and questions of the tradition of critical
theory, now within the historical context of a global
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ecological crisis. The fundamental constellation of "the
domination of nature" and other concepts and categories
used by the early critical theorists must be combined with
critical categories emerging under new historical
circumstances. This process forms a new constellation;
the radical ecological subject. This new constellation
can be viewed as an attempt to at least partially answer
the challenge to "succeed in formulating the continuities
between human history and natural history so carefully
that they are weak enough to be plausible and yet strong
enough to permit us to recognize man's place in the
cosmos
.
1
122
ENDNOTES
Capra,
(New
^^Itjof and Chari
York: E.P. Dutton,
ene
198frtna *'-L y W 4 )
, pp.3-4.
T°ka
f'
Brian
' ae-Gresix
E^QloaisaJ^Eiitiiia (san Pedro: R.& e.
an
Miles, 1987), P-
Tokar, p. 40
.
Tokar, p. 79 .
Habermas, Jurgen, "The current potential « *are very difficult to classify^ became scener°
teSt
^x!Svand topics =ha^ v;ry
Vol. II, p. 3i^
Marcuse, Herbert, Negations
; Essay s in
Culture," "
B
pp?°88 - 133^
'
^Hyman) (London: Unwin
Bookchin, Murray, The Ecology of FrepHom- fh 0
Slifornia-^h^h
° f H ioxa^to (Palo Alto,Cali nia. C es ire Books, 1982), p. 21.
Bookchin, Ecology, p. 21.
T
Books)
Ed '' Deep Enn1n^y < San Diego: Avant
Tobias, p. 256; Arne Naess, "Identification as aSource of Deep Ecological Attitudes."
Birkeland, Janis, "Ecofeminism: Linking Theory and
Practice, " Ecofeminism; Women, Animals. Nature
,Greta Gaard, Ed. (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press
1993), p . 1 8 . '
Spretnak, Charlene, "Ecofeminism: Our Roots and
Flowering," Rgweavinq the World: The Emergence of
^CQ feminism > Irene Diamond and Gloria Feman
Orenstein, Eds. (San Francisco: Sierra Club Books,
1990), p. 5.
14
15
16
17
18
.
19
.
20
.
21
.
22
.
23
.
24
.
25
.
26
.
21
.
28
.
29
.
30
.
31
unes, 1992)
, p. 99-100.
Horkheimer, Max mU
Continuum, 1986 ) <NeW York:
Horkheimer, p. 195
Horkheimer, p. 200.
Horkheimer, p. 208.
Horkheimer, pp. 210-211.
Horkheimer, p. 211.
Horkheimer, p. 215.
Horkheimer, p. 220.
Horkheimer, p. 220.
Horkheimer, p. 227
.
Horkheimer, p. 229
.
Horkheimer, p. 229
.
Horkheimer, p. 231.
Horkheimer, p. 230
.
Horkheimer, p. 230
.
Horkheimer, p. 234 .
Habermas claims to be following the original researchprogram as outlined by Horkheimer in early Institutepapers, especially with regard to interdisciplinary
research. The relationship of Habermas to
Horkheimer and Adorno and the claims to the
tradition of Critical Theory are discussed in Robert
Hullot-Kentor, "Back to Adorno," Telos
. 81, Fall
1989. For examples of Habermas's reading of the
relation between Horkheimer and Adorno, in English,
see Xhe Philosophical Discourse of Modernity
Frederick G. Lawrence, Trans. (Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1992), and Theory nf
Cpimunicative Action
,
Vol. I, last section.
124
32
33
34
35
36
37
F
o°f
°f
the—
Habermas discusses the need for i-ho -n •m critical theory and in nhii
the
u
llnguistic turn"
the final section of Vo^ I of ^
9ene“lly ln
^mmmicative Anti^ n For nn
earl“r
e
^nk
C
?o
i
?he°
f “*
„ r
,
lngUlstlc turn" see Albrecht Wellmer
Linguisti^Turn R!^-tions on the
»•. « !»2
H
Sc«S/sr:
Habermas, Jurgen, Knowledge and Human Tn^^r.-f JerpmvJ. Shapiro, TransT (Boston: BeaconTigTif^
2^ y
Mc™rthy
fltj^fd m V'Vn^tion nf Snr i^h Thomasi Lny, irans. (Boston: Beacon, 1979 )- Tho th^
of Commiini-cati ve ar-t-jor Vol z d
1 '
McCarthy, Trans. (Bostoh Beacon^ Tnd ?98?)(hereafter cited TCA I s TCA II).
A
Iliino?s7 M
lh
! h
0i fi
F'
l r 's
-£ p£ Loti nat ion (Evanston,linois. Northwestern University Press, 1992)
Modern ?f-^RaU'Q n_i.t_y (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1989) .
M
rtLVe?e^ "Industrialization and Capitalismn the Work of Max Weber," in Negations: Essays inCritical Theory (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968)
pp. 223-224.
. Marcuse, Herbert, Qn.e-Dimen si on aman (Boston Beacon,i964)
. Cited m Habermas, Toward a Rational Soriniy .
p. 85, and McCarthy, p. 389.
. See Thomas McCarthy, Th.e Cri tical Theory nf jnrnen
Habermas (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London
England: MIT Press, 1985), pp. 20ff and Section 2.5.
Habermas, Jurgen, Toward a Rational Society (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1970), p. 87. McCarthy p. 22.
125
41
42
43
44
45
46.
47
48
.
49
.
50
Habermas
, Jurcfpn *
Hahemas and M,A
r
t j ^T3 , and Counterquestions'Berns tein, Ed.
PP. 210-2li.
USSttS: MIT Press
- 1991)
,
Habermas, TCA I, p. 366
_
Habermas, TCA I, p . 3 67 ,
Marx
' Manifp^n
Quoted in Habermas, TCA, Vol. I, p. 368
_
Habermas, TCA I, p. 370
.
Quoted in Habermas, TCA I n -f
Dial PrH v r •, p. 373, from Necrat i vp
(FrAkflrtf
Habermas, TCA I, p. 374 .
Habermas, TCA M T3 383.
Habermas,
"Through
TCA
such
1/ p. 384.
mindfulne
n
c; v tJJLLltiil L Ol wnich 1 1
enciosed the misunderstood truth of all cultureenlightenment is opposed to domination as such ' "
o“ure
r
?n
S
Jh
ti0ni VlrtUe ° f thls -me^AAenature i t e subject, m whose fulfillment theunacknowledged truth of all culture lies hiddenenlightenment is universally opposed todomination " PialeeiLiii, of En.l iahtemnent
. p . 40 .
\
—
1 Habermas, TCA I, p. 384 .
52
. Habermas, TCA I, p. 390.
53
. Habermas, TCA I, p. 390.
54
^ Habermas, TCA I, P- 390,
p. 192. The standard English translation reads,
The reconciled condition would not be the
philosophical imperialism of annexing the alien.
Instead, its happiness would lie in the fact that
the alien, in the proximity it is granted, remains
what is distant and different, beyond the
heterogeneous and beyond that which is one's own."
Negative Dialectics
, p. 191.
126
55
56
57
58
59
Habermas TCA I, p. 390.
Habermas discusses "reconst-mpfi^M
and the Fivolm-inn „ f c„„ 1rt...
b n ln Comumnical-.j og
See
Habeas, PP .
(Berkeley md LosingCalifornia Press, 1984), Chapter 15. ' ° f
Habermas, TCA I, p. 95 .
T
AdornranfMlrcusrversloLC1nd“h the° rY ' thepotentials for providinglnhgbt infUr* 1111119contemporary situation, have been approached in
the reLtfonshiroftorcusfanfeco? deVelopment ° f
Kellner Critiii t7„ „ d ecol°gy see Douglas
n°
r
^f lg°^OUS lncorPoration of several developmentsAn attempt is made to bring together a critique ofHabermas, a more sympathetic reading of Adorno and
of critIcal°?he
ntS
?
0t Wh° lly aUen t0 the tradition
, i
i t ory from within radical ecoloqical
^
gh H tSeH- TherS haVe been efforts to developthis alternative form of critical theory, althouqtinot explicitly with regard to the radical ecology
Rethinkina
®et Micba® b Reid "Going Beyond Habermas:g Critical Theory," Radical Phiin^rh „ 64Summer 1993, p. 63. Also, Axel Honneth's
Introduction to Ihe Critique of Powop
, Kenneth
aynes, Trans. (Cambridge, Massachusetts, London,England: MIT Press, 1991), although the brief
consideration of Adorno's "rehabilitation" is stagedby Honneth with respect to critical theorists whohave adopted Habermas's version of critical theory.
Habermas, Jurgen, The Philosophical Discourse nf
Modernity
,
.also see Cultural-Political i ntervent i on.q
-in the Unfinished Project of Enlightenment
,
Axel
Honneth, Thomas McCarthy, Claus Offe, and Albrecht
Wellmer, Eds. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press,
1992).
60
. Jay, Martin, Mo.rno (Cambridge: Harvard Univ., 1984),
p. 156.
6
1
. The term may or may not have been appropriated from
Walter Benjamin, or more accurately, Benjamin's use
127
62
63
64
65
.
6 6
67
68
.
69
70
.
71
for A^rnrand\orkLimer (Pesee
P
w ?9mary) . source
"The Mimetic Faculty " in * n l
alter Benjamin,
Arendt, Ed., Harry Zohn Hannah
Books, 1968). Also see'susaTt
( “®w York: Schocken
(New York- ¥he F
° rSS
;PP- 85ff; Fredrrc Jameson^Lte MsrSm- AH
SS
' 1977)
Musikosioligie,
"
5
p!
°,° ted from Adorno, "Ideen zur
Jay Adorno, p. 77
, from "The Actuality ofhilosophy,
" l£lca 31, Spring 1977, pf 727
.
Quoted in Jay, Adorno, pp. 77-73
.
From Adorno, Negative Dialectic p . 376 ^
^Albany- state Po 1
1
f
bany. Umv. of New York, 1989), chapter 3.
Dallmayr, Margins, p. 71 .
Dallmayr, Margins, p.67.
Dallmayr, Margins, p.72.
H® ld
'
David
' Introduction to Critical Tho^,.
Horkhej-mer to Habermas (Berkeley: Univ ofCalifornia, 1980), p. 384.
Habermas, Jurgen, "Questions and Counterquestions "m Bernstein, Habermas an d Modernity
, p. 211.
128
PART II.
CRITIQUE OF RADICAL ECOLOGY
129
SECTION I
.
CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY
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CHAPTER 3
deep ecology and methodology
Arne Naess and Deep Ecology Methodology
One of the primary philosophical justifications for
the deep ecology aspect of the ecology movement comes from
the work of Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess. it is his
"deep questioning method" that forms the basis of the
Philosophy of deep ecology and the origin of the name.
The deep questioning method has itself been questioned by
some of those sympathetic to the general orientation of
deep ecology, finding this justification for a
"biocentric" or "egocentric" understanding of human
beings' relationship to nature inadequate. One of those
critics, Warwick Fox, has attempted to salvage Naess's
deep ecology work by emphasizing instead another aspect of
Naess's methodology, that of identification. Fox also
turns to humanistic psychology and its offshoot.
transpersonal psychology, to provide a psychological
justification for the deep ecological identification with
nature. However, this too results in a problematic
philosophical position, or in fact no philosophical
position, a stance without logical justification, a stance
Fox endorses for strategic reasons. The lack of logical
justification is not in itself a disqualification of Fox's
argument, but the consequences for political action based
on a "self" resulting from the adoption of this
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intuitionist method do create fundamental problems for any
ecological politics.
The early critical theorists provide an alternative
understanding of the relation of the human to nature
(subject to object, relationship and its potential for an
emancipatory political practice. With the concept of
mimesis as used especially by Adorno, it is possible to
orient a critical understanding of the relation to nature
Without falling into intuitionism, and without being
trapped in the consequences of a "logical system."
Arne Naess and the Origins of Deep Ecology
Arne Naess has not published a work that explicitly
and exclusively addresses the methodological foundations
of the idea of deep ecology, however, these foundations or
as he calls them "fundamentals" appear scattered
throughout his published work, in other deep ecologists'
work, and most importantly in a critical analysis by
fellow "ecocentrist" Warwick Fox. Fox divides Naess's
idea of deep ecology into three aspects, the formal, the
popular and the philosophical, and critiques each,
attempting to salvage the intent of the idea of deep
ecology, but in the form of a "transpersonal ecology"
based on insights from transpersonal psychology.^ The
"popular" sense of deep ecology is merely the recognition
that a variety of philosophical and political positions
now oppose themselves to the continuation of modern
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industrial civilization as manifested in its relation to
the global environment through multiple examples of
ecosystem destruction and species extinction. Naess's
"popular" sense of deep ecology is contrasted with the
"fundamental" which challenges the present relationship to
"nature" more fundamentally than the
"environmentalists"
who continue to desire the benefits of the modern
industrial society while simply addressing environmental
problems from within an ideology that views these problems
as amenable to technological, administrative or other
existing remedies. Those who do not question the basic
assumptions of modern industrial society, but merely
attempt to alleviate its most unpleasant or harmful
effects on humans, are characterized as anthropocentric,
reformist environmentalists. They have a "shallow"
understanding of environmental/ecological problems. Those
who have understood that the environmental crisis
questions the fundamental assumptions and activities of
modern industrial society have taken a "deep" perspective
of the problems. Naess and his most prominent American
proselytes, Bill Devall and George Sessions, believe
anyone who deeply questions existing society's actions and
consequences will come to a certain understanding of the
ecological situation, an understanding which includes some
common or general components as well as such specific
understandings as that of the "intrinsic value" of the
richness and diversity of life. One general fundamental
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would be that the complexity and richness of the biosphe
or planet is severely threatened, and requires immediate
actron in response . 2 Fox summarizes, " It is clear that
the general orientation that they (Naess and Sessions)
advocate is concerned with encouragrng a supportive, live-
and-let-live, or symbiotic attrtude on the part of humans
not only toward member of the ecosphere but even toward
all identifiable entitle or iooia in the ecosphere." 3
Fox's point in the presentation of this aspect of Naess's
position is to indicate the extent Naess is concerned with
a "general orientation" toward ecological awareness,
leaving room for a multitude of non-dogmatic approaches to
solving the ecological crisis. However, the philosophical
and political problems this position generate cannot be
dismissed by adopting a laissez-faire attitude of
tolerance when radically different results may result from
equally "deep" philosophical or ecological positions.
Naess's belief that all "deep questioning" will lead to a
roughly equivalent general orientation to ecological
problems is simply misconceived. Fox demonstrates this
inadequacy in regard to the "formal" sense of deep ecology
Naess developed. However, Fox wishes to retain the truth
of the popular sense of ecology by reformulating Naess's
"philosophical" sense of deep ecology with the help of
transpersonal psychology.
Fox critiques Naess's formal sense of deep ecology
examining its presentation in both published and
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unpublished works by Naess. Naess's formal sense of deep
ecology is heavily influenced by analytic philosophy and
is established by definitron, but it is the acknowledged
possibilities for developing "deep" but ecologically
destructive philosophical positrons which is the troubling
aspect of the formulation. Fox quotes extensively from
the unpublished manuscript:
The difference between the shallow and the deeo” °ne ° f deepness ^ argumentation ?and of differences in conclusions. in theshallow movement in favor of decreasing
pollution and economy of resources, positions
arG
^
aC
i
Y assumed valid which are questionedin the deeper movement 1 subscribe to thehypothesis that when the deeper issues areintroduced in a debate, the conclusions tendtowards those of the deeper movement
.... becausegoing deep" is the essential point, I recommend
„ ,
at
»
P° ln t of view might be characterized asdeep even if it defended some of the most
wasteful and socially destructive policies,
namely, if it were derived from a coherent'
philosophy answering deep questions. Whatever
philosophy, whether Western or Eastern, we take
as a starting point, it will not be compatible
with, or at least not suitable for a defense of,
present unecological policies.
^
Naess's procedure or method for establishing
philosophical depth is to begin with an intuitively
derived assumption which he calls a "fundamental" or a
"norm." The details of the procedure are not of as much
importance here as the consequences . ^ Deep ecology is
defined in formal terms, not on the content or substance
of the procedure, although Naess believes all deep
questioning will result in the same general orientation
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toward ecological problems. This leads Naess to the
following challenge;
"I am tempted to say that there will
be no examples [of nonecocentric views being derived from
fundamentals]. Serious attempts to find a deep
justification of the way life on the planet as treated
today... are doomed to failure, what I say is meant as a
challenge; is there a philosopher somewhere who would like
to try?"6 Fox takes up the challenge and asserts> „ It , s
my contention, which I propose to substantiate below, that
Naess intended meaning, that is, Naess's formal sense of
deep ecology, does not constitute a defensible sense of
deep ecology." 7
Fox then uses Naess's formal methodology to show that
both anthropocentric and anti-ecological positions can be
established by positing certain "fundamentals” that have
at least as much depth as Naess's intuitive assumption of
Self-realization!" (The exclamation mark is the
idiosyncratic sign Naess uses to designate those "norms"
that serve as the foundation for further norms and
hypotheses. This helps explain the name of the most
recognizable of the deep ecology activist groups, Earth
First!
. ) Fox’s counter examples begin with the two
fundamental norms "Obey God! " and "Evolution! " which
result in conclusions for practical action in the forms of
domination of the earth and genetic engineering,
respectively. 8 Since these alternative fundamentals are
in fact actually held by many individuals in existing
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sociiletY
' thS demonst^tion not only indicates the logical
difficulties of Naess
’ s formal understanding of the idea
of deep ecology, but it also indrcates the inadequacies of
thrs sense of deep ecology for a radical ecological
politics. Fox concludes that the formal sense of deep
ecology is untenable, and if the popular sense of deep
ecology is to be sustainable it will depend on what Fox
characterizes as the "philosophical" sense of deep
ecology. One of the effects of this challenge to the
formal understanding of deep ecology is to question the
term itself. Since vastly different results can be
achieved by basing alternative normative systems on
fundamentals that are equally "deep" but practically
contradictory, the term "deep" itself seems to require
rethinking. The original justification for the
terminology is untenable, depth of questioning, so is
there any way to retain what has become an important
signifier in the ecological struggle? Fox prefers to
abandon the term in favor of "ecocentric ecology, " a term
more directly indicating his belief in the importance of
transpersonal identification. However, if Fox's own
position is shown to be philosophically, logically and
practically problematic, what status does "deep ecology"
have, and can a more appropriate concept or concepts
replace this radical ecological identity? Does an
ecocentric or modified deep ecological approach to
"nature" produce an alternative ecological subject, one
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whose different awareness enables it to respond in a non-
dominating or non-destructive manner toward nature?
Warwick Fox and Transpersonal Ecology
With the untenability of the "formal" sense of deep
ecology. Fox turns to the "phrlosophical" sense that Arne
Naess also developed. Before examining Fox's elaboration
of the concept of "transpersonal ecology" it is necessary
to understand the role of the process of identification in
the development or maturing of what Naess calls the
"ecological self." Naess claims the process of
identification is at the heart of the development of the
ecological self, "The ecological self of a person is that
with which this person identifies. This key sentence
(rather than definition) about the self, shifts the burden
of clarification from the term 'self' to that of
identification,' or rather 'process of identification .'" 9
Besides Naess's unpublished work, Fox also examines
other, published statements of Naess's understanding of
the relationship between the process of identification and
the ecological self. In "Identification as the Source of
Deep Ecological Attitudes" Naess provides an extensive
defense of his understanding of identification
.
10 Naess
claims those in the deep ecology movement have in common
certain concerns and "ways of experiencing nature and
diversity of cultures ." 11 Naess has listed in various
places some of the basic principles of his own deep
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ecological philosophy. This version of deep ecology he
calls an "ecosophy,
" and since he claims multiple,
individual ecosophies are possible and encouraged, he
labels his own version "Ecosophy T." central principles
of Ecosophy T are the concepts of self-realization,
identification and the Self (with the capital S)
.
Naess further develops his understanding of the
ecological self and its realization by distinguishing the
deep ecological concept of "Self" from the "egoistic,"
utilitarian, or instrumental self, usually identified in
psychology as the ego. In opposition to the egoistic
self, Naess quotes several passages from various prophets
and teachers to demonstrate his understanding of the Self,
passages primarily derived from religious traditions
especially that of Buddhism. Naess summarizes the
insights by revealing,
"Self-realization in its absolute
maximum is, as I see it, the mature experience of oneness
in diversity as depicted in the above verse ." 12 Because
of his reliance on these mystical and meditative
traditions to indicate the intended concept of the Self
which develops with ecological awareness, Naess feels it
is then necessary to attempt to indicate the difference
between the deep ecological understanding of the self and
any mystical state. Naess rightly notes that the mystical
traditions tend to stress certain aspects of experience
that deny or dissolve the individual self into a
"nondiversi fied supreme whole ." 12 These mystical
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traditions are aiso criticized from a positivist and
scientific perspective for their vagueness and confusion,
describing an experience that seems to be unsustainable in
normal, everyday activity. Naess's understanding of the
process of identification necessary for ecological Self-
ealization is a self-conscious attempt to deal with the
objections to the mystical or meditative conception of a
non-egoistic ecological consciousness. The burden of the
position is to indicate how it is possible to develop a
"wider self" through a process of identification that does
not collapse all distinctions into an undifferentiated
oneness or wholeness. Naess defines the process of
developing the ecological self, "Identification is a
spontaneous, non-rational, but not irrational, process
through which the interest or interests o f another h.in,
axe reacted to as ou r own int erest or infprp.9U "14 This
understanding of identification leads to the "obliteration
of the experience of distinction between ego and alter,
between me and the sufferer." 15 it is of course this
claim that generates the problems connected to the charge
of mysticism. Naess says this experience of
identification with the other in joy as well as in
suffering, is only momentary or intermittent, and retains
the recognition that there are different individuals.
However, it is exactly this relation between identity and
difference, and the resulting questions it raises about
the possibility for retaining the uniqueness of the
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individual, and for its potential for spontaneous or free
activity, that is central to so much of contemporary
radical social theory and can be found as a core concern
of the early Frankfurt theorists.
Naess claims that "shallow" ecology or
environmentalism, attempts to explain or explain away
deep, intense or wide identification as a psychological
function of thp prro WTn r _ a_e eg
' In western social science, self-
realization is the term most often used for the
competitive development of a person’s talents and the
pursuit of an individual’s specific interests (Maslow and
others ).’’ 16 Instead of understanding identification as
merely the intensification of the structures of the ego
(which includes "altruistic" activity that is little more
that self-interest "rightly understood"), Naess borrows
from Spinoza to indicate an alternative understanding of
the self which "strives to develop its essence." In this
borrowed understanding, the urge of the self to "persevere
in one’s being" is not merely an urge to survive, but is a
"natural" urge toward "higher levels of ’freedom’
( libertas ) . This is a form of wider identification
which should not be confused with an altruism based on the
suppression of selfishness, the sacrifice of one’s own
interest for the sake of others. In the unecological
,
psychologist ic understanding of altruism there is the
requirement of "alienation" if someone is to act in the
interest of another. According to Naess, alienation from
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one's own interest prevents full maturation of the
individual, so altruistic behavior is immature behavior.
Alternatively, alienation and identification with others
should be understood as opposites. Naess argues that the
world or "reality" consists of original "wholes" which
have become fragmented through human
"development."
Rather than viewing the world as does the dominant
understanding which asserts isolated items or things
become lumped together to produce recognizable
information, "reality consists of wholes which we cut
down .
"
1
8
So for Naess identification is a reversal of our
alienation from the real world and our true interests,
"In other words: there is not, strictly speaking, a
primordial causal process of identification, but one of
largely unconscious alienation which is overcome in
experiences of identity ." 19 Furthermore, the process of
identification is a "natural" process in that it is the
consequence of the maturation of the individual. This
understanding of the process of identification, according
to Naess, is in opposition to the dominant form of
psychology founded on the ego-alter (subject-object)
distinction or duality. The eco-philosophical necessity
of "altruistic" behavior is eliminated with that
distinction, "The psychology and philosophy of the
(comprehensive) Self insists that the gradual maturing of
a person inevitably widens and deepens the self through
the process of identification ." 20 This is a strong
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statement about (male?, ontogenetic and phylogenetic
development. It requires an answer to the guestion,
-what
makes this maturation
"inevitable" and how is it, more
specifically, a process of identification?" a critical
questioning of this position must address not only the
status of the various identities and totalities involved,
but their relationship to history, to the ongoing
interaction between society and nature, and the
transformation of the possibilities of identification
which have taken place as a result of historical change.
Naess begins to address this problem of history and
the conditions under which the process of identification
can occur: "The notion of maturing has to do with getting
out what is latent in the nature of a being. Some
learning is presupposed, but thinking of present
conditions of competition in industrial, economic growth
societies, specialized learning may inhibit the process of
maturing. A competitive cult of talents does not favor
Self-realisation. As a consequence of the imperfect
conditions for maturing as persons, there is much
pessimism or disbelief in relation to the widening of the
Self, and more stress on developing altruism and moral
pressure. When Naess speaks negatively of moral
pressure he is implying a specific understanding of
morality, that of Kantian morality, with the same
distinctions Habermas makes between morality and ethics
.
22
Naess argues that the emphasis on a moral solution is
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necessary for those who attempt to solve the problems of
increasing alienation from the perspective of a radical
distinction of ego and alter, of subject and object.
Kantian inspired animal rights philosophies call for moral
action, such as not inflicting suffering on animals, not
because of the animal's suffering itself, but because of
the effect it has on the human subject. As Naess
explains, "When we decide ethically to be kind to them, it
should be because of the favorable effect of kindness on
us-a strange doctrine
.
"23 Naess asserts thafc ,. suffering „
is "perhaps the most potent source of identification,"
because of the spontaneous reaction to the suffering of
other creatures by human beings, which occurs "naturally"
unless "special social conditions" inhibit that
spontaneity. Spontaneous acts of goodness toward the
suffering would not be considered moral actions by Kant,
but rather would be labeled "beautiful." Against Kant,
Naess favors the beautiful action over the moral. ^4
If this appreciation of the beautiful act as an
indication of deep identification still seems inadequately
defined, and unsatisfying as a coherent philosophy of deep
ecology, it is a problem Naess himself recognizes:
The above seems to point in the direction of
philosophical mysticism, but the fourth term,
Self-realisation, breaks in and reinstates the
central position of the individual--even if the
capital S is used to express something beyond
narrow selves. The widening and deepening of
the individual selves somehow never makes them
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Even with Naess's faith in the possibilities of Self
realization and his insistence that deep ecology is not
just another form of mysticism, he shares with critical
theory two views about the present. From the deep
ecological perspective contemporary history is not one of
"progress" but of catastrophe, "Human conduct still today
as a pioneer invading species present (sic) a catastrophic
cultural lag. It is a conduct systematically
counteracting the process of identification with its fruit
of compassion and living light on Earth.
"
2
^ This
catastrophic view extends beyond simply a cultural lag,
The increasing destruction plus increasing information
about the destruction is apt to elicit strong feelings of
sorrow, despair, desperate actions and tireless efforts to
save what is left.... So far as I can see, the most
probable course of events is continued devastation of
conditions of life on this planet, combined with a
powerless upsurge of sorrow and lamentation ." 27
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Ecocentric Remedies
Warwick Fox has attempted to further develop the
concept of ecological rdentrficatron by introducing the
work of transpersonal psychology into the deep ecology
philosophical positron outlined by Naess, but even thus
effort retains the vagueness that gives deep ecology the
appearance of mysticism or romantic nature worship. Fox
examines three varieties of identification: personal,
ontological and cosmological. Personal identification is
the familiar form of the process of identification, those
people and objects closest to us, the ones we encounter on
an everyday or intimate basis that are most readily
assimilated to our sense of self. Immediate family may be
regarded as essentially part of self even to the extent
that one’s life may be sacrificed to protect those with
whom we identify. Fox rejects personal identification as
an adequate basis for deep ecology since it can as easily
produce aggressive and dominating behavior as nurturance
and caring. Those or that which is farthest removed from
one s identifications may in fact be viewed as a threat to
those closest to the self, that is, those furthest away
will be perceived as the threatening "other." Although
deep ecologists tend to speak as if their identifications
are personal identifications, Fox argues that this is
largely due to the difficulties of putting into words the
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Wider or deeper identifications characteristic of those
who share the understandings of deep ecologists.
Fox's briefest treatment is given to ontological
identification,
"Ontologically based identification refers
to experiences of commonality with all that is that are
brought about through deep-seated realization of the fact
things are. "28 Fox states that ontologicaUy based
identification is notoriously difficult to put into words,
but that it is probably a common experience and one that
is developed through the practice of Zen Buddhism. Fox
also states that Martin Heidegger has come closest to
putting this sense of identification into words. Fox
emphasizes how this feeling is one of astonishment or
amazement at "the manifestation of Being," that, "Things
ire! There is something rather than nothing!" He claims
this experience of the world can be obtained on an on-
going basis, not just in brief moments of mystical
rapture. This on-going experience results in a "deep but
impartial sense of identification with all existents."
Quoting one of the leading proponents of the Heideggerian
version of this deep ecology, Fox notes that this
experience leads to a certain type of action, the tendency
to let beings be, to let them take care of themselves in
accord with their own natures. 29 But Fox explicitly
associates this form of identification with mysticism,
first by quoting Wittgenstein on the meaning of the
mystical, and then by indicating that the experience
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itself can only be obtained through what are generally
considered mystical disciplines, one seriously wishes
to pursue the question r^-F iof ontologically based
identification then one must be prepared to undertake
arduous practice of the kind that rs associated with
certain kinds of experientially based spiritual
disciplines .
"
30
The third basis for deep ecological identification is
cosmology which for Fox is closely related to ontological
identification but allows more people into the deep
ecological household, including those who come to deep
ecology by way of the science of ecology:
Cosmological ly based identification refers toexperiences of commonality with all that is
fa
r
ct
9
tha?
bOUt “r<Th ^ep-seated^eanzaiion^ft we and all other entities are aspects of asingle unfolding reality. This realization can bebrought about through the empathic incorporation ofany cosmology This means that this realization canbe brought about through the empathic incorporationof mythological, religious, speculative
philosophical, or scientific cosmologies
.
31
Central to this cosmological identification is the
idea of a "single unfolding reality." Fox claims the
insight into the fact of human participation in the single
unfolding reality is capable of being "provoked" by
traditions as diverse as "the world-views of certain
indigenous peoples (e.g., of some North American Indians),
the philosophy of Taoism, or the philosophy of Spinoza."
In addition to mystical or quasi-mystical traditions, Fox
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also beiieves that modern science provides the means for
deep ecological awareness,
..Modern science is providing anincreasingly detailed account of the physical and
biological evolution of the universe that compels us to
view reality as a single unfolding process .'' 32
Fox prefers the cosmologically based form of
identification because of its aHvanbob r d tages over personal or
ontological identification. Personal identification as a
basis for deep-realization of the single unfolding
process, has a tendency to lapse into egoistic
identification where that which is closest and most like
one's self is defended at the expense of that which is
most different from one's ego. Family, friends, fellow
countrymen will receive the benefits of identification,
while nature, especially in its non-warm, non-fuzzy, forms
are more likely to be not only undefended but positively
dominated and exploited. However, personal identification
still provides the model for much of the language of deep
ecological identification. Ontological identification,
wonder at the fact hhat the world is, does not provide
much ground for communication of the individual's
experience of identification with the rest of nature.
Cosmological identification on the other hand, general
accounts of how the world is, are able to be communicated
symbolically, that is, cosmological identification can be
communicated through a range of traditions, from "the
communication of scientific, speculative philosophical,
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religious, and mythological views to the communication of
vivud visual images such as mandalas and the kinds of
images that have been presented here in which entities
have been conceived of as leaves on a tree. "33 Fox
ompletes his plea for a transpersonal ecology by claiming
that
:
In terms of politics and lifestyles,
transpersonal forms of identification'are
“Ied^
e
of
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actant that
* ° £ kind lnclude "°t on™
the earth M T ; treading lightly" upon(i.e., lifestyles of voluntary
simplicity) but also actions that respectfullybut resolutely attempt to alter the views andbehavror of those who persist in the delusionthat self realization lies in the direction ofdominating the earth and the myriad entities
with which we coexist. ^
Negative Dialectics and Identity
This overview of the "methodological" basis of the
philosophy of deep ecology indicates three areas needing
critical reflection. First, as Fox indicates, the deep
questioning method does not result in uniform conclusions
about the actions individuals should take in regard to
nature and other human beings. This results in Fox's turn
to the idea of identification which Naess also proposes as
^ fundament al aspect of deep ecological awareness.
Expanding on this insight, Fox proposes that "cosmological
identification" is the most adequate means of achieving
the necessary ecological awareness for addressing current
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ecological crises. Finally,
cosmological identification
epistemological basis for a
an ecocentric transpersonal
among the forms of
which "might" supply the
more adeguate deep ecology,
ecology, is modern science
critical examination of the adequacy of transpersonal
or
A
ecology must examine more closely, more "deeply, '
claims about identification and more specifically
Fox
' s
the
relation of identification to modern science.
Theodore Adorno’s "negative dialectics" offers an
alternative approach to the concerns of the deep and
transpersonal ecologists, which is more consistent
philosophically and addresses the problems of the
relationship of access to knowledge to identity formation
at a deeper or more self-reflexive level. Neaativp
M^ti^ was the title of Adorno’s last completed full
treatment of the problems of philosophy and specifically
of the situation of the human domination of nature.
Negative dialectics was an attempt to develop
philosophically an approach to the relationship of
cognition or awareness to "nature," yet seeks to
understand that relationship while still honoring the
difference or uniqueness of that which is not the subject
of cognition. In the deep ecological language this was an
attempt to understand "identification" without reducing
the object of cognition to a mere manifestation of the
constitutive power of the subject. Negative dialectics
rejects the Hegelian solution to the contradictions
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tween subject and object, between human subjectivity and
nature, that manifests itself in a dialectical
reconciliation of subject and object, in Absolute
Knowledge and the Absolute Subject. Negative dialectics
rejects the claim that the negation of the negation is
positive, that is, that the outcome of the struggle
between the subject and object is harmony or
reconciliation, at least not- int m the actual world in which
we live. The idealist reconciliation occurs only
abstractly leaving the actual conflicts and contradictions
of everyday life unchanged.
The deep and transpersonal ecological approaches, at
least in their philosophical representations, present an
understanding of the process of identification which very
much resembles the Hegelian or idealist solution of the
problem of the alienation or contradiction between humans
and nature. When identification of the self with the
world is viewed as an identification with a larger Self,
this results m philosophical difficulties corresponding
to those typical of idealism. Naess and Fox realize this
m their attempts to rescue the concepts of individuality
and diversity from the tendency of identification to
collapse into identity, the lack of differentiation
between the particular beings or entities of the world.
If identification with the world results in a reconciled
Self, it has the philosophical and political implications
of a totalizing perspective and possible totalitarian
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POUtiCS
' The uni™3s or essential drfference of that
which is not the self, or the subject, may collapse into a
mere manifestation of the SP lf rr se . Fok attempts to address
thiS ^ diSCUSSl°" of "Personal" identification and
its difference from cosmological identification. Personal
identification tends to result in all those behaviors
associated with "possessive individualism,
- the desire to
control and dominate that which resists reduction to self.
Fox also points out the frequent use of the language of
personal identification even by those who might be
cosmological ly identified, but he fails to explore this
beyond the simple recognition of the utility of using
familiar terminology to explain the concept of
Identification. The necessity of using the terminology of
personal experience is a clue to the problem of
cosmological identification. The examples Fox uses to
explain the idea of cosmological identification, Buddhism,
Taoism, modern science, all have a common tendency which
makes them cosmological, that is, they tend to collapse
the individual or particular into the general or
universal. The felt necessity to use the terminology of
personal identification is an indication of the only
partially acknowledged philosophical inability of
ecocentrism to provide an adequate response to the need to
give full credit to the particular and individual.
Personal and cosmological identification are in tension
because they tend to result in the opposing tendencies of
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means of
individualism and totalism or holism. The
ecological identification described by Naess and Fox,
either religious or scientific, lack the conceptual
distinctions necessary to fulfill the task of generating
ecological awareness, especially the establishment of
critical ecological consciousness capable of an analysis
of existing social, economic and political structures
which would enable coherent radical ecological practice.
Instead of mystical religious traditions, positivist
science, or psychologism, what is required is a means of
interpreting the relationships of subjectivity and
objectivity that can represent the full richness of those
relationships without sacrificing the human subject to a
fateful nature or making nature a mere material for
domination and exploitation serving the aggrandizement of
the ego and humanity.
Negative dialectics is an attempt to honor the
particular, the unique in the other, through a
philosophical interpretation of the relationship of
subjectivity to nature, including the fact subjectivity is
one manifestation of the objectivity of nature. In
Adorno's last two major works, Negative Pi a 1 prf i <-* and
Aesthetic Theory
,
he attempts to accomplish what Fox and
Naess seem to be striving for; a way of interpreting the
situation of human beings in the world in a way that
provides opportunities to resist the prevalent,
hegemonic, " ideology of domination which has resulted in
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the increasing destruction of external nature and the
crippling and sufferrng of human beings, both physically
and
'psychologically... One of the major difficulties in
confronting negative dialectxcs is Adorno's necessary
insistence on the impossibility of reducing philosophical
interpretation to a single fundamental or principle.
According to negative dialectics, the analysis of the
"object" under consideration must be given full
recognition of its uniqueness, difference, or otherness,
but, in the tradition of dialectical analysis, this
recognition must also acknowledge the history of the
object, and the history in the object-those impacts and
elements of society which penetrate the object as well as
the interpreting subject. Interpretation, both negatively
and dialectically, necessarily results in a layered
complex of mediations between the object and the
interpreting subject. Compounding the difficulty of
interpretation is Adorno’s assertion (contra Hegel) that
the whole is not rational, is not the true. On the
contrary, the whole is the false, that is, the world is
not tending to a synthetic resolution of its
contradictions in a positive absolute, but rather the
tendency is toward unreconciled catastrophe. Negative
dialectics is sometimes also called immanent criticism,
immanent contradiction, or non-identity thinking.
Asserting the importance of recognizing the non— identity
of subject and object, or of word and thing, is not to say
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that there is no recognitron of the importance of identity
(or
"identification"
) for cognition and for practice,
discarded^rV*1 identit y >™st not simply bescarded
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Adorno is making several claims in this statement
that are relevant for the problems of identification and
methods" of philosophical interpretation. To suppose
that psychological or philosophical identification is
simply a matter of discipline or technique is to be blind
to the impact of the contradictions and conflicts of
society which impact those disciplines, techniques or
methods themselves. The transpersonal ecologist's
reliance on religious and scientific disciplines to
generate a reconciled ecological consciousness is an
idealistic misrecognition of the place of suffering and
exploitation present in the world. It is not possible to
overcome the contradictions of society simply by
individual identification with the world, because the
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the actions of human domination which^ ^
the beginnings of human history, but which were
intensified with industnialization and capitalism. (There
are srgnificant differences between those phiiosophers of
ecology who attempt to identify the fundamental cause of
ecological destruction with industrialization itself or
with capitalism as the dominant mode of production.
Perhaps rather that attempting to choose between the two
as to which is more essential, it would be more worthwhile
and consistent with negative dialectics to examine their
interrelationships and see how they have been linked or
mediated with each other and with other elements of
identity thinking and its various forms of material
practice.) To identify with the whole is only part of the
process of overcoming the domination of nature, since
identification would necessarily involve identification
with a contradictory whole there is no avenue to immediate
access to the truth of the ecological situation. Naess's
representation of identification as the process of
overcoming alienation, thereby returning to a fullness-of-
experience, or an original, immediate relation to nature,
is an idealistic and romantic delusion with unavoidable
reactionary consequences. Rather than viewing
identification as an avenue of immediate access to truth,
or to "right living" or primordial "dwelling, "
identification can be viewed as an anticipation of the
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unavailabl
to exist,
of the "
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utopia" to come, an existence
existing world, a nature which has yet
in the mythic past. This "not yet" can
°nlY C°me lnt° belng throu9h the adequate interpretation
the existing situation, an interpretation which
indicates how the other of nature is repressed, how
suffering manifests itself. adequate interpretation
would bring this repression and suffering to
consciousness, as part of the mediation of the present
fragmented ecological consciousness with that future world
where contradiction and the ideology of domination no
longer exist, "Utopia would be above identity and above
contradiction; it would be a togetherness of diversity." 36
Adorno agrees that identification may lead to the
desired relationship with nature, but he rejects
assertions that the reconciliation with nature is possible
m its full sense m a world of suffering and catastrophe:
For the sake of utopia, identification is
reflected in the linguistic use of the word
outside of logic, in which we speak, not of
identifying an object, but of identifying with
people and things. Dialectics alone might
settle the Greek argument whether like is known
by like or by unlike. If the thesis that
likeness alone has that capacity makes us aware
of the indelible mimetic element in all
cognition and all human practice, this awareness
grows untrue when the af f inity--indelible, yet
infinitely far removed at the same time— is
posited as positive. In epistemology the
inevitable result is the false conclusion that
the object is the subject. 37
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Adorno does not deny the awareness generated in the
identification with others, but he returns to the
observation that the process of identification has the
idealist tendency to posit in the other the self or
subject of identification. The danger is of projecting
onto the other the characteristics of the self and
subjecting the other to the needs of the self as an
extension of the process of the domination of nature.
Identification can only retain what is intuitively
perceived as true by retaining the qualitative affinity
recognized in the process of mimesis. Adorno claims
mimesis is a mode of cognition that allows the possibility
of knowledge without domination. What is required however
is a comprehension of this process that goes beyond deep
ecology's mystical practices of expanded consciousness to
a knowledge that can be achieved without sacrificing the
uniqueness of the particular, a uniqueness which makes
every entity an object of ethical consideration for its
own sake. Deep ecology and transpersonal ecology have no
interpretive strategy capable of indicating right
ecological action even after the broader identification or
increased ecological awareness has taken place. Both
Naess and Fox view their position as "non-coercive"
because there is no "necessity" attached to the attainment
of ecological awareness. They seem to believe that the
abdication of the responsibility for establishing a means
of mediating between potential intuitive awareness,
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instead, this laissez-faire ideology produces a radicaljunction between their individual advocacy of
ecocentric views and their belief in the necessity of aheightened ecological awareness. They each provide
arguments for the benefits of identification with the rest
of nature, and an intensified need to defend the Self from
the destruction of existing society, but then provide no
basis for this link except an ambiguous hope that the
Self-identifying individual will choose the deep or
transpersonal ecological path. Both contend that there
will continue to be conflict, even among or between those
who have achieved ecological awareness. However, Fox
seems to argue that this "necessity'' of human nature can
be overcome even against the evidence of the ecological
crisis itself,
Understanding this fact [the transpersonal
understanding of the self] enables us to see why
i^
a
moral
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10giStS reject approaches that issue
” oug ts"... and why they do not attempt to
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tness of their views in such a way
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conclusions are morally binding on othersI both cases, the reason is that they are notinterested m supporting approaches that serve toreinforce the primary reality of the narrow,
atomistic, or particle-like volitional self. Fortranspersonal ecologists, given a deep enough
understanding of the way things are, the response ofemg molined to care for the unfolding of the worldm all its aspects follows "naturally"--not as alogical consequence but as a psvcholocri ca i
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Never mind that the world seem, eia s to contradict this
assumption of the relationship of human maturation to the
^
lre t0 031:6 f ° r natUre
' NeV6r mind tha t modern western
P x osophy, rncluding the Habermasian version of critrcal
theory as well as most versions of ecosocialism, which
vrew maturity as the increasing ability to form abstract
moral concepts and act rn a specifically moral world of
where non-human nature can only be "maturely"
as an object for technical control and human use
.
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At least Naess has the intellectual integrity to recognize
the dilemmas of hrs position, "The above seems to point rn
the direction of philosophical mysticism...." And even
though he attempts to reinstate the centrality of the
individual with the fundamental
"Self-realization!" he
realizes he has not made an argument for this position,
merely asserted a hope, "The widening and deepening of the
individual selves somehow never makes them into one
'mass What is needed is a coherent explanation of
the links between identification with others and
philosophical and political positions that use the
insights thus generated as a basis for a practice that can
halt and reverse the tendency for ecological and social
destruction and catastrophe, not a speculative hope in a
questionable process of "natural" maturation.
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^ CritlClsm or negative dialectics begins with
e object of interpretation and attempts to weave a
conceptual net that suspends the object
"momentarily, to
reveal the process it contains, including that to which it
is potentially becoming, In the historical situation that
is the culmination of destruction nnu wand where neither the
individual" nor "nature" truly exist uhy , t e process of
identification m the here and now does not lead to the
truth of the ecological situation but to an indication of
its negative existence, the absence of an adequate
understanding of a reconciled subject and object, history
and nature. What is possible is not an immediate access
to original nature, or ecological truth, but the awareness
that true nature would be radically otherwise than it is
at present. What is necessary is not simply a mystical
identification with nature and a subsequent defense of its
"essential" characteristics as established by personal
assertion or scientific certainty, but an interpretive
strategy capable of grasping the contradictory and
antagonistic world in its complexity.
yn Negative Dialectics Adorno proposes a theory of
philosophy which attempts to do justice to the non-
identical, to that which is not the subject. The
challenge for radical ecology is to interpret this theory
and its context, the critique of philosophy and its
application to aesthetics, and translate it into a fully
ecological understanding and interpretive strategy. One
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Of the aspects of Philosophy closely related to Naess's
deep ecology which Adorno addresses is that of
intuitionism, specifically that of Bergson. Again, the
problem of intuitionism is its attempt to attain immediate
insight Without the help of philosophical interpretation:
to exist m fact as an archaic rudiment ofmimetic reactions, what preceded its nast h ua promise beyond the ossified present dS
Evert r°
nS
f
UCCeed °nlY desul torily, however
the rationali?v
"ncluding ^rgson's own need^® ° ty he scorns, and needs itpreciseiy at the moment of concretionAbsolutrzed duration, pure becoming, the pure
^
would recoil into the timelessness
and
C
Aristotle
metaPhysics since Platoa . He did not mind that the thinahe groped for, if it is not to remam ,IS Visible solely with the equipment of
reflection upon its own means, andthat it grows arbitrary in a procedure
unrelated, from the start, to that of
cognition.
Adorno is asserting the necessity of philosophical
interpretation of the experience of intuition and of
reflection on the interpretive process itself. So, even
if intuition does contain the truth related to the
continuation of mimetic possibility it only escapes
idealist metaphysics and its consequent abstraction of
insight from its socio-historical context through
reflection on its own possibility. If ecological
awareness is going to go beyond mere affirmation of the
existing ideology of domination, whether as reformism or
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in more brutal authoritarian
-fn n forma, then deep ecology must
-ve beyond a naive belief in immediate access to the
truth of nature. The problem for radrcal ecology i s todevelop an interprets
"method" which results in an
ecological understanding of the relatronshrp of society
and nature that grves full credit to the non-identical as
«ell as the contradictions of existing society. This
becomes even more challenging when consideratron is given
to the various critiques of Adorno's critical theory which
explicitly rejects the orthodox interpretation of the
possibility of the revolutionary subject, a subject
corresponding to the actually existing members of the
industrial proletariat. An additional problem to be
included in these considerations are those interpretations
of Adorno's alternative conception of a resistant
subjectivity which assert that he fails to provide an
adequate conception of an alternative subjectivity, or
that he retains it only in the form of isolated
individuals dedicated to the "esotericism" of aesthetics
and critical thought. Besides these problematic relations
to the possibility of critical practice there is the
question of the suitability of Adorno's position for the
ecology movement. After all, Adorno was dedicated to the
immanent critique of philosophy and aesthetics, "cultural
forms,” and rarely addressed what are now seen as the
primary concerns of the ecology movement, those much more
physical, apparently less "cultural," phenomena such as
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acid rain, toxic wastes, and vanishing species. If
Adorno's critical theory is to provide a potentially
adequate interpretive framework for radical ecologists it
must yield two possibilities most of its critics deny it
is capable of; a revolutionary subject beyond the
contemplative individual, and, closely related, an
interpretive structure which neither evaporates into
mysticism nor simply imposes idiosyncratic judgments on
its object of analysis.
The encounter between Adorno's critical theory and
radical ecology must then engage the two areas of
subjectivity and politics. What are the insights and
limitations of the deep ecological or transpersonal
subject or Self, and how might deep ecology and critical
theory cross-pollinate to produce a more adeguate
interpretation of our ecological situation? How would
this new, potentially revolutionary, ecological subject
interpret specific or particular claims previously made
about how to proceed in addressing the problems of the
collapse of the global ecosystem to the extent that the
planet may not be able to support human life? Even more
specifically, how would a radical ecology informed by
critical theory address the deep ecology proposal for
increased wilderness preservation and its struggle with
the ideology of economic growth?
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CHAPTER 4
DEEP ECOLOGY and subjectivity
The deep, transpersonal, or eoocentric ecologists
represent the self as the key to answering various
ecological problems, including the general or overall
ecological crisis which is also believed to be a crisis of
thS SPlrit
- A Central difficulty the ecological self or
subject faces is in the relationship of its general or
universal perspective to the uniqueness or particularity
of individual entities. Can the ecological identification
the ecocentrists argue for provide the level of ecological
awareness needed to reverse the problems of ecological
destruction and at the same time honor the uniqueness of
individuals? Both Naess and Fox recognize the potential
problem of a self-identification which identifies with
nature generally but then cannot be linked with the needs
of individual entities except by appealing to a process of
"natural maturity" the ecologically identified self (Self)
undergoes. A critical examination of this position must
question the status of this natural maturity and the more
generally held belief in some teleologically directed
universal process of development of human beings. The
problems associated with a belief in teleological human
development should also be examined in the context of the
problematic theories about the processes of
identification. This examination can be carried forward
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resulting from
by addressing several specific questions
these problematic beliefs. First ls the question again Qfthe possibility of an immedrate access to knowledge
achieved in the process of identification. i s not the
identifying self, as well as that wlth which ^
identifies, marked by the contradictions and conflicts of
society, so that identification does not give Mediate
access to an originary truth of pristine nature? An
alternative more socially and historically situated
understanding of the processes of identification would
then present, at best, an opportunity to critically
examine the mediations between society and nature at
various levels. This would result in the need for a
theory of society as much as an understanding of
ecological science. Second, to what extent is the claim
of universal identification and natural maturity the claim
of a specific class, race, gender, and so forth? Deep
ecology has already been criticized for its assumptions
about gender, and it is important to reemphasize this
critique and extend it to include an encounter with the
perspective of negative dialectical or non-identity
thinking. Finally, Naess limits the ethical or moral
implications of the process of identification with the
wider self of nature by returning to the idea of the need
for individual self-preservation based on a theory of
vital needs. What is a vital need and how might vital
needs change historically and in response to the
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development of indivi
o
iduals and ecosystems? i s there
escape from the trsnn^ ntraditional problem of distinguishing
between true and false needs?
Critique of Self-identification
Various authors have challenged the deep ecology
understanding of identification, putting into question the
type of self or subjectivity assumed by these radical
ecologists. Tim Lube has challenged the deep ecology
understanding of subjectivity by, in part, relying on the
insights of Horkheimer and Adorno and the tradition of
critical theory
.
1 Deep ecology depends on the two
fundamental values of "self-realization" and "biocentric
equality,
" and it is the process of developing an
ecological awareness of these fundamental values and their
resulting consequences which Luke critiques. Luke claims
the deep ecologists take an anti-Enlightenment stance
which includes anti-industrial, anti-technology (neo-
Luddite) and neo-primitive elements. His final judgment
of deep ecology is that it is deeply flawed, projecting an
idealized reconciled humanity onto nature, and implying a
need for what could become a "new discipline of ethical
surveillance (self-administered by the subject in Taoist
meditation, Buddhist self-in-Self introspection, and
mythic Native American purification rituals) to
reconstitute human subjectivity within natural
subjectivity ." 2 The question here is whether the deep
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ecology insights can be preserved ±f^
_VaUd '' 3 r6SCUlng ° f theSe ^Whts not by means of the
Phiiosophy of deep ecology, but with an extended critical
theory based primarily on the work of Theodor Adorno.
Luke summarizes the deep ecologrcal project, "By
citing new norms to constrarn humanity's destruction of
the ecosphere, deep ecologists aspire to overturn the
Enlightenment schema underpinning advanced industrialism's
instrumental rationality. In adopting examples they see
m primal cultures, deep ecologists believe they can
effectuate Nature's reenchantment, the development of
nondominating sciences, and an emergence of a new
ecological society by creating new forms of human
selfhood ." 3 The development of a nondominating science
was of course at the heart of the Marcuse-Habermas debate
and a basic reason for Habermas's rejection of Marcuse's
call for a "logic of gratification ." 4 The epistemological
status of science is also related to Habermas's charge
against Horkheimer and Adorno of mysticism, since Habermas
sees no other possibilities for science to relate to
nature than through technologies that are fundamentally
tools of domination. The relationship of a non-dominating
radical ecological version of science, the "reenchantment"
of nature and its affect on new forms of "selfhood," can
be addressed within the context of Luke's critique of deep
ecology by way of a critical response.
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George Sessions and Bin Devall have ^^ ^extend Naess’s
’’ecosophy, ” beyo„d its sometimes
idiosyncratic assertions, in an attempt to develop the
common themes" of deep ecology. 0ne of Luke . s
fundamental critici qmq n-f n1S S ° f d6ep ^ological subjectivity i s
^ n0t mSet ^
-
-present a radical new
orm of ecological consciousness, but instead should be
seen as merely replicating many of the characteristics of
modern individualism, and that the assertions about
possibilities for the development of this ecological
consciousness are in fact class based. His central
criticism of the deep ecological understanding of the
self, or subjectivity, focuses on its reliance on
questionable means for attaining this subjectivity, not
the goal of elimination of the prevailing worldview of
present society with its instrumental rationality and
domination of nature. Whether using the deep questioning
method, Taoism, Buddhism, or other traditions for raising
personal consciousness, the deep ecologists seem to be
open to the objection that they have abstracted these
traditions out of their social-historical context. This
seems to be true of the appropriation of the religions,
and of Native American peoples' beliefs and ritual
practices. This abstraction has two consequences: first,
it fails to acknowledge the authoritarian societies the
traditions developed within and reinforced; second, it is
not at all obvious how these traditions and rituals.
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"primitive"especially tho„ ot
^
“"temporary social conditions.
ThS hSart ° f thS the deep ecology
understanding ot subjecfrvlfy rs the lack ot an adegnate
reatment ot the relationshrp between history and nature
^ims the deep ecologist progects the need tor
liberation onto "Nature" and in so doing projects
what is actually one particular aspect of the ecosphere
(the human) as the expression of the whole of nature
This is comparable to the Marxist understanding of false
consciousness, where the bourgeois or capitalist class
asserts that its class position has achieved the truth of
history and is the representative of the progressive
development of history, and which manifests itself in
various specific forms including that of the nation-state,
private economy, individualism, and so forth. The
falseness of the assertion, its status as ideology, is the
result of mistakenly taking the particular as the
universal. in the bourgeois idealism of Hegel,
reconciliation of subject and object, or society and
nature, becomes metaphysical when development of the
dialectic between the two opposing phenomena achieves its
ultimate realization in subject-object identity, the
Absolute Subject. Luke claims the deep ecology philosophy
repeats this ideological construction in two ways. It too
is class based, but, in addition, it is an expression of
the particularity of the human species, it is
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"anthropomorphic," the nir-im = +-uitimate s lgn of faiiure for d
ecological ethics r„vnLUke surr|marizes this conclusion.
Nature in deep ecology simply becomes a
.
,
_
Y CO new transcendent
identical subject-object to redeem humanity. By
projecting selfhood into Nature, humans are to be saved bym mg their self maturation and spiritual growth in
it.... Nature, then, becomes ecosophical humanity's
alienated self-understanding, partly reflected back to
itself and selectively perceived as self-realization,
rediscovered in biospheric processes. *5 This process
takes its most "alienated" form in the return to Gaia
mythology where the earth is viewed as self-regulating
meta-subject. Perhaps the issues involved can be
Clarified, and an alternative conception of the
relationship of society and nature be advanced, by
examining the manner in which Adorno approached a
fundamentally similar philosophical and political riddle.
An examination of Adorno's understanding of the
relationship between society and nature, or history and
nature, indicates the continuity of his thought throughout
his years as critical philosopher. Two works in
particular, the essay "The Idea of a Natural History" and
his late work Negative Dialectics reveal a consistent
theoretical position in this fundamental area. The
argument for this continuity and consistency in Adorno's
work was first put forward by Susan Buck-Morss. 6 Adorno
begins his exploration of the relation of nature and
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hl7Y ^ diStlngUiShl- hl » understanding from those ofa «tory of nature" or a nature as simply an object fQr
science, However, I do not overstep myself if i
-y that the real intention here is to dralectically
overcome the usual antithesis of nature and history.
Therefore, wherever I operate with the concepts of nature
and history, no ultimate definitions are meant, rather I
am pursuing the intention of pushing these concepts to a
point where they are mediated in their apparent
difference. " 7 For Adorno then the concepts of history and
nature interpenetrate and can only be developed in a
process of analysis. However, as a preliminary
approximation of the difference, Adorno strongly
associates the status of nature to that of myth, "The
concept of nature that is to be dissolved is one that, if
I translated it into standard philosophical terminology,
would come closest to the concept of myth." This
understanding of the concept of myth means "what has
always been, what as fatefully arranged predetermined
being underlies history and appears in history; it is
substance in history." 8 Then of course it becomes
necessary to more fully explain the relation of nature and
history, "History means the mode of conduct established by
tradition that is characterized primarily by the
occurrence of the qualitatively new; it is a movement that
does not play itself out in mere identity, mere
reproduction of what has always been, but rather one in
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movement that gains its true
s
which the new occurs; it is a
character through what appears in it as new "9
‘“J
understanding of history as a relationship to the L ls
the basis for its distinction from myth, and can he viewed
as central to what will become negative dialectics and its
criticism of Hegelian, Marxist and Heideggerian
Philosophical positions Por example, in the section of
on "Natural History" Adorno uses Marx
against dogmatic Marxists to extend the critique of Hegel.
After quoting a long passage from the introduction of
Capita which includes Marx's assertion, "I comprehend the
development of society's economic formation of society as
a process of natural history.
..
"U, Adorno explains Marx's
meaning against the interpretation of the Marxists, what
is being argued, asserts Adorno, is the status of the
"natural laws" of capitalism. The "law of capitalist
accumulation" is conceived as an inevitability of natural
processes, as the "law of nature," a naturalization of
history that serves to mystify the exploitative process of
capitalism. The reason it can be called a law by Marx is
because of its appearance to the subjects of society,
"That law is natural because of its inevitable character
under the prevailing conditions of production. Ideology
is not superimposed as a detachable layer on the being of
society; it is inherent in that being." 12 The status of
these natural laws" is not that of ontological
inevitability, but of something to be abolished, a
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possibility bpr^n q
^
+-v>Y Decause they are historical th^t- <t at is, made byhuman beings. Adorno knows this is tr„» ,LUIS IS ue because of the
purpose of Marx's work "Th-iQ -iK
' ls ls confirmed by the
strongest motive behind all Marxist ihcm liarxis theory: that those
laws can be abolished. The realm of freedom would no
sooner begin than they would cease to apply...13 For
Adorno then, Marx's concept of the laws of capitalism is
used to reveal the workings of domination, a process that
has become so extensive, he argues, that what is in fact
historical appears to have the status of the ''natural."
This fulfillment of domination is best exemplified in the
Philosophy of Hegel, where spirrt comes to dominate all
existence, finally rising to the status of a "second
nature." But rather than the unfolding of necessity as
Hegel contends, this is the formulation of the "bourgeois
consciousness," a consciousness that views its power to
rule as an expression of natural necessity, veiling its
program of self-interested domination, "Spirit as a second
nature is the negation of the spirit, however, and that
the more thoroughly the blinder its self-consciousness is
to its natural growth. This is what happens to Hegel.
His world spirit is the ideology of natural history. He
calls it world spirit because of its power. Domination is
absolutized and projected on Being itself, which is said
to be the spirit." 14 Adorno's critical theory is based in
the argument that this domination has extended itself to
the totality of society, leaving only fragments and
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marginal existences to mark t-hohe possibility of its
— "hen ^ "b°— consciousness" Resents1S
.
t0 ltSelf ^ reVerses the human and the natural and
mystifies history as fate;
5t2fi «**•• .» being
IS trapped within fhprof. total. what
itself as its o™' otherness hTeS ?° appear toof idealism. The morfr^L^essly Phe“on
socialization commands all momenta n f Kinterhuman immediacy, the smaller the capacityof men to recall that this web has evolved Lthe more irresistible its natural appearancehe appearance is reinforced as the distance'rtSf0ry “d MtUre teeps Sgrowing
:
imprisonment
“ lrreslstib^ Parable of
This leads Adorno to again assert the reason for
considering the antithesis of nature and history as both
true and false. The two are opposites as a result of what
human beings have done with respect to nature, dominating
it, making it the "other" to be dominated, and feared. It
is feared because it can potentially overwhelm the
subject. The opposition is false to the extent that
philosophy constructs its categories in such a way that it
conceals the truth, the truth that history is used to
conceal the historical nature of existing domination and
exploitation. The unveiling of this requires a critical
interpretive approach to the relationship, "History can be
considered from two sides, divided into the history of
nature and the history of mankind. Yet there is no
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separating the two sides- as i„
rt „
' 33 l0ng as
^ist, natural
human hrstory win qualify each other." Thi s isquote from Marx, which Adorno emphaslzes ^
dogmatic materialists
.
"16 Of course the necessity of
interpretation invites the question of its relation to
Practice, especially a transformative or revolutionary
practice and its relation to an "ecological politics. "17
This excursus through Adorno makes it possible to
-re fully explore Puke's objection to the deep ecological
subjectivity. Deep ecology points to the various
religious and philosophical traditions to legitimate its
understanding of the process and consequences of
identification. Included in the list of approved means to
larger identification is the participation in outdoor
activities, including "fishing, hunting, surfing,
sunbathing, kayaking, canoeing, sailing, mountain
climbing, hang gliding, skiing, running, bicycling and
birdwatching." 18 Luke points out that many of these
activities are those of "industrial tourism," activities
of overstylized modes of corporate consumerist
leisure." 19 Many of these activities require a class
position within existing consumerist capitalism that
allows for considerable consumption of leisure time as
well as the physical means of participation, a position
that could result in the philosophy of deep ecology being
labeled an "ideology of white-collar intellectuals or
professional-technical workers" who are simply defending
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th61r PriVUegSd lifestyles
. The Identification which
occurs in such activities win tend not to be that of
-rely another
..citizen., in the biosphere of equaUty, or
even one of equality in the sphere of social relations,
but an identity complicit with a mode of production,
consumption, and reproduction that replicates systematic
domination and exploitation of nature in its various
addition, the knowledge acquired through the
"reenchantment of Nature" will not be that of ilmediate
truth but that which is mediated through history, and
through nature's entwinement with history, as both Adorno
and Marx indicate. What is lacking in the deep ecological
understanding of subjectivity and its relation to
identification is sufficient distinction or
differentiation of different types of self or subjects and
a more concrete or specific understanding of the process
of identification itself, one that does not leave us with
largely abstract notions of the self and of nature.
Without an explicit acknowledgment of the relationship of
the possibilities of self-realization, or self-
identification with the means to actualize those
possibilities, the deep ecology philosophy threatens to
remain abstract, contradictory and potentially a
contributor to a social situation of intensified
domination and exploitation, all in the name of both
"defending external nature" and "disciplining internal
nature." Luke questions the practical consequences of
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these adventures of outdoor self-realization and
entification, who will make such goods [composite surf
boards, hang girders, and eighteen-speed trail b r kesl or
produce food while others see* self-realisation and
biocentri.c equality?"20
Can the deep ecology philosophy be altered to bring
about a viable understanding of the possibilities of self-
identification with nature? Or are there such fundamental
contradictions within the positron that some alternative
conception of the relationship of society to nature, and
Of individuals to society must be developed?
Different Identities
One aspect of the ecocentric understanding of the
process of identification that is most problematic is its
tendency to abstractly acknowledge the importance of
history and situation as they relate to the processes of
identification, but then fail to adequately take this into
account m cases where "defense" of nature actually
occurs. Marti Kheel has highlighted these problems by
analyzing deep ecology's claims with the use of the
primary feminist category of gender. Kheel argues that
central to both deep ecologist and ecofeminist thought is
an opposition to "axiological or value theories" which
attempt to establish universally binding, logically
derived criteria for determining moral values, which
result in systems of rights and obligations.
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Alternatively, both +-uassert the need for a transformed,
ecological consciousness as necessary for the existence of
a relationship tetween society and nature that Is not one
of domination and destruction. Deep or transpersonal
ecologists call for self-realization, or Self-
realization!, in an attempt to establish this greater
ecological swarsnsss rinQ .p , ,e e
. One of the assumptions of this
self realizing identification is th^-t- i +- •° l hat it will necessarily
lead to defense of the rest of nature as a process of
"natural maturity. Kheel argues that the deep ecological
understanding of the process of identification is in fact
a masculine process of identification with potentially
destructive consequences for nature, thus revealing the
inadequacy of the deep ecological understanding of
ecological consciousness.
Kheel claims the difference between deep ecology and
ecofemmism is their alternative views of the root cause
of "our environmental malaise ." 21 Deep ecologists or
ecocentrists view anthropocentrism as the root of
ecological problems, while ecofeminists conclude that it
is androcentrism, " not humans but "men and the
masculinist worldview" which are ultimately responsible
for ecological problems. Kheel traces the ecofeminist
analysis of androcentrism to Simone de Beauvoir and her
work The Second Sex which provides an explanation of the
process whereby nature and women are objectified as men
acquire their sense of self. Kheel also relies on
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psychoanalytic
"object relatrons theory., to explain how
the formation of male identity requires a two-stage
process of disrdentification with the mother. identity
formation is not only a difference or differentiation of
individual egos but of gender specific difference.
Dorothy Dinnerstein is cited as showing how the male not
only disidentifies with the mother and women, but with the
rest of nature as well. Object relations theory explains
masculine development of identity as a process of
objectification of the other-both of women, and nature
generally— and the desire of the male for unity with the
original mother figure, a desire to "reexperience the
original state of union ." 22 whether the psychoanalytic or
ecofeminist reduction is adequate to address the
ecological crisis is itself open to critical examination,
but what is of interest here is how this analysis reveals
the limits of present deep ecology philosophy
.
23
One of the key assertions of the deep
ecologist/transpersonal ecologists is the consequence of
identification with nature as a whole. Once the
individual matures in his identifications he will then
begin to react to nature as one’s self and protect and
defend it both as a whole and in its particulars, similar
to how one would tend to act in situations requiring the
narrowly construed ego's struggle for self-preservation.
The only reason to kill would then be for "vital needs."
As Arne Naess has explained,
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be?Sgs
Ci
c»sc“X perc™“ ^ is thab humanbeings have for self-realisaM Urge other biving
therefore assume a_kind of r-o=.°
n
' and that we must
candudL_to,arris
e9abitariJdAttr^ P ril}cl P le °f biospheric
sometimes been misunderstood as ll right ' hasneeds should never have priori fv
ning that human
needs. But this is neve? intende^LIfhave for instance greater obliaafC, l Practice, we
nearer to us. This i mn i i , g . n that which is
involve killing or iniurinn
Utlas whl ch sometimes
dimensions of ^
“umans
. . . The
compared with vital needs of tth
f humans must be
is a conflict.
°
er sP®cies, if there
Naess discusses the relationships of
identification, killing, vital needs.
equality,
and rituals;
This does not imply that one acts, wishes to
princiol ^
onalstenh y can act in harmony with the
httoU equality. The statements aboutbiospheric equality must be merely taken asguidelines. Even under conditions of Intenseidentification, killing occurs. The Indians in
an
f°rn
h'
"lth thelr animistic mythology, were
with real?,?
eq
;f
llty in principle, combinedistic admissions of their own vitalneeds. When hunger arrives, brother rabbit
bu^h UPd nf the fPOt ; '* brother is a citizen,hut oh, so temptingly nutri t ious ! '
--this
exclamation is too easy: the complicated ritualswhich surround the hunt in many culturesillustrate how closely people feel bound to
other beings, and how natural it is to feel that
when we harm others, we also harm ourselves.
Non-instrumental acts develop into
instrumental
.
Z!=>
Kheel's analysis centers on the writings of Jose
Ortega y Gasset and Aldo Leopold. What these two have in
common is a love of hunting, the point of the analysis
being that even those who are killing for sport claim to
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be deeply identified wlth the naturg they ^
naturalness" or inevxtabrlity of development or maturity
associated with the process of identification
„ith "nature
as a whole," as claimed by the deep/transpersonal
ecologists, does not in fact occur. Aido fold's
relationship to hunting is of special interest since he isfrequently cited in the deep ecology literature
especially that of Earth Eirstl, as someone who had an
especially heightened since of ecological awareness
Le°P° ld '
- developed the idea of
the "land ethic" which claims human beings should be "gust
Plain citizens" within nature as a whole. if soraeone were
to exemplify the consequences of radical ecological
Identification with the whole of nature it would be
reasonable to believe it would be someone like Leopold.
However, he makes fundamental claims about the
relationship of hunting and identity:
Dursn?h
t:l
f
Ct that findS delight in the sight andp uit o game is bred into the very fiber of
e race.... the man who does not like to see,
unt, photograph, or otherwise outwit birds oranimais is hardly normal. He is supercivilized,
and I for one do not know how do deal withim
. . . . Some can live without opportunity for theexercise and control of the hunting instinct,lust as I suppose some can live without work,play, love, business, or other vital adventure.
But in these days we regard such deprivations as
unsocial. Opportunity for exercise of all the
normal instincts has come to be regarded more
and more as an inalienable right.
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AS Kheel points out, this individual who seems to
epitomize so much of what deep ecoiogists believe is a
strong advocate of sport hunting, which seems to be in
"Hr
C°ntradiCtl0n t0 the
*Y the deep ecologists
of the necessary development of concern for other entities
for their own sake" as the individual becomes
increasingly identified with the whole of nature. Rather
than, a rnatural" procps^ n -p m ,e s of maturing, the non-destructive,
non-dominating behavior idealized by the ecocentrists is 1
product of social and historical factors as well as the
vital needs" of the human organism. The ecocentric
reliance on a theory of "normal" development or maturing
of the individual human being is in fact a return to some
notion of an ontological essence, some "necessary
structure" of "human nature ". This conception does not
adequately consider the role of history, of
"socialization," through family, economics, politics, and
so forth. What is required instead is an understanding of
the mediating links between the process of identification
and the development of an ecological awareness adequate to
the problem of destruction and catastrophe, in both its
"ecological" and "social" forms, for both the individual
and the community. The quote marks indicate the dominant
use of the language which includes assumptions of identity
and duality, of a nature separate from history and
society. Much of the concern of a theory of non-identity
or negative dialectics is to emphasize the impossibility
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“ “* “ “'«•
.»•
~c«», „a
reverse, ail concepts necessarily include their
opposite
.
KheSl eXtendS hSr “alysis in m attempt to capture
the sense of deep ambivalence of those dedicated to
hunting and killing. The ambivalence is generated by a
conflict between the desire to be one with nature again,
time to retain what is uniquely human.
However, what seems to be uniquely human, as it is
frequently represented by many of the heroes of deep
ecologists, is a characteristic of those identified as
male. Ortega is quoted to indicate this deep ambivalence
toward the hunt, the animal, nature, and self-identity:
’’Nor can it be other wise, because man has never really
known what an animal is. Before and beyond all science,
humanity sees itself as something emerging from animality,
but it cannot be sure of having transcended that state
completely ." 27 The analysis continues with the indication
that this ambivalence is a result of the yearning for
unity, but fulfillment is made impossible by the death of
the animal. In object relations theory "it is only when
the boy child transforms his mother into an object that
his identity can be formed. In a similar way, animals
have become objects in the eyes of these men ." 28 What
results is the opposite of the deep/transpersonal
ecologists' claim for the processes of maturity and Self-
identification, the other is not honored for its own sake.
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but becomes a sacrifice ^ +-uthe development of (male)
identity. The "merging" with nature as a whole results inthe death of the nvHrnnparticular animal,
"The sicmi-f-;^significance of
' "d"Ctl0ri of th* “‘“1 to 0bj,c,
„ „„ tJi
“ “•
-or. important
animal itself. "29 pvpnE e those most closely identified with
the deep ecology movement. Bill Devall and George
Sessions, who have worked with Naess to develop a deep
ecology platform, include hunting as "an especially
useful activity' fh^-t- , n' +-u .Y ha , with the proper attitude,' can
help encourage
'maturity' of the self." 30
Kheel fully understands the claims by Naess, Fox and
others that they do not rntend to sacrifice the individual
for the sake of identification with the larger whole of
nature, but the examples of Ortega and Leopold make clear
that the process of identification cannot be assumed to
result in a natural maturity assuring the commonality of
purpose among deep ecologists. This would seem to be a
basic problem for deep ecological ethics. Does Leopold's
statement constitute a sufficiently "vital need" of the
individual human being to justify the killing of another
being?
Kheel returns to the principles of object relations
theory to summarize the importance of her analysis, "This
preference for identification with the larger 'whole' may
reflect the familiar masculine urge to transcend the
concrete world of particularity in preference for
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something more enduring and abstract Ecof . .
i
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- eminists mustprepared to examine more deeolv t-u
that f, , .
y 6 unconscious drives
e e self that one seeks to expand. "31
One response to this argument has been briefly
attempted by Bril Devall who directly addresses Kheel
s
CritlC1Sm
' ThS resP°n^ rs framed in regard to the
history of suppression of "the erotic" and the
possibilities for alternative sexual identity. He argues
that the feminist or ecofeminist analysis that
concentrates on the difference between male and female
forms of identification tends to intensify the "battle
between the sexes" or the "sexual problem." Devall
believes the "sexual problem" cannot be resolved through
the "impact of feminism and popular sex therapies" but
instead requires a turn to "earth-bonding experience. "32
Implicitly criticizing Kheel 's reliance on object
relations theory, but more explicitly any theoretical
position related to psychoanalytics, Devall states,
When psychologists focus more on human
re ationships than on relationships which
us^nfn
US
^
n
^
nonhuman nature, they do not moveinto wild territory. We only touch the
surface of the pond if we deny the empowering
energy of eros and sexuality in the web of
re ationships of our ecological self. Eros canbe expressed through different sexual modes anddifferent genders may express eros energy ininnovative ways. Recalling eros from banishment
and. integrating it through our practice requires
moving from our minimal self further into wild
territory, listening to feelings long
suppressed. In Marcuse's terms, what is
required is a new radical sensibility that draws
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on the qualitative, elements,™
world of experience. 33 y ' preconscious
Devall acknowledges that the "nri mn primary worlds of
experience" are "nrnh^iu • ^P obably influenced by gender" and cites
studies by carol Gilli gan and others ^
evidence that women find rewards in establishing
particular relationships, rich in texturing mL mg, eaning, and
affective layering."34 From fchis u afc first ^
on the path to an expanded understanding of the
role of gender identity in any attempt to develop a
greater self-identification,
"In our examination of
different ways to explore ecological self, it is wise to
remember the complexity of relations between gender
identity, sexual roles, sexual preferences and
socialization. "3^ Howevpr wv, a +- uc e , what he presents with the one
hand he removes with the other. There is no
acknowledgment of the depth with which gender identity
inhibits some possibilities and enhances others, and there
is little acknowledgment of the extent gender identity
structures all social relationships. Instead he attempts
to collapse the differences of gender or sex, "Both women
and men participate in engendering new life. Bringing
forth new life is part of the creative process of sharing
and discovering meaning. Humans produce or engender in a
larger context, but not alone. Humans engender because
they are connected, physically, emotionally, erotically,
with the widening circle of energy. Men and women have
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their °W
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XPerienCeS in context of this Targer
circle .
"
J6 Thic, ,• c _n s ls a reduction of matterss uc of sexuality
*“ S“"
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»™n .tt„pe , t0 otf„ „„c,ptio„ o(
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multiple-gendered self to define m .he feminist argument
that the root of the
"ecologrcal crisis" is best viewed as
a Product of androcentric or patriarchal culture. He
admits that feminrst critiques have
"provrded powerful
insights exposing the once hidden assumptions under which
modern civilization operates," but he rejects what he
an attempt to reduce deep ecology to a branch of
feminism. The feminist argument is viewed instead as a
limited concern of interhuman problems which falsely
pushes nature into the background. Devall fails to
acknowledge the ubiquity of the problem of gender identity
for the project of a wider self-identification,
"Anthropocentrism remains the central concern of deep
ecology. The ecological crisis has complex psycho-sexual
roots. In this historical era we can continue
intellectual tasks of uncovering historical causes of the
crisis and at the same time move beyond divisiveness to
explore ecological self. ”37 For Devall/ moving beyond ^
divisiveness means to move beyond the "sexual problem,"
that is, to put all this intellectually fashionable
feminist criticism and other "intellectual tasks" in their
proper place and get on with the real business of
exploring the ecological self, which has merely incidental
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or historically contingent relations to gender identity.
The real work of addressing the ecological crisis, the
movement into the ''wild territory" involves releasing
suppressed ontological possibilities.
SoLgLX^a^ -^ntmcation with
connections with individual live^can de"
1 eXls
J
:in,3
enter into feminist ecophilosophv H ?P ecolo9Y
cui^-.f^rnSft^lrc ™e;;SlHur
eqUireS
our dichotomy. We need eachCSt-hp
3 3 posltlve task-
ontological insights... Our ontological^risis^”
61^ 1
severe that we cannot wait for thfperfect
S °
in e ectual theory to provide us with the answers. 38
Devall is saying that the relationship of gender to
identity is of little consequence compared to a "deeper,"
"ontological" problem of the human species' destruction’ of
nature. He seems to imply that everyone should give up
this foolish intellectualizing and go to the woods and get
ecologically Self-identified. Feminists should be
concerned with the real problems of the world not these
secondary issues of inequality.
Critical theory has also suffered from an
androcentric blindness or at least an inadequate
examination of the differences between masculine and
feminine relationships to the issues central to critical
theory, including the domination of nature. Nancy Fraser
has developed a critique of Habermas's version of critical
theory that is not simply an addition to the other
critiques discussed earlier (see Chapters 1 and 2) . In
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this critique, Habermas is shown to have made
unactnowiedqed assumptions about the structure o f society
an about the capacity of his categories of analysis to
offer an adequate interpretive framework for the project
of emancipation. Praser argues these assumptrons, when
lly analysed, reveal an androcentric bias in
Habermas' version of critical theory. Fraser concludes
with some recommendations for the drrection in which a
more adequate critrcal theory of society would have to
take;
that puts them ^Xla^^^he^ as"institutions that, albeit in different wavs
and°o?t
W°m
?
n ' S subordination, since both familyfficial economy appropriate our labor
Y
short circuit our participation in theinterpretation of our needs, and shield
norma^veiy secured need interpretations from
P tacal contestation what we need insteadis a framework capable of foregrounding the evilof dominance and subordination 39
Her additional criticisms include the point that
there is a need to acknowledge the ways the socialization
process within the family are structured by gender
identities, and that this has consequences beyond what
Habermas claims are the major problems of the welfare
state and its relation to capitalism, family life, and the
"public sphere ." 40
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Although not entirely on the same grounds, the other
theorists associated strongly with the early Frankfurt
School of critical theory, Horkheimer, Marcuse and Adorno,
also suffer from gender myopia in much of their
analysis However, Marcuse and Adorno did address the
status of women in existing society. Marcuse even went so
far as to identify the women’s movement as one of the
hopes for an emancipatory political practice.« Adorno
_
always cautious about asserting any positive political
program, did provide insights into women's situation,
which have become central themes in later developments of
feminism, although not directly linked to his
observations.
Because the final emancipation of women was so self-evident to socialist programmes, there seems for along time to
_
have been no need to think through theconcrete position of women.... The impossibility ofliberating women under the present conditions is
attributed not to the conditions but to the advocates
°5,freec^om
' anc*- the frailty of emancipatory ideals,
which brings them close to neurosis, is confused withtheir realization.... 4 -3
Adorno is claiming that women, as the victims of a
society of oppression, have been blamed for their status
instead of the blame being attributed rightly to the
social conditions themselves. One of Adorno’s frequent
targets for criticism was dogmatic Marxism and then
actually existing socialism, especially the Stalinist
version. The discrimination against women which kept them
from employment in the paid sector and tied to unpaid
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household work did not protect them from
economic conditions;
the oppression of
®y virtue of her di -p
production she re tainsCertain tr^V"?0888 ofcharacterize the human u . ts whlch
in the grasp of society.
. .She^ilrllJ'TJSt entirelVsubject in historical development r h rt aSdependence to which she u P $ ’ The state of
her.
. .
.Following this Une K"edh?UtllateBreach the conclusion
,
thought, one might
sphere of proton onlv ^ eSCaped the
entirely by the sphere of
6 absorbed all the more
captivaLd
Y
by thfWdffc^ ti0n ' t0 beless than men are transfixed bv tL C0I™0 p lty world noprofit. Women mirror the inineM «diacy ofhas inflicted on them— thev h stlce masculine society
commodities 44 Y becortle increasingly like
The liberation of women then does not occur simply by
moving from unpaid to paid labor. The different,
gendered, positions in "exchange society" are each
expressions of the operations of the production-
consumption system. A truly free society would remove
both types of domination, "Hope cannot aim at making the
mutilated social character of women identical to the
mutilated social character of men; rather, its goal must
be a state in which the face of the grieving woman
disappears simultaneously with that of the bustling,
capable man, a state in which all that survives the
disgrace of the difference between the sexes is the
happiness that difference makes possible
.
,,4d
Even though the early critical theorists develop
critiques which offer possibilities for a gender sensitive
social theory, and specific comments on the workings of
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domination and exploitation with regard to women, their
positions fundamentally do not include a nuanced
discussion of theM mediations which would
constitute an adequate critical analysis. However, some
indication of the relevance of an ecofeminist informed
critical theory may be produced by a closer examination of
the deep ecology reliance on the concept of "vital needs."
Vital Needs
Deep ecologists, including George Sessions and Arne
Naess, have attempted to move beyond the simple invocation
for self-realization and wider self-identification by
providing a list of "Basic Principles" which, it was
hoped, would summarize deep ecological insights after its
more that 15 years of practice, and be "understood and
accepted by persons coming from different philosophical
and religious positions." 46 This is a list of basic
principles, a "platform for a deep ecology movement" which
consists of eight points that Naess and other deep
ecologists argue they have in common. Position number
three includes the statement that "Humans have no right to
reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital
needs." The richness and diversity referred to are the
"richness and diversity of life forms" as values "in
themselves" which contribute to the "flourishing of human
and non-human life on Earth." 47 The remaining points or
principles essentially refer back to this idea of vital
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needs
, resulting in assertions that h,L human population
^ rSdUCed
' that public Policy affecting economics,
technology, and ideology must change, and ^^ ^
understand these principles have an obligation to try todirectly or indirectly implement the needed changes. The
principles, including the idea of vital needs, have been
discussed and explained in various contexts. m Devall
and Sessions' understanding,
"The term 'vital need' is
left deliberately vague to allow for considerable latitudem judgment. "48 They claim this need for latitude m
judgment is a result of different climates and other
related bioregional situations, including
"differences in
the structures of societies as they now exist," for
example, "for some Eskimos, snowmobiles are necessary
today to satisfy vital needs." 49
Again, Luke s critique of deep ecology dwells on the
implication of the idea of vital needs for a politics of
deep ecology, "if humans have no right to reduce the
diversity of life, except to satisfy vital needs, then
what are the standards for identifying vital needs?" 50
For Luke this brings up basic questions about deciding
whose vital needs take precedence when different entities
are m conflict. Are humans allowed to fight diseases by
killing viruses and bacteria? What about introduced
species which are destroying ecosystems, should they be
wiped out or are they just part of nature evolving into
new forms? The few examples provided by deep ecologists
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in response to these types of questions seem to Luke to beorm of
..soft anthropocentrism," the smuggUng in Qfhuitisn va. I110
s
ues at the expense of other entities,
"People
will continue to cut and burn trees kill h
. g
6 S
' l11 and eat plants
and animals, or isolate and kill germs to fulfill vitalhuman needs or protect the integrity nf he gn ty o humanly defined
ecocommunities
. . .After deep ecologrcal framing, it
appears that a ritual prayer, the right attitude of
respect, or compassionate loving gratitude „m
rationalize and legitimate softer anthropocentric
actions
.
Luke may be too harsh in his judgments. This is
partially a product of the selective quotations he uses to
support his position, quotes that link diverse
philosophical positions on the basis of their own self-
identification but which may in fact be contradictory.
The most philosophically unsatisfying versions of deep
ecology are those that attempt to link it with established
religions such as Buddhism. Perhaps a more genuine
critique would examine the more philosophically coherent
philosophy of deep ecology's founder, Naess, although one
of the primary limitations of his position, it is true, is
the cultivation of a tolerant acceptance of anyone who
wants to be included within the deep ecology tent. To the
extent Naess, Devall, Sessions, et al. endorse the
tendency to ecumenical inclusion of all faiths they are
deserving of Luke’s criticism and closely fit his
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moral visions of what might be; at the same ftle time, it failsto outline practicable means for realising these
ecologically moral visions ” 52 Th-i. This conclusion is in fact
ased on a very selective sample of "deep ecologists" and
may not be appropriate if the more philosophical and less
mystical versions of the philosophy are examined.
A closer examination of Arne Naess’s position reveals
several similarities to critical ihotheory, particularly that
of Marcuse. However, an analysis of the critical
theorists’ explicit expressions of the lints or mediations
between society, nature, and the individual, may serve to
correct some of the shortfalls of the deep ecology
analysis, extending it and opening additional theoretical
and practical possibilities. The place of needs in an
adequate critical theory of society, or a critical theory
of ecology, must be linked to the possibilities of
politics and its relation to the situation of emancipation
or the good life. An analysis of needs apparently
requires at least two interconnected approaches. The
first theoretical necessity is to acknowledge the
impossibility of predetermining the content of needs in a
situation of emancipated and ecological consciousness.
This results in some acceptance of the fact that the
establishment of needs must take place within the context
of need interpretation in something like a "public
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sphere .
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Secondly, for the ecologically or critically
r"'
thS COntSnt ° f nSed lnt™“ begin with
e lstmction of something l lke
.-vital needs" or "true
needs" from wants, wishes or fa i' bn
' false needs.
The classic critir^i 4- u _heory expression of this
Problem occurs in Marcuse, s
where
attempts to distinguish true from false needs;
obj ective
n
conditions°to toe^xtent^o^vhb™ SU of vita^ ZT the
and poverty, are^niversallv^r T lon of toil
But as historical'standardsf they'df“t^t
lesser) contradiction to theprevad ini
C“ claS thelStSoriiy
are true and^alsp
1'31
''! 5 ' the question °f what
individuals^themseives^but^nly ^
SS’SS.'E answer. 53^ ^ ™ ^ to
Adorno, in his essay on "Society" discusses various
attempts to define society and its components and finds
them wanting. They tend to inadequately reflect on the
effects of the processes of abstraction and reification,
like that of "role playing." in one of the scattered
examples of Adorno's idea of the alternative society of
the future, he indicates a relationship to needs, but this
indication is stated, as Marcuse says is necessary in
existing conditions, in the form of contradiction;
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Doug Kellner, in an examination of these issues,
expresses concern with the position exemplified by the
above Adorno statement. He believes the early critical
theorists failed to distinguish between consumerism and
consumption, at least sufficiently to be able to
acknowledge the possibility of decisions about consumption
that may not be completely supportive of the system of
domination and exploitation by the capitalist system.
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This is an attempt on Kellner's oarr t-
.
.
P t to move away from the
a izmg critique, a move which allows for the
activities «
cotscptict t, individuals,
„„ „ _develop „ tu,,„ tein,,.- Ih„ „,„i ts „„ „
view of the potentials of individuals under existing
socrety,
"Consumption can thus be a rational, life-
enhancing activity that increases one, human powers and
fulfills genuine human needs. Consequently, rather than
denouncing comities and consumption per se, we should
try to discriminate between valuable and worthless or
dubious commodities, and dehumanized, fetishized
consumption as opposed to creative, life-enhancing
consumption.
Deep ecologists then must provide criteria to
distinguish vital needs from non-vital or false needs if
they are to meet the demands of their critics, but they
must also explain the criteria for interpreting those
needs in such a way that they can be defended within the
sphere of public discourse. Nancy Fraser discusses the
difference between what she calls the "discussion of need
satisfaction" and "the politics of need interpretation ." 56
Any interpretation of needs claims would have to be
justified. Fraser attempts to explain what such an
interpretive justification would have to consist of;
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Fraser's position sounds very much like that of
Habermas with his attempt to establish a communicative
ethic to rejuvenate the "public sphere." m fact, Kellner
too follows his above observations with an appeal to the
critical theory efforts of Habermas,
Habermas has been proposing sustained publicdiscussion of needs, values and public policy Hisargument that we must revitalize the public sphereand engage in debate about crucial social, politicaland ethical issues is relevant to the topic at handFollowing Habermas, Critical Theory can help topromote public
. debate on needs, commodities andconsumer practices so as to aim for democratic
consensus on these issues. Such debate could beconnected^with discourse on values and the good
However, Fraser indicates her version of needs
interpretation and its justification is significantly
different from the Habermasian version, "In its first-
order normative content, this formulation is Habermasian.
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"
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The underlying difficulty with the deep ecology
approach to needs and their interpretation is a continuing
vacillation about the status of needs as ontologically
derived and therefore to a great extent expressing a
desire for transcending or quasi-transcending the need for
historical interpretation, thus denying the fundamentally
historical character of needs as they are produced by the
operations of the system of production and consumption.
This may be an indication of a fundamental conflict within
need interpretation, one that cannot be resolved at the
theoretical level but which is instead only possibly
addressed in actual discussion by individuals, through
their ecocentric interpretations of the needs of their
local ecocommunity. We again return to the question of
whether deep ecology involves any criteria, including
substantive criteria, for need interpretation in actual
local discussion.
There is recognition in deep ecology, or at least by
Naess, of the impossibility of simply relying on market
systems to determine distribution of need satisfaction.
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interpretation,
"Classical economics concerned itself witha substantial nart o-f k ldX p of human needs Th Q ~
hnt_, ..,
S ' e Perspective was
phl losophical and practical
. Modern economics tendsO narrow d0wn the perspective and fcQ
the market for human needs. Ecosophy asks fQr a ^
estabUshment of the classical perspective, adding
insights from cultural anthropology.
-60 Naess ^
recognizes that the existing system of
"representation"
and its intricate links to the interests of large
corporations does not meet the requirement for public
discussion of needs and need interpretation. He explains
how politicians and "energy experts" speak of increasing
energy "needs" by attempting to equate them with "human
needs" instead of making the more appropriate distinction
that energy needs are a product of the market and the
standard of living in consumerist cultures. 61 Naess
explores in some detail the relation of economics and
ecosophy, tracing the ideas of economics and politics to
the classical Greek understanding of the terms, describing
the science of economics as "household management" and the
polls as a "community of households." He devotes a full
chapter to this discussion including the observation that
deep ecology has tended to ignore economic discussion, and
that he is providing a partial response to criticisms
which have focused on this gap. One of his basic points
is that current economic measurements are fundamentally
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inadequate for dealing with the ecological crisis. The
measures do discrete between types of needs, " In GNP
there is no plnce for ^ h-i * . •motion between waste, luxury,
and a satisfaction of fundamental needs ." 62 In
summarizing his chapter on technology and lifestyle Naess
also connects needs to technological development,
"The
ecosophical basis for an appraisal of technique is the
satisfaction of vital needs in the diverse local
communities .
"
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Naess thus is aware of the necessity of developing an
interpretation of needs that takes history and social
conflict into consideration, although it is unclear to
what extent he believes society penetrates individual
consciousness in its structuring of needs. The discussion
of the possibility of self-identification with nature
would indicate a strong belief in the voluntary ability of
individuals to alter their need structures, or
alternatively, that the wider ecological self-awareness is
a product of increased maturity, seen as a "natural"
process. Criticisms of both of these positions have
indicated that deep ecology has not adequately addressed
the question of the depth of penetration of the psyche of
individuals by the operations of the present economic and
sexual order. Besides the examples already given, and the
alternative view of Adorno about the depth of structuring
of needs interpretation by an oppressive society, it is
only necessary to point to such phenomena as bulimia and
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rexia nervosa as examples of where individual will or
choice is an inadeguate emanation of the di stortion of
"needs hierarchies- even at the most basic or
-vital-
levels
.
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Even though the description of needs by deep ecology
tends to take on positivist or transcendent
characteristics, there is the recognition of the
desirability of determining actual need structure in local
settings, including the consideration of non-human needs.
In this context, Naess discusses the control of "life
spaces" and the closeness or remoteness of control as a
function of self-preservation, or the satisfaction of
"basic needs .- 65 He attempts to link the political
program of local control of decision-making to his
understanding of needs, "The next ecosophical principles
to be incorporated are those of self-sufficiency,
decentralisation, and autonomy. These social principles
are first to be linked to their biological
counterparts ." 66 He then curiously discusses need
satisfaction in terms of "control," the intent being to
explain that satisfaction of needs, in order to be
ecologically coherent, should be the result of utilizing
resources closest to hand. As need satisfaction becomes
reliant on ever more remote sources, it generates an
increasingly unstable set of relationships, "Increase of
remoteness correlates with increase of dangers, of
inadequacy of powers of self-preservation and therefore
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Naess
with decrease of sp1f-m,iealisation potentials ." 67
en connects these observations about biological andhuman needs to the correlated social practices,
"By the
local self-sufficiency and autonomy we shall
sources of basic need satisfactions, or more generally
sources of Self-realisation, nearby in the life space and
secondly, to what degree the organism has adequate control
Of this area to satisfy its needs ." 68
in comparing competing needs of different organisms,
specificaily of humans to non-humans, Naess offers another
principle,
"Responsible decisions closely require one to
consider the entire norm system. The dimensions of
needs of humans must be compared with vital
needs of other species, if there is a conflict ." 69
Naess's distinctions between needs—biological, species
specific and class specific-lead him to ask if "non-
biological" needs are in fact needs or whether they are
better understood as wishes. The implicit underlying
question being, "What is the relation of social structure
to the formation of needs ." 76
Finally, the interpretation of needs ultimately
depends on individual experience and therefore on the
processes of identification. Naess makes critical
comments on the relation of the "happy consumer" to the
type of consumption of outdoor activity that serves to
reinforce capitalist practices, but he still advocates the
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importance of outdoor activities,
"Understanding of
anything in nature begins with direct experience, but this
soon stimulates reflection. "VI He recognizes the
necessity of interpretation or reflection on the
experience of nature and the relation of the
interpretation of nature to the determination of needs and
their satisfaction. For Napqq .ess, the mediation provided by
reflection serves as a link to the necessity of
preservation of wild nature. The reason for protecting
wilderness areas for other than human utility is still
perceived as a human need, but a need that develops in
consequence of increased maturity, "These propositions
suggest that to ascribe value to animals, plants,
landscapes, and wilderness areas independently of their
relation to human utility or benefit is a philosophically
legitimate procedure. To relate all value to mankind is a
form of anthropocentrism which is not philosophically
tenable .
"
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Naess then attempts to unite the connections between
the issues of self-preservation, moral action, and the
relation of "beautiful actions" to the environment, "A
person acts beautifully when acting benevolently from
inclination. Environment is then not felt to be something
strange or hostile which we must unfortunately adapt
ourself to, but something valuable which we are incl 1 ned
to treat with joy and respect, and the overwhelming
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richness of which we are inclined to use to satisfy our
vital needs
.
" 73
The practical consequence of this stance has been the
emergence of the radical ecological group Earth First , and
s defense of wilderness and wildness. The question of
the relation of the philosophical justification of deep
ecology to its political application should now be
considered. It is only in this relation of philosophy to
social and political change that deep ecology, and radical
ecology generally, can be adequately evaluated.
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CHAPTER 5
DEEP ECOLOGY AND POLITICS
The Philosophy of deep ecology has
.manifested itselfm the radical ecology movement most directly in the
element known as Earth First:. The group has grown ^ a
VW van full of radical "cowboys" into an organrzation with
its own Journal, educational foundation, and supporters
that number in the thousands if not tens of thousands.
Thus development has taken place since 1980, and includes
events that landed co-founder Dave Foreman and others in
prison for "ecoterrorist" activities.! By the mid-1990s
the group had members, or those who identify themselves as
Earth First ! ers, across the U.S. and around the world.
The brief history of Earth First! is mostly that of
actions taken in order to save "pristine" wilderness areas
and the biological diversity and spiritual potential of
these fragments of ecosystems. This dynamic history
continues at what seems like an accelerating pace even
though most of its original leadership has distanced
itself from the highly activist group, a distancing not
because of its radicalness, but the opposite. The charges
against the organization by its founders are based in the
belief that it has grown into the type of organization it
was originally conceived against, one characterized as
increasingly bureaucratic, bogged down with internal
bickering and now controlled by "social justice" critics
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a de
ft
;
st agenda " deraiis
whlch began as
h
fSnSe " WlldemeSS
— compromise. "2 Some ofe founders fare moved on to concentrate aimost sole ly onthe expansion of wild areas in the world and especiaii y inNorth America
. Although the anatomy of the various
actions to defend specific parts of the natural world
provide useful lessons on the group and the
motivations of individual members, as well as on responses
by the system of domination and exploitation that is
destroying the planet piece by piece, what is of most
concern in the present context is the relationship of
radical ecological resistance to the assertions about its
philosophical underpinning-deep ecology. Examining the
relationship of theory and practice will require drawing
on actual examples of confrontation between the radical
ecologists and the dominant economic, political and social
system. However, history as such is not the present
concern, rather what is required philosophically at this
point is the critical evaluation of the relationship
between the philosophy of deep ecology and its radical
practice. Three aspects of this will be considered here:
first, evaluation of the place of "wilderness" in the
self-understanding of the activists; second, their use of
the tactic of monkeywrenching; and finally, the potential
of the concept of the "bioregion" as a basis for future
P^^tical organization. Another way to understand these
issues is by attempting to address the question, "How does
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the defense of wilderness relate t<j ^^ ^
identification propounded by Naess and Fox ? " m respect
to critical theory potential contribution to this
exploration, it can be ashed, .,oes Adorno's use of the
concept of mimesis offer an alternative conceptual
approach which can simultaneously better explain the
actions of the radical ecologists and their
contradictions, and then indicate an analysis which can
more adequately guide future radical ecological activity-'
imPortant will fop an ana i wo -i ,oe an analysis and understanding of
the extent to which the actions of these radical
ecologists are "revolutionary" and what is meant by the
term. Especially interesting in this respect is the
question of why the activists claim to be non-
revolutionary yet official police organizations identify
them as terrorists? Finally, does the commitment to
wilderness, bioregions and a general ecosystems approach
to ecological problems provide an adequate basis for a
post-domination-of-nature society, or does the concept of
bioregions need to be supplemented not only with a vision
of future politics, but also by an analysis that can
adequately address the relationship of the ecological
crisis to current social and cultural crises, crises which
are also a manifestation of the internal domination and
colonization of nature.
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Nature and Identity
The heart of the Earth First! movement is its "no
compromrse" stand with regard to wiiderness. w ilderness
preservation and restoration is the basis for all
subsequent action;
In a true Earth-radical group, concern for
The idea
S
of
P
wUd
rVati °n be the keYstone.m a.e t il erness after all i o -t-vor. ,
radical in human thought--more radical than
S
Paine, than Marx, than Mao. Wilderness sav,.uman beings are not paramount, Earth is not
’ forHomo sapiens alone, human life is but e Tiftform on the planet and has no right to ?akeexclusive possession. Yes, wilderness for itsown sake, without any need to justify it forhuman benefit. Wilderness for wilderness. Forbears and whales and titmice and rattlesnakesand stink bugs. And.
. .wilderness for humanings. Because it is the laboratory of humanevolution, and because it is home
.
3
For the deep ecologist, the primary reason for
preservation and extension of wilderness is to keep intact
the processes of evolution, which represent various
journey's along different ecological paths expressed
through the genetic material and behaviors of individual
species. Wilderness is necessary to preserve biological
diversity. The rate of species extinction is greater now
than any time in natural history, even greater than the
fabled die off of the dinosaurs.^ The activities of
radical Earth First !ers then are aimed at restoring the
means for evolutionary processes to continue even if—or
as most believe, when—human beings make it impossible for
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their own species to continue to exist th
acH,HH 6 9031 of thesetivities is not to establish a sustainable
.
mab society, butO Simply mate possible the continuation of the evolution
complex life with the remaining genetic material andintact ecosystems that are available:
"We must envision
and propose the restoration of biological wildernesses of
several million acres in all of America's ern t-n s ecosystems, with
corridors between them for the transmission of genetic
variability. Wilderness is the arena for evolution, and
there must be enough of it for natural forces to have free
rein .
"
5 What Foreman proposes is not a better managed
system, and not simple preservation of existing
"wild.,
sites, but the extension of wilderness with no ultimate
boundary. The limits of his neo-primitivism are unclear,
"Keep Cleveland, Los Angeles. Contain them. Try to make
them habitable. But identify big areas that can be
restored to a semblance of natural conditions, reintroduce
the Grizzly Bear and wolf and prairie grasses, and declare
them off limits to modern civilization ." 6 in his argument
for putting Earth first. Foreman insists that native
diversity and the evolution of life should be placed
highest on any value system. The protection of standards
of living or any other human interests are secondary, "In
everything human society does, the primary consideration
should be for the long-term health and biological
diversity of Earth. After that, we can consider the
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welfare of humans. We should be kind ^Kl
' compassionate, and
caring with other people, but Earth comes first. "7
One of the enduring difficulties with Foreman's
position, and one that has led to charges of racism, ls
the value system that develops out ofp £ thls uncompromising
defense of genetic diversity, the "refusal inm r to use human
beings as the measure by which to value others." This
problem goes beyond Earth First! 's insistence about
civilization's tendency toward anthropocentrism to what
many claim is the group's underlying misanthropy. The
most notorious of these value dilemmas comes when
evaluating disease and famine in relation to human
populations, "Human suffering resulting from drought and
famine in Ethiopia is tragic, yes, but the destruction
there of other creatures and habitat is even more
tragic ." 8 Foreman links this assertion directly to the
philosophy of deep ecology or "biocentrism." it is
through this philosophy that Foreman attempts to justify
his position,
The dominant philosophy of our time (which contains
Judeo-Christianity, Islam, capitalism, Marxism,
scientism, and secular humanism) is anthropocentrism.
It places human beings at the center of the universe,
separates them from nature, and endows them with
unique value. EFlers are in direct opposition to
that philosophy. Ours is an ecological perspective
that views Earth as a community and recognizes such
apparent enemies as "disease" (e.g., malaria) and
"pests" (e.g., mosquitoes) not as manifestations of
evil to be overcome but rather as vital and necessary
components of a complex and vibrant biosphere.^
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This privileging of the natural over the human has theI" " 3 — 1 of the culture-natureduality, and therefore may succumb to the same „Liie conceptual
structuring, revealed in the type of analysis of
rationality which critical theory emphasizes. Horkheimer
and Adorno examine these fundamental processes in
DliilBCl^L
-En^^ The purpose of Horkheimer and
Adorno's examination of enlightenment is not simply to
abandon
"enlightenment" or human reason, "The accompanying
critique of enlightenment is intended to prepare the way
for a positive notion of enlightenment which will release
it from entanglement in blind domination. "10 The tw0 main
theses of the work are that "myth is already
enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology. »U
These theses are examined in specific relation to two
examples, the first of which involves an interpretation of
the journeys of Odysseus in the Odyssey. They illuminate
the "difference and the unity" of "mythic nature" and the
"enlightened mastery of nature." An examination of this
example of the relationship of myth and enlightenment, the
dialectic of enlightenment, may aid in understanding the
philosophical issues and problematics of the philosophy of
deep ecology.
Horkheimer and Adorno examine the Homeric poem of the
adventures of Odysseus from a unique perspective. 1 ^ The
hero is viewed as the prototypical example of the
bourgeois individual" and the story of his adventures is
223
111 erPrSted 35 3 St°ry ° f the creation of the bourgeois
self. More generally, Odysseus's adventures represent the
various stages of development of self-identity. More
directly, the tale is interpreted as recounting both the
development of subjectivity generally, and particularly
its bourgeois or individualistic form. Odysseus is
confronted with various challenges to his survival, and to
his individual autonomy. These challenges appear in
various forms of nature nr TlV,o fate, where impulse or instinct
tempt the hero to abandon the self in exchange for
pleasure or happiness. Odysseus overcomes these
temptations and challenges through various, often clever,
means, which result in the hero's denial of his desires in
the service of preservation of the self. The different
episodes of the adventure involve overcoming internal and
external nature in order to retain the identity of the
self:
The very spirit that dominates nature repeatedly
vindicates the superiority of nature in
competition.
. . .Only consciously contrived
adaptation to nature brings nature under the
control of the physically weaker .... Imitation
enters into the service of domination inasmuch
as even man is anthropomorphized for man. The
pattern of Odyssean cunning is the mastery of
nature through such adaptation. Renunciation,
the principle of bourgeois disillusionment, the
outward schema for the intensification of
sacrifice. .. .He just pulls through; struggle is
his survival; and all the fame that he and the
others win in the process serves merely to
confirm that the title of hero, is only gained
at the price of the abasement and mortification
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undi vide^happiness
.
I3
mplete
' universal, and
The mastery of nature is achieved through clever
calculation, what the authors will call instrumental
rationalrty. Thls
"rational- dominatron of nature is
understood as the control of fate or mythrc forces, and
results rn a self that is formed through the limited
Processes of rnstrumental rationality. The domination of
external nature is accomplished by way of the internal
domination of the self:
SUUV'1"!' *“« n
sacrifices'
to natural deities. All human, when systematically executeddeceive the god to whom they are made: thevsubject him to the primacy of human ends anddissolve his power; and the deception of' the godcarries over smoothly into that practiced bv thedisbelieving priests on the believers
... Bycalculating his own sacrifice, he effectivelynegates the power to whom the sacrifice is madeIn this way he redeems the life he hadforfeited.
In this interpretation then, sacrifice is an early
form of "rational exchange" whereby the sacrifice enables
humans to gain control of the actions of the gods, of the
mythic forces of fate, of nature, and of men. Examination
of the specific episodes of Odysseus' journey become for
the critical theorists an examination of the history of
western civilization since, as archaic prototype of the
bourgeois individual, Odysseus anticipates what will be
the general structure of later society. The Odyssey is
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something of a model for understanding certarn aspects of
modern society.
The entire journey of Odysseus and the details of the
crrtrcal theorists' analysis is not possible or needed
here, but a few examples will help illustrate their
concerns about the relationship of myth and enlightenment
and indicate some further directions for development. m
their analysis of the episode in which Odysseus escapes
Polyphemus the Cyclops, Horkheimer and Adorno interpret
this as a depiction of the stage or phase of "brute
egotism" in human development,
Polyphemus represents a later stage in world
and
e
herdsmen"
th
For
a
Homer
C
blrbarf"' “U ° f huntersthe absence of any syste^tic^g^K anfthe 35ck of any systematic organization of labor andsociety governing the disposal of time. This is
subiectiofof
3^ 1^" 1^ 1 S°Ciety ' funded on thejection o the physically weaker, but as vetit^™h^he yardStlCk ° f™ Proper^and
Odysseus (Udeis) and some of his crew are held
captive by the Cyclops, and it is through clever deception
that Odysseus escapes although in the process he loses
some crew members to the ravenous Cyclops. Odysseus’ ruse
is to answer the Cyclops’ question of Odysseus’ identity
by adopting the name "No-man" or "Nobody." When Odysseus
(Udeis) attempts to escape after blinding the Cyclops, the
Cyclops’ pleas for help to the other members of his tribe
become ineffectual after they ask for the name of the
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offender, and he answers,
"No-man" (Udeis] hua ) as escaped.
Odysseus takes advantage of the refatronshfp of Xanguage
refers, that is, the difference between "the
word" and "the thing." In this case, "Udeis" has two
meanings, doth as a proper name and as "no one." Odysseus
is then moving in a space of thought that is different
from that of the mythic. This development in
conceptualization, according to the critical theorists,
resembles that reasoning which supports the system of
'
con t rac t s . The ear 1 i pr fn-rm m-Fo of reason was unable to
distinguish word from thing,
Objecc. STS
SK.SSS-
1
word rs emphasized, in order to change the actualityIn this way, consciousness of intention arises: in
Y '
is distress, Odysseus becomes aware of the dualism
things 16
arnS that the same word can mean different'
It is in the use of the ambiguity of the relationship
of word and thing that Odysseus is able to save himself,
but only by denying himself, "Odysseus' two contradictory
actions in his encounter with Polyphemus, his answering to
the name, and his disowning it, are nevertheless one. He
acknowledges himself to himself by denying himself under
the name Nobody; he saves his life by losing himself. "II
Another example supports the critical theorists'
claims about this process of development of instrumental
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rationality, the domination of nature and thL ' e formation
° e autonomous individual," in their di^rn discussion of thehero’s encounter with the goddess Circe giro *.£ . C ce tempts the
crew with beauty and sexualY pleasure. This episode of the
tale represents a hrgher phase of develops, bey0nd the
simplistic egoism of the Cyclops. This is the point of
development of magic and the use of ambiguous illusion,
"The magical story of Circe refers back again to the magic
stage proper. Magic disintegrates the individual, who
once again succumbs to it and is thus made to revert to an
older biological species. ”18 Clrce is able to „ take ^
erotic initiative" and so for the critical theorists
represents the type of the prostitute. Circe has an
ambiguous nature, both corrupter and helper, a mythical
mixture of both water and fire gained from her immortal
ancestors. The magical spell which she uses on the crew
turns them into swine, unlike her previous victims who
became again undomesticated creatures of the wilderness.
The men are liberated from the repressed nature that had
made them individuals, "selves," and thereby achieve an
illusion of "redemption." This form of redemption is
represented as a delusion by Homer as indicated by the
theorists, "But because they have already been men, the
civilized epic cannot represent what has happened to them
as anything other than unseemly degradation, and in the
Homeric account there is hardly any trace of pleasure." 19
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The critical theorist 1 = is analysis continues with
comments on the statu* ^n s of women in the bourgeois-
patriarchal social order tv-,. They especially note that the
ritual used by Circe in working her magic is the
repetition of the process by which women themselves are
subjugated. Women "under the pressure of civilized
judgment" identify with the image that civilization
presents of them, weak and defenseless, but also
desirable,
"As a representative of nature, woman in
bourgeois society has become the enigmatic image of
irresistibility and powerlessness. m this way she
reflects for domination the pure lie that posits the
subjection instead of the redemption of nature. "20
In their analysis of Odysseus’ overcoming of Circe’s
power, Horkheimer and Adorno’s interpretation is
inadequate in that it too rigidly focuses on that aspect
of sexual relations, particularly marriage, that lends
itself to concepts related to those of exchange society.
To be more fully adequate to that which it analyzes, in
addition to the analysis of exchange relationships, the
interpretation requires the independent analysis of
patriarchal relationships. It is true that Odysseus is
able to resist Circe's temptations with the help of an
antidote received from the god of commerce and the market
But Odysseus is still threatened by the sexual power of
Circe, so, with sword in hand, he forces her to swear to
an oath that if he has sex with her she will not use her
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°*“ “ to p„,«cl tr„
mutilation, from t.v.ng. for prohibition oi
promiscuity and for male domination, which—as a nin permanent
epri vation of instinct-is nevertheless a symbolic self-
mutilation on the part of the man. "21 But as P. j. Mills
has indicated, the critical theorists have failed to see
that the oath is one-sided, "They miss the double standardm the oath, for what is clearly prohibited is female
promiscuity. Odysseus indulges in sex with Circe and
curtails her relations with other men, even though he is
married to Penelope . "22 For Horkheimer and Adorno the
oath is an early form of the marriage contract, in their
analysis pleasure is degraded to love as ideology, circe
renounces the power of her desire and Odysseus is no
longer able to enjoy the full pleasure of sexual
surrender. This, they argue, is a precursor of the
frigidity" of the bourgeois marital relationship where
the marriage contract is an expression of love as
ideology, performing "its work of deception about the
hatred of competitors." 23 But the analysis of this
contractual relationship is incomplete, it fails to
address the full ineguality of the contracting parties,
and does not fully indicate the coercion of the contract.
Horkheimer and Adorno emphasize the resulting
solitariness that results from a world of exchange where
competition invades all aspects of life, but it is not
only the injustices of unequal exchange that are revealed
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by the circumstances of the oath. As „ills indicateS;
mentioned is that man and woman have never
been equal in love on patriarchal society; love as
ideology has always been more deadly for woman than for
man. The defeat of female desire, the defeat of female
power in love, is extracted from Circe through trickery
and the threat of violence." 24
In the ensuing analysis of Odysseus' return to has
homeland, Horkhermer and Adorno attempt to show the power
of the remembrance of suffering, but by neglecting the
specificity of the previously discussed relations of
marriage, they fail to appreciate the gendered character
of the suffering. Circe's oath was a renunciation of
promiscuity on her part, but it did not apply to
Odysseus's own actions. When he returns to his kingdom he
questions his wife’s fidelity and disguises himself in an
attempt to discover the truth. He finds that Penelope has
resisted the suitors who have pursued her in the 19 year
absence of the king, but other female members of the court
have not been so faithful. Horkheimer and Adorno complete
the story, "In Book 22 of the Odyssey, there is a
description of the way in which Odysseus' son punishes the
faithless women who had reverted to prostitution .... The
passage closes with the information that the feet of the
row of suspended women 'kicked out for a short while, but
not for long.'"'1- 0 Mills points out that the description
of the women as prostitutes is Horkheimer and Adorno's
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an indication of their (male) blindness to thefact that the women did no more than Odysseus had done
with Circe. Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the
meaning of that last line hinges on the universal
character of suffering and the remembrance of that
suffering indicated in the structure of the passage
However as Mills responds,
"Horkheimer and Adorno see this
episode as an account of atrocity in which we cannot
forget the victims or their agony, but this is to see a
generalized brutality in what is a specifically female
death inflicted on women for violating codes of sexual
behavior set up by men. "26
Robert Hullot-Kentor also seizes on the final image
of the dying women to help refute the interpretation of
Adorno which Habermas has fostered and which is unable to
bear the weight of its assertions. Hullot-Kentor focuses
on the analysis of the Odyssey as an example of what he
believes is Adorno's fundamental philosophical innovation,
the unity of the self is the work of a sacrificial
cunning .
'
Accomplished in sacrifice is the exchange as
equivalents something of less value for something of more
value. As the acts of sacrifice develop, as the process
of substitution is extended, cunning is developed.
Cunning should be understood here in relation to the
history of philosophy, specifically to Hegel's
understanding of the cunning or ruse of Reason.
Dialectical development occurs through the actions of
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is
individuals through history, but without therr a
nf -i . cn i warenessimate ends to which history progresses. Reasonprogressively actually itself, eventually achieving
solute Knowledge, but it does so „behlnd ^ ^the subjects involved. The individual subjects are
sacrificed to the ultimate purposes of Reason. Hullot-
Kentor asserts that Adorno's writings are based on the
reversal of what is in Hegel a process of domination
This process of both abstract and concrete domination
typical of western civilization. The highest forms of
this process of "domination by substitution" are
scientific and mathematical snrh =,« i ,
' uc as m physics. The
reversal of the me ^ • , .Process of domination requires the
recognition of the futility of this process of sacrificial
substitution,
"Adorno shows that the overturning of
sacrifice, and the movement toward the development of
cunning inheres in the dialectic of sacrifice ." 28 After
commenting on the analysis of marriage and property in the
Odyssey essay, Hullot-Kentor indicates the analyses'
common direction, "The reversals of marriage and property
are only instances of the basic issue of the possible
reversal of mediation with which Dialprt-ir- n f
En l ightenment is concerned: the reversal of subjectivity
from the domination to the liberation of nature ." 29 He
quotes Adorno on the relation of sacrifice to a society
beyond the present one, "Odysseus is at the same time a
sacrifice for the abrogation of sacrifice. His masterful
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>r a
renunciation, as a struggle against myth, stands ln fQ]
society that no longer demands renunciation and
domination: one that masters itself, not in order to
oerce itself and others, but for reconciliation . "30 The
thrust of Hullot-Kentor's argument is that all of Morno,
worts are dedicated to revealing the internal tendency of
sacrifice's service of cunning or reason, but which
eventually becomes aware of its own futility, creating the
possibility of its reversal from domination to liberation.
The internalization of sacrifice is the establishment of
self, sacrifice took place to preserve the self, but, "The
internalization of sacrifice is the establishment of the
principle of identity as the principle of the self. "31
The self-identical self cannot be sacrificed because there
is no substitute for it. The point is made by Adorno,
"The self is precisely the human being to whom the magical
power of substitution is no longer attributed. The
establishment of the self severs that fluctuating unity
with nature that the sacrifice of the self claimed to
achieve." 32 The struggle against nature, and its mythical
forms, required a process of sacrifice that eventually
produced the possibility of a self with its continuing
identity, the self-identical self. The basis for the
critique of sacrifice, sacrifice established in the
operations of that instrumental rationality which
cunningly offered the unequal exchange as if equivalent,
itself develops out of the process of sacrifice. Reason,
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the unity of the general anH ^ +. •d particular i«
.
.
.
d
' ls the principle
i entity, Reason means, according to its own form,
something libe the ldea of the reconciliation of the
universal and the particular
.
..33 The non-substitutahle
self, the self-identical self, the imitable self is
essentially different from or other than nature, yet when
this self forgets that it is nature it also forgets the
purposes for which it was formed, says Adorno, "m the
instant in which men sever the consciousness of themselves
as nature, all of the purposes for which they struggle to
Preserve themselves, social progress, the intensification
of material and intellectual forces, indeed consciousness
itself, are vitiated ." 34 Reason, as the principle of
identity, attempts to control the world, nature, by
reducing it to itself. This "second nature” becomes as
imprisoning as the mythic nature that inspired sacrifice.
The extension of control and domination would be
characterized in later works by the critical theorists as
the "totally administered society." it is only through
the memory of itself as always and still part of nature
that the self can obtain freedom from its self-built
prison of second nature, "Precisely reason that no longer
takes itself to be absolute, that recognizes itself as
nature and no longer as something absolutely opposed to
nature, precisely this reason that is conscious of itself
as nature, ceases to be mere nature ." 33
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Hullot-Kentor
*"
" “• “““ » »«.=., ,iact or remembrance which tran^-Ftransforms domination into thepossibility of liberation This i,i s a result of the
similarity of art to society,
"The same process of thedomination of nature that society carries out occurs
within the art wort; the same sacrificial act of reason is
rr 3 6
carried out by art through its construction. »« The
sacrifices carried out in the actual domination of nature
are justified as "necessary" by the self-preserving
reason, the principle of identity. Art can mourn the
sacrifice by "undoing" its self-identity. Adorno compares
this self undoing of art to the weaving and unweaving that
occupied Penelope as she waited for Odysseus,
artifacts is what art actually does to itselfsince Homer's poem, this episode is not whaj it iseasily mistaken to be, an addition or vestige' bu?ather a constitutive category of art: through thisategory art absorbs the impossibility of the
ini?v
Y
Art
f the
v°
ne and the many as ** element of itslty works, no less than reason, have theirform of cunning
.
37
Hullot-Kentor indicates the hanging of Penelope's
maids is one of those moments of the self-undoing of art
where the memory of the unnecessary sacrifice points to
the possibility of a society beyond domination.
The memory has two aspects: it contains not only what
was undergone, but the possibility of the fairy
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happily ever after. in reflect
1Ch predicate s the
at a standstill.
.
. enlightenment
^ °n this dial ectic
consciousness of the uselessness^f 5 to . terms as thethis consciousness of sacnfice. i nss
' reason recovers its 38
Memory of Deep Ecology
one of the most troubling assertions contained in thephilosophy of deep ecology, and in Forets understanding
the role of "intuitive awareness" in acquiring
knowledge of the correct relation between humans and
nature
:
We can all recognize that linear rational
of’ou^brain and
1
conscioisLss
Pre
RauLaUtyPr
t
“ irt
-r
valid, perhaps more so, is intuitive, Y
cognizant
V
ofUltimate * truth^byhsitting
01" 6
' t,
ReaSng
W
b
ld
k
than bY StUdying ^ a lib^ry*din ooks, engaging in logical discourseand compiling facts and figures are necess t inthe modern context, but they are not the onlyways to comprehend the world and our livesOften our gut instincts enable us to act moreeffectively m a crisis than does careful
rational analysis. 39
This incipient anti-intellectualism, a reflection of
American "pragmatism" and radical "actionism,
" takes on
ominous characteristics with the additional uncritical
embrace of the "natural" side of humans, reminiscent of
Niotzsche s idolization of the beast,
We reject the New Age eco-la-la that says we must
transcend our base animal nature and take charge of
our evolution in order to become higher, moral
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to glorying in our^weat^horrao”™ t0 beln9 anima1 'We struggle against the modern c®
5
'
^
ears
' and blood.
u11, passionless androids wP °
mpulsion to become
logical lives; we smell, tastl ^ Uve s^itary,Earth; we live with gusto
.
40 ' See ' hear and fee l
This emphasis on action and animal nature is again
e simple reversal of the nature-culture duality
characteristic of rdentity thinking. This reversal does
not eliminate the inherent tendency of conceptual
domination, it merely sides with the opposite term in the
struggle, there is no
"reconciliation.'. Foreman however,
does occasionally acknowledge the difficulties of
obtaining the truth.
back- to- the- landers "cutt^T ° f “-culture
thinkers, and^adi^l^ eS^ts^tT 1 t
conS?*
this land—of Turtle T be a P r°duct of
frth /hmer i ca- -we ^are^ a ^product TAlTr^l“
millennia of We^rn “vmSion.^ ° f elght
As was discussed previously concerning the
relationship of immediate experience and knowledge, it is
clear that Adorno does not accept the legitimacy of the
claim to immediate truth, that alternatively there is
needed a critical interpretation of experience to reveal
its truth content. The claim of deep ecology and of
Foreman of being able to achieve immediate truth
intuitively is ideological to the extent it serves as
complete justification of eco-defensive actions and to the
extent that it denies the deeply penetrating structures of
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society into the mental processes nf in •
. „
P o the individual. The
SXPerlenCe ° f thS W^rness devotee may containan element of "higher truths,-
' hut this intuits
recognition requires an interpretative response, at
minimum interpretation is needed to translate intuitive
knowledge into strategic and ethical action, such as
monkeywrenching. In the context of
Adorno attempts to justify the necessity of critical
interpretation of intuitive experience and relate it to
truth content. Perhaps there are sufficient affinities
between the aesthetic experience Adorno examines and the
wilderness experience Foreman promotes that, with
appropriate
"refunctioning" of concepts responding to the
difference in their "objects of interpretation," a more
adequate critical interpretive framework can be provided
for the radical ecology movement. 42 Specifically, what is
now needed is a more nuanced understanding of the
mediations between society and nature, their mutual
determinations, and the necessity of their simultaneous
consideration for both theory and action.
What is of concern here is the relationship of
experience to intuitive knowledge and how this can be
interpreted to provide a more secure footing for the
actions of radical ecology which aim at the eventual
establishment of an ecological society at peace with
nature. This depends on how experience, specifically the
experience of "nature," is transformed into knowledge.
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Primitive
Critical Theory and the
It may help to clarify „hat is at stake ^ ^examining Adorno's understanding of the prehistory of
science and art, and the potential of transforming their
purposes. The status of intuitive knowledge is at theheart of the criticisms of deep ecology which have
attempted to portrav -if- noP y it as essentially fascist. « Adorno
and Horkheimer's attention to the elements of fascism andits relationship to "primitive" experience may inuminate
the potential problems of deep ecology's current
philosophical strategy.
Key to understanding the early critical theory work
on these issues is the rrmr-om+-Li concept/term mime.si " a
foundational concept never defined. "44 Nature appears as
an overwhelming force to the early human, a force that
must be appeased or fooled.
Only consciously contrived adaptation to naturerings nature under the control of the physically
simn?
r
"'i
The ratio which supplants mimesis is notply its counterpart. It is itself mimesis:mimesis unto death. The subjective spirit whichcancels the animation of nature can master adespirituairzed nature onl Y by imitating its rigidityand desprrrfuaUsing Itself in turn. Imitation Yters into the service of domination inasmuch aseven man is anthropomorphized for man. The pattern
such adap?ation?«
g iS the maste^ ° f nature through
Modern reason has "degenerated" as it has imitated
the nature which it has come to dominate. A vicious,
240
"
'TC1*t, “•*• “ tb. 1Mvid„ „much as "nature" ever has. The role ,
-en as the path to th
-^ghtenment was
P e overcoming of myth and mythlikenature
. Enlightenment is the effort to drssolve myth,'
——Pi. Of
nature of the subjective. in thif°
3eCti°n °nto
supernatural, spirits and h
ls view, the
Of men who allow themselvesTotl ?
re mirror images
natural phenomena. Conseauen? 1
beUrightened by
figures can all be brought tf lY the many mythic
and reduced to the human subject?^00 denominator.
Enlightenment asserts that everything of meaning rs
available to the reason of "man." Through formal logic
and its mathematicization rn science the world is made
calculable, predictable, and most importantly available
for utilization by man. The earliest conversion of myth,
from explanation of the world and projection of the human
to potential control and use, took the form of magic, a
precursor to science, "Myth intended report, naming, the
narration of the Beginning; but also presentation,
confirmation, explanation: a tendency that grew stronger
with recording and collection of myths. Narrative became
didactic at an early stage. Every ritual includes the
idea of activity as a determined process which magic can
nevertheless influence ." 47 However, within magic, nature
was not organized conceptually as so many examples of a
common characteristic; the specificity or uniqueness of
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oTr.tr
"
«' «• »uttau,
infl
XOnS ° f thS PriSSt ° r Shaman to its potentialuence in inducing other events:
Magic was not ordered hv nn Qit changed like the cultic rr/ J;
dentical spirit:
supposed to accord with hh
ks whlch were
Magic is utterly untrue Spirits -
not yet negatedbv et . ln it domination is
pure truth anfactin a
mng itSelf into the
world that has become! subjectl^i?”^ ° f the
magician imitates demons; in ordej to fZ uthem or to appease them, he behaves frightenfrighteningly or makes gesturesEven though his ta^v i
~
y of aPPeasement.
conceives of hLself as he neverfor whom the man
happy hunting-grounds become the unmfd onthe inclusive concent for a n £led cosmos,
plunder. P all possibilities of
It is not the invisible power of nature as a whole
that the magician seeks to influence, instead there is
still the recognition in these actions of the specific
qualities of the object influenced,
"In magic there is
specific representation. What happens to the enemy’s
spear, hair or name, also happens to the individual; the
sacrificial animal is massacred instead of the god.
Substitution in the course of sacrifice marks a step
toward discursive logic ." 49 Even though magic honors the
uniqueness of the individual it attempts to influence, in
this attempted influence against the mythic or fated
character of the world, the repetition of nature, it also
becomes the first attempt to "identify" nature, to reduce
nature to category and example. The critical theorists
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eugue that the
the essence of
identifying and controlling of nature
science
:
is
Science prepares the end of fhiIn science there is no specifbh State ° f affair s.if there are no sacrificial an representation: and
Representation is exchanged “r”^
*here ia a° god.
universal interchangabiUtv L t fungib1®-m representation but as at°m ls smashed notthe rabbit does not ret,r«™f w™. 0f matter ' andpresenting '^ ° f
- virtually ignored b
?
y the^V^
Science attempts to demythologize or disenchant the
-Id, but it does so at the expense of the unrgueness of
each individual. Magic retained an affinity for
individuality bv it* Fy y s use of mimesis,
"Like srihnmcience, magic
pursues aims, but sppV
^
fn » *eeks to achieve them by mimesis-not by
progressively distancing itself from the object. "51
Mimetic magic still recognizes the affinities are
similarities between self and other, between the human and
the "other" in nature.
Science in its ideological forms is extended into a
means for the control of human nature as well, and thus
acquires the characteristics of the very nature it first
wanted to control. Science, in the hands of a society
dominated by the exchange principle broadly understood,
transforms the individual into a mere example of universal
processes, a speciman available for control and
manipulation. The history of "development" from magic to
science, from myth to enlightenment is also a story of the
return into the mythic, of renewed confrontation with
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fateful necessity,
"Mythology itself set off th
process of enlightenment in which ever and ^
Unendl '' g
again, with t-hpinevitability of necessity, every specific theoretic visuccumbs to the destructive criticism that it is only a
a d
“ the -ry notions of spirit, of truth
n
, indeed, enlightenment itself have hr it, become animistic
magic. The principle of fatal necessity.
...
"52
The tendency toward ever increased domination is not
confined to science or only directed toward external
nature, but is also the tendency of philosophy and the
confinement of sub
: ectivity to rational calculation.
Adorno calls this tendency
"identity thinking." if
Philosophy is to break the hold of the logic of domination
then it must become aware of the alternative possibilities
of thought lodged in the repressed fragments of mimesis
that remain,
While doing violence to the obiert of
obJecT^itT3 3 KT* 8 'oject, and t unconsciously obeys the idpp n f m w
amends to the pieces for what it "has done A ^
conscious
Y/
fl
hlS unconscious tendency becomes
11 J ;
Accompanying irreconcilable thoughts isthe hope for reconcilement, because the resistance of
freedom of th^ ^ being ' the commaridinghe subject, intends in the object eventhat which the object was deprived by
objectification. 53
Philosophy must make conscious the potentials of the
objects it responds to, potentials suppressed in the
activities of identifying thought, including the various
forms of substitution or exchange. The "exchange
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mentality" and processes of substitute
n
.
ion are ideologicalm that the non-identical is claimed to he identical
Borrowing from Hegel, Morno asserts that
"yielding" to
the object is the only way for its posslbiUtles fco ^
expressed. However, if the Hegelian system is followed,
thought merely returns on itself as a reflection of the
subject not the revelation of the object. Adorno does not
simply reject Hegelian dialectics, but radicalizes it and
already radicalized forms as presented by Marx.
Adorno attempts to rescue the insights Marx had from the
Marxists who captured the critical philosophy. The rescue
is dedicated to the individual and the particularity of
nature, "If the thought really yielded to the object, if
its attention were on the object, not on its category, the
very objects would start talking under the lingering
eye."s4 But the theoretician is not simply a quietistic,
meditative mystic,
True practice, the totality of acts that would
satisfy the idea of freedom, does indeed reguire fulltheoretical consciousness But practice also needssomething else, something physical which
consciousness does not exhaust, something conveyed toreason and qualitatively different from it... The partof action that differs from the pure
consciousness
... the part that abruptly leaps outthis is spontaneity, o
The problem of the spontaneous response to the object
interpretation is the mistake of seeing in the object
what is actually in the self. This is the basis of the
analysis of "Anti-semitism" in the Dialectic. nf
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Central to this analysis
relationship of mimesis to projection and
projection. Projection is tracked to its
and the attempt to survive,
is the
false
animal origins
in a certain sense all perceotinn ioprojection of sensory impressions t P^ 6011011 - Theanimal prehistory, a mechanism r 3 legacy of our
and obtaining food, an extension^/the'^K6"31^impulse with which t-bo n-; u °n . the combative
or Pain--reacted to movements
animals
-»ith pleasure
intentions of the object Tn
'
h
lrresPective of the
has been automatized like nth
uma
^
bein9 s projection
behaviors which h^e'becoL
“
d
The process of projection,
(which is not entirely different
like that of mimesis
) > is refined or extended
With the development of civilization. This development
occurs both at the social and individual levels;
of^/hi^h
6111 ° f things
' the fixed universal orderw c science is merely an abstract
expression, is
...the unconscious product of theanimal organ in the struggle for existence, ofautomatic projection. But in human society,
where affective and intellectual life aredifferentiated with the formation of theindividual, the latter requires an increasinglyfirm control over projection; he must learn at
one and the same time to refine and inhibit itBy learning to distinguish between his own and’
extraneous thoughts and feelings under the force
of economic necessity, a distinction is madebetween without and within, the possibility ofdistancing and identifying, self-awareness and
the conscience. Further consideration is
necessary to understand the controlled
projection, and the way in which it is deformed
into false projection—which is part of the
essence of anti-Semitism.^
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The "system of thfngs " is the set of reiationshipsT are estabUshed as the—ting , identlfying self- ernalizes fts impressions of the world. This process
of the human organism is necessary for survival, and also
results in the formation of the
"rndividual .
" However,
thrs formation is unstable, requiring extreme effort to
sustain it. The
"projection" of the outside world into
the individual psyche, is the formation of the self or
subject, and requires the development of control of the
process itself. A false projection in a sense reverses
the process, what is perceived as external is actually a
representation of the subject. The important distinction
here in the critical theorists' explanation is between
true and false projection, and the subsequent impacts
these will have on the individual. The formation of the
individual is a product of this process of projection:
In order to reflect the thing as it is, the
subject must return to it more than he receivesfrom it. The subject creates the world outsidehimself from the traces which it leaves in his
senses: the unity of the thing in its manifold
characteristics and states; and he therefore
constitutes the ' I ' retrospectively by learning
to grant a synthetic unity not only to the
external impressions, but to the internal
impressions which gradually separate off from
them. The real ego is the most recent constant
product of projection
.
58
The process of projection is a creation of both the
external world and the internal world (the "I"),
simultaneously. But the constancy of the external world,
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the stability of the object, is a product of the subject's
relation to the object, which as nat
' nature
' is in a state of
constant flux. The object's identity is imposed by the
subject
. This
"synthetic unity" of the object is the
basis for the unity of the subject, and the objectivity of
the subject. These considerations go far beyond what has
thus far been presented as deep ecology.
Any attempt to overcome the domination of nature and
therefore create a world in which real freedom and
happiness are possible must recognize the necessary role
of critical interpretation in that effort. The rescue of
nature will also be a rescue of reason and can only be
accomplished by attending to what is not identical to
reason;
Only in that mediation by which the meaninglesssensation brings a thought to the full
th=
d
^h iVl^Y Which U is capable, while one other hand the thought abandons itself
without
. reservation to the predominate
impression, is that pathological loneliness
which characterizes the whole of nature
overcome. The possibilities of reconciliation
appears not m certainty unaffected by thought,m the preconceptual unity of perception and
object, but in their considered opposition. Thedistinction is made in the subject, which has
the external world in its own consciousness and
yet recognizes it as something other. Therefore
reflection, the life of reason, takes place as
conscious pro j ection
.
Critical interpretation is "conscious projection,"
the subject aware of the process that results in the
"synthetic unity" of the object, of nature. Again, the
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danger is a fal
one that does not make the
self and the independent
se projection,
necessary distinctions between
objects of the external world:
13156 Action.
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familiar; tut fal™ prijectr^^^es^r
int!L?feKpe?Lnce
r
s
d
as
n
hostu
neS
^
ra0St
Hi
s “bj®ct wil1 n°t admit as his oTeven
”hlCh
thoiagh they are most assuredly so, areattributed to the
victim
.
60 object—the prospective
False projection is a repressed mimesis, where the
self or subject is projected onto the external world.
This false projection, which results in the fear of the
other and the subsequent attempts to master or dominate
it, is a key to understanding the various forms of
oppression and exploitation, including those based on
race, gender, class, and other natural categories. To
overcome domination requires the internalization of the
external while honoring the particularity or individuality
of all aspects of the external world.
Foreman has an understanding of enlightenment not so
far from the implications of Adorno's analysis,
Do not misunderstand my words. I seek after wisdom
and enlightenment, too. I go alone into the
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wilderness in quest of visions t +-mYs elf with my own self-imnort-^nA
try n0t to delude
there. In the Big Outside
’ ' '
*
Realit y is out
of it--raw, rank, brawling" anri
act:i
-on in defense
-is vastly more important than al?°ri
Sh it: may be “
With which I can swell my heaS in
enli 9htenment
years in which my consciousness exJsts?^"
1 SC° re
Monkeywrenching
Monkeywrenching is one of the primary means of
uncompromising defense of the Earth. The term is borrowed
from Ed Abbey, but Foreman has done the most to take it
from the somewhat romanticized novel form to actual
widespread use in the radical ecological movement.
Foreman continues to defend eco-tage tactics by placing
them within a philosophical and practical framework.
Monkeywrenching has the characteristics of nonviolent
anarchism. Foreman's first claim in the defense of
monkeywrenching is that it is nonviolent,
Monkeywrenching is nonviolent resistance to thedestruction of natural diversity and wilderness. Itis never directed toward harming human beings or
other forms of life. it is aimed at inanimate
machines and tools that are destroying life. Care is
always taken to minimize any possible threat topeople, including the monkeywrenchers themselves . ^2
Monkeywrenching is also "truly individual action."
It is necessarily so because of the usually illegal nature
of the activities, carried out with the hopes of not being
caught, therefore requiring the utmost in secrecy.
However, two particular incidents indicate the difficulty
of defending the nonviolence position in conjunction with
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most notorious case of
the necessity of secrecy. The
ecotage gone awry may be a recent .tree spiking" case that
resulted in injuries, although most Earth Fi rst!ers claim
the incident does not have the characteristics of a true
monkeywrenching activity. 63 The logger who ^
was sawing a tree that had been "spiked" but without
notification of the activity, so that the likelihood of
eventual injury to timber workers was fairly high. This
contradicts the supposedly ethical and strategic use of
this technique by the eco-defenders
. All potentially
injurious actions should be minimized, usually by fully
informing potential victims.
The other aspect of monkeywrenching, its requirement
of secrecy, reveals the two-edged nature of the activity,
as it landed several ecoteurs in prison. Earth Firstlers
and their associates were arrested after beginning to
execute plans for toppling electrical power line support
towers. When a small group of activists began to ecotage
the tower they were surrounded by scores of FBI agents.
The FBI had penetrated the radical ecology movement on the
grounds that the ecotage activity is a form of
terrorism. 64 Foreman was arrested as a co-conspirator in
the action because he had helped the group obtain some
limited financial support although everyone insists he had
no direct knowledge of what the money was being used for.
The guestions of nonviolence and the need for secrecy
require an explicit defense because their conjunction is
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not recognized by those who
_ ^ Qf ^ ^
crvxl disobedience, including the civil rights actlons
the U.S. Direct action in defense of civil rights
received substantial philosophical and spiritual
justification through the writings of Dr. Martin Luther
King, Jr. and his reliance on the thoughts and actions of
Gandhi and Thoreau. It may be illuminating to compare the
arguments of Foreman and King to find where they converge
and diverge in an attempt to determine if changed
historical circumstances indicate a necessary change in
tactics as well.
Foreman views monkeywrenching as a "deliberate and
ethical" activity which is not revolutionary. He claims
it is not the aim of ecodefense to "overthrow" any social,
political, or economic system, "it is merely nonviolent
self-defense of the wild." This defense is aimed at
keeping "industrial civilization" out of nature and to
speed its retreat from areas that should be wild. 65
Foreman likens monkeywrenching to the Boston Tea Party of
1773 and to the work of the Underground Railroad preceding
the U.S. Civil War.
The philosophical and ethical dimensions of Foreman's
defense of ecodefense may be most fully revealed in direct
comparison to the defense of the activities of the civil
rights movement by Dr. King. King indicated there are
four basic steps in any non-violent campaign:
"( 1
)
collection of the facts to determine whether
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injustices are alive, (2) negotiation, (3)self-
purification, and (4) direct action. "66 Wew can compare
the relation of the four steps outlined by King along with
his additional counts on direct action to the activities
of the Earth First
! ers
. The beginnings of Earth First'
fit well with the King model of nonviolent campaigns. As
indicated by Rib Scarce in his study of the
founding members of Earth Firgf i i ,u n h st! almost uniformly came
from activist backgrounds that had included full
participation in the establishment. Many were lobbyists
and representatives of environmental groups, some
attempting to develop comprehensive wilderness plans with
Congress and the Carter administration in the late 1970s.
Foreman is a prime example of this very conventional
citizen activist profile; briefly a Marine, Wilderness
Society lobbyist, committed to rational argumentation and
negotiation. The decision to abandon conventional
environmentalism for radical ecological activity came only
after long years of negotiation and compromise, which the
radicals finally realized had in fact resulted in near
total victory for the forces of economic growth and
ecosystem destruction. 67 But the justification for the
Earth First! movement is not the same as the justification
for specific acts of monkeywrenching
. Foreman offers many
examples of individual actions in his general defense of
monkeywrenching. The high level of scientific knowledge
and investigation of the "facts" by Earth First! ers is
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evident in the detailled arguments that take place In thePages of their Journal. However, it is not' as Clear what
role of negotiation is for Earth First!
. Their „no
compromise" stand would seem to rule out any negotiation,
yet in forming the group it was recognized that the more
radical stand they would take would make mainstream
environmentalism appear moderate and reasonable and
thereby open room for negotiation for the mainstreamers
.
68
foreman dlrec t comments on the difference between civil
disobedience and monkeywrenching seem to indicate
significant deviations from King's position,
society or some aspect th^ro^-p ^
cases ls to reform
nonviolently vioUtinS the law ^
Conscl ®ntl°asly and
personal integrity. In othpr racoe ; +. . ,
against evil being done, to refuse to acquiesce"^
33
cas erarres? and
erebY
h°
^ Spirituall V' In both
the action?^ P
unls ment are integral elements of
In characterizing Earth First! civil disobedience he
claims its motivations have differed from those of "Gandhi
and the Civil Rights movement." Civil disobedience by the
ecologists is "goal-directed” rather than spiritually
directed, "Many Earth First !ers would argue that thwarting
destructive projects is the purpose of the civil
disobedience they commit. Although this has been my
motivation when participating in civil disobedience, it is
254
But in
not the classic strategy of civil disobedience „ 70
examining Dr King's actual arguments and uses of civil
obedience it is not so clear that the differences are
ose Foreman cites. King asks what the purpose is ofdirect action and answers the complaints against it.
Nonviolent direct arfinn
crisis and establish such creativeT^® SUCh 3community that has constantly !e!usedT°
n that 3
forced to confront the issue! It seeks t^df ! 6 iSthe issue so that it i K o ramatize
the purpose of ?he i t
“ be ^ored.
. .
. So
situation so crisis-packed ^ e ° Create a
open the door to negotiation
"lU lnevitably
Foreman does not give enough credit to the civil
tights movement or the radical ecology movement; not to
the civil rights movement because it goes beyond a
stereotype of simply seeking idealistic truths and
spiritual redemption, and not enough to the radical
ecologists for acting in a philosophically coherent
manner, action which does not require hero-like sacrifices
of their enlightened elite." Foreman misunderstands his
own argument,
onJceywrenchuig can also be seen as a sophisticatedpolitical tactic that dramatizes ecological issues
thSm before the Public when they otherwisewould be ignored in the media, applies pressure to
resource-extraction corporations and government
agencies that otherwise are able to resist
legitimate" pressure from law-abiding conservation
organizations, and broadens the spectrum of
environmental activism so that lobbying by mainstreamffrnnng o nnf ] rr j • , ..7 7groups is not considered "extremist
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Even though this paraliels exactly the argents of
Dr. King about the goals of civil disobedience and their
relationship to tactics. Foreman characterizes this
aspect of his argument simply as "Machiavellian" as mere
means-to-an-end, but this is to misunderstand Machiavelli
as well as King. Machiavelli
• s advice to the prince was
to use whatever means necessary to obtain or retain his
purposes, that is, that the end justified the means. But
this can lead to a contradiction of means and ends, and
ethical incoherence. Typically, Machiavelli advocated
various means to gain political power, power that then
became the means for any chosen purpose. However, the
means to alternative ends tends to become the goal itself,
so that the purpose of political power becomes an end in
itself and therefore essentially morally bankrupt. King
argues that the means must be consistent with the end,
"that ends and means must cohere" and "the idea that means
must be as pure as the end, " not that the means must be an
end m itself, as Foreman implies
.
73 Foreman seems to
want to present monkeywrenching as a means to an end, the
end being the promotion of biological diversity. The
question is whether monkeywrenching in its actual practice
is consistent with the ultimate end of expanded wilderness
and the protection of biological diversity, usually stated
by the deep ecologists in ethical terms as the right of
particular forms of life to exist "for their own sake."
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ould be more philosophically convincing to build
on King's observations about the relationship of just and
unjust laws, which King attributes to the earlier thought
of Saint Thomas Aquinas. In this argument a "just law is
a man-made code that squares with the moral law or the law
of God ." 74 King argues that the civil rights
demonstrators were acting consistently with this higher
law and the segregationists were not. Foreman uses the
same type of appeal to higher laws as justification of
direct, and usually illegal, action, "When we break unjust
political laws to obey higher ethical laws, we must guard
against developing a laxity toward standards in general.
Indeed, when one deliberately engages in civil
disobedience from time to time, one needs to attend to
just laws with an even greater sense of responsibility ." 75
King also gives further evidence of the difference
between just and unjust laws by claiming that when the
majority inflicts a code on the minority that is not
binding on itself, this is unjust, or "difference made
legal, but when the majority compels a minority to follow
a law that it is willing to follow itself, this is just,
or sameness made legal. King continues this moral
justification of direct action by stating that true peace
exists when there is respect for the dignity and worth of
human personality. The deep ecologists are arguing for
respecting the dignity and worth, or the "intrinsic
value," of other non-human entities. They indicate that
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this is not an impossible or even unusual attitude to take
toward non-human nature by citing the rituals and prayers
of pre-modern native peoples when they would need to take
the life of another being, or would in some other way
actively intervene in the relationship with non-human
nature. King furthermore indicates the necessity for the
public character of direct action,
One who breaks an unjust law must do it ooenl
v
lovingly . . .and with a willingness to acceptthtpenalty I submit that an individual who breaks alaw that conscience tells him is unjust, andWillingly accepts the penalty by staying in jail toarouse the conscience of the community over itsinjustice, is in reality expressing the very highest
respect for law
.
77 y 9
King uses the same examples as Foreman, the Boston
Tea Party as a positive form of civil disobedience, and
Hitler's use of what were legal means to produce a society
that practiced genocide. 7 ^ What is required of Earth
First!, or the followers of deep ecology, is to extend the
philosophical justification for their actions not distance
themselves from them. However, it is unclear whether the
more accurate model for radical ecological actions is
civil disobedience style direct action, or Vietnam and
Central American style guerrilla war. The crucial
differences between strategies and justification have
significantly different impacts on social change.
Foreman's understanding about the relationship of direct
action to publicizing the actions seems ambivalent if not
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contradictory. He claims that monkeywrenching actions do
not now require publicity and that public pronouncements
invite increased police actions,
'•Monkeywrenching has now
received adequate media attention, it can be argued, and
can now be carried on effectively without publicity
.... In
certain cases, publicity about an action may still serve a
worthwhile purpose; this must be determined individually...
But on what basis should the individual decide to go
public and how does this relate to possible arrest, jaU
time and fines? Foreman states, "The goals of
monkeywrenching are to block environmentally destructive
projects, to increase the costs of such projects and
thereby make them economically unattractive, and to raise
public awareness of the taxpayer-subsidized devastation of
biological diversity occurring throughout the world ." 79
It would seem that "silent" monkeywrenching only partially
accomplishes its goals if it fails to actively engage the
public on the political and ethical levels, instead of
merely privatizing the struggle. The insistence on the
secretiveness of the lone ecowarrior carries with it the
undertones of the myth of individualism which lies at the
heart of the ideology of domination and destruction.
Foreman seems to recognize the dilemma but does not
adequately address the issues. After repeatedly denying
the intention of reforming society or seeking its
revolutionary overthrow, he asks, "How do you change
society when you are apart from it? How do you understand
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yourself when you denv thp cnri ai* u y me soci l environment that
produced you? How can you gain support for your goals and
actions when your behavior alienates potential
supporters? ”80 He returns to the guerrilla war analogy to
emphasize that even in violent confrontation, the "wise
guerrillas know that they are part of society and need
support from the population base." 81 it would seem the
more consistent and powerful argument and tactic would be
to follow Dr. King's insight about the need to use direct
action as a means of mobilizing potential supporters and
the consciences of the opposition.
On the one hand Foreman awaits the day when the truly
free society will have realized the bioregional and
wilderness visions of reinhabitation and neo-primevalism.
On the other hand, he claims to be against "reform" and
unsupportive of "revolution." This combination of being
for and against radical change results in a reactive if
not fully reactionary response to the abuse of nature, one
without a long-term strategy,
Monkeywrenching, on the other hand, is aimed not at
reforming society but at thwarting destruction.
Although a similarly high level of deliberate and
ethical behavior is required, spiritual growth is not
a specific goal of ecotage (although it may be a side
benefit)
. What is important is stopping the damage;
the monkeywrencher, like the guerrilla fighter, is
more effective when avoiding capture and being able
to return again and again. 8 ^
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But the guerrilla fighter has long-term purposes, to
defeat the enemy, to drive them from the homeland, to
establish an alternative way of life. Foreman's argument
seems to contradict itself; arguing for an expansion of
wilderness and reinhabitation of bioregions, but at the
same time to claim no political objectives of reform or
revolution, just the objective to "thwart ." 83 But in
proclaiming the objective to thwart the government and its
industrial supporters of "development" Foreman relies on a
too simple analysis of the historical and political basis
for the legitimacy of the U.S. government.
Under closer examination, it is questionable whether
Foreman is taking his own arguments seriously. Perhaps he
is practicing monkeywrenching at another level, a version
of paper" monkeywrenching, "In addition to illegal
ecotage, monkeywrenching can be thought of as a strategy
that includes entirely legal techniques and that operates
within the system, too it is known as 'paper
monkeywrenching' in such cases ." 84 Are the
inconsistencies of his position, especially where they
appear most polemical and hyperbolic, in fact the paper
monkeywrenching of a weathered old cunning coyote from the
Southwest? Maybe his observation of others is a
representation of self,
Sometimes, when I hear public statements about
monkeywrenching, I feel like a Coyote strolling
through a Texas cow town and I tuck my tail between
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tracks
S
to
n
the
r
h?ns “T7 head and make
a wink and a corner-of-the-mouth smile and know
Ch
someone's putting out leftovers on the back Iht s important, in this funny place called • *
In his chapter on "Strategic Monkeywrenching, " where
he reiterates the need for secrecy, for keeping the book
on the subject (which he wrote and promotes) "out of
sight," and on the need to choose targets carefully to
avoid the FBI (which arrested him) and other police
forces, it is possible to detect a wink from Foreman's
back porch when he explains the strategic importance of
bumper stickers, "Any conservationist bumper sticker may
mark one as a suspect in some rural areas. Careful
ecoteurs may even try camouflage--an American flag decal
or NRA sticker. Non-monkeywrenchers like me should
continue to brandish 'I'd Rather Be Monkeywrenching'
bumper stickers ." 86 A slight smile can be glimpsed when
he says he would not encourage anyone to monkeywrench, but
in a footnote to such an unexpected statement, he adds,
More important, I would not want to dis courage anyone
from monkeywrenching. Those willing to commit ecotage are
needed today as never before. The advice I offer here is
merely that--advice .
"
87 The smile gets a little
and includes a wink,
broader
wrenches for pearl ' har>dled
Wilderness campfire with a few old
n
frie°d
nd 3
good cigar, and musing about the future
smokin9 a
monkeywrenching in the most generafof
V
say to George and Bonnie that ? have l \ ' 1 mlght
monkeywrenchers who don’t want tn
few ldeas for
want to be as effective as possible 88
CaUght “d Who
And of course the little wilderness campfire should never
be understood as a hangout for radicals,
-Of course, the
above comments are gust renderings around the fire, smoke
rings blown into the night air, desultory accompaniments
to the hooting of owls. The kind of casual rnrUi talk you might
have heard in a seedy Boston waterfront tavern in, say,
1773 ” 89
Bioregionalism
If Earth First !ers, present and former, and deep
ecologists generally, view the retention and expansion of
wilderness as the primary focus of their political
agendas, then how do human beings fit into this neo-
primeval world? Foreman and others suggest that
bioregionalism" is the most compatible form of social
organization to enhance the goals of deep ecology, which
center around the protection of biological diversity.
Bioregional groups met in the first North American
Bioregional Congress in the Ozarks in 1984. However,
bioregionalism as a way of life had gathered sufficient
momentum by 1978 that the first books dealing with the
topic began to appear, including Peter Berg and Raymond
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Dasmann s R£inliii]2i1^
Reinhabitation
is a form of "living-in-place" which,
eans following the necessities and pleasures of lifeas they are uniquely presented by a particular ,h
£
and evolving ways to ensure long-term occupancy ofthat site A society which practices living“n-p?acekeeps a balance with its region of support^lhrouqhlinks between human lives, other living things andthe processes of the planet-seasons, weather wearcycles as revealed by the place itself, it i s theopposrte of a society which mate^Liying throughshort-term destructive exploi^httlFllfd and
Foreman summarizes this concept of social
organization, "Bioregionalism, then, is fundamentally
concerned with dwelling in place, a concept far removed
from the suburbs, cities, and farms of our continent.
Reinhabitation involves adapting yourself to the place
instead of the place to you; it means becoming part of a
community already present--the natural community of beasts
and birds and fish and plants and rivers and mountains and
plains and sea ." 91
The idea of bioregionalism presents problems of
political organization especially as it relates to ideas
about the level at which community decisions should be
made which impact the relation between society and nature.
Foreman rightly points out that under present conditions
the adoption of strict local control of a bioregion would
have devastating ecological consequences,
While local control of the land is fine in theory and
as a long-term goal (after we truly appreciate this
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land and agree to adapt ourselves tn i r •the other way around) let no , instead of
that we would have littlfDrot"Tfer ' for “““>Ple,
other natural areas in ios? ,"?61"655 orit were up to the state-level pol
® "estern states if
residents of those states
.... Congress^
5
°l ruralbeacon of ecoloairai ori n , . n(?ress is a shining
-st state S?sia ?o
county commission. 92 yet ' to a rural
Foreman views the process of converting society from
its present incarnation, emphasizing technology, industry
and growth, to one which is ecologically aware, as that of
"reinhabitation." The bioregion would center around the
expansion of wilderness areas, but would include "natural
corridors established to allow for the free flow of
genetic material between them and to such preserves in
other bioregions. "93 This process is not one of mere
preservation of existing systems but would at least
initially, require active intervention, "in many cases,
temporary transitional management will be needed to help
nature restore suitably large areas to wildness.
Extirpated native animals should be introduced if
possible. If salmon streams need to be repaired,
clearcuts rehabilitated, prairies replanted, roads
removed then that becomes the hands-on work of
reinhabitation.
"
94
The central political question for this project of
reinhabitation is how it relates to present political
structures. One of the problems of addressing the needs
of the bioregions is how those needs can be represented.
The bioregionalists see the bioregion as a substitute or
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supersession of the nation-state. Peter Berg has
attempted to express the necessity of transforming
politics from its nation-state basis to the bioregion.
It's time to develop the
?he
e
naiu?arsystems°that “^“^tainlng
Bioregions are the natural ^
m
^
ely SUpP°rt a11 life.
lives. Re inhabit ation^of^bioregions
11“
—yone
adaptive cultures that follow the unigSe^characteristics of climate, watersheds sol , ,orms, and native plants and animals that Hof’ landthese places, is the appropriate direction 6transition from Late Industrial society. §5 £ 3
in an interview with Berg has gone
into some detail about the relationship of bioregional
possibilities as an alternative to the nation-state,
"Bioregion as a location is an ecological context. Who
are you?~I am a person who lives in a place that contains
other life, in ecosystems, and I am part of those
processes; I am part of my bioregion. You can be part of
your bioregion, but it's getting harder and harder to be a
member of a nation state, in good faith, because the
planetary biosphere doesn't have nation states." 96 Berg
explains the idea of the bioregion as an organizational
principle that develops out of the expansion of the idea
of ecology beyond its narrow understanding as a scientific
field. Berg believes the ideas of ecology will have as
revolutionary an effect on life in the future as physics
has had since the early days of the modern period. Even
the word ecology only came to mass consciousness with the
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work of Rachel Carson in 1963 with the publication of
"These ideas from the natural sciences
started to come over into popular consciousness not as
tools to disassemble nature, but to see it, to ^ its
sanctity.
"
97
In commenting on the relationship of bioregion to
nation-state, Berg also attacks the myth of the
proletariat,
What is the role of the nation state? it seems thatit s_a very destructive one from a biospheric pointof view. Not only is it replaceable, it probabwmust be replaced by another view. Should my
species
r
in
1
the h°
h™aniy ? °r should they be human
ih!d I biosphere? Probably human species int e biosphere. Should they be the workers of theworld: No, the managers have to lose their chains
Whai is ?he
1S thS PUrP°Se of 9 r°wth in the economy?t r t purpose of progress? It seems thatr n «=>\7 f -r-o Hnof y ythey're destructive purposes.
Berg compares the dying "industrial" society to the
emerging ecological one.
In the industrial era, the image was material
progress, transforming things, mutating things,
changing their being, their shape, their chemistry,
their nuclear components, changing everything about
them! Whereas I think self-reliance, sustainability,
climax, states of succession those are good images
for the ecological era. And a lot of people can
relate to them. They have a lot of lessons to teach
about human interaction. 99
Berg believes the new ecological consciousness will
manifest itself in terms of "political locatedness . " This
will result in a "bioregional consciousness" that will
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seek political autonomy for the separate bioregions, but
Berg's vision seems naive and idealized in retrospect,
In Europe, the boundaries of ethnic peoples can oftenbe considered roughly bioregional
...
,
As nation spatesbecome more desperate to control their situationsthey impose more on the regions, bioregions, anSethnic peoples, and by so doing create in them adesire for a separate identity, and a feeling ofdeliberate repression of their values. 100
Against these assertions, the "ethnic cleansing" at
the root of the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia
should give pause to any utopian assertion of the
natural tendency toward harmony should humans organize
themselves politically on the basis of a fetishized
localism. Finally, Berg puts the emerging ecological
consciousness in political revolutionary terms;
For us to become liberated from such late-
industrial forms of control, it seems to me that
we need an image, a vision without which we
cannot survive. That's what 'freedom' was,
beginning in the 18th century. Freedom suddenly
became a flame. People would die for freedom.
Think of the Paris Commune: people were so
desperate to revise society in an egalitarian
way that they seized part of Paris and said, 'We
will live or die to be this way. ' Well, I see
us literally dying and not living if the
depredations on the planet continue. and so a
vision that is worth living for is what I'm
hoping to get from wilderness
.
The North American Bioregional Congress has met since
1984, and the bioregionalists involved have developed
complex and thoughtful approaches to the development of
bioregional politics and consciousness. Bill Devall,
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committed to deep ecology and bioregional
"Bioregional movements are political and
expressions of our vital need to be part
ism states,
social
of/ not apart
from, the place wherein we dwell .
"
102 Although
bioregionalism may contain the potential for new political
forms, for abandoning nation-states and multinational
corporations, it has not sufficiently addressed the
repression of internal nature which when released may take
its revenge in new levels of domination such as in the
former Yugoslavia, a revenge of nature modeled on
fascism. Foreman recognizes that the goals of the radical
ecologists presently have an unachievable utopian quality
about them, and in this he may share some of the pessimism
of critical theory,
Perhaps it is. a hopeless quest. But one who lovesarth can do no less. Maybe a species will be saved
SavbP nnr
St T 11 T UnCUt ° r a dam Wil1 be torn down.M y e ot. A monkeywrench thrown into the gears ofthe machine may not stop it. But it might delay itmake it cost more. And it feels good to put itthere. UJ
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SECTION II.
CRITIQUE OF SOCIAL ECOLOGY
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CHAPTER 6
SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY
Social Ecology and critical theory are in a complex
relationship. The philosophy of social ecology is
primarily the work of one person, Murray Bookchin, who has
attempted since the 1950s to combine the insights of
radical social thought with those of ecology and
evolutionary biology. His first book, under the pseudonym
of Lewis Herber, Our Synthetic Environment
f was published
in 1962, the same year as Rachel Carson's Silent Spring
However, the most complete statement of his philosophy is
found in The
—Ecology of—Freedom in which Bookchin brings
together ideas and observations from more than twenty
years of thought into a sustained argument for the
development of an ethics grounded in ecology and
evolution. This claim for an "objectively grounded"
ecological ethics is the focus of social ecology and the
source of its influence on the radical ecology movement.
It is also the basis for many criticisms which come from
two principle directions; the deep ecologist or
ecocentrist wing of the ecology movement, and from
critical theorists who fundamentally identify with the
work of Habermas. Bookchin himself at times argues that
social ecology is an extension and correction of the work
of the early critical theorists, Horkheimer, Adorno, and
Marcuse. Any serious examination of the philosophy of
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nsocial ecology must also examine these relationships.
:
this chapter Bookchin's claims for the adequacy of his
approach for addressing the ecological crisis, that his
"dialectical naturalism" overcomes the limitations of
other philosophies of radical ecology as well as the
problems of the various versions of critical theory, will
be explored. In the next chapter the resulting social
ecology understanding of subjectivity will be examined to
determine its adequacy for addressing the ecological
crisis. Chapter 8 will then provide an overview of the
resulting recommendations or restrictions on politics as
they relate to the subject of social ecology.
Dialectical Naturalism
Bookchm has attempted to summarize the philosophical
basis for social ecology in the term "dialectical
naturalism." 1 it is frequently difficult to understand
what Bookchin's arguments actually mean as is evident from
the wide range of interpretations his work receives, as
well as his own responses to criticism. At the risk of
yet another misinterpretation it will be helpful to
summarize the major thrust of his argument.
Bookchin conceives of his work as an attempt to
combine the insights of dialectics with those of a theory
of natural evolution. He traces his understanding of
dialectics from Aristotle to where it reached its "high
point," in the logical works of Hegel, but, Bookchin
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argues, Hegel ' s was not the fullest possible
of diaiectics
. This can only occur, he claims, by
"naturalizing the dialectic. -2 This dialectic differs
from the dualism that Plato offered, a dualism which
underlies what Bookchin calls
"conventional reason."
Conventional reason is controlled by the identity
principle (the critique of which was the primary concern
of all of Adorno's work),
"Conventional reason rests on
identity, not change; its fundamental principle is that &
the famous 'principle of identity,' which means
that any given phenomenon can be only itself and cannot be
other than what we immediately perceive it to be at a
given moment in time. It does not address the problem of
change ." 3 Conventional reason seeks logical consistency,
the application of the identity principle, but does not
explore the process of change systematically as a process
of development that includes reason itself. The Platonic
dualism of identity and change, claims Bookchin, "echoed"
through Western philosophy until the nineteenth century
when dialectical thinkers explored how "unity itself
actually consists of the unity of opposites ." 4 Bookchin
claims Hegel basically solved the paradox of how "self-
persistence" is achieved through change. Dialectical
reason expresses the developmental notion of reality by
claiming that A equals
—
b
oth A and not A . An entity is not
only what it is at this moment but also what it is
becoming. It contains a latent potential which, under
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appropriate conditions, will come to manifest itself.
This is sometimes expressed as the identity of identity
and non-identity, or the unity of opposites. Bookchin
claims "dialectic" has been misused, even by Hegel, who
made it into a cosmological system resembling a theology,
as Absolute Knowledge, the result of the unfolding logic
of the contradiction and resolution of the contradiction,
of identity and non-identity. This was "even labeled
’God' by Hegel ." 5 In order to correct this theological
misuse of dialectic, Bookchin proposes to introduce the
idea of the theory of evolution into dialectical thought.
Bookchin sees the dialectic, when combined with a
post-Hegel theory of evolution, as the solution to the
philosophical problems of the ecology movement. He
generally characterizes other forms of philosophies of
ecology, especially deep ecology, as mystical and
irrational. The danger presented by these other
ecological philosophies is that most of their concepts are
"unnecessarily vague," and in their worst forms they are
misanthropic, anti-intellectual and contain the potential
for a very reactionary politics.
A crucial point in Bookchin' s explication of the
origins of dialectics is his claim that dialectics, and
dialectical reason, must be emphasized as a "process" and
should not be viewed simply as a "method." Dialectical
reason is not only a way of thinking about causality or a
way to analyze the relationship of an entity to what it
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might become, but is also an ontology, a description of
the objective world, "Dialectic is also, in fact, an
ontological form of causality. it is, in effect, both a
way of reasoning about causality in the form of a
development and, simultaneously, an account of the
objective world. Logic, in Hegel's work, joins hands with
ontology. "6 The iogical categories are developed by means
of what Bookchin calls "eductive thinking" (as distinct
from deductive or inductive which he identifies with
conventional reason), so that the "category” develops
toward its latent or implicit possibilities. The
dialectical development of the categories is part of the
process of the Becoming of Being, that is, dialectical
"causation" is the "differentiation of potentiality into
actuality in the course of which each new actuality
becomes the potentiality for further differentiation and
actualization." 7 Bookchin understands Hegel and
Aristotle s interpretation of causality as "emergent, " the
becoming explicit of the implicit in the "unfolding of its
latent form and possibilities." 8 Hegel uses the example
of the development of an acorn into an oak tree to
indicate that development does not "go in just any
direction," in indefinite change, but toward that which
fulfills its potential. In Hegel's "theologically
influenced" language, a thing or phenomenon must unfold or
develop toward its perfection, and if it fails in this
unfolding of its potential it is "inadequate" to its final
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form or idea, it is "imperfect." Hegel's theologically
influenced understanding of contradiction is expressed in
the working out of the dialectic, "The whole course of the
dialectic culminates in the 'Absolute' which is 'perfect'
in its fullness, wholeness, and unity ." 9
Bookchin claims his own dialectical naturalism
overcomes this theological understanding of development
inherited from Aristotle and Hegel, "Dialectical
naturalism, on the contrary, conceives contradiction as
distinctly natural in the sense that things and phenomena
are incomplete and unactualized in their development—not
imperfect' in any idealistic or supranatural sense ."-*- 9
Dialectical naturalism, instead of terminating in an
absolute, whether labeled the Ideal or God or something
else, attempts to "advance a vision" of ever-increasing
fullness or wholeness that includes a "richness of
differentiation and subjectivity ." 11 It is in the
i- o i a t i on ship of evolution to subjectivity that most
criticisms of Bookchin' s project have been generated.
Bookchin' s understanding of the relationship of
dialectical naturalism to subjectivity is at the core of
his attempt to develop an "objective ethics" that could
serve as a guide to ecological action and the development
of an ecological society. A closer examination of the
relationship of dialectical naturalism and subjectivity
will take place in the next chapter, but a brief overview
will serve to introduce two other "methodological" issues;
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Bookchin's rejection of Marx, and the rejection of the
early Frankfurt School position, which is staged on
related but not identical grounds.
Bookchin understands social ecology as presenting an
alternative to the "despair" of the "Frankfurt School-
over its inability to adequately address the "problem of
objective ethics. "12 Bookchin claims the establishment of
an objective ethics would provide guidance for the
development of "ecocommunities" which would live in
balance with nature, and just as importantly, would
constitute a liberated and truly just society. Bookchin
believes the establishment of an objective ethics is
possible based on the philosophy of social ecology. By
ecologizing" the dialectic received from the tradition
extending from Aristotle through Hegel, he believes
dialectics can be removed from its absolutist tendency and
provide the possibility for the development of
subjectivity without any predetermined terminal point. To
achieve this, Hegelian dialectics must be "greatly
modified," beginning with a shift of emphasis from the
notion of "strife," most often translated as "antithesis,"
toward differentiation and "mutuality." Bookchin's
dialectical naturalism replaces strife or conflict as the
basis for progress with an "ecological view" of progress
as the growing or increase of self-consciousness and
mutuality. He claims "the organic" creates forms,
relationships, processes and environments for itself
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through its metabolic activity, and this activity of self-
maintenance involves a "rudimentary subjectivity ." 13 The
organism must be able to identify itself in at least some
basic form for it to maintain its life-form as a unique
whole. But beyond maintenance of its organic integrity,
Bookchm claims the organism "strives" to become other
that what it is, "Conceived dialectically, organic
evolution, like social development, is, in a very loose
way, subjective in that life-forms and the communities
they establish, strive to be other than what they are ." 14
This striving of life yields "increasing degrees of
subjectivity" as qualitatively new "attributes" and
interrelationships" are actualized from the potentials of
life. This qualitatively new form of life can occur at
the level of biotic, communal, or social organization.
The emergence of new degrees of subjectivity expresses and
radically conditions "the fact that a new potential has
emerged, opening a new realm of possibility with its own
unique self-directive mode of activity ." 15 Viewed
historically and cumulatively the results of the
actualizations of potential "constitute a developmental
continuum." Bookchin summarizes this view of dialectics,
Emerging from this superb, basically Hegelian,
ensemble is a world that is always ethically
problematic, an ethics that is always objective, a
recognition of selfhood and subjectivity that
embodies nonhuman and human nature, and a development
from metabolic self-maintenance to rational self-
direction that thereby locates the origins of reason
284
exists ^^
e
frornatu?e
SUP
?he
Undane
i
d0main that
“S"“£rs"
development™ ^ a Shared cont of
But this basically Hegelian dialectics needs a theory
of evolution as a corrective to the "hard teleological
predeterminations" it acquired from the Greeks and from
Christianity
.
17 it is "only ecology that can ventilate
the dialectic" and bring about an end to the "hard
teleology" of previous versions of dialectics. The
inclusion of ecology in dialectics makes it "co-extensive
with natural evolution ." 18 A theory of natural evolution
that ecology provides would not only correct the hard
teleological tendencies of dialectic, but the dialectic
would then serve as a "source of meaning" for natural
evolution; not only a source of rational meaning, but also
ethical meaning. As part of the natural world, human
beings must inevitably intervene in nature, Bookchin
asserts, and the result of this "natural" intervention is
the creation of a "second nature" out of first nature, "By
second nature, I mean humanity's development of a uniquely
human culture, a wide variety of institutionalized human
communities, an effective human technics, a richly
symbolic language, and a carefully managed source of
nutriment ." 19 This second nature was produced through a
"highly graded" and "many phased" evolution resulting in
social institutions, various forms of human interaction,
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and "in the best of cases, a mutuality between first and
second nature that enriched both natures ." 20
The ecological crisis then is a crisis of "the
emergence of society out of biology" that resulted from
the contradictions of "hierarchy, domination, patriarchy,
classes, and the State." 2 ! This understanding of the
origins of the ecological crisis is what prompts Bookchin
to use the term "social ecology," which is intended to
emphasize the Sflsial origins of the crisis, and the fact
that the "resolution of this social crisis can only be
achieved by reorganizing society along ecological lines,
imbued with an ecological philosophy and sensibility ." 22
The resolution of the social crisis requires an objective
ethics which can be found in dialectical naturalism.
Humanity is the "embodiment of nature rendered self-
conscious and self-reflexive, " at least potentially. This
is not the present social condition since this potential
is currently "filled by blind market-oriented interests
and an egoistic marketplace mentality ."^ 0 Bookchin states
that an objective ecological ethics has not yet been
"rationally developed, " but at a minimum this future ethic
must include the idea of "human stewardship of the
planet ."^ 4 Planetary stewardship would involve the
"radical integration" of first and second nature,
including the development of new ecocommunities
,
ecotechnologies
,
and "an abiding ecological sensibility
that embodies nature's thrust towards self-ref lexivity .
"
20
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This would be nature acting on itself "rationally based
on "coordinates created by nature's potential for freedom
and conceptual thought," an objective ethics attempting to
define "what-could-be" as the realm of "objective
possibility ." 26 T nm a truly ecological society second
nature would be first nature rendered self-reflexive,
thinking nature could now self-consciously
"guide its own
evolution." Ecological society would be a transcendence
of both first and second nature in what Bookchin calls a
fr££ nature. This would not involve a collapse of either
first into second nature or vice-versa, as each would
retain its "specificity and integrity." Bookchin claims
this simply would be an expression or extension of natural
evolutionary tendencies, "Humanity, far from diminishing
the integrity of nature, would add the dimension of
freedom, reason, and ethics to first nature and raise
evolution to a level of self-reflexivity that has always
been latent in the very emergence of the natural world ." 27
This does not give humans free rein over nature since
natural evolution also "confers responsibility" on human
beings because of their unique capacities to think
conceptually and "feel a deep empathy for the world of
life." Humanity thus has the responsibility to reverse
the destruction and devastation of the biosphere, to
intervene in natural processes, and potentially to be as
creative as "natural evolution itself." This
understanding of the potential and responsibilities of
287
human beings shifts the analysis of ecological problems to
the question of the ways human beings will intervene in
nature. Whether "humanity" will become conscious of
itself as a tendency in natural evolution or not, whether
human beings come to act as responsible moral and
ecological agents, is a social problem, according to
Bookchin, which requires a specifically social ecology for
its solution.
In various contexts Bookchin has elaborated on why he
believes other philosophical orientations would not
adequately address specific ecological problems, or the
ecology crisis generally. Deep ecology has received
severe criticism for its irrational, mystical and
frequently reactionary tendencies
.
29 He has also rejected
various forms of systems theory and other neo-positivist
attempts to conceptualize the ecological crisis,
frequently making use of arguments that closely resemble
those of the early Frankfurt School
.
20 He also rejects
orthodox Marxism in much the same way, but extends his
criticism of Marxism to the "Neo-Marxism" of the critical
theorists, including Horkheimer, Adorno and Marcuse.
Bookchin’ s critique of the critical theorists hinges on
his understanding of the relationship between domination
and hierarchy. Even though this understanding is the
basis for Bookchin' s claims about the fundamental
differences between social ecology and early critical
theory, it is not clear what he believes to be the
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He sometimes seems to
continuing link between the two.
fundamentally dismiss critical theory but at other times
appears to be declaring himself the rightful heir to the
earlier project, in opposition to Habermas. This position
forces Bookchin to respond to attacks not only from deep
ecologists or ecocentrists
, but also from the Habermasian
wing of critical theory, a response that includes a
challenge to its claim to the heritage of critical theory;
ls tr
f9
lc that Adorno could not remove what Buck-orss calls "the taboo against positivity." To do sowould entail a "reconstruction" of humanity’s
relation with nature in terms of a radical social
ecology according to which the graded (i.e. mediated)development of natural history into social history
ceases to be teleologically pregiven in the emergence
o capitalism and the notion of humanity's domination
of nature--a notion of domination that has its rootsm the domination of human by human. ... Social
ecology, which was unknown to the Frankfurt School
except in a very technical form, could have provided
the mediations that would have spared nature
philosophy and a naturalistic ethics from the stigma
it acquired as a result of a static Hellenic
ontology, National Socialist "folk philosophy" and
Marxism's "diamat." jl
Even though in his battle with those faithful to
Habermas, Bookchin seems to nestle close to Adorno and
early critical theory, at other times he leaves the
impression of an unbridgeable gulf between critical theory
and social ecology: "Despite some recent nonsense to the
effect that the 'Frankfurt School' reconnoitered a
nonhierarchical and ecological view of society's future,
289
in no sense were its most able thinker:
V ” •
I
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notably M.ix
seems to depend on the "resoluteness" of the critique of
hierarchy and domination. The respective critiques of
hierarchy and domination therefore require a fuller
analysis. Before moving to that task however, the charge
of "Pessimism" deserves comment. Bookchin reiterates the
charge in several places with phrases such as "Theodor
Adorno and Max Horkheimer's dark pessimism," or "Reason,
whose defeat at the hands of Horkheimer and Adorno evoked
so much pessimism among their colleagues ."' 1 The
arguments of Hu I lot Kentor against Habermas's
"pessimistic" reading of Adorno would also apply to
Bookchin' s charges, but it is not necessary to look any
further that Bookchin himself to weaken the charge of
pessimism; "To simply designate Adorno 'pessimistic' is a
cheap shot." ;/| It is in the explanation of why the
description of Adorno as "pessimistic" is unfitting that
Bookchin stakes his claim most clearly to the legacy of
the early critical theorists,
Adorno was a transitional figure whose pulsating
contrariety and focus on the non-identity of the
object with the concept advanced a powerful
perspective for clearing the air of ossified notions
of reason, history, progress, conformity, and
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Social ecology’s claim to have developed Adorno's
perspective on non-identity is dependent on Bookchin’s
ability to clarify the difference between domination and
hierarchy, and place the concern with hierarchy at the
center of the analysis of the ecological crisis.
Domination
Bookchin tends to collapse Horkheimer and Adorno's
understanding of the domination of nature into an orthodox
Marxist or economic reductionist perspective based on the
subsequent required interpretation of Marx's own
understanding of the relationship of domination to labor.
Bookchin believes the critical theorists' analysis of
reason and of the trajectory of civilization are dependent
on a certain Marxist understanding of the domination of
nature.
Indeed, human reason, in their view, was hopelessly
tainted by its origin (as they understood it) as a
means for dominating nature— a vast, presumable
civilizatory enterprise that also required the
domination of human by human as mere instruments of
production. Marxist theory saw human servitude and
the development of classes as unavoidable steps in
humanity's 'tortured' march toward freedom from
material want and, hopefully, from social domination
itself. 36
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Bookchin claims this understanding of the process of
' vilization was taken for granted as fundamental by all
members of the Frankfurt School, and it was this
conception of the role of domination in the development of
civilization that eventually led to their "fatalism."
This Marxist basis of their analysis led them to conclude
that any attempt at liberation or emancipation was
"hopelessly tainted by the need to dominate nature and
consequently
-man .’" 37 Bookchin is claiming that Marx’s
emphasis on the necessity of the domination of nature for
human survival and for the development of human
subjectivity imposes a burden on his theory which
logically results in an inevitable total
instrumentalization of human reason and society.
Alternatively, Bookchin argues, domination is "thoroughly
social" in that it begins within society and is then
transferred onto the relationship of humans and external
nature. This is the basis for the centrality of the
"social" in social ecology,
Various modes of social institutionalization, not
modes of organizing human labour (so crucial to
Marx), led to domination. Hence, domination can be
removed only by resolving problematics that have
their origins in hierarchy and status, not simply in
class and the technological control of nature.
Domination, in effect, is not eluctably wedded to
human survival in a "hostile" natural world, as Marx
and the Frankfurt School believed, but to far-
reaching institutional changes . 38
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Bookchm claims the relationship of domination to
nature is "radically reversed" in social ecology in
comparison to the Marxist understanding. The domination
of nature did not begin with interaction with nature as a
basis for survival, but as part of the
institutionalization of social relationships based on
"natural" differences, most importantly differences that
result in the development of "gerontocracies" in which the
young were "placed in varying degrees of servitude to the
old, and in patriarchies where women were placed into the
servitude of men. Since the domination of nature did not
start in the effort to "control" nature or natural forces,
nature then can be seen as a "ground for freedom" as
opposed to the basically "Victorian image of nature" which
views it as "blind, mute, cruel, and stingy." These
claims must be examined in detail to illuminate the real
differences and similarities between social ecology and
critical theory, and to generate possible alternative
interpretations of the self-understanding of the critical
theorists
.
Bookchin's understanding of the thrust of the
critical theory argument and its limitations is dependent
on the relationship he sees between critical theory and
Marxism. Bookchin's analysis of Marxism is done largely
through the spectacles of a scientistic interpretation.
Bookchin admits that the question of the "scientific
methodology" of Marx can be read in many ways, but he
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chooses to read it in a fairly narrow sense. Bookchin's
central concern here is with the "scientistic" Marx who
attempts to reveal the "natural laws" of economic
movement. Especially of concern to Bookchin is Marx’s
claim that "the economic formation of society... is a
process of natural history." Bookchin claims it is in the
Marxian dialectic's claims about the concept of
"lawfulness" that the project shows its ultimate
theoretical and political bankruptcy
.
The crucial issue here is how to read Marx's
interpretation of capitalism and its place in "natural
history." Bookchin's reading exemplifies the typical
critique of Marx's tendency toward "scientism, economic
reduct ionism, and technological determinism. " It is
claimed that Marx views the objectification of nature for
human purposes as the fundamental relationship between
humans and external nature, that in fact it is precisely
to the extent that the human species makes nature an
object of production that it can be distinguished from
other animal forms of life. History, as the history of
class struggle, is the story of the appropriation of
production surplus by a ruling class at the expense of the
laboring ruled class. With capitalism, the process of
exploitation is extended in all directions, but, in this
version of the interpretation, capitalism also
revolutionizes all relationships in society and makes
possible a new form of society which will eliminate the
294
exploitation of labor through class structure. One of the
central questions then is the "necessity" of capitalism
and the extent to which the domination of nature is viewed
as the basis for the future free society. Under
Bookchin's interpretation, and the orthodox Marxist
interpretation, the domination of nature must extend
itself as far as possible to pave the way for eventual
emancipation. The development of technology is then
viewed as the basis for freedom, since only complete
domination of nature makes nature the totally subjugated
object of ever expanding human needs. The ability to
fashion nature as desired is the sign of human freedom.
Technical control of nature is then the project and
definition of human reason. The organization of society
is therefore challengeable only on the basis of its
rationality, that is, its ability to dominate nature in
order to extract use from nature that fulfills human
needs. Society is challenged on the basis of its
rationality in this narrow, instrumental, sense. In
Bookchin's version of this story,
Marx, while he may have joined Hegel in a commitment
to consciousness and freedom as the realization of
humanity's potentialities, has no inherent moral or
spiritual criterion for affirming this destiny. The
entire theory is captive to its own reduction of
ethics to law, subjectivity to objectivity, freedom
to necessity. Domination now becomes admissible as ;
"precondition" for liberation, capitalism as a
"precondition" for socialism, centralization as a
"precondition" for decentralization, the state as a
"precondition" for communism. 40
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Bookchin interprets this to mean that domination can
only be challenged on the basis of the "objective laws"
Marx has described in economic terms, where domination is
elevated to the status of natural fact." Even though
Marx did not intend the rise of totalitarian society as
the embodiment of a society based on these understandings
of domination, his understanding of the domination of
nature means there are "no inherent ethical considerations
m his theoretical apparatus" that would lead in another
direction
.
41 This lack of an ethical orientation outside
the domination of nature is for Bookchin "the fatal flaw"
of Marxism that then carries over into Frankfurt School
thought, creating the absence in critical theory, or so
Bookchin claims, of a grounding for an "objective
ethics . " 4 ‘1-
There are of course other interpretations of Marx,
but the most important in relation to Bookchin'
s
assertions is that of Adorno. One of the central
questions for determining the difference between Adorno's
negative dialectics and Bookchin' s social ecology is: What
is the relation between domination and history, or
domination and society or culture? Bookchin asserts that
critical theory is still in the "thrall" of Marxism, in
particular the scientistic version of Marxism that views
domination not only as a necessary moment in the dialectic
of freedom and necessity, but domination as the very basis
of freedom, a domination destined to continue even after a
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"proletarian victory." Central to this perspective is
Bookchin 's claim about the status of "natural law" in
Marx's work, and the necessarily instrumental approach to
nature that this entails. Bookchin acknowledges that a
scientistic reading based on the Preface to Capi tal may be
objected to on the basis of other passages in the
Grundrisse as well as in Capita l itself, but, he insists,
the scientistic reading is the more authentic, "What
decisively unites both the scientism of physics and the
Marxian Dialectic, however, is the concept of 'lawfulness'
itself—the preconception that social reality and its
trajectory can be explained in terms that remove human
visions, cultural influences, and most significantly,
ethical goals from the social process ." 43 Bookchin
includes the "Frankfurt School" in this assessment,
Like Marx, the Frankfurt School had a typical
Victorian image of nature. Nature was seen as a
"domineering" force over humanity that human guile--
and the class rule--had to exorcise before a
classless society was possible. The Frankfurt
School, no less than Marxism, in effect, placed the
onus for domination on a "blind," "mute," "cruel,"
and "stin
society . 4
Bookchin establishes only two interpretive
possibilities, a dichotomously structured choice of
positions, regarding the issue of the domination of
nature; either the domination of nature begins with the
human domination of nature, necessarily extending into the
whole of society, and presenting itself as the avenue to
F'
nature, not (let me emphasize) only on
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freedom (this being "Marxian dialectics"), or, (according
to social ecology) the idea of domination originated in
the domination of one part of society over another, and
only then extended to the unnecessary domination of
nature
.
At one level this can be seen as merely a restatement
of the difference between Marx and Hegel in their
respective interpretations of the master-slave dialectic.
For Hegel the struggle for self-consciousness involves the
"struggle unto death" between two consciousnesses which,
if it does not end in death for one of the parties, leads
to the enslavement of one by the other. The paradox of
f
-consciousness is that the slave, in working on nature
in order to serve the master, finds his consciousness
objectified within the nature on which he works.
Ironically, the slave comes to see his "self, " rather than
that of the master, objectified in the world. Marx alters
this labor theory of self-objectification to ground his
claim that within the interaction between humans and
nature in the working-up of nature into useful objects can
be found the beginnings of the domination of nature and of
the creation of the truly human species. Similarly, the
common participation in labor by the proletariat in the
factory serves as the basis for the development of "class
consciousness" which eventually leads to revolution.
Bookchin is reenacting this Hegelian versus Marxian
understanding of the basis for social domination but in
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slightly altered terms. Bookchin believes his
innovations
, based on the inclusion of his theory of
evolution and on his interpretation of the origins of
civilization, are a more adequate interpretation of the
origins of domination, and therefore provide a more
coherent basis for overcoming domination. The claims made
for social ecology depend on the adequacy of Bookchin'
s
understanding of the relationships between evolution and
subjectivity, between hierarchy and domination, and on the
adequacy of alternative interpretations of these. The
difference between social ecology and critical theory
hinges on the interpretation of natural history in
relation to social history. This is the reason for
Bookchin
' s concentration on the relationship in Marxism
between domination and "natural law" and the resulting
possibility for a society free of domination, that is,
free of the "necessity" of domination.
How might Marx be otherwise interpreted, or more
importantly, do the members of the early Frankfurt School
subscribe to the interpretation Bookchin attributes to
them? Specifically, does Theodore Adorno hold to this
understanding of Marx, and, if not, where can we locate a
break in the chain of the history of domination, or in
Adorno's terms, an end to the dialectic of enlightenment?
Adorno interprets Marx as fully within the dialectic
tradition, not simply as another positivistic scientist.
An adequate interpretation of the claim in the Preface of
299
that the comprehension of the economic formation
of society is a "process of natural history" revealed by
its "natural laws" requires a truly dialectical
understanding of natural history and the status of
natural law within that history. Adorno claims that
Marx rather than Hegel most fully understood that, "The
objectivity of historic life is that of natural
history. "4o This understanding does not reduce society to
the deterministic, fatalistic, predictability of matter in
motion, but conceives of the structures of domination in
society as having the force to continue despite the
consciousness of individuals. The status of the
operations of domination are "laws" because of their
ideological status,
The so-called law of nature that is merely one of
capitalist society, after all, is therefore called
mystification ' by Marx.
. . .That law is natural
because of its inevitable character under the
prevailing conditions of production. Ideology is not
superimposed as a detachable layer on the being of
society: it is inherent in that being. It rests upon
abstraction, which is of the essence of the exchange
process. Without disregard for living human beings
there could be no exchange.
^
This "natural law" has the same status as myth, it is both
true and untrue. It mystifies a relationship as "natural"
that is in fact thoroughly social and therefore
potentially changeable. The structures of domination act
as a law, as a "universal," because they act "over the
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heads of the particular subjects involved. Marx makes
this clear,
other way round, having objective wealththe worker's need to develop. ^7
Adorno elaborates on this interpretation of Marx, but
m a way that does not collapse Marx's understanding of
the relationship of society and nature into the
scientistic understanding Bookchin attributes to him. The
scientistic interpretation of Marx may have been necessary
for critics to adopt at a certain time in history, when
the Soviet dominated interpretation of the "sacred texts"
was the orthodoxy with which all opposing views would
organize themselves, but with the political collapse of
that totalitarian state it is appropriate to develop
interpretation and critigue on a more rigorous reading.
If the object of criticism then is the systematic
distortions of Marx, Adorno would be in agreement with the
gist of Bookchin' s claim,
Only such a perverter of Marxian motives as Diamat
—
which prolongs the realm of necessity by avowing that
it is the one of freedom--could it occur to falsify
Marx's polemical concept of natural legality from a
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construction of natural history into scientivistic
° in
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iantS * Yet thls does not ^ob Marx
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s
talk of natural history of any part of its truth
content, i.e., its critical content
.
48
To emphasize the point once more, Marx's
characterization of the workings of capitalism as "natural
law is intended as both accurate description and ironic
observation. It is "lawful" to the extent it is mystified
to appear as if it is simply a manifestation of the
necessity of nature, "The totality of the process does
appear as an objective context arising by natural growth.
It is indeed due to the interaction of conscious
individuals, but neither seated in their consciousness nor
subsumed under them as a whole. The irony is to use
the language of "natural science" to describe a thoroughly
social phenomenon. But at yet another level of reflexion,
the natural-social distinction loses its dichotomous
structure and must be thought dialectically,
Such a social concept of nature has a dialectic of
its own. The thesis that society is subject to
natural laws is ideology if it is hypostatized as
immutably given by nature. But the legality is real
as a law of motion for the unconscious society, as
Das Kapital
,
in a phenomenology of the anti-spirit,
traces it from the anal
the theory of collapse.
It seems clear that the Diamat or scientistic
interpretation of Marx's critique of capitalism was not
adequate either "hermeneutically" or historically.
Bookchin's (or Habermas's) reductions of the critique must
be viewed as largely strategic in an effort to legitimate
sis or tne commodity form to
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their own projects, but this does not mean that there is
not an element of truth in the scientistic
interpretation. 5 ! Adorno explains some of the motivation
for Marx and Engels's stress on the need for an "economic-
revolution as a consequence of their struggles with the
anarchists over leadership of the revolution, a struggle
against the anarchist tendency to concentrate on the need
to abolish the State and its institutional structures. A
revolution against the State would merely be a "political-
revolution, "The revolution desired by (Engels) and Marx
was one of economic conditions in society as a whole, in
the basic stratum of its self-preservation; it was not
revolution as a change in society's political form, in the
rules of the game of dominion ." 52 To the extent the
solution of domination was seen to lay in the rational
planning of economic activity, the limits of Marx's vision
became apparent with the actual structure of the Soviet
State. Adorno seems to claim that the actions of then
actually existing socialism" served as an indictment of
economic reductionism even in its most subtle and
dialectical form. Marx and Engels's belief in the
centrality of economic revolution was inadequate,
Their imago of the revolution put its stamp upon the
image of the primal world; the overwhelming weight of
the economic contradictions in capitalism seemed to
call for its derivation from the accumulated
objectivity of what had been historically stronger
since time immemorial. They could not foresee what
became apparent later, in the revolution's failure
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even where it succeeded: that domination may outlast
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Domination is not solved through state planning of
the economy, in fact it may intensify. Whether the Soviet
state embodied true socialism is beside the point,
domination could no longer be viewed as solvable by the
simple attempt to plan production. This prompts Adorno to
speculate about the possibilities of an alternative vision
of a free society, a vision that does not collapse into
mere economic administration. He implies that the future
society would have to be based on another understanding of
domination besides simply that of economic necessity,
Touched upon by events of the twentieth century,
however, is the idea of historic totality as a
calculable economic necessity. Only if things might
have gone differently; if the totality is recognized
as a socially necessary semblance, as the hypostasis
of the universal pressed out of individual human
beings; if its claim to be absolute is broken—only
then will a critical social consciousness retain its
freedom to think that things might be different some
day
.
This criticism, of a social theory that views the
world as a totality, especially an economic totality,
implies that a return to the individual and non-identical
may provide an important perspective for understanding the
possibilities for an emancipated future. As Martin Jay
indicates in his study of Adorno,
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individual will re|?ai:^£fPS-?M5uari?rl“dmodern mass society as one moment in the fofe-fieldof peace. And most utopian of all, the object willm°rV e9ain ita rightful place alongside theindividual and collective subject in a dialectic ofmutually supportive non-identity. 55 jL
The individual is one aspect of Adorno's concern with
the non-identical and the particular, but it is only in
relationship to the universal and society that these have
meaning. To honor the non-identical, identity thinking
must both occur and be thought against. This is what
gives Adorno's works their paradoxical and sometimes
enigmatic quality. In describing the relationship between
individual and society, even though he is pointing to the
need to rescue individuality from its submersion in mass
society, Adorno indicates the individual cannot be simply
abstracted by thought from the matrix of society, but
neither is it appropriate to view society as the simple
adding up of the actions of its individual members. The
individual and the cognition of the individual are
historical products in an extended sense, where human
history merges with natural history. The individual
subject thinks through concepts that are dependent on the
(dialectical) connection between subjectivity and
experience. Adorno rejects any attempt to radically
separate the transcendental from the empirical subject,
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in trUth far more constitutive thanthe function ascribed by idealism to the
transcendental subject. 56
The individual is not to be placed above or outside of
history either, although its "thinking" cannot do without
the "transcendental" moment,
Nevertheless, the concept of transcendentality
reminds us that thinking, by dint of its immanent
moments of universality, transcends its owninalienable individuation. The antithesis of
universal and particular, too, is both necessary anddeceptive. Neither one exists without the other— theparticular only as defined and thus universal; the
universal only as the definition of something
particular, and thus itself particular. Both of them
are and are not. This is one of the strongest
motives of nonidealist dialectics. 55
This issue of the relation of the empirical subject
or the individual to the notion of the transcendental
becomes especially important when considering Bookchin's
claims about the basis for social ecology's evolution-
infused Hegelian dialectic. Adorno emphasizes the
inseparability of subject and object, individual and
society, particular and universal, in a way, as we will
see in the next chapter, that Bookchin minimizes at
crucial points. For Adorno the social and historical
306
origins of concepts, or the "formality" of individual
thought, must not be forgotten,
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For any alternative society to exist in the future it
would require new forms of cognition which, Adorno
implies, would be related to changes in the "division of
labor which impact the forms of cognition and
individuality itself. The individual arises from the
species' necessity of self-preservation, that is, the
individual does not exist prior to "society." This
observation resonates with the claims about the early
history or "pre-history" of subjectivity explored by
Horkheimer and Adorno in Dialectic of Enlightenment .
Adorno in the late essay "Subject and Object" reiterates
the position on the development of the individual as a
product of evolution, or natural history.
But the priority thesis is absurd only as long as the
individual or its earlier biological form is
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'the' human being antedated the species is either aBibiical reminiscence or sheer Platonism. Nature onits lower levels teems with unindividuated organismsIf, as more recent biologists claim, humans aieactually born so much more ill-equipped than other
creatures, it probably was only in association, byudimentary social toil, that they could stay alive;the tirincipiiim i ndj viduat i on i a would be secondary tothat, a hypothetical kind of biological division oflabor. That any single human should have emergedirst, archetypically, is improbable. By the faithin such an emergence, the prjncipium i nrli vi dnati oni s .historically fully developed already, is mythicallyprojected backwards, or onto the firmament of eternalideas. The species might individuate itself by
mutation, in order then, by individuation, to
reproduce itself in individuals along lines of
biological singularity
.
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Of course the priority of the individual is central
to the philosophy of liberalism, and the object of much of
Marx's criticism. The problem for historical Marxism
became the place of the individual in socialist society.
The individual ' s place was one of mostly meaninglessness
in much of socialist history. One of the primary motives
of the early critical theorists was to rescue
individuality from mass society in its various forms:
fascist, state socialist, or monopoly capitalist.
Motivated against this economic reduction of the
individual into a mere cog in the machinery of production
was what Martin Jay has explained as, "Adorno's
philosophical defense of the contingent, suffering,
empirical subject, that ethically materialist moment in
his thought ." 50 Bookchin denies the possibility of
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ethical claims by critical theory primarily because of the
connection the critical theorists make about the
domination of naturp -j -t-o toi =i-t-o +- *4 .ldu e, its relation to Marx's understanding
of human labor, and the difference of labor from mere
animal activity. 61 Central to the critical theory claims
about these relationships is their treatment of the
emergence of identity, the "prehistory" of subjectivity,
which is at the core of the "dialectic of enlightenment."
Bookchin must challenge this "natural history" of the
subject if his claim about the priority of "social
domination" is to hold true. The claims he is forced to
make about the "origins" of domination depend on his
understanding of hierarchy and on his understanding of the
differences between his conception of domination and that
of the critical theorists.
Hierarchy
Bookchin rejects critical theory as an adequate
approach to the problems of the ecology crisis because,
for example, Horkheimer and Adorno are not "resolutely
critical of hierarchy and domination ." 6 ^ This claim
depends on Bookchin' s understanding of domination and
hierarchy and also the meaning of "resolutely critical."
Bookchin rejects the understanding of domination that is
tied to Marx's claim that human labor involves the
necessary domination of nature, "The argument that our
abuse of nature subverts the material conditions for our
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own survival, although surely true, is crassly
instrumental. It assumes that our concern for nature
rests on our self-interest, rather than on a feeling for
the community of life of which we are part, allbeit in a
very unique and distinctive way ." 63 This sounds very much
like the argument of the deep ecologists, particularly
Naess, and their rejection of the merely utilitarian
arguments of environmentalism. It is also similar to the
deep ecologists' call for wider "Self-" identification.
Before rushing to reduce social ecology to just another
variation of deep ecology however, Bookchin's
understanding of the difference between social ecology and
critical theory should be inspected more closely.
Bookchin does not view the relationship between the human
subject and its object, nature, as one of estrangement or
alienation, on the contrary, "It is becoming a cliche to
fault ’separation' as the source of apartness in our
highly fragmented world. We must see that every process
is also a form of 'alienation' in the very non-Marxist
sense of differentiation in which the whole is seen as the
richly varied fulfillment of its latent potentialities ." 64
Bookchin's vision of alienation and differentiation is one
of "self-expression or self-articulation" where the
"other" is viewed as part of a "whole." He does not deny
the existence of antagonism, but claims this can be
overcome by "struggle" and "reconciliation." Bookchin
claims conflict and the attempt to control nature (an
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alternative formulation of the phrase "domination of
nature") are not the only way to understand natural
evolutron and social antagonism, but that, "The reality of
conflict must never override the reality of
differentiation as the long-range character of development
in nature and society." 6 - For Bookchin, human society is
an extension of natural evolution seen as the "flow of
derived phases as well as a shared development from the
simpler to the more complex." Evolution consists of ever
greater "unity-in-diversity,
" complexity, and variety,
viewed as indicators of life's participation in its own
evolution. Diversity is not only a source of ecological
stability, but the expression of "freedom" at the core of
evolution itself, "Diversity.
. .may also be regarded in a
very fundamental sense as an ever-expanding, albeit
nascent, source of freedom within nature, a medium for
objectively anchoring varying degrees of choice, self-
directiveness, and participation by life-forms in their
dwn
—
p
volut ioh . 66 However, this evolutionary freedom is
not identical to human freedom, "The dim choices that
animals exercise in their own evolution are not the will
that human beings exhibit in their social lives. Nor is
the nascent freedom conferred by natural complexity the
same as the rational decisions that human beings bring to
the service of their own development ." 67 Although here
highlighting the difference between the animal and the
human, Bookchin is claiming that there is no "rupture"
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between human will and freedom (conceived as "self-
consciousness and self-reflection") and natural history.
Human will and freedom are aspects of nature in which all
phenomena are emergent, "graded" forms of a potentiality
which manifests itself in various forms, including the
human, in the process of evolution.
This raises two questions, first, when does
"domination" then arise, and secondly, what is the role of
’scarcity" m the struggle for self-preservation, that
necessity of controlling nature for biological reasons
recognized by Marxists, liberals, and others? Bookchin
discusses these issues in the chapter "The Emergence of
Hierarchy" in The Ecology of Freedom
. Bookchin asks a
series of questions which imply there are ways of
considering the relationship of humans to nature which are
alternatives to the "Marxist" model. Among other
questions he asks, "Is it a given that nature is 'stingy*
and that labor is humanity's principal means of redemption
from animality?" Of course he has already loaded the
question both with the use of the term "redemption, " and
with his previously articulated economic determinist
interpretation of Marx, one which reduces Marx's argument
to a demand for a necessarily increasing domination of
nature if humans are to achieve "freedom." The questions
he asks imply a choice between interpretations, either
"society" effectively exploited nature to build a surplus
at which point one "class" of people appropriated the
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surplus for themselves (the Marxist interpretation)
, or
groups (or "strata") within society appropriated the
technology and surplus and then constituted themselves as
a "clearly definable ruling class. "68 Bookchin summarizes
his series of questions by identifying the issue he wants
to address, 'I am asking not if the notion of dominating
nature gave rise to the domination of human by human but
rather if the domination of human by human gave rise to
the notion of dominating nature." 69 He proposes a set of
key indicators that should show which of the
interpretations is the more adequate. In this proposed
set of dichotomous choices, he opposes culture to
technics, consciousness to labor, and hierarchies to
classes as the categories that explain the opening or
closure of possibilities for human history.
Bookchin argues that hierarchies resulted from
natural differences, but were not strictly speaking
caused" by natural difference. The natural differences
between young and old, and women and men became social
differences as the males and elders began to
institutionalize" roles within the emerging social
structure, roles that changed the balance of power between
members of the early human groups, finally resulting in
the emergence of "rulers." Bookchin denies "domination"
existed in the earliest "organic" societies, the "early
world" based on "matriarchy." Domination did not exist
because the ideas of "domination" and "rule" did not
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exist, contrary to the claims of "anthropologists like
Levi Strauss or "feminists like Simone de Beauvoir ." 70
This distinction about the "ideas" of domination or rule
serves as a first indication that Bookchin is not using
terms in anything like Marxist or most other contemporary
thought. In his elaboration of the emergence of
hierarchy, the concern is not so much with whether there
are actual relationships of domination or power but with
the ideas that then become the basis for further
structuring of relationships and there generalization,
Not until distinctly social interests emerge that
clash directly with this natural matrix and turn the
weaknesses, perhaps the growing tensions, of organic
society into outright fractures, will the unitybetween human and human, and between humanity and
nature, finally be broken. Then power will emerge,
not simply as a social fact, with all its
differentiations, but as a concept--and so will the
concept of freedom
.
11
Recognition of the importance Bookchin places on the
necessity of the existence of the concept before a
relationship can properly be called domination, power, or
whatever, is central for comprehending his fundamentally
idealistic and subjectivistic orientation. This
orientation is partially obscured by his claims for the
"naturalization" of the dialectic by means of his
idiosyncratic theory of evolution.
This element of social constructionism is more
explicit in Bookchin' s recent responses to deep ecology
criticism. He clarifies his distinction between the "idea
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of dominating nature" and "actual domination of nature" in
response to criticism from Robyn Eckersley and Warwick
Fox,
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Eckersley, however, ignores the fact that my writingsfocus on the id^a of domination of nature, not on theactual dominating of nature
,
which I repeatedlyindeed emphatically, claim is impossible
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Bookchin claims he is not "exclusively" concerned
with whether a specific society "actually" damages an eco-
community, even if it is to the extent of extinction of
species. His concern is with the "systematic" factor in
social life of the " idea of controlling nature." 7 ^
Bookchin summarizes this curious formulation for
understanding the ecological crisis;
I am also concerned with whether it (a given society)
ideologically identifies human progress with the idea
of dominating nature. I am concerned, in effect,
with a broad cultural mentality and its underlying
sources—notably, the projection of the idea of
social domination and control into nature—not with
transient behavior patterns that come or go as a
result of opportunistic, often historically short-
lived circumstances."^
This assertion allows Bookchin then to disassociate
himself from a deterministic reading of his statements
about the relationship between hierarchy and the
domination of nature. In this way he can reject
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criticisms that point out that hierarchical societies have
and could exist that do not dominate nature, and
conversely, egalitarian societies have or could exist that
do. This seems to mean, for Bookchin, that the
domination" of nature does not occur until a society
consciously invokes the "idea" of domination in its
relationship with nature. Domination of nature cannot
occur, by definition, until the idea of domination has
come into existence with the "warped" development of
society, "I emphasize intentionality and the historical
experience provided by our emergence out of a distorted
second nature I speak of the idea of dominating nature
as 'emerging' out of hierarchy in my theoretical works--
that is, that I conceive of hierarchy as a historical
presupposition for the idea of dominating nature.
In this increasingly subjectivist, tautological
argument, it becomes necessary to indicate the point of
contact between hierarchy and domination. Bookchin calls
for an examination of the "logic of history" by "looking
at the past from the standpoint of origins ." 76 He then
provides a narrative of the beginnings of social life, an
"origin" that reaches back into the matricentric "organic"
societies that are "difficult to detail," and only
gradually evolve into hierarchical social systems. It is
claimed in this story that the "biological facts" of age,
sex, and ancestry, are not turned into the basis of
hierarchy and domination by the "early organic societies."
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This requires Bookchin to speculate on the phases of
social change that brought these "ideas" about. In
"preliterate" communities "women" lack the male's
mobility, basically because of their domestic tasks that
revolve around the care of the human infant. This "primal
division of labor" limits the woman to basically sedentary
ways of life while the males become ever more proficient
m the fundamentally violent activity of hunting and the
associated activity of group defense. The biological
differences between men and women in primal society then
lead to a necessary, but "complementary" division of
labor, but the division of labor leads to the formation of
very different social spaces,
For not only hunting, but also defense and later war
are part of the male's division of labor. Insofar as
these responsibilities require the conscious
administrative coordination of people and resources,
they are not merely hard biological facts of life;
instead, they are uniquely social facts, or what we
in the modern world, are likely to call pol i ti r.^1 . 77
The domestic and "civil" spheres then are not in
conflict in the primal society since the division is a
reflection of the biological necessity of the sexual
division of labor, and the roles within society are still
structured on the basis of the "biological facts" of age,
sex and ancestry. But the "raw materials" for the
hierarchical society yet to come are in place, and it is
now that the important step is taken away from the harmony
of organic society toward the emergence of the
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hierarchical society and the spread of the idea of
domination
.
Bookchin claims that in the drvision of labor the
sexes complement each other economically but that the
Young and the old do not. The elder members of the group
come to be "vital repositories of knowledge and wisdom,
"
but this knowledge and wisdom forms the basis for the
elders' function in what is becoming a distinctly social
and cultural sphere. The old become conscious of the
social as a result of necessity, a matter of survival,
since their waning physical powers make them aware of
their "vulnerability to natural forces," a weakness that
can only be alleviated by the development of "social
power" and a specifically
"hierarchical social power."
The old are the architects of social power and its
hierarchical institutionalization. Even if only
'unconsciously," the old begin to develop "a certain
amount of cunning and self-interest" which becomes the
awareness and hatred of natural necessity which presents
itself as the increasing possibility of death. In their
resentment the old turn this natural necessity against the
young m the form of "cruelty accomplished through social
means." This constitutes the beginnings of a change in
nature,
Nature begins to take her revenge on the earliest
attempts of primordial society to control her. But
this is nature internalized, the nature in humanity
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However, age alone is not a sufficient basis for the
development of
"institutionalized hierarchy" since
everyone must get older. The "prrmordial balance" among
members of the community had previously been marntained
through a "parity of privileges" for the old, so that, for
Bookchin, what is problematic is how the elders attempted
to institutionalize these privileges in a way that
developed into a repressive hierarchy. He draws on
anthropological studies to indicate how the elderly tended
to also function as "medicine-men" who acquired social
power from the rituals they frequently controlled, "Social
power begins to crystallize as the fetishization of
magical power over certain forces of nature.
"
7 9 with this
observation the shaman becomes the "strategic figure in
any discussion of social hierarchy" as this person
"solidifies the power of the elders." Bookchin represents
the shaman as occupying a position of "professionalized
power," specialist in the division of labor, specialist in
fear, mediator between the "suprahuman power of the
environment and the fears of the community ." ° ^ Bookchin
then elaborates on the process whereby power is
institutionalized in hierarchies and developed into
systems of domination, or "epistemologies of rule."
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Bookchin's argument is loaded, or overloaded with
idiosyncratic understandings of concepts, specifically
those of domination and hrerarchy. Even though Bookchin
argued that the critical theorists were too beholden to
Marx's conception of domination, that the domination of
nature over human beings had to be overcome before freedom
was possible, he also recognized they had included
criticism of the domination of "men over men." However,
Bookchin believes they completely ignored or even accepted
the problem of hierarchy. How then would Bookchin explain
Adorno's statements about hierarchy while discussing the
subject-object dialectic? The subject-object dialectic is
the form of the argument about the relationship between
humans and nature on which Adorno focuses. This form of
the argument is inherited from the development of
dialectical thought since at least German Idealism,
extended through Hegel and Marx. Bookchin would certainly
recognize the subject-object dialectic as an important if
not the central issue in the problem of the domination of
nature, especially since he makes the issue of
subjectivity, particularly the subjectivity of nature, so
central to his own project. Bookchin in fact very closely
links his theoretical project to Hegel's attempt to
resolve the subject-object dialectic, asserting that
dialectical naturalism is the most adequate solution to
the problems raised by Hegel's notion of the Absolute
Subject and Absolute Knowledge. Adorno also rejects
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Hegel’s solution to the problem of the subject-object
dialectic, which resolves it into the supremacy of the
subject, and he likewise rejects the opposite solution,
the supremacy of the object. In fact, Adorno goes so far
as to claim, "The purpose of critical thought is to
abolish the hierarchy. "81 Thls can be read as g statement
about the basic attitude of critical theory towards the
issue of hierarchy. Hierarchy, in all its forms, is
unacceptable to critical theory, hierarchy where either
"side" of the dialectic attempts to assert dominance.
Bookchin's understanding of hierarchy is too narrow, as is
his attempt to define the domination of nature as the
"idea" of domination. The consequences of his argument
are not only that its idiosyncrasies produce vast
confusion rather than illumination regarding the
relationship of society to the ecological crisis, but it
also occludes the insights available from other
philosophical positions, including deep ecology, Marxism,
feminism, and critical theory.
Bookchin’s philosophy of social ecology, as he
applies it to alternative interpretative frameworks,
results in systematic blindness. This is especially true
in regard to his interpretations of Marx and critical
theory. Bookchin quotes from a section of Horkheimer and
Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment to provide evidence of
the lack of resoluteness of the critical theorists against
hierarchy and domination, and to counter claims that the
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critical theorists
"reconnoitered a nonhierarchical and
ecological view of society's future ." 82 The key sentence
for Bookchin's interpretation of one section of "The
Transformation of Ideas into Domination," a discussion
about "uncompromising individuals," is the last sentence
of the section: "The history of the old religions and
schools like that of the modern parties and revolutions
teaches us that the price for survival is practical
involvement, the transformation of ideas into
domination ." 83 Bookchin (mis) reads this as Horkheimer and
Adorno's endorsement of domination and hierarchy. in fact
the passage should be read as exactly the opposite, as a
condemnation of the procedures of hierarchy and
domination. In the preceding paragraphs the authors
discuss the relationship of "ancient history" to its
repetition in 'more recent times." The "uncompromising
individuals," like John the Baptist, the cynics, and
individuals from the tradition of the Upanishads, are
mistakenly understood, they argue, if they are interpreted
as simply one in a series of stages of progress in the
main tendency of their respective societies. They are
more correctly read as pointing toward "left-wing ideas
split off from the powerful cliques and parties." This is
a perfectly apt description of the early Frankfurt
School's self-understanding. The authors emphasize this
radical difference in their characterization of the
"uncompromising individuals" and their "anarchic"
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organization, "The uncompromising people who
m history did not lack all forms of organized society,
otherwise not even their names would have been handed down
to us. They set up at least a certain systematic doctrine
and rules of conduct. "84 These individuals did not
establish a religion but "merely" founded "an order," and
they also criticized and developed philosophies, even "a
theory of the state." Like the critical theorists who
rejected capitalism and state socialism, the
uncompromising individuals "set greater store by the idea
and the individual than by administration and the
collective. They therefore arouse anger." These
individuals "may have been in favor of unity and
cooperation but they were not able to build a strong
hierarchy. Adorno's endorsement of the essay form, for
example, can be read, should be read, as following in the
line of these anarchic, uncompromising individuals who,
"Neither in their theory (which was lacking in unity and
logic)
,
nor in their practical behavior (which was not
adequately coordinated) did their being reflect the world
as it really was." The world as it really was, was and
is, a world of domination and hierarchy, a world no self-
respecting uncompromising individual would want to
"reflect" either in their thought or their actions. The
critical theorists' additional comments in this passage,
on the Buddha and asceticism, attempt to reveal how even
radical thought can be compromised by a "real talent for
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organization." These examples should be read as
indicative of the ambiguous character of the relationship
of asceticism and materialism, and how the avenues of
radical change should always be considered problematic in
there ambiguity. The history of religions, schools of
philosophy, modern parties, and modern revolutions
indicate the repetition of the same message: when radical
ideas enter into social practice they seem to always
become complicit with domination and hierarchy, what were
once critical insights, or revolutionary ideas, become
tools of domination. The critical theorist, or radical
ecologist, is faced with a dilemma, how to relate radical
thought to radical action: "The critic who talks thus may
speak the truth in the eyes of the civilizing
philosophers, but he is not in step with the course of
social life ." 85
It is essential at this point to turn to the problem
of the creation or transformation of radical ecological
subjectivity and its political consequences, this time as
they are theorized by Murray Bookchin.
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CHAPTER 7
SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND SUBJECTIVITY
Social ecology's conception of subjectivity depends
on Bookchin's understanding of evolution. It also depends
on his refusal to accept conflict or antagonism between
the human organism and non-human nature as a fundamental
aspect of the subject-object relationship. He does not
accept, as do nearly all Western philosophers, that humans
must struggle to appropriate from nature the necessities
of life. Bookchin’s is a basically indefensible
philosophical position, as it is represented in the
central work Ihe Ecology of Freedom, a position he has
since partially backed away from, but without fully
acknowledging the consequences for the philosophy of
social ecology as a whole. The constellation of concepts
this problem revolves around include scarcity, necessity,
freedom, domination and subjectivity. Bookchin no longer
uniformly asserts that there is no natural scarcity with
which the human organism must adapt itself, but he has not
adequately dealt with the way this change of position
affects his understanding of critical theory and its
reliance on the assumption that human beings necessarily
must labor on nature to fulfill their metabolic needs.
The critical theorists, and most of Western philosophy,
attempt to connect this biological necessity to the
formation of subjectivity. They therefore must examine
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how the
the subject-object relationship to determine
process of concept formation produces deferences between
human metabolic activity and the unconceptualized
processes of biological maintenance developed by other
life forms. The necessity of understanding the
relationship of concepts to things requires some theory of
language, and therefore some understanding of
socialization and psychological development. In the
philosophy of social ecology it is clear that the
production and reproduction of the "symbolic order" is
under-theorized as a result of Bookchin' s early refusal to
fully examine alternative understandings of the
necessities of metabolic activity. The fundamental
structure of the philosophy of social ecology is put in
question by an inadequate theory of language, thus
requiring a salvage operation if the genuine insights
Bookchin does offer are to be retained.
Subjectivity and Teleology
Bookchin develops his understanding of human
subjectivity by examining the development of subjectivity
in nature through its various stages, phases, or "grades."
This development ranges from the inorganic through simple
organic molecules, to cells, organisms, and finally to
human beings
. What interests Bookchin is the way nature
has evolved; through an inherent self-identifying
activity, required of any complex compound or organism if
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a momentary
it is to continue its existence beyond
conjunction of randomly colliding atoms
. For ^
to live there must be some capacity on its part to
identify itself over time q n ,r , so that it can maintain its
integrity, grow, develop and reproduce. Bookchin
represents evolution as an "iimnanent striving” of nature,
a description meant to distinguish his understanding of
’
evolution from what he charges is the Darwinist or Neo-
Darwinist over-emphasis on random changes of genetic
structures, competition between and among species, and,
therefore, a fundamentally directionless process of
development. He rejects evolutionary biologists'
arguments, like those of Stephen J. Gould's, about the
processes of evolution. He particularly rejects the use
of examples, like the Burgess Shale fossil record, which
biologists normally cite as evidence of the accidental
characteristics determining survival of particular
species. Instead, Bookchin argues the proliferation of
species, before the cataclysm that destroyed so many of
them, was an indication of the "fecundity" of nature, an
example not of accidental influences or randomness in
evolutionary development, but of an immanent, ubiquitous
"striving of life for ever more complex development."
This striving for life, according to Bookchin, necessarily
also means the striving for more complex forms of
subjectivity. Borrowing from other evolutionary theorists
and naturalists, especially Kropotkin, Bookchin believes
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organism
it is more accurate to view the "fitness" of an
as that which is best abie to help others survrve He
explains Kropotkin's concept of "mutualism" ln terms of
the "symbiotic" relationships that develop between and
n organism which lead to the increased development of
all organisms. Bookchin claims that evolutionary fitness
is "rarely biologically meaningful as mere species
survival and adaptation."-'-
Bookchin 's emphasis is a much needed corrective to
those theories of evolution that place all adaptive
activity in the categories of competition, scarcity, and
conflict, however, he goes beyond correcting the one-
sidedness of the crude Darwinistic interpretations to a
similarly one-sided support of the ideas of cooperation,
symbiosis, and mutual aid. The work of biologists like
Lynn Margulis and James Lovelock seem to strongly
undermine early theories of evolution that did not take
into account the impacts of species on their environment
and the way these activities could feed back into the
survivability of the species themselves and of life in
general. The culmination of this capacity of organisms to
modify their own environments is of course the "Gaia
Hypothesis" as defined by Lovelock, "This postulates that
the physical and chemical condition of the surface of the
Earth, of the atmosphere, and of the oceans has been and
is actively made fit and comfortable by the presence of
life itself. This is in contrast to the conventional
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wisdom which held that life adapted to the planetary
conditions as it and they evolved their separate ways. "2
Bookchin goes beyond the claims made by the
originators of this theory about the self-maintaining
activity of life by combining these observations with his
understanding of the self-identifying activity of
organisms. He considers this self-identifying activity to
be a form of subjectivity, even in as rudimentary a case
as the individual cell's need for self-maintaining
ecognition. This leads Bookchin to further claim that,
"Life is necessary not only for its own self-maintenance
but for its own self- formation
. 'Gaia' and subjectivity
are more than the effects of life; they are its integral
attributes. Although the Gaia Hypothesis as presented
by the biologists is persuasive, it is problematic to link
life's self-maintaining characteristics to an immanent
teleology of subjectivity as Bookchin asserts. This
assertion is problematic both because of the teleology of
the argument, and because of the lack of sufficient
distinction between human and non-human subjectivity.
The characterization of evolution as involving some
basic self-identity is a genuine insight. Organisms must
be able to distinguish their own structure from that which
they are not. But to characterize this simply as
subjectivity is onesided if there is not the simultaneous
acknowledgment of the organism's conflict with what is
non identical to it. The organism is in a dialectic
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between itself and what is other than itself, and
therefore is inadequately understood if characterized
SimPl y " the of subjectivity rather than as a
manifestation of a dialectic of subjectivity and
objectivity, or identity and non-identity. The same is
true of the concepts of mutualism and symbiosis, which are
only understandable as they are constituted by their
opposite, or by that which is in contradiction to them.
Bookchin must minimize the negating forces of nature in
order to raise up his constructions of the concepts of
mutualism, complexity, and subjectivity to the level of an
objective ethics. These concepts do provide some critical
purchase for understanding the limits of the currently
dominant characterizations of nature and evolution,
especially as these are transposed uncritically into
justification for egoistic competition and an ever-
expanding global capitalism. However, Bookchin makes
claims for his alternative concepts that go beyond their
genuine critical value to a specific teleological
understanding which is unnecessary and cannot be
adequately supported.
The matter of the philosophy of social ecology's
teleology has been at the center of much of the criticism
it has received, and Bookchin 's clarifications in response
have done little to eliminate the problems. In his most
developed single work, he specifically discusses the
relationship of his philosophy and teleology,
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variety' t^rraiMnSSomirpamcle^thr1the course of evolution *-u pdrLlcl s through
self-reflexive T?h hn those conscious,
we cannot help but speculate bein9s '
of a broadly conceived telos and a Uten?
15^ 1^
subjectivity in substance itself thatyields mind and intellectuality! the llYreactivity of substance, in the sensibility
!labo!ation
e
o?
10Ped microor9anisms, in the
°
and the layered development o?' t^brain^on^'senses an evolution of mind so coherent and2 1S f St™l temptation tobLUDe !t (as) ... inevitable
.
But Bookchin does not want to confuse this
inevitability of mind with the strong claims of Hegel and
others who are bound to a "hard" teleology. Bookchin
wants to retain the idea that human subjectivity is the
"actualization of potentiality," the manifestation of an
immanent striving within substance itself, but he is
unclear about what relationship he perceives between this
and the concepts of fortuity, uncertainty, and randomness
Bookchin rejects the Darwinist interpretation that random
change is an integral factor in the evolution of species,
but this would seem to verge on making the evolution of
the specific forms of life, particularly human self-
conscious life, a teleological inevitability, present in
essence at the beginnings of the universe. Bookchin
denies this inevitability but in an unsatisfactory way,
Our notion of teleology need not be governed by any
"iron necessity" or unswerving self-development that
inevitably" summons forth the end of a phenomenon
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from its nascent beginning m +-u
phenomenon may not be randnmi
Alt
^°
u^h a specific
fortuity could prevent its ^seb^ct
^' C
?
nStltUted
'
"telos" would thus annear sSh' UallZation - Its
prevailing} striving f, he consequence of a
necessity:"^™1® than as an inevitable
This passage seems to invite two very different
interpretations. The passage could mean that human beings
are in fact the expression of a single universal
subjectivity that elaborates itself through time.
eventually bringing into being the human
of self-consciousness. Human subjectivi
organism capable
ty would then be
the inevitable expression of the striving universe unless
some catastrophe strikes, stopping evolution towards the
unique manifestation of this potential. Fortuity, or
chance is then a block to the development of human
subjectivity which is the goal of the immanent striving of
nature. Alternatively, the striving of nature toward
subjectivity might manifest itself in a variety of self-
conscious or self-reflective forms. The rejection of the
idea of the "inevitability" of the human form of self-
conscious, self-reflective subjectivity in this
alternative interpretation would be an acknowledgment of
other possibilities, or potential other forms, of self-
consciousness
.
The difference in interpretation has real
consequences
,
most importantly in what we accept as
reason, and therefore what will be considered a rational
society. Bookchin views human subjectivity as essentially
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a common human capacity and an expression of the "high
degree of orderly continuity" in "first nature." Thrs
continuity is the
"actualization of potentialities" which
result in ever more complex and more
"self-aware or
subjective" life-forme; 6torms. This evolutionary continuity of
development results in life-forms capable of
conceptualizing, understanding, and communicating with
each other in "increasingly symbolic terms." This is most
fully developed as conceptual thought and language, the
distinguishing characteristics of the human species.
The human species has these capacities to an extentthat is unprecedented m any existing life-formHumanity's awareness of itself, its ability ?ogeneralize this awareness to the level of a highlysystematic understanding of its environment in the
fn™f?naui
l0
??
Phy
' 6thlCS
' and aesthetics,a d fi ally, its capacity to alter itself and its
systematically by means of knowledge andtechnology, places it beyond the realm of the
subjectivity that exists in "first nature " 7
What this capacity to alter nature means for
political action will be taken up in the next chapter.
What is of importance here is the relationship of the
domination of nature to conceptualization and language, a
symbolic order which is uniquely human, a symbolic order
that, according to some feminist theories, is
fundamentally a male order rather than a universally human
order
.
If the present symbolic order is inevitable,
except for the possibility of the termination of the human
species, then the structure of that order has potentially
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disastrous results for women. Alternatively, if the
current symbolic order is merely one expression among a
variety of possible syn^olrc orders then a space is open
for challenging the existing order.
The possibilities for the development of subjectivity
also have consequences for non-human nature. Bookchin
goes beyond merely stating that human subjectivity is a
product of the development of nature to conclude that
humans are constituted to intervene in first nature, that
humans "can consciously change the entire realm of 'first
nature. '"9 it is how Bookchin characterizes this capacity
to intervene in first nature that has concerned many of
his critics, and especially problematic are the purposes
of the intervention,
Humanity has been instituted to intervene activelyconsciously, and purposively into "first na?Sre- withunparalleled effectiveness and alter it on aplanetary scale. To denigrate these capacities is todeny the thrust of natural evolution itself toward
°J g^
1C complexity and subj ectivity— the potentiality
of first nature" to actualize itself in self-
conscious intellectuality.
There are two concerns which emerge from this
formulation of dialectical naturalism. First, how
strongly do we read the human species and its symbolic
order as the expression of the tendency, directionality,
or goal of natural evolution. Second, how should that
tendency, directionality, or goal be projected into the
future. The extent of the transparency or opaqueness of
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man SUbjeCtlVlty must determined in order to Justifyhuman intervention into first nature in its effort to
"develop its potential." However, beyond Bookchin's
formulation, the potential of nature must be considered
not only in terms of subjectivity but also in terms of
subjectivity, or in more conventional terms, in its
objectivity. These issues come together in Bookchin's
attempt to relate human rationality to natural
subjectivity,
"whether or not we decide to select reason
as the most complex expression of subjectivity, the graded
emergence of mind in the natural history of life i s part
of the larger landscape of subjectivity itself. »U
Eookchin understands "mind" as more than the activity of
the human brain, as including the "human body as a whole"
as an embodiment of natural history. Whether it is the
embodiment of all of natural history or simply one aspect
°f it is more to the point.
Ethical Subjects
Bookchin argues that "ethical imperatives" result
from an ecological interpretation of nature but these
cannot be established except with the actual existence of
a truly ecological society. The present society is
incapable of determining these ecological ethics because
of its "sensibilities" which are structured by the
imperatives of capitalism. Bookchin argues that an
interpretation of nature linked specifically to the
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immanent development of
conceive of a "wholeness
"resurrection" possible,
were unable to provide a
subjectivity is the only „ay to
of nature that makes its
He claims the critical theorists
sufficient interpretation of
nature to accomplish the goal of
"resurrection,"
specifically,
"The flaw in Horkheimer and Adorno’s works
on reason stems from their failure to integrate
rationality with subjectivity in order to bring nature
within the compass of To do so# they^
have had to understand the message of social ecology, a
realm that was completely outside their intellectual
tradition. "le Bookchin claims Horkheimer and Adorno too
closely adhered to Marxism for them to bridge the gap
between nature and subjectivity, that they were too easily
led into considering the subjectivity of nature as mere
mysticism. The result is the collapse of their critique
of reason into another form of instrumentalism, and the
advocacy of yet another philosophy which views nature as
object for human manipulation. Bookchin claims social
ecology can lead us out of this aporia toward the
development of an adequate, objectively grounded ethics
that will enable the transformation of "existing
sensibilities, technics, and communities along ecological
lines." J This ecological sensibility would then create
the possibility for ethical intervention in nature,
341
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at spawns a human
nature's complexity^ and aTum/ 6^103 that
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' s stbiectivitv
“tlOMl ity that
neither give nor take- it 1 t. ere ' humanity would
with nature in creat^g the newand form that are mart nf =, levels of diversity
humanness and naturalness
.
I 4
”1030 hel 9htened sense of
Bookchin engages critical theory again a few
Paragraphs later, hut thus tame it rs Marcuse he chooses
as a target and rrghtly so. The focus of the attack is
Marcuse's conventional Enlightenment bias of seeing human
freedom as resulting from an ever more thorough domination
of nature. Bookchin quotes Marcuse's assertion that the
pacification of nature,
"presupposes the mastery of
Nature, which is and remains the object opposed to the
developing subject. "15 However, Bookchin then
inadequately discusses the central point of Marcuse's
observations, that human interaction with the rest of
nature involves both "necessity" and "freedom," only to
justify his own alternative understanding of nature.
Bookchin' s conception of nature is difficult to defend,
but central to the consistency of his philosophical
position,
There is no "cruelty" in nature, only the predation(and mutualism) around which natural history has
evolved its structures for sustaining life and
ecological balance. There is no "suffering" in
nature, only the unavoidable physical pain that comes
with injury. There is no "scarcity" and "want" in
nature, only needs that must be satisfied if life
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fecundity of nat“e d"' the Serial
its earliest hominii'; f f®pring
Ve
h
“mPdetel y Stunned
mindful of "scarcity" as a social category!5 ®
h* 6"
The "social category of scarcity" is important to
understanding Bookchin's project of reconciling humanity
and nature. Social ecology's solutions for resolving the
problems of the domination of nature will not focus on the
economic" problems of scarcity, and neither win there be
an attempt, like that of the early critical theorists, to
evoke a relationship to non-identical nature that includes
the inescapable moment of domination within the process of
abstraction or conceptualization itself. Instead Bookchin
Will evade the problems of "scarcity" and reject any
attempt to understand the complexity of the concept of
mimesis and its relationship to reason and an alternative
conceptuality in which nature and humanity may be
reconciled
.
It is unclear how Bookchin understands the problems
of conceptualization and the subject-object relationship
of critical theory and especially of Adorno's negative
dialectics. In a reference to the position of Horkheimer
and Adorno on reconciliation, Bookchin contends, "The
function of an ethical philosophy does not entail a
mimetic reduction of ethics to its source
. But it is
not clear how he interprets the critical theorists'
emphasis on mimesis or how his notion of natural
subjectivity differs from the mimetic. Adorno especially
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incorporated mimesis into his understanding of the
possibilities and forms of criticism and
world. Its in the understandings of the
of a truly free
concepts of
domination, mimesis, subjectivity and nature that
theory and social ecology must be differentiated.
critical
Scarcity, Natural and Social
Bookchin's claim that there is no "scarcity" in
nature requires closer examination. In discussing the
emergence of hierarchy Bookchin briefly focuses on the
idea of scarcity and suffering,
1S merely a Actional phenomenon that
w . nf
be descnbea primarily in terms of needs or
of life
piously. Without a sufficiency in the means, life itself is impossible, and without a6XCe
f
S these means, life is degraded to ael struggle for survival, irrespective of theievel of needs. Leisure time, under these
conditions, is not free time that fosters
intellectual advances beyond the magical, artistic
and mythopoeic. To a large extent, the "time" of a
community on the edge of survival is "suffering
time." It is a time when hunger is the all-
encompassing fear that persistently lives with the
community, a time when the diminution of hunger is
the community's constant preoccupation
.
Bookchin extends the concept of scarcity by
indicating there is both biological and cultural scarcity.
Cultural scarcity is a result of socially induced scarcity
that potentially could be alleviated since the
technological means are present for its elimination,
however, the social structure actually creates a system of
needs that work against their satisfaction. His
conclusions about socially or culturally induced scarcity
are not novel, and a much more complex elaboration of this
Phenomenon is available from other sources, such as Marx.
What is of particular interest here is Bookchin's
assertions about the relationship of biological scarcity
to the emergence of human culture. He seems to claim
different meanings for the term "scarcity" depending on
the immediate focus of his arguments, asserting there is
no scarcity in nature (only needs that must be satisfied)
at one point, but then indicating an analytical
distinction between biological and cultural scarcity at
another crucial point in his argument. Also, in his
battle with the Habermasians, Bookchin has claimed to have
"modified" his views about scarcity and post-scarcity,
stating, "capitalism has given 'scarcity' a unignp
character ." 19 But it is not clear from this admission
whether or not he believes scarcity exists always and
generally in nature, or if it only exists in various
distinct forms, corresponding to specific "cultures" (what
Marx would call "modes of production")
There are a number of objections which have been
voiced with regard to Bookchin' s understanding of
evolution and ecology, objections which if substantiated
would have various impacts on the overall philosophy of
social ecology. First, it is not clear that subjectivity
can be taken as the telos, however "soft," of natural
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evolution, when it seems more appropriate< as ^^
ecological theorists have argued, to consider mere
survival itself as the primary thrust, or measure of
success of evolution 20 mi- ^
• Thls deeP ecological critique
leads to one particular political ovd or ecological demand-
the preservation of species at viable population levels,
m ecosystems of long-term survivability, in order to
continue the process of evolution. The
"continuation of
evolution" would include both survival of existing species
and the potential for further speciation. This
fundamentally ecological and neo-Darwinian position does
not depend on the expansion of the idea of subjectivity to
the whole of nature. This criticism charges Bookchin with
reinserting hierarchy in the conceptualization of nature
by making subjectivity the measure of evolutionary
progress. If human subjectivity is the ultimate measure
of the development of subjectivity in nature generally the
human is again placed in a hierarchical relationship to
the non-human or the "under-developed subjectivity" of
other forms in nature.
Related to the criticism of the emphasis on
subjectivity is an objection to social ecology's
additional assertion that there exists a tendency toward
increased complexity in natural evolution. As has been
pointed out by Bookchin' s critics, the Gaia hypothesis
itself does not indicate that complexity as such is an
assurance of the survivability of life on the planet;
346
sometimes a reduction in complexity increases the
Ukelihood of survivability.21 without subjectivity and
its closely related idea of complexity as the overall or
primary tendency of natural evolution, the links between
dialectical naturalism and anarchism begin to lose their
strength. The dependency of social ecology on a
questionable theory of evolution has led some critics to
charge that Bookchin is merely using ecology selectively
for the purposes of an anarchic Utopian vision that
otherwise is difficult to defend philosophically. 22
These arguments tend to challenge Bookchin 's position
based on the available evidence from ecological science
and from arguments within evolutionary biology, but it is
not clear that the "facts" can settle the issues since the
interpretation of the tendencies of evolution condition
the status of those facts themselves, and for Bookchin
these "facts" are a fundamental matter of contention (for
example, the fossil record itself). 23 Bookchin's argument
about the relationship of actuality to potentiality cannot
be dismissed simply because the present state of the
physical and biological sciences have alternative
assumptions about the construction of the universe.
Instead of criticizing the philosophy of social ecology
from the outside, on the basis of what are basically
objectivist arguments (however correct they may in fact
be)
,
the only fruitful way of revealing the limitations of
347
Bookchin'
s position is
critically.
from the inside--immanently,
The point at which the philosophy of social ecology
distinguishes itself from Marxism and critical theory is
at the interface between nature and culture. There are
crucial gaps in Bookchin's arguments in exactly those
Places where he attempts to distance himself from critical
theory, and it is precisely at these crucial turning
points that a reinterpretation of the arguments of
critical theory may provide a more adequate resolution to
the difficulties in which social ecology finds itself.
The relationships between natural scarcity, domination,
and hierarchy form the constellation which, if unlocked,
should allow an alternative vision of the ecological
future to emerge.
Bookchin attributes to Marxism as a whole, and to
critical theory’s use of Marx's understanding of the
relationship of human labor to nature, a particularly
narrow or "orthodox" understanding. The central charge
concerns what is involved in the appropriation of the
metabolically necessary means of existence for the human
species. Philosophically it is a question of developing
concepts which sufficiently convey a description of the
phenomenon without unduly prejudicing our understanding
with inappropriate metaphorical and historical resonances.
The two terms of most concern are domination and
hierarchy, which Bookchin claims are most properly
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understood as
..social" terms
, so social in fact that he
claims the "domination of nature" could not exrst until
after hierarchy existed. He takes hierarchy to mean, in
its initial form, the elevation of one group of human
beings above another, specifically, elder males above the
young and the females.
Central to the comparison of social ecology to other
radical ecological critiques and to critical theory is
Bookchin's unconvincing assertion of the meaning of the
idea "domination of nature." By shifting the meaning of
the terms, Bookchm not only obfuscates the arguments of
those he criticizes, but also renders his own position
problematic. Like many others from a traditional
socialist background he uses a semantic play within the
term "domination" to ground the claim that domination of
nature is impossible
.
24 Bookchin claims to be concerned
with the "idea" of domination, defined as society's
systematic identification of its own progress with that
domination, the domination of external nature being merely
an extension of the already present domination of human by
human. Since the domination of human by human precedes
the domination of nature by humans, according to Bookchin,
the location for addressing ecological problems is found
fundamentally in social relations. This is the reason for
his emphasis on the necessity of certain democratic forms
of organization when discussing the future ecological
society, a much different emphasis than that of deep
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ecology, for instance, which tends to concentrate on the
situation of actually existing life-forms in various
ecosystems and the actions needed to preserve their
biological integrity. This is at the core of the
disagreement within the green movement in the U.S., if not
the world, between those who emphasize social justice
issues and those who primarily seek wilderness
preservation and species protection. These two
alternatives are not simply complementary positions. As
the fundamental disagreements between deep and social
ecologists have intensified they have increasingly
mutually questioned the philosophical grounding of their
respective political actions.
Critical theory made the domination of nature a
central concept in its critique of society. it is
important to examine the alternative understanding of this
concept within critical theory and how Bookchin has
misinterpreted this understanding. A reexamination of the
concept of the domination of nature should also open new
potential for building on social ecology's understanding
of subjectivity.
The critical theorists like many radical ecologists
use the terms domination, mastery, and control
interchangeably to describe the relationship of human to
nature. However, this slippage in terms does not seem
by itself to alter Bookchin' s critique. His claim that
the domination of human by human as the basis of hierarchy
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establishes what he believes are categories of analysis
that are more fundamental than those which come from
Marx's analysis of human labor and nature. 26 Bookchin
claims, "Horkheimer and Adorno (and the Frankfurt School
generally) do us a great disservice by imputing domination
to the emergence of reason as such. "27 He indlcates that
the critical theorists' understanding of the relationship
of domination and reason "reveals the basic difference"
between their theoretical strategy and his own. He quotes
Horkheimer,
From the time when reason became the instrument fordomination of human and extrahuman nature by man-
frustrated in^t^
01" lts/ery beginnings-it has beenm i s own intention of discovering thetruth. This is due to the very fact that it madenature a mere object, and that it failed to discoverthe trace of itself m such ob j ectivization, in theconcepts of matter and things not less than in thoseof gods and spirit. 28
Bookchin emphasizes that the difference between the
critical theorists and his own position is that
domination, according to social ecology, begins with the
domination of human by human. But in his further
elaboration of this point Bookchin seems to be missing the
basic argument of critical theory, "Indeed, even after the
emergence of hierarchy, reason's objectification of
phenomena was largely centered on the domination of 'man
by man, ' long before 'nature idolatry' succumbed to
secular philosophy and science.
"
2
^ Bookchin seems to be
equating critical theory's understanding of reason's
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with therelationship to nature emergence of philosophy
and science as traditionally understood, not with
conceptualization as such. He is also claiming
alternatively, that social ecology goes "behind" or before
Philosophy or science to an earlier social formation when
social hierarchy first presents itself. r s this what
Bookchin is claiming or is there another interpretation of
his objection to critical theory? what a*, the critical
theorists claiming about the relationship of reason to the
domination of nature, and how do they conceive of
conceptualization itself?
Bookchin gets closer to the crux of the problem when
he briefly examines the concept of "exchange" and how it
is used by Horkheimer and Adorno. In their analysis of
the Odvssey they write,
he step from chaos to civilization, in which natural
conditions exert their power no longer directly butthrough the medium of human consciousness, has not
changed the principle of equivalence. Indeed, menpaid for this very step by worshipping what they were
once m thrall to only in the same way as all other
creatures. Before, the fetishes were subject to thelaw of equivalence. Now equivalence has itselfbecome a fetish.
Bookchin' s remarks on this observation reflect the
same reasoning as in his defense of his concern with the
-idea of domination. He claims there was not a
sensibility of exchange" present in the primordial world,
that that sensibility did not exist until the marketplace
had been established. There seem to be at least three
352
alternative ways of approaching Bookchin's objections. if
he is claiming that some thing or some relationship does
not exit until the concept for
seem to be idealism and social
worse. If it is meaningful to
it exists, then this would
constructionism at its
say that domination does
not exist until the idea of domination exists, or that
exchange does not exist until the idea of exchange exists,
it must be equally true that dinosaurs did not exist until
the idea of dinosaurs existed, or that the world was not
round until the idea that the world was round existed.
This is absurd. Alternatively, Bookchin may be claiming
that the understanding of exchange in its fullness was not
available to early humans, and this is of course a true,
but trivial, observation. What is being argued by the
critical theorists, regarding exchange, is one aspect of
dialectical understanding of history. The
potential, that is, before the full actualization of the
idea of exchange expressed itself, existed partially or in
a limited form in the primordial relationships of humans
to nature. A fully developed exchange sensibility of
course could not have been available to early humans, if
we understand that fully developed sensibility to require
the immersion in market society. What is really of
interest here is the claim that the first glimmerings of
an understanding of exchange, a proto-exchange, or, using
Walter Benjamin’s terms, an Ur-exchange, was taking place.
The validity of Bookchin's objection to the idea of
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exchange being used to describe early humans , reiationship
to nature depends on whether the description fruitfully
opens the question of the domination of nature to critical
reflection, and whether it does so in a manner which makes
for a more adequate critique of existing society than does
social ecology.
The issues surrounding the idea of exchange are
examined by the critical theorists in two different
arenas, the subject-object relationship as expressed in
the emergence of the ego or human subject in the attempt
at self-preservation, and in the shaman's use of ritual,
magic and sacrifice to mediate between humans and the
spirits. Bookchin provides an alternative narrative of
the role of the shaman and the emergence of the ego.
For Bookchin, "the shaman is a strategic figure in
any discussion of social hierarchy" and therefore this
role is at the heart of the problem of domination. The
shaman, usually male, effects changes in the status of the
elders and their privileges. The shaman is a "specialist
fear who professionalizes power. " The shaman is a
mediator between the powers of the environment and the
"fears of the community," who uses magic and divination as
his means. Bookchin views the shaman as an early form of
political manipulator, "the incipient State personified."
The shaman is always under threat of retaliation should
his charms fail and thus must insure his own survival by
creating structures of support and ongoing power through
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mutually advantageous alliances. The shaman as "quasi-
religious formulator" is the creator of "the ideological
mythos that crystallizes incipient power into actual
power. "32 Alliances tend to be formed between elders and
young warriors, while myths establish ongoing authority,
and, when combrned, these allrances and myths constitute
early forms of political institutions and political
coalitions. Bookchin claims these proto-political forms
already tend to exaggerate the aggression and violence of
the "masculine temperament" of the "patricentric"
community. At this point systematic domination comes into
being as a result of the hierarchy of the elder males over
the young and over women. True class relationships have
yet to form since the principles of "organic society,
usufruct, complementarity" and "the irreducible minimum,"
are the norm, so no specifically economic exploitation is
systematically involved. Wealth as such is suspect and
elaborate means are involved to become dispossessed of
what could only appear as "bewitched concretized power." 33
This means for Bookchin that there is a period of emerging
social hierarchy and domination of human by human which
occurs prior to economic exploitation, "We must fix this
pr^class, indeed, pi^.economic, period in social
development clearly in our minds because the vast
ideological corpus of ’modernity' — capitalism,
particularly in its western form--has been designed in
large part to veil it from our vision." 34 Bookchin claims
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the mystification of these earlier stages of domination of
human by human occur even in such concepts as "primitive
communism" and "matriarchy." For example, within the idea
of primitive communism is the "insidious concept of a
stingy nature,' of a ’natural scarcity’ that dictates
communal relaticns-as though a communal sharing of things
is exogenous to humanity and must be imposed by survival
needs to overcome an ’innate’ human egoism that
’modernity' so often identifies with
’ selfhood. ”’35
Likewise, Bookchin proclaims, the idea of matriarchy
assumes that women ruled society before men, so the idea
of matriarchy does not challenge domination, it simply
alters which gender will dominate. Both of the examples
again reveal the narrowed interpretive framework from
which Bookchin operates. Primitive communism does not
imply a need to overcome innate human egoism, but rather a
necessary cooperation for group survival as a whole.
Bookchin reads the term through the lenses of his theory
of the emergence of hierarchy not through those which view
cooperation as economically necessary. And to view
matriarchy simply as another form of domination is to
ignore its possible radically different structure.
^
The role of the shaman, according to social ecology's
"origins" narrative, was later expanded to that of a
priesthood due to the frequency of failure of the shaman's
attempt at intervention into natural events. Divination
and magic could then be replaced by a theology--a rational
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explanation of the history and origins of men and gods.
What previously were individual technical failures of the
shaman could now be interpreted as the moral failure of
the community. In addition, the systems of command and
obedience developed by the shaman later could be used by
others desiring power, specifically the "military
fraternity" of the warriors, who in time became the nobles
and lords of the feudal manors.
Closely related to this narrative of the origins of
domination is Bookchin's understanding of the emergence of
the human self or subject. Central to the idea of the
development of the human subject must be some
understanding of the process of distinction or separation
of the human from non-human nature. Bookchin argues that
this separation should not be viewed as based in an
"epistemology of rule and domination, or worse, class
relationships and exploitation." 37 Instead he calls for
the development of a phenomenology of the self that
adequately takes into account the other aspects of self-
formation: conciliation and participation. Bookchin
claims the I which emerges from the "welter of its" is
not the product of antagonism, since antagonism, in
Bookchin's view, is based in fear, a thoroughly socia
1
experience which must be learned. Bookchin is responding
to the modern, or bourgeois, notion of the self as
fundamentally competitive, of human subjects as
antagonistic egos seeking ever increased opportunity for
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the expansion and expression of power, most succinctly
stated by Hobbes in the phrase of a "war of all against
all." But in his counter-image Bookchin's alternative
understanding of the ego is itself one-sided, "Had reason,
with its capacity for calculation, been used to divide and
destroy rather than unite and create, the very human
quality of humanity would have turned upon itself and the
species immolated itself ages ago, long before it devised
Its armamentarium of modern weaponry ." 38 a brief review
of the history of war and genocide should subdue the
impact of such overly optimistic, near Utopian claims.
However, even though he overemphasizes the peaceful and
cooperative side of human actions, by pressing forward
with this understanding of the conciliatory and
participatory possibilities of human subjectivity Bookchin
does provide some theoretical potential for the
development of radical ecological thought.
Bookchin claims the alternative human subjectivity,
repressed in a society structured on the basis of
antagonism, competition, and limitless power-seeking, was
expressed in earlier societies in their relationships to
external nature. Here he returns to the themes of
shamanism, magic and animism. Bookchin cites as
confirmation of this understanding of early human-to-
nature interaction the tendency of preliterate peoples to
treat the objects and life-forms of nature as other
subjects, even to the point of attempting to "reason" with
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them as
radical
in this
they would with another human being. There is no
separation of spirit and body, of mind and matter
organic form of knowledge,
Preliterate epistemology tends to unify rather th.n
our 1„
preliterate animistic mind. To the animi qt- mgn'
soul for example, is his breatt Is S'h“eart, or other such clearly substantial entities. 39
It is in attempting to explain the apparent violation
of the "conciliatory epistemology," itself a result of the
preliterate "conciliatory sensibility" (appearing in the
use of magic and ritual), that Bookchin makes claims at
odds with those of critical theory. The understanding of
magic and ritual in organic or "primitive" societies
requires some interpretation of the role of mimesis and
its relationship to the process of conceptual abstraction.
In question is the operation of magic and ritual and how
it mediates between the human community and the external
world,
By magically imitating nature, its forces, or
the actions of animals and people, preliterate
communities project their own needs into
external nature; it is essential to emphasize
that external nature is conceptualized at the
very outset as a mutualistic community. Prior
to the manipulative act is the ceremonious
supplicatory word, the appeal to a rational
being--to a subject--for cooperation and
understanding. Rites always precede action and
signify that there must be communication between
equal participants, not mere coercion. The
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consent of an animal, say a bear, is anessential part of the hunt in which it win be
Bookchm's discussion is a response to Horkheimer and
Adorno understanding of the relationship of myth and
magic to the domination of nature, and the ascendancy of
instrumental rationality in modern society. At issue is
the possibility for an understanding of reason not
reducible to an instrument of calculation, an
understanding of reason that provides a relationship to
nature without domination. Bookchin must deny the
presence of fear in nature, just as he must deny the
presence of domination in the relationship of human beings
to the nature they must appropriate out of metabolic
necessity, because these concepts undermine his
understanding of hierarchy and its relation to liberatory
reason. The philosophy of social ecology requires a
return to the origins of human social relationships in
which fear, domination, and conflict are absent, but a
return which is at the same time also fully conscious or
aware of this past and therefore able to raise up, or
resurrect, nature into a new state of "free nature." This
would be a return to a non-dominating subjectivity, a
dialectical "Aufhebung" to a higher level of development
with greater diversity, complexity and self-reflection.
Bookchin views the critical theory project as doomed from
the beginning because it includes the "negative" aspects
of subjectivity— fear, antagonism, domination--as present
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at the beginning of the development of human beings,
"dialectic of enlightenment" as a "dialectic of
domination,
" according to Bookchin, is "actually no
The
dialectic at all-at least not in its attempt to explain
the negation of reason through its own self-
development. "41 The fundamental project both social
ecology and critical theory share is the attempt at a
recovery of reason from its collapse into instrumental
rationality.
Central to this disagreement are different
understandings of the relationship of mimesis and reason.
For Bookchin, "simple mimesis" as an integral part of
magic and ritual, implies a unity with the "object."
Bookchin represents this unity as the recognition of the
object's "subjectivity." 42 For Adorno mimesis is the
recognition by the human of the uniqueness of the object,
n°t its common participation in subjectivity,
The shaman's rites were directed to the wind,
the rain, the serpent without, or the demon in
the sick man, but not to materials or specimens.
Magic was not ordered by one, identical spirit:
it changed like the cultic masks which were
supposed to accord with the various spirits.
Magic is utterly untrue, yet in it domination is
not yet negated by transforming itself into the
pure thought and action as the very ground of
the world that has become subject to it. The
magician imitates demons; in order to frighten
them or to appease them, he behaves
frighteningly or makes gestures of appeasement.
Even though his task is impersonating he never
conceives of himself as does the civilized man
for whom the unpretentious preserves of the
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happy hunting-grounds become
the inclusive concept for allplunder
.
q
J
the unified cosmos
possibilities of
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With the development of rationality, or the dialectic
of enlightenment, in which magic becomes science, the
relationship of the unique, different or non-identical to
the human subject collapses into the unity of the
identical and universal, as quoted previously,
fher
1106 therS iS n° sPecific representation: andif t e are no sacrificial animals there is no oodRepresentation is exchanged for the fungible
universal interchangability
. An atom is smashed not
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Ut aS 3 specimen of matter, andi oes not represent but, as a mere exampleis virtually ignored by the zeal of the laboratory. 4 ^
In the change from magic to science the self becomes
increasingly identified with nature as a whole, the
individual entities with their unique spirits become
examples of the spirit of nature as a whole, a spirit that
is then identified with the human, "in place of the local
spirits and demons there appeared heaven and its
hierarchy; in place of the invocations of the magician and
the tribe the distinct graduation of sacrifice and the
labor of the unfree mediated through the word of
4 Scommand. This elimination of the particular or unique
aspects in nature continues until human subjectivity has
engulfed all of nature in its self affirming project until
finally, "Man" assumes the power of "God" and turns the
unique potentials of each being into means for his own
ends. Each individual example of nature is simply another
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instance of the unity of nature, its identity as material
for manipuiation,
"Disqualified nature beco.es the chaotic
matter of mere classification, and the all-powerful self
becomes mere possession-abstract identity. "46 What is
important in the discussion of these "origins" of
domination is the development and extension of
instrumental rationality to the totality of thought, where
this development began, and where an alternative reason
remains. At the time of meaningful magic the kernel of
the development of instrumental reason was present but
still remained to be developed, "in magic there is
specific representation. What happens to the enemy's
spear, hair or name, also happens to the individual; the
sacrificial animal is massacred instead of the god.
Substitution in the course of sacrifice marks a step
toward discursive logic ." 47 This is not the same as
saying that the substitutions involved in magic and ritual
in preliterate society had the full blown characteristics
of logical analysis or that this society had the
understanding of the binding contract of "equivalent
exchange as in modern market societies. In modern
society abstraction serves to radically separate subject
and object, to identify the object with its concept
without remainder, to eliminate in thought the uniqueness
of the particular entity. In magical mimesis this radical
split between subject and object does not operate,
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Like science, magic pursues aims, but seeks tnachieve them by mimesis-not by progressive! «distancing itself from the objec? 9 "grounded in the "sovereignty of ideas " whirh fhprimitive, like the neurotic, is 6himself; there can be no "over-evalMtiln lit, V?processes as against reality" where there isradical distinction between thoughts and realty. 48
For the critical theorists domination begins with
abstraction, with the substitution of concept for
immediate experience of the thing or object. This process
of abstraction is tied to the process of domination in
labor, the transformation of nature into a use for humans,
"The universality of ideas as developed by discursive
logic, domination in the conceptual sphere, is raised up
on the basis of actual domination ."^ 9 For the critical
theorists the animal's world is a world without concept,
It lacks any word to seize the identical in the flux of
phenomena, to isolate the same species in the alternation
of specimens, or the same thing in altered situations."
The animal does have the capacity for recognition but it
is very limited, the "flux of things" has no permanency
about it, there is no definite past and no expectation of
a future. The animal is both enclosed within itself and
exposed to the world, "An animal answers to its name and
has no self ." 50 The animal can experience fear, pain,
sorrow, but not true happiness, since happiness requires
the concept, a way to resist the emptiness of the flux of
the world, a way to bring the world to a halt for a
moment. The animal lives in a world of "stifled urges and
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unbounded passion" without the capacity to "apply the
brake of cognation to their destiny. "51 Adorno WQuld
elaborate on these themes an later works where he explored
the relationship of the concept to the identifying
subject. The concept is a way of controlling nature and
of establishing the human subject or ego, "In truth, all
concepts, even the philosophical ones, refer to
nonconceptualities, because concepts on their part are
moments of the reality that requires their formation,
primarily for the control of nature.
"
5 2 So for Adorno,
human thought is a process of identifying, of eliminating
the non-identical by identifying the concept with the
thing, "Yet the appearance of identity is inherent in
thought itself, in its pure form. To think is to
identify. But this is not to indicate the absence of
any hope of going beyond the identical, of possibilities
outside of the domination of nature; in fact, dialectics
is the consistent sense of nonidentity." The "untruth of
identity" is that "the concept does not exhaust the thing
conceived." 54 This non-identity inheres in the concept
itself, referring as it does to something outside itself,
it is constituted also by what it is not. The development
of philosophy, along negative dialectic lines (and maybe
in the direction of a revised dialectical naturalism)
,
helps to reveal the non-identical in the conceptual,
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Philosophy is the most serious of thinqs hut th
» stt' *
”
K;»
Without abandoning itself. 5
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The process of producing the "primacy of identity,"
m its various forms, must have, according to Adorno,
involved an "unspeakable effort" on the part of the
species. The emergence of the I or the ego makes
possible the perception of freedom and unfreedom
(unfreedom viewed as the constraint the environment
imposes on the subject). The "naive subject" simply
opposes itself to its environment, not understanding its
own inclusion in nature, seeking a "spiritualized" realm
beyond that of natural causality. The subject desires to
be master over nature, but its true freedom requires
revelation that it is in fact reflecting rather than
escaping from the domination of nature,
To dominate this conditioning, consciousness must
render it transparent. The thought, by means of its
freedom, turns back to itself as to its subject, and
its sovereignty also leads to the concept of
unfreedom.
. . .It is the nature-controlling sovereignty
and its social form, dominion over people, that
suggest the opposite to our consciousness: the idea
of freedom. Its historical archetype was he who is
topmost in hierarchies, the man who is not visibly
dependent .
^
Freedom would require escape also from the domination of
the I, of the subject identical to itself through
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domination of the object, the other. The idea of freedom
trades on a world before the ego, before the constant I
made possible through the identifying concept,
The dawning sense of freedom feeds upon the
anv°solid
lmpUlSe n0t ye" Peered byy I. The more the I curbs that impulsethe more chaotic and thus questionable will itmd the Pre temporal freedom. Without ananamnesis of the untamed impulse that precedesthe ego— an impulse later banished to the zoneof unfree bondage to nature--it would beimpossible to derive the idea of freedom,
although that idea in turn ends up reinforcingthe ego. In spontaneity, the philosophical
concept that does most to exalt freedom as a
mode of conduct above empirical existence, there
resounds the echo of that by whose control and
ultimate destruction the I of idealistic
philosophy means to prove its freedom
.
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Before the subject's relation to nature becomes
transparent, and this is still not so, the old way of
things predominates. The dialectic of enlightenment is
the attempt to be free of nature's power to dominate the
human species by controlling that power of domination for
the species own purposes. Nature is controlled according
to dominating reason by applying the right concepts to all
its parts, and can only then escape the primordial fear of
the all powerful other of nature, "Man imagines himself
free from fear when there is no longer anything
unknown.
. . .Enlightenment is mythic fear turned
radical ... .Nothing at all may remain outside, because the
mere idea of outsideness is the very source of fear." 5 ^
Fear is controlled by the naming or conceptualization of
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that which is feared, the power of unknown nature to
dissolve the individual subject. This dissolution is not
that of subjectivity into objectivity, but loss of the
individual self,
hat the primitive experiences in this regard isnot a spiritual as opposed to a material
substance, but the intricacy of the natural incontrast to the individual. The gasp of
surprise which accompanies the experience of theunusual becomes its name. it fixes the
transcendence of the unknown in relation to theknown, and therefore terror as sacredness. Thedualization of nature as appearance and
sequence, effort and power, which first makespossible both myth and science, originates inhuman fear, the expression of which becomes
explanation. It is not the soul which is
transposed to nature, as psychologism would haveit, mana, the moving spirit, is no projection,but the echo of the real supremacy of nature in
the weak souls of primitive men.^
This understanding of the relationship of word to
thing and its development out of fear is in sharp contrast
to Bookchin's own understanding. Bookchin claims the word
was part of ritual and common life, "But the ritual of the
word in the form of incantations and work songs reminds us
of a more primordial sensibility based on mutual
recognition and shared rationality."^^ The primitive
relation to nature is not one of fear and the struggle to
continue individual and collective existence, but of
mutual respect and the recognition of the "object's
subjectivity." This understanding is not merely in
reference to the already advanced social forms of ritual
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and ceremony, but includes a basic understanding of
conceptualization itself.
Bookchin’s understanding of the relationship of the
particular to the universal with respect to language is
wholly inadequate. He concedes there was recognition of
particularity in the primitive world, "a sense of
particularity in the manifold of this experiential unity."
The "animist" could distinguish bear from bison and from
human being, by name and even aesthetically, as cave
paintings indicate. What is very curious is Bookchin's
equation of "universal" with "spirit" in a very narrow,
overly literal sense,
the repressive, abstraction of the individual
bear into a bear spirit, a universalizing of the
spirit of bears that denies their specificity,
is I suspect, a later development in the
elaboration of the animistic spirit. In
rendering the individual bear subject to
manipulative forms of human predation,
generalization in this form marks the first
steps toward the objectification of the external
world. Before there were bear spirits there
were probably only individual bears . 62
For Bookchin then the hunting and killing of the bear
is not a manifestation of domination, mastery, or control
of nature by humans. These do not exist until the
individual bear is conceptualized as a mere representation
of the bear "spirit." There is a confusion here in the
relationship of particular and universal. At the moment
of differentiation involved in conceptualization, of
applying a general concept to an individual object there
369
is movement within the dialectic of particular and
universal. The distinction between species, bear from
bison from human, for example, is already a movement of
contrast between the particular anHcix L i d the universal, without
literal reference to "spirit." The uniqueness of the
individual animal has been at least partially dissolved in
its reduction to the member of a species, into "a bear."
In this way, one aspect of the non-identity of the
individual being or entity is violated at the moment of
its conceptualization. To attempt to claim the universal
is not operating within language or conceptualization
until there is explicit reference to "spirit" is to
crudely identify the universal with a theological and
metaphysical understanding of the concept of the
universal. But this misidentification of the universal
with the theological meaning of the term "spirit" is
exactly what Bookchin does,
By abstracting a bear spirit from individual
bears, by generalizing from the particular to
the universal, and further, by infusing this
process of abstraction with magical content, we
are developing a new epistemology for explaining
the external world. If the individual bear is
merely an epiphenomenon of an animal spirit, it
is now possible to objectify nature by
completely subsuming the particular by the
general and denying the uniqueness of the
specific and concrete. The emphasis of the
animistic thereby shifts from accommodation and
communication to domination and coercion.
^
But the shift has already occurred with the reduction
of the individual to the member of a species, the
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particular to an example of the universal. The concept
"bear" has already partly eliminated the non-identity of
the individual animal, which could only be retained in
something like a "pure nominalism." Social ecology’s
desire to respect or honor the "uniqueness of the specif
and concrete" coincides with that of critical theory, but
the relationship of reason to this possibility is deeply
embedded in the process of conceptualization itself,
according to critical theory. Bookchin cannot accept
this, more adequate, understanding of the dialectic of the
particular and the universal because it would implicate
identifying reason as containing an element of repression
from the very beginning. This immediately puts the
discussion of the possibilities of freedom back before the
institution of social hierarchy to the more fundamental
problem of the relationship between human and nature. The
very formation of the individual ego, which is a
manifestation of the adjustment to reality required by the
physical limitation on the organism, is an aspect of the
domination of nature both external and internal.
Bookchin s understanding of the dialectic of particular
and universal cannot address the repressive qualities of
language and conceptualization as such. Adorno on the
contrary retains the initial insight of Hegel without
"hypostatizing” spirit in Bookchin' s Hegelian manner,
371
servant, "develops" the"genesStof “d
teT
ne
Thr
rP0Se as wel1 as t0 heterogeneousmat er e origin of "I" in "Not I" remainsscarcely veiled. it is looked up in the realliving process, in the legalities of thesurvival of the species, of providing it withnutrients. Thereafter, Hegel hyposL^s thed, but m vain. To succeed somehow, he mustblow it up into a whole, the total spirit. 6
”
The I, the ego, emerges for Hegel, Marx and the critical
theorists in the encounter between the human organism and
external nature, in the necessity of metabolism.
Different understandings of the resulting potential for
freedom is what later marks their different philosophical
positions. Adorno would repeatedly return to the
relationships between self-identification,
conceptualization, and the taking-in, or incorporation, of
external nature as the other. He typically would indicate
the relation of concept to identity as that of devouring,
of eating the other . 66 There is a gap in Bookchin'
s
understanding of subjectivity between the relationship of
metabolism and human conceptualization. Bookchin does
acknowledge the intimate link between subjectivity and
metabolism, "In the organic world, the metabolic activity
of life-forms constitutes the sense of self-identity,
however germinal, from which nature begins to acquire its
rudimentary subjectivity ." 66 However, Bookchin does not
see metabolic activity as simultaneously the maintenance
f self-identity and the destruction of the non-identical,o
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Its absorption or incorporation of the other into the
self. Bookchin's dialectic of subgectxvity becomes one-
sided as a dialectic of identity incapable of adequate
acknowledgment of the coercive effects on the non-
ldentical, especially as this occurs at the human level
where conceptualization facilitates the control of nature
Women and Reason
Social ecology's conception of subjectivity also
impacts how reason is related to the differences between
men and women. Remember, Bookchin argues the "natural"
differences between men and women, basically revolving
around reproductive biology, as well as women's smaller
physical size, creates a "natural" division between their
respective sphere's of activity, "The female is a
specialist in child rearing and food-gathering. Her
responsibilities focus on nurture and sustenance. From
childhood she will be taught to identify with such
'feminine' traits as caring and tenderness, and she will
be trained in comparatively sedentary occupations ."^ 7 In
addition, the woman is the source of community in the
earliest organic societies,
The blood-tie and the rights and duties that surround
it are embodied in an unspoken oath that comprised
the only visible unifying principle of early
community life. And this bond initially derives from
woman. She alone becomes the very protoplasm of
sociality: the ancestress that cements the young into
lasting consociation, the source of the blood that
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06 Wh° nourishes a
mutuality a
recognition that extends from infancy to death sheIS instructress in the basic ways of life theindisputable personification of community' as suchconceived as an intimate familial experience. 68
^'
It was "woman" who made the human species different
from others by her emphasis on the sharing of food as a
"consistent communal activity" and as a "universally
social phenomenon. "63 it was woman who provided the basis
of civilization, the model of the "Mother Goddess," and
the creator of the original golden age,
We cannot ignore the fact that woman's foraging
activities helped awaken in humanity an acute
sense of place, of pikos. . Her nurturing
sensibility helped create not only the origins
of society but literally the roots of
civilization--a terrain the male has arrogantly
claimed for himself. Her "stake in
civilization" was different from that of the
predatory male: it was more domestic, more
pacifying, and more caring. Her sensibility ran
deeper and was laden with more hope than the
male's, for she embodied in her very physical
being mythology's ancient message of a lost
"golden age" and a fecund nature.^ 6
In Bookchin's social ecology the emergence of
domination results from the male's usurpation of women's
place in the creation of civilization, at least its
symbolic usurpation. Although hierarchy begins with the
institutionalization of the shaman's role as an aspect of
the authority of the elders, soon it is the elder men only
who rule, extending patricentric relations to full
patriarchy,
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Under patriarchy woman represents the opposite of the
male "moral" development of civilization, because she
shows the signs of inferior nature in her very being, in
her smaller size and weaker body. Woman becomes the very
source of the concept of domination, "Even before man
embarks on his conquest of man—of class by class-
patriarchal morality obliges him to affirm his conquest of
woman. The subjugation of her nature and its absorption
into the nexus of patriarchal morality forms the
archetypal act of domination that ultimately gives rise to
man's imagery of a subjugated nature ." 72 Bookchin
identifies a linguistic link between women and nature,
It is perhaps not accidental that nature and earth
retain the female gender into our own time. What may
seem to us like a linguistic atavism that reflects a
long-gone era when social life was matricentric and
nature was its domestic abode may well be an on-going
and subtly viable expression of man's continual
violation of woman as nature and of nature as
woman.
But Bookchin argues against those such as Simone de
Beauvoir who claim that under patriarchal morality woman
is reduced to a generalized Other who is opposed, negated
and contained. Alternatively, he argues male morality
"particularizes this otherness into a specific hatred of
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her inquisitiveness, of her probing subjectivity and
curiosity. "74 Woman haunts male
"civilization" with the
fear that her powers have not been fully exorcised, powers
which inhere in the ability "to reproduce the species, to
rear it, to provide it with a loving refuge from the
'unfriendly world,'" and in woman's powers of material
achievement, including food cultivation, pottery, and
weaving, all of which provided the basis for the emergence
of male civilization. But, Bookchin insists, the
domination of woman is not a denial of "woman's"
subj ectivity,
Ironically there is no denial, here, of woman's
subjectivity but a shrieking fear of her latent
back
r
in?n
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i^e P° ssibillty tha t they may be stirredto life again. Hence, patriarchal morality
must bring
. her into complicity with the male's ever-tremulous image of her inferiority. She must betaught to view her posture of renunciation, modesty
and obedience as the intrinsic attributes of her
subjectivity, in short, her total negation as apersonality . '
^
From this indication of woman as the negative of the
masculine image of morality and civilization, an image
that echoes that of Horkheimer and Adorno, 76 it is not
clear how Bookchin 's dependence on the idea of maternal
care or "mother love" should be interpreted, especially
with regard to the issues of separation and alienation.
Bookchin rejects what he sees as Hegel's over-reliance on
an antagonistic understanding of alienation (the German
" Selbs tentausserung" ) which he claims is more accurately
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translated as "self-detachment" rather than alienation.
Bookchin views alienation, separation, or self-detachment
as based not on antagonism but on "wholeness, fullness and
completeness" resulting in the further assertion that
Hegel's understanding of negativity is more adequately
understood as an annulling of the "other" not in the since
of annihilation but "in order to absorb it into a movement
toward a richly variegated completeness ." 77 Bookchin
rejects the "strictly theoretical" or "strictly
intellectual" strategy Hegel adopts for resolving the
paradox of alienation. Bookchin proposes to examine the
more concrete "juncture of biology and socialization" that
occurs with human birth and early childhood development,
with the intention of uncovering a basis for reason not
reducible to merely instrumental terms. It is in the
relation between child and mother that Bookchin finds the
most important influences on the development of human
reason, "Biology and socialization, in fact, cojoin
precisely at the point where maternal care is the most
formative factor in childhood acculturation.
. . .Reason
comes to the child primarily through the care, support,
attention, and instruction provided by the mother ." 78 The
long period of biological dependency which allows the
"mental plasticity" of the young human the ability to
acquire knowledge also allows the development of strong
social bonds with "parents, siblings, and some kind of
rudimentary community." 7 ^ It is curious that here
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emphasizes socializing agents beyond the mother,
as he does in an example of the socialization of Hopi
children, but he continues to use the term "maternal'' to
plain the origins of liberatory reason. He does
superficially address this potential threat to the idea of
a liberatory maternal reason by noting the "mother-infant
relationship is the initial step in the socialization
process the cradle in which the need for consociation is
created ." 80 But this still begs the question of whether
it is specifically a female who must be the care giver,
and it also begs the question of how much the physiology
of the baby requires physical contact with concrete
objects and with other humans, regardless of sex or
gender. At issue is how much of the development of reason
is a tactile experience and exactly the relationship this
has to "the mother."
Bookchin paints a picture of maternal care as one of
utopian "mutual support, concern, and love" opposed by
civilization" which is "a massive enterprise to undo the
impact of maternal care, nurture, and modes of thought on
the character structure of the offspring."®-'- Civilization
changes this caring, nurturing character into one that is
"shapeless, unfeeling, and harsh" so that humanity will be
accepting of "war, exploitation, political obedience, and
rule." This warping of human character is an undoing of
the human's animal first nature as well as its human
second nature acquired as a child. It is a violation of
378
the atmosphere of "dependency and protective custody" the
child experiences "in the arms of its mother. "82
The liberatory reason formed under the mother's care,
and repressed by civilization, has the characteristics of
an ecological reason, a specific liberatory rationality,
it is not only love that the mother ordinarily gives
her child, but a rationality of 'otherness' that stands
sharply at odds with its modern arrogant counterpart.
This earlier rationality is unabashedly svmh^n,- ..83 In
this sentimental idealization of the mother-child
relationship, Bookchin also claims the mother's love is "a
spontaneous, unconditional sentiment of caring, free from
any reciprocating obligations by the child," but even more
importantly it results in a "rationality of
deobjectification" or a "resubj ectivizing of experience"
in which the other is in a "logical nexus of mutuality." 84
Contrary to scientism, or to Marxism, claims Bookchin,
this leads to a view of the other not as alien or
alienated but as "the active component that it always has
been in natural and social history." These observations
on mother love then lead Bookchin to characterize
libertarian rationality as involving the observation of
the other in an "ethical context, " representing an
ecologized notion of self-detachment that emphasizes
"wholeness, completeness, and fullness." Finally,
connecting this idealization of the mother-child
relationship to the needs of the philosophy of social
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ecology, Bookchin indicates the essential features of
reason,
A libertarian rationality raises natural i
itself
°
f
it
nitY
k
in diversit y to the level of°reason
and tte "othIr"
e
thaV°
giC ° f UlUty ^tween the"??
integrative function of diversity— 5 ?nd
t
^
1
f
t can be comprehended and integratedsymbolically. Diversity and unity do not contradicteac other as logical antinomies. To the contrary
gives it intellfSi
£
f
1
ddversitY
' the that
'
.
,
igibility and meaning, and hence a
i tsel f?^
PrinC1Ple n0t °nlY ° f ecol°gy bub of reason
Bookchin believes the "formal structure" of
dialectical and analytical reason would need to change
little to be able to accommodate this ecological and
libertarian rationality. He acknowledges the presence of
an "other" to libertarian reason that is "antagonistic and
oppositional," a "parasitic" rationality as opposed to the
"mutualism" of libertarian reason. He asserts "symbiotic"
reason is composed of both the mutualistic and the
parasitic. At this point in his analysis of a more
complex understanding of reason, one approaching that of
critical theory, instead of offering the needed analysis
of a dialectic between mutualism and parasitism,
"symbiotic reason" then is collapsed into an identity with
"mutualism.
"
ob Bookchin associates mutualism with "an
ethical context of virtue" against the parasitism of a
"value-free context of utility and efficiency." This is a
simple exclusion or marginalization of "parasitic" reason.
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In the now one-sided characterization of reason, the
mutualism of libertarian reason
"objectively validates"
social ecology's concept of the good, that is, the ability
to form concepts of the good comes from the "natural
history of subj ectivity .
" Humanity is an expression of
natural history, subjectivity developed to the point of
rational self-awareness, and this capacity for self-
awareness generates another human potential, "As a unique
agent of consciousness, humanity can provide the voice of
nature's internal rationality in the form of thought and
self-reflective action. Libertarian reason seeks to
consciously mitigate ecological destruction, in the realms
of both social ecology and natural ecology ." 87
This justification of libertarian rationality, which
contains the potential to produce a "third" or "free"
nature, is open to criticism from several directions. It
is openly one-sided in its emphasis on subjectivity viewed
in a mutualistic" sense. Bookchin acknowledges this bias
but indicates it is preferable to what he views as the
only alternative, a bias in favor of a rationality based
on control, manipulation, domination, and estrangement;
Libertarian reason would advance a contrasting view
in its orientation toward ecological symbiosis, but
doubtless this can be regarded as a bias that is
neither more nor less justifiable than the bias of
authoritarian rationalism. But biases are not formed
from mere air. Not only do they always exist in
every orientation we hold, but their impact upon
thought is all the more insidious when their
381
aX
"value- free^epi stemology?^
6 ° f "°bjeCtivit^ and
But this dichotomization of choices does not exhaust
possible ways of thinking about reason. The limitations
of a one-sided philosophy of social ecology may have
significant consequences for a politics of ecology.
Bookchin's characterization of the principles of
ecology and evolution are also questionable, and should
they not hold up to a critical examination based on
physical or empirical evidence the fundamental basis of
the philosophy of social ecology would be destablized.
The questionable assertions about the status of physical
evidence includes his representation of early human life
m utopian, or golden age, images, nearly free of conflict
or struggle among humans and between humans and nature.
His reliance on questionable anthropology makes his
position vulnerable to a fundamentally damaging critique
should additional contradictory anthropological evidence
appear, thus placing him at the mercy of the sort of
ob j ectivi zing science he opposes.
Finally, his representation of motherhood in idyllic
terms has been challenged by recent feminist
investigations, as well as more than a century of
psychoanalytics. The development of rationality in the
child has probably never been as Bookchin indicates, but
certainly the development of subjectivity differs between
the male and the female child, a problem not addressed by
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Bookchm. This is but one indication of the reduction of
subjectivity into a uniform essence in the philosophy of
social ecology, a more detailed examination of the
specific relations of subjectivity and motherhood is
necessary to understand the consequences and potentials of
maternal care. This is also necessary in examining
alternative forms of early child care not dependent on the
natural mother, and to confront what seems to be a bias
toward traditionalistic family structure in Bookchin's
analysis. These issues of motherhood and female
subjectivity, how they have been addressed in feminism,
and their consequences for radical ecology, will be
examined in the final section of this work. But before
turning to the relationship of ecofeminism to radical
ecology and critical theory, an examination of the impact
of the philosophical limitations of social ecology on
radical ecological politics is in order.
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CHAPTER 8
SOCIAL ECOLOGY AND POLITICS
The philosophy of social ecology attempts to combine
the insights of ecology with a social analysis to produce
a vision of a future liberated, ecological society. Any
philosophy of radical ecology must address the connections
between ecology and social institutions including the
problem of the "naturalistic fallacy," the relationship of
"ought" to "is." Bookchin claims dialectical naturalism
overcomes this problem and provides an objective ethical
basis for policy decision-making and fundamental choices
about the institutional structure of society. A critical
exploration of this "objective" basis for politics must
begin with social ecology's claim about the relationship
between its theory of evolution and its vision of
democratic institutions, particularly as developed in the
ideas of municipalism and confederalism. Fundamental
relationships requiring close scrutiny are those between
Bookchin' s understanding of the evolution of subjectivity
and the other basic concepts of social ecology, including
complexity, diversity (sometimes discussed in the terms of
"unity in diversity, " or differentiation)
,
mutualism (or
complementarity, or symbiosis), and spontaneity (or
participation)
,
and how they are transposed into
"objective values" for political and social institution
building. Earlier critiques of Bookchin' s theories on the
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relationship between evolution and subjectivity questioned
whether the arguments linking ecology and liberatory
institutions were anything other than personal preference,
rather than logical or rational relationships. Of
specific concern has been Bookchin's assertions about the
directionality of evolution, and his understanding of the
application of ecological principles to the political
sphere of human activities. If Bookchin's understanding
of evolution is fundamentally flawed, and if his
characterization of the relationship between reason and
subjectivity is also flawed, then how does this change the
"objective" status of the liberatory and democratic
institutions he advocates? The reverse can also be asked;
if the political and social institutions he advocates
fulfill fundamental requirements of freedom and justice in
the human community, do they provide an acceptable means
of addressing ecological problems? In other words,
although Bookchin's vision of a municipalist and
confederalist institutional structure for a future
ecological society may not be a simple extension of the
evolution of nature's subjectivity, it may still be true
that these ideas presently represent the most adequate
means for addressing ecological and social problems from a
radical ecological perspective.
Another way of looking at this problem is as a
relationship of means and ends. Does the means of self-
government, in the form of municipalism and confederalism,
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cohere with the end of ecologically viable relationships
between the human species and the rest of nature with
which it is inextricably intertwined? All of radical
ecology fundamentally agrees that the nature-culture
conceptual duality has a real effect on the human species'
attempt to dominate nature. This domination has extended
itself to the point of ecological catastrophe for other
species, and to a questioning of the ultimate viability of
the human species on this planet. The problem for a
philosophy of radical ecology is to first produce an
analysis of the relationship of ecological problems to
society that goes to the root of the problem, and
secondly, to provide the basis for a vision of an
ecological society that can resolve ecological problems
while still promoting human aspirations for freedom and
happiness
.
1 This must be said because, as many authors
have pointed out, it is perfectly possible to envision an
authoritarian or totalitarian society that could establish
long-term relationships of ecological sustainability.
Part of the reason for Bookchin's emphasis on the "idea"
of the domination of nature as the ideological
underpinning of a society was to avoid the deterministic
reading of social ecology which interprets it as claiming
that only hierarchical societies produce ecological
destruction, or that the absence of hierarchy necessarily
will result in the elimination of the domination of
nature. Rather, it seems that the elimination of social
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' ln B00kchin '^ view, is a necessary step toward
the elimination of the domination of external nature,
although not a suffrcient one. By definition the
elimination of hierarchy is a necessary step in the
removal of domination of human by human, one form of the
domination of nature. Consideration of domination of
humans by humans, viewed as one expression of the
"development" of nature, must be included in any radical
ecological critique of the domination of nature. This
seems to be one of Bookchin's principle disagreements with
those deep ecologists who tend toward the misanthropic;
they reenact the nature-culture dualism by simply
condemning the human species, arguing for the simple
preservation of other species until humans annihilate
themselves. A consistent radical ecological philosophy
must include the human species among the natural species
that are to be freed from domination by human culture.
Municipalism and confederalism are the basic
institutional structures for a future ecological society
according to social ecology and should be explored from
several perspectives. First, the relationship of the
philosophy oi social ecology to the institutions of
municipalism and confederalism should be unraveled and
evaluated on the basis of their philosophical coherence
and consistency. Second, municipalism and confederalism
should be examined on the basis of their claims to be the
most adequate democratic institutional forms capable of
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resolving the problems of hierarchy and the domination of
human by human. Finally, the implications of social
ecology for the resolution of actual ecological questions
must be addressed. After completing thrs investigation of
the political implications of the philosophy of social
ecology as it now stands, it will be shown to be
inadequate to the tasks it has set itself, partrcularly
its ability to: a) integrate social and political
institutions into ecological requirements; b) demonstrate
the internal consistency of the relationship of
municipalism and confederalism to the ideas of freedom and
democracy; and c) show that social ecology does not
continue to dominate non-human nature in favor of human
sub j ect ivity
.
Municipalism, Confederalism and Ecology
Independent of its relationship to the issues of
ecology, Bookchin's examinations of the democratic forms
of organization of municipalism and confederalism, as
alternatives to authoritarian and representative
republican forms of government, are significant
contributions to the development of anarchist political
O
theory. The historical evidence and examples Bookchin
has amassed are a direct challenge to fatalistic and
reformist arguments that view the nation-state and liberal
representative institutions as essentially
unchallengeable. Much of the appeal of social ecology to
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concrete
activists comes from its ability to offer
historical examples of alternative democratic
institutional arrangements that do not degenerate into
appendages of economic reduction!™. but at the same time
emphasize a connection to populist or grass roots
democratic efforts, and without resorting to vanguardism.
The relationship of these institutions to Bookchin's
understanding of evolution is the starting point for an
examination which will then open onto the issues of
democracy and its relationship to a truly ecological and
free society.
One of the frequently leveled charges against
Bookchm is that he opportunistically connects his
libertarian anarchist political ideology to the cause of
ecology, that there is a great deal of shear opportunism
involved in social ecology. At one level this seems to be
totally misplaced. Bookchin was, as he frequently
indicates, one of the first leftist radicals on the
contemporary scene to place ecological concerns within a
philosophy of radical social change
.
3 His sensitivity to
ecological concerns dates back to his earliest efforts to
express the need to address societal problems within an
ecological context, and in a philosophically coherent
manner,
The critical edge of ecology is due not so much to
the power of human reason. .. .but to a still higher
power, the sovereignty of nature... but ecology
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S Ve ge against human
if the criticism of Bookchin as philosophical
pportunist is meant to indicate that he is simply riding
the wave of new social movement activities and successes,
the criticism is misplaced. It is much closer to the
truth to say that Bookchin may have had a significant
influence in aiding the development of the new social
movements, especially the radical ecology movement.
However, criticisms of Bookchin's philosophy of social
ecology which focus on the emphasis he gives to some
ecological insights while ignoring or suppressing others,
and the convenient way these ecological insights coincide
with his social and political analysis, are closer to the
mark. In an effort to illuminate this issue it will be
useful to first examine Bookchin's vision of future
liberatory politics, then compare the resulting
institutional arrangements to the demands of the
ecological crisis, thus enabling us to evaluate whether
the institutions actually provide an adequate solution.
The two issues of primary importance then are the
adequacies of Bookchin's understanding of ecology, and his
emphasis on the resolution of social problems as the basis
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for then resolving the problems of the domination of
nature
.
Bookchin has charged many of his critics with
misrepresenting his position on libertarian municipalism,
its relationship to the political sphere of human
activity, and its impact on bringing about an ecological
society. 5 Any summary runs the risk of oversimplifying or
reducing the argument to its inessential components, an
empty shell, in comparison to its full development in its
original form. The following explication will attempt to
avoid these pitfalls, but at the same time indicate the
areas that have become problematic from a radical
ecological perspective.
Bookchin has developed the ideas of municipalism and
confederal ism m many articles and other publications over
a number of years, but his arguments have remained
fundamentally consistent throughout. 6 What should be
emphasized about this body of work are the envisioned
institutional arrangements and their philosophical,
political and ecological justifications. Bookchin argues
that libertarian municipalism is fundamentally different
in structure than other proposals which seek to radically
alter social and political relations. In Bookchin' s view,
other proposals for transforming politics are merely
additional techniques for holding power within
"representative" government institutions or "parliamentary
party" structures, not "a moral calling based on
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Many of
traditionally, community, and freedom ." 7
Bookchin statements about the basis of politics rely on
hrs interpretation of classical Greek forms, and have led
many critics to reduce his position to a simple romantic
idealist longing for a mythic golden age of politics.
Some statements do leave an impression of this tendency,
for example, libertarian municipalism,
"Involves a
redefinition of politics, a return to the word's original
Greek meaning as the management of the conmunity or
by means of direct face-to-face assemblies of the people
m the formulation of public policy and based on an ethics
of complementarity and solidarity ." 8 As can already be
seen by comparing the two preceding quotes, the basis for
his alternative politics varies with the statement; from
tradition, community and freedom, to complementarity and
solidarity, to still other terms elsewhere, all
representing the desired principles of social and
political structure. The relationship of these varying
political bases of action are not directly linked to the
analysis of ecological problems, but flow from the general
relations between hierarchy and subjectivity.
The basic structure of the social ecological society
would consist of politics at the "municipal" level, at the
level of what are now labeled cities and counties or
townships. Higher level political structure basically
would be merely coordinating levels of policy
administration. Policy itself would be decided at the
397
municipal or local level. Loral v^-i • +. •P litics would consist ofdirect face-to-face democracy with an emphasis on
developing a public sphere of discussion or dialogue.
This public sphere, Bookchin argues, was typical in
earlier places and times when parks, sidewalks, cafes and
other meeting places served as arenas for discussion of
common interests and public concerns. This he contrasts
to "representative" systems where individuals scarcely
take part in government except as constituent or consumer,
thus lacking any meaningful participation in policy
decisions. Bookchin is at pains to distinguish policy-
making from the "administration of policy" as it would
take place in a liberated society,
"Eoli<ty is made by a
community or neighborhood assembly of free citizens;
administration is performed by confederal councils
composed of mandated, recallable deputies of wards, towns,
and villages ." 9 The delegates to higher level
coordinating bodies would be mandated to carry-out only
the policies expressed by the true policy-making bodies at
the municipal or local level, and would be subject to
recall at any time.
Although the general tendency would be for the local
community to move toward a self-reliant political and
economic structure there are important reasons not to
carry this goal to extremes. The confederation of
municipalities would make possible the exploitation of
certain economic advantages due to the uneven distribution
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f resources. it makes no sense for a community to pursue
self-reliance to the point of actual hardship and
immiserating labor merely because local situations make
certain products difficult to acquire. The confederation
of municipalities would offer the opportunity to
distribute goods according to need. In fact, Bookchin
frequently cites Marx's maxim as the basis for economic
decision-making. Bookchin rejects capitalism as an
adequate economic structure; he claims its profit
motivated imperative of "grow or die" destroys ecosystems
and disempowers individuals from controlling their own
lives. However, Bookchin also rejects the Marxist notion
that a particular class can represent the general
interests of society, and he therefore rejects such ideas
as "workplace democracy" or "syndicalism" as anything
other than complicity with the basic imperatives of
capitalism. The general interest of humanity cannot be
found in the strictly economic sphere, however,
It would seem to me that the need to repair our
relationship with the natural world is certainly a
general interest" that is beyond dispute--and,
indeed, it remains the "general interest" advanced by
social ecology. It may be possible to coopt many
dissatisfied elements in the present society, but
nature is not cooptable. Indeed, the only politics
that remains for the left is one based on the premise
that there i_s. a "general interest" in democratizing
society and preserving the planet . 10
Besides the economic necessity for confederation of
municipalities, there also is a political necessity
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involving the aims of democracy and the protection of
individual rights. The danger of local control over
Policy is the temptation of "parochialism," which may
degenerate into abuse of minorities and individuals. The
enforcement of basic human rights is not a violation of
local autonomy, according to Bookchin, rather, it is the
recognition of the larger confederated community as a
whole,
If par ti cui ar communities or neighborhoods—or <minority grouping of them—choose to go theirown way to a point where human rights 'are
violated or where ecological mayhem ispermitted the majority in a local or regional
confederation has every right to prevent such
malfeasances through its confederal council.This is not a denial of democracy but the
assertion of a shared agreement by all to
recognize civil rights and maintain the
ecological integrity of a region. These rights
and needs are not asserted so much by a
confederal council as by the majority of thepopular assemblies conceived as one large
community that expresses its wishes through its
confederal deputies. This policy-making still
remains local, but its administration is vestedin the confederal network as a whole. The
confederation in effect is a Community of
communities based on distinct human rights and
ecological imperatives
.
11
The model of libertarian municipalism is incompatible
with strategies to "nationalize" an economy, and
incompatible with the continued existence of the nation-
state. The libertarian municipalist strategy raises
economics to the level of public concern and public policy
making. In this, Bookchin feels comfortable in
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acknowledging Marx's contribution to the analysis of
capitalism,
"Marx, to his credit, clearly demonstrated
that the 'free market’ inevitably yields the oligarchic
and monopolistic corporate market with entrepreneurial
manipulations that in every way parallel and ultimately
converge with state controls.”^ He goes on to indicate
that the concentrations of power produced by capitalism
and the nation-state limit the possibilities for reducing
pollution, recycling wastes and making sound use of
regional raw materials
.
13 But more to the point, the
present economic and political structures make it
impossible to develop a "truly ecological sensibility" as
opposed to merely acting in an "ecologically responsible"
manner, "We should not, I believe, lose sight of what it
means to live an ecological way of life, not merely follow
sound ecological practices. The multitude of handbooks
that teach us how to conserve, invest, eat, and buy in an
ecologically responsible' manner are a travesty of the
more basic need to reflect on what it means to think
—
yes,
to reason and to live ecologically in the full meaning of
the term." 1 ^ The result of living in a society that was
"radically veering toward decentralized, participatory
democracy, guided by communitarian and ecological
principles" would be individuals who would not consider it
in any way reasonable to pollute the air or water in a
manner that would damage others, and who would not
consider legitimate any violation of another human being's
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basic rights. The confederalist society would be
fundamentally different from the present one premised as
it is on self-interest, profit, and an exchange mentality,
"I would like to think that a confederal ecological
society would be a sharing one, one based on the pleasure
that is felt in distributing among communities according
to their needs, not one in which 'cooperative'
capitalistic communities mire themselves in the quid pro
quo of exchange relationships ." 15
Few democratic theorists have attempted to present
such a complex vision of alternative social, economic, and
political structures supported by historical examples of
actual, although limited, alternative societal
arrangements. For this reason if for no other, Bookchin
deserves to be taken seriously by the radical ecology
movement. What must be more closely examined though are
the long-standing objections to these proposals. One
general tendency of the objections to social ecology is to
focus on a perceived impracticality of the suggestions.
This pragmatist approach itself generally relies on
reformist alternatives, including the retention of
representative or parliamentary systems while converting
to some form of economic "market socialism." The most
prominent example of the use of this strategy has been the
German Greens, who Bookchin repeatedly cites as an example
of the strategy's failure. The realist (Realo) faction
gued for pragmatic approaches to German politics whichar
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more
has resulted in exactly the consequences the
fundamentalist greens (fundis) warned against. Besides
the cooptation of green issues in parliament through a
tradeoffs, the individuals who come to hold the
seats themselves begin to make arguments for the retention
Of their own personal power
.
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There are other questions about strategies of
political transformation and democratic requirements that
will be taken up in the next section of this chapter, but
there remains the lingering question of the fit between
the arguments for libertarian municipalism and the more
strictly ecological basis of the philosophy of social
ecology. Besides the pragmatist objections, there have
been other criticisms, and these have been based on
Bookchin's assertions about the directionality of
evolution and the place of human subjectivity in nature as
a whole. The pragmatist arguments have to a great extent
been dismissed by Bookchin simply by claiming against them
that simply because something has not happened before does
not mean it could not happen in the future. Bookchin
dismisses the pragmatists by attacking their fatalism, but
he also relies on the historical evidence of an ongoing
tension between the centralizing tendencies of the nation-
state, on the one hand, and the decentralizing and
democratic tendencies that have broken out in some of the
most revolutionary periods of human history, on the other.
It is only in examining competing strategies in
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relationship to the ultimate goals of an ecological
society that a decision can be made as to which is the
most philosophically coherent, and which offers the best
long-term prospects for resolving the problems of the
domination of nature.
Bookchin has attempted to condense the discussion of
the fundamental principles and the political implications
of libertarian municipalism in several short essays
including "Theses on Libertarian Municipalism ." 17 He
presents libertarian municipalism as performing a
transforming role aimed at reaching the "anarchist ideals"
of decentralized, stateless, collectively managed, and
directly democratic communities. These confederated
municipalities or "communes" form the framework for a
liberated society "rooted in the nonhierarchical ethics of
a unity of diversity, self-formation and seif-management,
complementarity, and mutual aid ." 18 What is of special
interest in this and most of Bookchin
' s other formulations
of libertarian municipalism is the lack of direct
reference to the principles and assumptions of his
interpretation of ecological/evolutionary principles. If
the criticisms of his interpretation of evolution and
ecological principles are valid, what impact will that
have on the transformative role of libertarian
municipalism?
The strength of Bookchin' s argument for municipalism
and confederalism derives from its coherence relative to
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democratic theory, and on his unrelenting criticism of
capitalism, which he presents as a system which is
fundamentally antagonistic to the full development of
human beings. Bookchin views the municipality or city, or
Commune, as historically the location not only of economic
functions, but, more importantly, as the location of the
transformation of the quasi-tribal "folk" united by blood-
ties and custom into a "body politic" of citizens united
by ethical values based on reason
.
19 He continually
emphasizes the role of reason for any meaningful politics
which would replace the repressive system of
parliamentarism and representation found in the nation-
state, "Politics, as distinguished from the social and
statist, involves the re-embodiment of masses into richly
articulated assemblies, the formation of a body politic in
an arena of discourse, shared rationality, free
expression, and radically democratic modes of decision-
making. The process is interactive and self-formative ." 20
It would seem that the self-forming activity of politics
provides the link to his understanding of ecological
principles because it is tied to the fundamental
"evolution of subjectivity" that expresses the basic
striving" of nature. In this way the interactions at the
level of face-to-face democracy become an extension of the
development of natural subjectivity.
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Since the
complex forms
striving of nature is toward ever more
of subjectivity, society should develop
institutions which further this process. Bookchin is
arguing that the institutions which result in the fullest
development of human reason contribute positively to the
development of natural subjectivity. Developed human
subjectivity would allow the human species to become the
"voice of nature" as a whole.
The only means of determining the implications of
Bookchin' s "social" emphasis in the philosophy of social
ecology, for future policies in a free society, and for
determining in what language the "voice of nature" speaks,
is to examine the positions he and his followers have
actually taken in the struggle within the green movement.
There have been many issues on which to base this
examination, but there are several that suggest themselves
for closer viewing. The first are those concerning the
relationship between feminism and social ecology,
Particularly the relationship of women to democracy and
the "public sphere." The particular issues involved have
included; the role of an "ethic of care" in radical
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ecology ,so frequently offered as a basis for politics by
ecofemmists and other feminists); the politics of
abortion and "reproductive freedom"; and the role of
majority voting procedures relative to the process of
consensus-seeking. m addition to the more strictly
(eco) feminist issues, social ecology has also had to
engage with two central concerns of deep ecology;
wilderness preservation and over-population. Before
looking at these specific instances of application of the
principles of social ecology to policy problems and
decision-making, it is fitting to note what Bookchin sees
as the relationship of the intellectual to revolutionary
social movements, which may be an indication of the status
of his own comments within the relationship between theory
and practice.
Bookchin believes the libertarian body politic, and
by implication the libertarian ecological society, cannot
be achieved without a "well-organized, programmatically
coherent, highly-conscious libertarian movement." To meet
these requirements there must be a radical
intelligentsia " that participates in "its own vibrant
community life, " individuals who are not to be confused
with "the assortment of anemic intellectuals who staff the
academies and institutes of western society." The danger
of not developing an anarchist "stratum of thinkers" to
provide vital new ideas for the movement is the
stultification of thought into mere dogma. The
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justification for the development of an intelligentsia
within the movement, besides the development of ideas, is
provided by the history of revolutionary change, "For all
its shortcomings and failings, it was this radical
intelligentsia that provided the cutting edge of every
revolutionary project in history-and, in fact, literally
the very ideas of social change from which the
people drew their social insights ." 22
Women, Democracy and Social Ecology
Janet Biehl has written on ecofeminism from the
social ecology perspective and examined its relationship
to many of the issues already mentioned
.
23
she closely
follows Bookchin's arguments from Iha_,Ecoloav of
and elsewhere in developing positions that more directly
touch on the concerns of feminists and ecofeminists
.
Because of the consistency of her perspective with that of
Bookchin it is reasonable to believe her positions on
these issues reflect, or are consistent with, the
philosophy of social ecology presented elsewhere. There
are three issues which especially may illuminate the
strengths and weaknesses of the philosophy of social
ecology on policy issues; abortion, consensus decision-
making, and an "ethic of care."
The position of social ecology on abortion and
reproductive freedoms is intimately linked to the
questions of ecological subjectivity. Biehl unreservedly
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rejects one type of ecofeminist ethic, which P. j. MiUs
has labeled the "abstract pro-nature stance,"
„hi ch
obliges all human beings to oppose abortion ^ ^
that it rs destructive to "life. "24 Biehl argues ^
this (abstract pro-life, ethic is taken from an
interpretation of "first nature" that does not appreciate
the difference between the potentials of human and non-
human nature, specifically with regard to human
subjectivity. Biehl follows Bookchin in asserting that
human "second nature" has emerged from first nature as the
expression of the potential for the development of
subjectivity which occurs with the evolution of life. In
addition, the distinctiveness of human beings includes
their ability to create institutions that are "highly
mutable" and therefore able to provide for radical or
revolutionary changes in human behavior, unlike animals
which are merely "genetically programmed" to react to
their environment
.
25 Although humanity has not fulfilled
its potential in the history of civilization so far, the
direction of fulfillment can be "educed" dialectically by
examining the logic of development to determine "what
society should be ." 26 Present society is irrational and
an ^-'-
-eco -^- 09ical
,
but should become both rational and
ecological by fulfilling its potential, "This
potentiality, the 'should be,' becomes in the ethics of
social ecology, the overarching standard of actualization
and wholeness ." 27 Social ecology is "critical" because of
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this standard which establishes "the true actualization of
humanity's potential." The dialectical critique indicates
the direction society should take, which Biehl describes
in Hegelian terms as an "Aufhebung" of first and second
nature into "free nature," a "synthesis" of the two into
the "form of a harmonious, conscious, and ecological" free
nature where both "human and non-human nature come rnto
their own as a rational, self-conscious, and purposeful
unity ." 28 Human consciousness, as an expression or
product of natural evolution, is put into service of first
nature "by diminishing the impact of natural catastrophes,
and promoting the thrust of natural evolution toward
diversity and ending needless suffering, thereby fueling
the creativity of natural evolution through its technics,
science, and rationality." The relationship between human
and non-human nature would be (should be) governed by an
ethics of complementarity" in which "human needs and the
needs of nonhuman life-forms would be joined in a
complementary way so that there is a beneficial,
reciprocal relationship between the two." This
mutualistic free nature would result in a human society
both nonhierarchical and cooperative in which, "Society's
'completeness' would be based on the 'completeness' of
humans in their self-fulfillment as rational, free, and
self-conscious beings ." 29
It is on the basis of this fulfillment of human
subjectivity through the ability to make conscious ethical
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decisions that abortion and reproductive freedom would be
guaranteed, "In social ecology's ethics, in which first
nature is a realm of increasing sub : ectivity out of which
society emerges, women would have a right to reproductive
freedom that is grounded in the emergence of society and
natural evolution. As human beings uniquely capable of
making ethical choices that increase their freedom in the
context of an ecological whole, women’s reproductive
freedom would be a given. "30 what Biehl does not address
IS the impact of the potential of the fetus to be a full
functioning human being capable of its own ethical
decision-making. This possibility appears at first to
take the same form in the justification against abortion
as she offers lot it. It would seem that a resolution of
this seeming contradiction would depend on an argument
very much like that offered by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Roe v. Wade that a "compelling point of viability" is
reached by the fetus at which time the community's
interest in the "potential" for a meaningful life shifts,
so that the "right" to an abortion is not absolute, but
Biehl does not examine the issue that extensively. To
simply assert that, on the basis of the fulfillment of
human subjectivity, the right to "reproductive freedom,"
including abortion, is simply "given," is not to fully
consider the implications of social ecology's emphasis on
the development of the potential of subjectivity in al 1 of
nature. As part of nature the fetus too possesses some
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potential for subjectivitv K 1n +- +.activity, but it is important to ask
when that potential is actualized to the point of
requiring consideration of the meaningful rights, or
potential exercise of freedom, of the fetus along with
that of the mother. This criticism does not necessarily
imply the alternative is true, that the potential at
conception becomes the standard for decision, only that,
as stated by the social ecologists, there is no clear way
Of distinguishing between these choices.
The differences between women and men enter into
other policy choices also. Biehl rejects
"essentialist
"
interpretations of women's knowledge and social status
asserting that women and men share a common natural
history, with common abilities to create institutions,
invent written language, and engage in rational thought,
including self-conscious reflection. Women are not the
ontological difference" of men, rather they are
"differentiations" of humanity's potential to achieve a
"rich variegated wholeness." Biehl argues men and women
have the potential to choose "different social roles"
making possible a transcendence of the biologically
determined sexual differences of nonhuman beings. 3 -*- This
interchangeability of roles is possible without humans
losing their sexual distinctiveness" (whatever that
means)
. It is in the evolution of society beyond
tribalistic "blood-ties" with their traditions, rituals,
and incantations, and their contemporary reinvigoration as
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in
advocated by some ecofeminists, that social ecology
attempts to establish an "ecological ethics" grounded
"the potentiality of human beings to consciously and
rationally create a fee ecological society." 32
This analysis and interpretation of ecofeminism is
used by Biehl in also attacking many proposals by
ecofeminists and feminists alike who have attempted to
develop an "ethic of care." The context for this critique
is Biehl 's discussion of the relationship of women to the
democratic tradition. 33 Biehl defends the democratic
tradition and its origins in ancient Athens against
feminists who advocate an ethic of care against the "cold,
abstract, individualistic and rationalistic" democratic
ideal. Although Biehl interestingly narrates the origins
of democracy in Athens, her critique of the ecofeminist
and feminist arguments on the relationship of the ethic of
care to democracy tend to reduce those positions to
caricatures, resulting in an unsatisfying engagement with
the issues at stake.
The feminist position which supports the value of an
ethic of care is reduced in Biehl' s analysis to the mere
advocacy of a return to the private realm of "female
virtues" connected to the "moral" values of "mothering,
family life and feelings of caring (as well as sometimes
the intuitions of mysticism) ."34 Biehl 's interpretation
reduces the expanding discourse on caring to a simplistic
call for private life to replace the public sphere in
413
order therefore to replace the 'potentials of reason" with
emotron and irrationality,
"By emphasizing the private
realm and family over the polrtical realm, it potentially
enervates important aims of reinvigorating and
reconstructing local political institutions along
grassroots-democratic or libertarian municipalist
lines
.
The threat from the ethic of care, for Biehl
Dust as it has been for the dominant tradition of Western
Philosophy since at least the Greeks, is the threat of
irrationality invading the rationality of politics, of the
logic of the household overwhelming the logic of the
community. Biehl 's critique is valuable in so far as it
does address the limitations of those ecofeminist and
feminist positions that tend to essentialize female
subjectivity into a biologically determined knowledge
about the world, not taking into account the effects of
socialization, particularly identity formation in a
patriarchal world. To the extent this criticism is aimed
solely at those who attempt to attribute a "quasi-
biological
,
even innate 'moral' sensibility" to women
alone, Biehl is correct in asserting that it is a
fundamentally questionable basis for grounding political
theory and political movements. However, theories which
present essentialized female knowledge as the basis of an
ethic of care are not the most developed form of this
position, and do not contain the potentials for
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application to social and political theory that many find
so promising.
For instance, Biehl, at least by the location of
quotations, links Sara Ruddick with this position. 36
Precisely what is at issue for Ruddick is both the
relationship of abstract conceptualization and rationality
to the activity of "mothers," and how this "private
sphere" is dismissed as the sphere of emotions and
irrationality in the Western philosophical tradition,
when, in fact, "maternal thinking" involves a great deal
of very complex reasoning. Further, the problems
encountered in caring for the other, especially when the
care-giver is at a great advantage in power and reason,
may have implications for transformation of the public
sphere, in ways not reducible to a mere reflection of the
private. This ethic is developed in order to address the
disjunction in liberal moral theory between "the general
and the concrete other. ”37 RuddicJt attempts to address
the dismissive attitude which asserts mother's are merely
reacting naturally" in the process of caring for others.
She resists the characterization of the "private sphere"
as merely the sphere of emotions. Hers is an attempt to
connect the activities of mothers with the complex
theories of non-violence in the tradition of Gandhi and
King, where, "The aim of nonviolent battle is responsible
reconciliation in which crimes are named and
responsibility for them is assigned." Ruddick is
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explicitly looking for ways to theorize
not essentialize women into naturalistic
mothering that do
protectors of
latent subjectivity, but who actively engage in conscious
efforts to. reduce injustice and bring about peace,
certainly goals not only compatible with, but central to
any future ecological society. Ruddick explains the
connection between maternal thinking and nonviolence,
In examining maternal practice thrmmh +-n i
nonviolence, I look fo? evince oHn ongo ng*
° f
attempt to renounce and resist violent H
opponents and to keep a peace that is as
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my^ purpose
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llC understandin9s °f peacemaking.t , it is sufficient that there arp snmo
articulate!^ 1068 actua11* governed by the idLfff
She is not claiming all mothers follow a path of
nonviolence with those they care for, and neither is she
claiming that those who do follow this path actually
achieve their aims at all times, what she is claiming is
that maternal thinking cannot be as easily dismissed as
Biehl and others indicate with the labels "irrational,
emotional, and mystical."
It is especially curious that Biehl basically
dismisses the ethic of care discourse considering the
claims Bookchin made in The Ecology of Freedom such as,
For it is not only love that the mother ordinarily gives
her child, but a rationality of 'otherness' that stands
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sharply at odds with its modern arrogant counterpart ." 39
It would have been a much more progressive strategy to
address Bookchin's philosophical dependence, even
uncritical reliance, on an almost idealized notion of
mother-infant relationships, by addressing how this
position is challenged by the work of feminists on the
ethic of care and the development of identity, rather than
to simply repeat an attack on those early ecofeminist
theories that were admittedly also essentialist
idealizations calling for atavistic retribalizations
.
This progressive understanding of the ethic of care is
nowhere implied by Biehl, not even in the ritualistic
repetition at the end of her critique of a call for the
inclusion of the values of caring, nurturing and community
into the "democratic tradition" in order to "enrich" that
tradition. The crucial point to be made is the dualism
invoked when an ethic of care is placed in the category of
the irrational or emotional, and opposed to the "reason"
of the public sphere, "The feminist challenge is to seek
this infusion without rejecting the democratic tradition
in favor of an atavistic return to tribal society, to
fulfill the inclusive and egalitarian promise of poli
s
.
and to expand and reinvigorate the grassroots democratic
tradition--with values of caring and community as well as
with women's rationality ."^ 9 The incoherence of the
social ecology critique is made evident here as the "value
of caring" is set in opposition to "women's rationality."
417
Biehl s critique also aims at the work of Nancy
Hartsock, especially as Hartsock represents the
relationship between the democracy of Athens and the
psychology of the warrior-hero . 41 Hartsock makes limited
claims for her analysis of the relationship between Greek
masculine eros and democratic conduct,
-'The point I have
attempted to make is that prpp and power are deeply
connected, and when erpp takes negative, masculine forms
that point toward death rather than life, the community as
a whole will be structured by those dynamics . "42 instead
of a further examination, in the light of social ecology,
of the relationship between the erotic and the rational in
democratic decision-making, this connection is simply
dismissed as a wish to return to the "ethics of the blood-
feud, " the social circumstance which, Bookchin argued,
initially motivated the progressive escape toward new,
universal is tic, forms of justice. 43 Biehl dismisses
Hartsock
' s argument as both psychoanalytic reductionism,
and as incorrectly based on a masculine ideal taken from
Homer and Greek myths. The newly emerging democratic
code, argues Biehl, represented a qualitative social
evolutionary advance over the earlier warrior-hero
ideal. 44 Biehl' s criticism hits home to the extent
Hartsock s characterizations of masculine eros tends to be
typically one-sided. However, there is an important
insight contained in Hartsock' s conclusion that the actual
functioning of democracy retains a large element of
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domination, frequently remaining unconscious or
subterranean in more current forms. For example, evidence
of the continuing influence of domination in democratic
theory can be found in social ecology itself with regard
to its position on the procedure of consensus-seeking in
decision-making
.
Biehl rejects both the ethic of care and the feminist
charges that democracy is entangled with domination, on
the basis of the fundamentally Aristotelian and Hegelian
argument that the household is the sphere of the
particular while the truly political or public sphere is
representative of universal human concerns. in this
understanding any call for inclusion of "private sphere"
concerns risks regression to the norms of kinship
relations and its grounding of justice in the blood-feud.
Likewise the inclusion of considerations about the
influence of eros and its association with the body
threatens to undermine social ecology's understanding of
democracy as it is linked to the development of reason and
human subjectivity. This rationalist, modernist stance is
fundamentally at odds with even the early feminist insight
that the "personal is political." In addition, the
refusal to seriously include the influence of the erotic
and non-rational as an aspect of policy formation forces
social ecology into a contradictory position in regard to
democratic process. For example, Biehl attacks Judith
Plant's and others' promotion of consensus decision-making
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as potentially and historically a "tyranny of moral
persuasion. The central concern is about the
relationship of consensus to the preservation of diversity
in the context of addressing the needs of the community
and the goal of "unity."
Which decision-making process, consensus-seeking or
simple majority vote, more adequately resists tendencies
toward political domination? Social ecologists have
claimed that the consensus-seeking process has the effect
of stifling dissent and that the goals of "unity" and
"integration" are given "almost metaphysical, if not
quasi-religious
,
qualities that smother personal
independence and disagreement." But what is majority rule
but the most blatant expression of domination in
democratic form. Its underlying premise is that of
exchange, that each person is equal, so that the simple
quantitative summation of votes results in the most
efficient form of decision-making. This reliance on the
latent threat of force (the majority can "enforce" the
decision) also results in the necessity of strong
protection of individual "rights, " as Bookchin had
explicitly recognized in earlier works, because the
majority is by definition likely to exclude significant
numbers of others who do not agree on the policy decisions
that are made.
Biehl also attempts to dismiss consensus decision-
making by again linking it to the particularistic morality
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Of the kinship group, "Consensus is a form of decision-
making most appropriate for small, intimate groups— for
families and friends But we encounter problems in
larger, more heterogeneous, public spheres, where
conflicts of opinion are not only inevitable but even
desirable ." 46 in this view consensus is a process that
leads to homogenization and the demand for conformity
rather than to the productive results of "conflict" of
opinion. Claims that consensus-seeking attempts to
achieve "collective wisdom" are simply dismissed as a
mystification of what are actually tendencies toward
collective suppression of the individual, of installation
of fear into those who think critically, idiosyncratically
or originally. Consensus-seeking, in other words, is
merely a ploy for the demand to conform to conventional
thinking
.
47
Admittedly some claims by Plant and others for the
benefits of consensus are overstated, and the "fanatical"
forms of this procedure do have a certain totalitarian
aspect to them, but to reduce consensus-seeking to the
instances of its abuse is certainly no less problematic
than the reduction of the idea of democracy to the form of
destructive eroticism. As John Rensenbrink has explained
in his discussion of the development of the U.S. green
movement there are important differences between the
"pure" form of consensus and the generally practiced
procedure of "consensus-seeking" that does not allow the
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1VldUal °r smal1 group the PO«- to block an decisionsby the community. ^ what ls not examined fay ^ ^
-st of the discussion of this issue in the sociai ecology
tterature, are the advantages of consensus-seeking. By
rearing an attempt for consensus by the community, or,
if consensus cannot be attained, an extraordinary majority
to agree before action is taken or policy established, the
community dialogue gives increased power to the individual
relative to the group. it offers the possibility that the
individual or the minority can potentially persuade the
majority of the inadequacy in their reasoning, and in this
way the consensus-seeking serves the development of human
subjectivity in a very rationally designed procedure.
Simple majority rule, especially for major policy
decisions, not only tends to eliminate the possibility of
inclusion of minority views within the final decision, but
threatens the long-term legitimacy of the decision-making
process itself since small changes in a few opinions can
have enormous impacts on fundamental agreements about the
conduct of society. Additionally, as mentioned before,
when majority rule is used other measures must be taken to
protect individuals as well as community stability. This
is the reason for the necessity of a "bill of rights" or
"declaration of human rights" and for the necessity of
inclusion of extraordinary majority procedures even within
representative democracies, such as in constitutional
amendment and debating processes (for example, cloture in
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the U.S. senate,. These addltlonal ^ ^
undamental changes in rufes on laws, and the regurrements
f ratl°nal deb3te
' “« perceived as fegitimate by the
People involved. To assert the primacv ofP y majority rule,
and the centrality of "conflict" of opinions, is to
validate the charges that democracy is fundamentally a
t0°lin the arSSnal ° f the ideology of domination, when
the individual simply represents a "vote,
"
and
quantitative superiority supersedes extended dialogue, and
when conflict takes presence over common agreement,
democracy has degenerated from a process of honoring the
individual to the reduction of decision-making to the
force of the stronger. Per all the social ecology railing
against representative democracy, the endorsement of
magority voting procedures should be a priori suspect, if
only because representative systems are all too willing to
abide by "majority rule ." 49
Wild Ecology, Social Politics
Besides questionable adherence to some procedural
rules, social ecology's emphasis on the social roots of
the ecological crisis have brought it into sharp conflict
with deep ecology on the issues of overpopulation and
wilderness preservation. Although social ecology provides
some telling criticisms of the cruder arguments of some
deep ecology activists, it reveals its own one-sidedness
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in the justification of its position on these most
concrete political and ecological issues.
Bookchm has addressed the
"neo-Malthusian" arguments
of deep ecology about overpopulation by fundamentally
adopting a dismissive attitude toward these concerns. He
rightly criticizes the overly simplified restatement of
Mai thus
, that population grows geometrically while food
supplies grow arithmetically or additively, which deep
ecologists frequently rely on to imply or assert that
civilization is doomed. As Bookchin documents, the
history of this argument has consisted of repeated
assertions of the imminent destruction of society by
massive increase in numbers of people, usually the poor,
or those of ethnic and racial backgrounds other than those
of the wealthy and powerful, who are supposedly
reproducing at an unacceptable rate. Bookchin rightly
argues that population questions cannot be separated from
their link to issues of wealth distribution and
technological development, but in the form Bookchin
presents them these caveats are overstated. He is correct
m emphasizing the non-comparability of human to other
life-form populations with regard to population growth
issues, because of the human potential to consciously
change behavior
.
50 Bookchin also rightly links much of
the problem of hunger to the "grow-or-die" necessities of
a capitalist social and economic system which destroys
traditional sustainable economies, substituting cash crops
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needed for national deficit financing for native cropping
that insures the long-term health of the land and the
people However, Boohchin goes beyond criticism of the
inadequate deep ecologist arguments, which reduces the
population problem to just another example of an
ecosystem’s "carrying capacity," to a justification for
ignoring the potential of overpopulation on the grounds of
technological optimism. Although it is true that some
formerly fertile regions of agriculture were plundered for
profit by European colonialists, it does not follow, as is
implied by Bookchin, that with the withdrawal of
capitalism, these regions, such as the Horn of Africa, can
simply resume their previous productivity. The soil
itself may have been depleted to such an extent that it
will take generations of intensive care for anything like
previous fertility to return. The agricultural capacity
of despoiled regions is not simply present as unused
potential to be recovered with the change of social and
political institutions. Some regions, like the rain
forests, can never be recovered, not only because of the
losses of "fertility" but also because of the extinction
of species that were integral parts of the ecosystems as a
whole. Recovery of other areas cannot occur on a time
scale that would have a significant impact on the food
needs and other resource needs of the growing populations
in these areas.
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More disturbing though are yet other forms of
Bookchin's technological optimism which lead to additional
disagreements with the deep ecological perspective. He
cites statistics on the growth of food production in the
post-World War II period as if this trend could be
extrapolated indefinitely into the future. In fact, many
of the increases in food production in the period Bookchin
cites, mostly 1950 to the early 1980s, were one-time only
increases (such as those involving deforestation for
agribusiness purposes), or involved agricultural
techniques which have since been called into question,
such as the increased use of pesticides and herbicides as
well as genetic engineering. These technologies cause
environmental damage which results in the long-term
decline in the marginal increases in food production
relative to their costs
.
53 Bookchin is correct in
criticizing deep ecology's often simplistic analysis of
the problems of overpopulation, but he is also guilty of
oversimplification. Without massive changes in human
behavior in the next two generations the world population
will double, and there is no one who has the technological
optimism to assert that food production will be able to
keep up with that level of increase. 53
The other issue of central concern to deep ecologists
has been wilderness, and it is on this issue that the deep
ecologists have viewed themselves most distant from
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Bookchin social ecology. Dave Foreman and others ^
wilderness preservation concerns which they believed were
being increasingly subordinated to other more "social"
ecological problems. 54 other
"ecocentrists" have
increasingly acknowledged the interconnection of various
ecological problems, like acid rain and global warming,
with the need for wilderness preservation. Even Foreman
now explicitly makes the social connections, including
concerns for the disproportionate impact of ecological
degradation on women, and the influence of racism on
current environmental policy decisions by corporations and
government. 55 Robyn Eckersley has most closely examined
the various positions on wilderness preservation and calls
it and population growth the two issues that act as a
'litmus test" in distinguishing the ecocentric from the
human centered forms of radical ecology, "The ecocentric
stream is also noted for its greater readiness to advocate
the setting aside of large tracts of wilderness,
regardless of whether such preservation can be shown to be
useful in some way to humankind. The anthropocentric
stream, in contrast, tends to be more preoccupied with the
urban and agricultural human environment. Large scale
wilderness preservation tends not to be supported unless a
strong human-centered justification can be
demonstrated." 56 Beyond a simple
ecocentric/anthropocentric distinction radical ecologists
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are concerned with the impact an ecological ethics will
have on policy decisions. The primary assertion made in
social ecology rs that its interpretation of the process
of evolution, specifically the tendency for ever more
complex stages of subjectivity to evolve, provides an
"objective ethics" on which to make political judgments.
However, for ecocentrists like Eckersley the issues of
ecological ethics go beyond any human centered value
system,
Ecocentric environmentalism may be seen as a morewi e ranging and more ecologically informed variant
other' streamsTP”
bUUdS °n the lns^hts ° f thern r reams of environmentalism thus far
considered. Whereas the early preservationists were
scenerv a
^°
ncerned to Protect wilderness as sublimey nd were motivated mainly by aesthetic andspiritual considerations, ecocentric
environmentalists are also concerned to protectthreatened populations, species, habitats, and
ecosystems wherever situated and irrespective oftheir use value or importance to humans Inparticular, ecocentric environmentalists strongly
support the preservation of large tracts of
wilderness as the best means of enabling theflourishing of a diverse nonhuman world.
The question of the relation of subjectivity to
diversity then is at the heart of the differences between
deep ecology and social ecology, and it is with regard to
the issue of wilderness that the two approaches have
battled philosophically. Some of the difference has
resulted from Bookchin's idiosyncratic use of certain
terms, as well as from the wide differences in
philosophical backgrounds or orientations of those on
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- But be^d these interpretative
disagreements there do seem to be substantive differences
which could result in very different policy emphasis.
Bookchin claims the ecocentrists and deep ecologists
have misrepresented and misinterpreted his positions both
on wilderness, and on his understanding of the
advisability and degree of human intervention into natural
ecological processes. 58 it is true that- t? u iL at Eckersley and
others have exaggerated Bookchin' s claims on some
accounts, but it is also true that Bookchin's
"polemical
zeal gets a bit out of control" in his own responses and
characterization of the opposing view. 59 The statements
he makes concerning the capacity of humans to alter "first
nature" are frequently very subtly qualified so it is
usually not clear what the full implications of his
statements are, making it quite understandable that his
arguments about the limits to human intervention might be
misunderstood or misinterpreted by others. For example,
m denying that he advocates that humans "seize the helm
of evolution" Bookchin does use terminology that raises
disturbing implications,
Free nature represents the "synthesis" of first
and second nature in a gualitatively new
evolutionary dimension in which "first and
second nature are melded into a free, rational,
and ethical nature" that retains the
"specificity" of first and second nature
divested of all notions of "centricity" (read:
hierarchy) as such. The concept of free nature
is meant to express precisely the "ethics of
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complementarity,
"...in which human conceptualthought, placed not "over" first nature but inthe service of both natural and socialevo ut ion, forms a new .symbiotic relationshipbetween human communities and the nonhuman eco-communities in which they are located
.
60
Concerns arise over what
new evolution" and about what
relationship in the "ethic of
is meant by "qualitatively
counts as a symbiotic
complementarity." By
emphasizing rationality and subjectivity there is an
implication that human reason and human subjectivity
become the standard toward which the rest of nature should
be urged to evolve. This is the source of the charges
against social ecology that it is "humanistic" or
anthropocentric,
" since it is feared that making
subjectivity the center of the theory of evolution, and
human subjectivity representative of the most developed
form of natural subjectivity, will have the consequence of
putting human needs and interests ahead of those of other
species and the general evolutionary needs of ecosystems
and biosphere. The fear is that human interests will be
identified as those of the evolution of the planet as a
whole, instead of recognizing that human interests are
simply a partial interest in relationship to those of all
forms of life. The fear is that human subjectivity will
become the standard for the planet's biospheric evolution,
and that consequently, some species or regions will be
"ecologically" expendable because they fail to meet the
needs of a developing "rational" subjectivity.
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Part of the difficulty in interpreting Bookchin,
besides his infamous lack of citations, especially rn some
of bis most provocative accusations, is his tendency to
state his positions in terms that are highly ambiguous.
In responding to the charges of deep ecologists, he
claims, "What is more troubling to me, however, is how so
many of my deep ecology critics have themselves pushed the
absurd idea that I oppose the wilderness preservation
goals of Earth First!, or that I think Earth First!
activists are
’ eco-fascists
.
"'61 yet it is very easy to
get these impressions from his writings. Bookchin
frequently juxtaposes deep ecology views to those of
fascism, and his statements on wilderness seem
contradictory depending on where one looks. 62 in
explaining the inevitability of human intervention into
nature, Bookchin claims humanity is the "embodiment of
nature rendered self-conscious and self-reflexive,"
necessitating human "stewardship" of the planet, "In
advocating human stewardship of the earth, I do not
believe it has to consist of such accommodating measures
as James Lovelock’s establishment of ecological wilderness
zones or patching up environmental dislocations with half
measures." 63 It is unclear what the difference is between
Lovelock's wilderness zones and those of deep ecology, but
in another context Bookchin is all for wilderness (Or is
he?), "My own anarchist proclivities have fostered in my
thinking a love of spontaneity, be it in human behavior or
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in natural development. Natural evolution cannot be
denied its own spontaneity and fecundity. That is why one
Part of our struggle should always be to protect and
expand Wilderness areas. "64 But what status ^ ^
qualifier "cannot be denied" have? is the preservation of
wilderness simply capitulation to natural
"spontaneity" or
ntegral to a future ecological society? can the
call for spontaneity be reconciled with other statements
which resonate with the sounds of domination within reason
itself, "That humanity was expelled from the Garden of
Eden does not mean that we must turn an antagonistic face
toward nature; rather, it is a metaphor for a new,
eminently ecological function: the need to create more
fecund gardens than Eden itself
.. .Certain biotic and
cultural imperatives cannot be ignored if our concept of
an ecological society is to have integrative meaning and
self-conscious direction." 65 The question is, how do we
determine what those "biotic and cultural imperatives"
are? Bookchin attempts to distinguish between the
capacities and desirability of intervention in nature
under the presently unfavorable circumstances of either
state or corporate capitalism, and the more favorable
interventions possible in a future ecological society, "As
I have repeatedly emphasized, only in an ecological
society can we hope that human ingenuity and technology
will play an ecologically creative role it 66
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Again, what makes Bookchin so difficult to fully
understand is not an inherent difficulty of the concepts
he uses but the problematic ambiguity of the way they are
stated. The differences between deep ecology and social
ecology revolve around the theorized relation between
human subjectivity, or identity, and non-human forms of
these. in one of Bookchin's more extended discussions of
wilderness he traces the idea back through its American
proponents to Rousseau and the ambiguities of his
understanding of nature. In this discussion, Bookchin
again emphasizes the misanthropic consequences of a
"retreat" into remote locations, by contrasting the
ecologists' tendency to shun human contact, with the
aacial function of tribal peoples' "vision quests." Deep
ecologists are portrayed as captives of a "crude
biologism,
" misanthropes who set the human in stark
opposition to the natural. Although Bookchin emphasizes,
or over-emphasizes, the misanthropic dangers of wilderness
advocacy, he occasionally, briefly, will cite what are
apparently acceptable, to social ecology, attributes of
wilderness experience, "Wilderness, or what is left of it
today, can give one a sense of freedom, a heightened sense
of nature's fecundity, a love of nonhuman life-forms, and
a richer aesthetic outlook and appreciation of the natural
order." But even this ambiguous acknowledgment does not
address the concerns of the deep ecologists since Bookchin
seems to view wilderness only in terms of its benefits to
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human beings and only indirectly, through human
intervention, considers the needs of the life-forms
themselves wrthrn the wilderness. Bookchin' s insistence
that wilderness is a human designation and simply further
evidence of human intervention is a trivial point since rt
us obvious that the designation
"wilderness" is a socral
construction. What is of real concern is the place of
human beings relative to the rest of earthly l ife
. Does
human subjectivity represent the fullest development of
natural evolutionary tendencies, or is it merely one form
of the evolution of life which cannot be reduced to
stages, grades, or phases? What happens to the nature
that is non-identical to subjectivity-which must exist
for the concept of subjectivity to have any meaning— if „e
do not accept Bookchin’s quasi-Hegelian solution which
reduces all of existence to an expression of subjectivity?
Perhaps this is the central question to pose to social
ecology
.
A clue to the correct interpretation of the
fundamental ambiguities in the philosophy of social
ecology is an analogy that Bookchin repeatedly uses,
borrowed from Hegel, left intact and defended against
criticism. The analogy is that of the acorn and the oak
tree, the acorn representing latent potentiality that is
actualized in the development of the fully grown oak.
Bookchin has used the analogy in several works and always
to make the same basic point, but in close examination it
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becomes clear that the analogy, as others have Indicated,
too pointedly confirms the correct interpretation of
social ecology. 68 In Bookchin , s description pf^ , s
analogy the emphasis is on the development of potential,
and the directionality of development toward wholeness or
fullness, "An acorn, for example, may become food for a
squirrel or wither on a concrete sidewalk, rather than
'develop' into what it is potentially constituted to
become notably, an oak trpp "69 R , , .y K ee
‘ Bookchm rejects Hegel's
emphasis on the antagonistic character of this process,
the antagonism that generates the tension necessary to
impel the process forward in time. Tellingly, Bookchin
also extends the analogy to the birth process, "A thing or
phenomenon in dialectical causality remains unsettled,
unstable, in tension--much as a fetus ripening toward
birth strains to be born because of the way it is
constituted—until it develops itself into what it 'should
be' in all its wholeness or fullness." Bookchin makes the
acorn-birth connection elsewhere also, "What is potential
m an acorn that yields an oak tree or in a human embryo
that yields a mature, creative adult is equivalent to what
is potential in nature that yields society and what is
potential in society that yields freedom, selfhood and
consciousness
. it is this development toward what it
"should be" that provides the "objective grounding" for
the ethics of social ecology. This is why Bookchin must
so vehemently defend the analogy against alternative
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interpretations of potentiality and possrbility. The
Problematic nature of that ethics extends beyond the
obvious difficulty of defending the abortion and
reproductive freedom stance developed by Biehl. Robyn
Eckersley has pointedly questioned the analogy,
specifically its extension from the plant world to both
the ontogenetic and phylogenetic developments of human
beings. Concerning the individual human being and its
ontogenetic development,
between In'L'n^nd'a h™a°9y £ince the Parities
confined to the growth pattern^rthe^phys^cai
31^
about
1
what 'humans 'may
S
properly ^ue
C
°^Ciousne- »r
^ ^t^hiract^irFv^- --
psychologically, intellectu^'lly^ethicany^^11
At the societal or phylogenetic level, the level of
species development, the limits of the analogy of the
acorn are the limits of its similarity to society and the
human species as a whole. Eckersley asks the appropriate
questions of social ecology, "How can it be said that
there exists some objective standard of fulfillment latent
Within human society itself, urging it toward mind and
truth? Why are not ail of the myriad potential paths of
human development also objective and desirable ones in
Bookchin's sense? What is it about Bookchin's
evolutionary path of mutuality, diversity, and 'advancing
subjectivity' that makes it the good and true path...?" 7 ^
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In response to this criticism Bookchin attempts to
explain the limits and advantages of the analogy, with
varying degrees of success. The basic disagreement is
about the appropriate conceptualization of the "myriad
potential paths" of development. As Bookchin indicates,
That an acorn was constituted over a Iona
maple dSes^ot’ mnn%Sat
b
n°aLays°becomls ToT *tree. It may become food for a scmirroi ? K
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But this understanding of directionality sacrifices the
advances which have been made in our understanding of the
evolution of nature to an abstract isolation of natural
beings, to a bourgeois notion of the development of the
individual (being)
. The analogy of the oak developing
from potential in the acorn does not allow for its non-
identity with the fully developed oak, a non-identity that
also inheres in the acorn. The non-identity of its
development toward the oak is the identity of its
development with the ecosystem as a whole, of which it is
a part, the ecosystem which includes the squirrel. One
aspect of the acorn's potentiality, as constituted through
natural evolution, is as food for the other life-forms
that interact with the oaks, which are merely one among
many species in the complex interaction of the ecosystem.
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acorn relates to
It is not beside the point to ask how the
the other "myriad pathways of evolutron" when the oak rs
considered in relation to the rest of the ecocommunity,
rather than in analytic isolation as is so important for
the functioning of idealist dialectics. The limits of the
analogy are the limits of its idealist origins, with
consequences that go beyond the trivial and threaten to
undermine the "objective ethics" of social ecology.
The analogy and what it represents structure the
relationship of the potentiality and directionality of the
development of human subjectivity. it is this
directionality of subjectivity which social ecology relies
on to justify intervention into nonhuman nature. Bookchin
claims he rejects Hegel's dialectic because of its attempt
to embody the "idealistic universal Geist or Spirit," just
as he rejects Marxist dialectic because of its "tilt
toward a wooden mechanism ." 74 Instead he offers
dialectical naturalism as an alternative understanding of
natural development that does not revert to a "cosmic
subject" or to "mechanical forces." But this does not
answer ecological questions about directionality of
development and about the relationship of human
subjectivity to the non-identical. Bookchin' s attempt at
clarification is inadequate,
Dialectical naturalism retains the entelechial
notions of dialectical philosophy, but modifies
Hegel ' s concept of wholeness such that development
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Even though not terminating in an Absolute,
subjectivity remains the standard of social ecology's
ethics, and the inadequacy of Bookchin's analogy is
inseparable from the idea of wholeness on which the ethic
of complementarity depends, an idea of wholeness that is
based in the idealist tendency of social ecology that
views the oak as complete and closed. Current
understandings of ecology will not allow for this
understanding of closure in the individual being, nor does
it allow for a sense of completeness in the processes of
evolution. To substitute the idea of "approximation to
wholeness" for full closure, or complete wholeness, is
still to operate within the framework of idealism, to the
detriment of the non-identical in nature. To reduce the
process of evolution simply to an expression of the
development of subjectivity is to reduce nature to a
reflection of an essentialized notion of human beings.
Further, the lack of differentiation within the idea of
subjectivity inadequately takes into consideration the
non-identical nature of subjectivity itself, a problem
which has become of enormous concern for feminism. The
possibilities of evolution that cannot be collapsed into
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exPresslons of subjectlvlty are better expressed
a
eory of non-identity than through dialectical
naturalism. A theory of non-identity also opens more
fruitful or
..fecund., possibilities for the development of
liberatory forms of subjectivity than does a philosophy
that expands subjectivity into universal explanation
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tic gratification,
s association of theidea of happine ss with its idealist understanding
which places happiness within an ascetic orintel lectuali zed form of continual contemplation,
thus reinforcing the mind-body split and reenacting,
as a goal of human development, the subject's
complete separation from physical nature. This is
not the conception of happiness the critical
theorists subscribed to, and they explicitly rejectedthe idealist understanding. The dangers from an
emphasis on pleasure alone are those of crude
materialism and hedonism, with their tendency to
suppress the mediating role of subjectivity.
Happiness seems to provide richer opportunities for
development, philosophically and ecologically, than
does pleasure, as a goal of the ecological society.
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SECTION III.
CRITIQUE OF ECOFEMINISM
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CHAPTER 9
ECOFEMINISM AND METHODOLOGY
Ecofeminism is problematically related to both the
ecology movement and to feminist theory. Attempts at a
categorization or typology of positions relating ecology,
feminism and ecofeminism will yield various results
depending on whose definition of these terms is used. For
example, the self-identification of "ecofeminists"
stoncally began after the early development of both the
ecology and feminist or women’s movements. However, with
continuing attempts to develop categories to clarify
various conceptual and political relationships the
question has been raised as to whether ecofeminism should
more properly be viewed as an attempt to "synthesize"
ecological and feminist insights, or whether it is best
understood as a subfield or form of either radical ecology
or feminist theory. This becomes a crucial guestion
because of the different analytical categories used by the
different theoretical frameworks. Both deep ecology and
social ecology have had to address the implications of
ecofeminist positions for their respective self-
understandings, and, more recently, ecofeminists have come
under criticism for not fully confronting feminism's own
internal divisions and the resulting implications intra-
feminist tensions have for a more specifically
ecofeminist theory and practice. These concerns will be
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addressed here by first examining some of the strands of
ecofeminism which have developed out of what have been
called "radical" and "cultural" feminism
.
1 Also, a
critical examination of current theory and practice of
self-identified ecofeminists will help reveal the problems
with many of these positions, and indicate the importance
of pursuing more fully the links between feminism and the
ecology movement. Second, a closer examination of the
"subject" of ecofeminism is only possible by venturing
into the increasingly complex conversation within feminism
itself concerning the entertwined issues of methodology,
subjectivity, and political possibility. Finally, more
specific issues which have concerned ecofeminists, such as
animal rights and an "ethic of care," raise political
questions about which any adequate theory of radical
ecology must provide some guidance. The possibilities for
societal transformation of the liberal welfare-state, or
late capitalism, " through participatory democracy must be
more directly related to ecofeminist politics than it has
been so far if radical ecology is to avoid the charges of
impracticality and idealist utopianism.
Ecofeminist Emergence
The most problematic version of ecofeminism can be
traced to its emergence from "radical feminism, " that
understanding of the women's movement which accepts the
"essentialist " identification of women with nature, best
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exemplified in women's mothering and nurturing roles, but
which then attempts to reverse the androcentric evaluation
of those qualities. This position accepts the claim that
women are "naturally" better nurturers than men and that
men are naturally driven to be aggressive and therefore
solely responsible for the current culture of domination.
In its most essentialist form this ecofeminism accepts the
claim that the ecology crisis can only be adequately
addressed by the ascendancy of women's values to the
status of social and political norms. To accomplish this
these ecofeminists support an attempt to recapture what is
believed to be the original form of human society,
matriarchy, which supposedly emphasized the values of
relationship, nurturance, and an ethic of care and
mothering. Included in most versions of this matriarchal
myth is the worship of an "original Mother Goddess." This
version of ecofeminism is frequently associated with "New
Age philosophies that emphasize mysticism, recovery of
ritual, female shamanism, and various "occult" practices.
This ecofeminism is obviously open to philosophical attack
because of its irrationalism, essentialism, and regressive
political implications.
This radical, essentialist ecofeminism has also been
linked most closely with deep ecology and with various
interpretations of the "spiritual" or "sacred" aspects of
the ecology movement . 2 Any attempt to reduce the
different self-understandings of these ecofeminis ( t/m) s
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necessarily will collapse what is non-identical about them
mto a category of identity, but to develop the concept of
ecofeminism so it can be comprehended in relation to
radical ecology and any future ecological consciousness it
is necessary to indicate some common tendencies and their
accompanying limitations and potentials. in its most
mystical, irrational, and spiritual form this ecofeminism
results in fundamentally reactionary political
implications. For example, Gloria Feman Orenstein has
attempted to develop an "Ecofeminism Ethic of Shamanism
and the Sacred" which however lacks sufficient reflection
about its political consequences
.
3 Orenstein recounts her
experiences as she was introduced to shamanism in the
world of the Sami of northern Norway. Orenstein goes into
some detail about the relationship of her teacher, a
female Shaman with a long family heritage of Shamanism,
and the teacher's relationship to her own culture's
stories and legends about the behavior and importance of
spirits. The details of Orenstein' s training, including
spiritual and shamanistic experiences, are not of central
importance here. The "truth" or "objectivity" of the
experiences are not being questioned, however, the
translation of those experiences into a basis for
political action, and the specifics of the political
process used and its relationship to authority, are
problematic. The relationships established by the student
of shamanism with "ancestors," local culture and
452
traditions, and especially with the land, through
observdncGs of cvr 1 po ,y es of nature (equinox and solstice, the
m°°n ^ the tidSS) and b* -d drinking from the
avarlable native sources of nourishment are unquestionably
lmP°rtant ^ SStablish
-g a truly ecological relationship
with that specific space and place of nature. However,
when the principles of shamanism are translated into
politics the consequences are much less benign than
Orenstein implies. Orenstein criticizes the usual
presentation of shamanism in the U.S. and its tendency to
"universalize and essentialize" the various teachings.
She claims this results in an ignorance of the "practical
and political use to which shamanic powers can also be
put ." 4 she then gives an example in which women from
Samiland practiced civil disobedience through a sit-in
against the building of a hydroelectric power plant. The
shaman leader of the women used "visions" to guide the
action, and when the new Prime Minister, Gro Bruntland,
did not speak with the women as promised, the shaman asked
the women to tell her what they had been dreaming. The
various dreams were interpreted by the shaman and these
interpretations served as the basis for further actions
which included a request for an audience with the Pope,
and a visit to the United Nations in New York. The dreams
served in this shamanistic world as legitimate bases for
guiding political action. Although not resulting from the
same analytical framework, critical theorists would have
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as part of the
no difficulty in accepting dreams
repertoire of information available for interpretation of
any political situation, especially considering the early
critical theorists' heavy reliance on psychoanalytics
.
5
What is problematic is Orenstein's further
observation that the shaman, "Took the visions of the
women to be as relevant as those of a Shaman, she did noi
establish a hierarchy among women as visionaries in
action Here is ecofeminism in action ." 6 what
Orenstein does not critically address is the fact that it
was the shaman who was doing the interpreting and who then
provided the recommendations for further political action.
The collapse of the two leadership roles, the "spiritual"
and "political," into a single site of power results in a
form of political authority not based in any democratic
participation, but constitutes authority as a result of a
combination of heredity, spiritual privilege, and a
particular or individual perspective. To assert that
there is no hierarchy because all the participants' dreams
were equally available for interpretation, fails to
address the fact of hierarchy resulting from
interpretation by a single "spiritual" authority. This is
a blatant example of a regression to an historical period
where political authority was derivative from spiritual
authority, resulting in a pre-modern rather than a post-
modern political agency. In fact, it is a collapse of the
political back into the spiritual or religious, and is
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fundamentally hierarchical and anti-democratic, reducing
the political consciousness of the individual subject and
making her subservient to a higher interpretive authority.
This is a reenactment of a "masculine" assertion of power
m the guise of feminine sensitivity and spirituality.
Many analyses of ecofeminism center on the
distinction between two fundamental tendencies or
historical origins of the movement and its theory; the
spiritual on the one hand, and the rational or conceptual
on the other. The spiritual strand, as exemplified by
Orenstein, has been most fully developed by those such as
Starhawk and Charlene Spretnak who claim ecofeminism
develops out of the spirituality found in what has been
most commonly called "cultural feminism." This
spiritually guided cultural feminism emphasizes the
differences in the experiences of women and men and the
concomitant potentials for developing values which differ
from those of the male dominated and dominant culture of
the present. The defenders of spiritual ecofeminism trace
the problems of domination of women and nature to the
ascendancy of patriarchy. This story of patriarchal
ascension requires acceptance of a questionable
anthropological assertion that in some period before the
patriarchal history of (male) civilization there was an
extended period of matriarchy
.
7 During this period not
only was society supposedly arranged on the principles of
the central figure of the mother, but the
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spiritual/religious beliefs of these people revolved
around Goddess worship. The political implication drawn
from these assumptions and beliefs is that the overthrow
or transformation of the existing relatrons of domination
must be generated through a reemergence of the values of
women and of the "feminine," which is then theorized in
various ways. The specifics of the different
ecofeminists positions of course vary significantly, but
much of their politics seems to be very compatible if not
identical. it is the political implications of the
assumptions of "spiritual ecofeminism" which have come
under sustained attack. Janet Biehl, one of the most
persistent critics, along with Bookchin and other social
ecologists have condemned the spiritual ecofeminists as
opening the door to a politics of mysticism with
reactionary tendencies nearly indistinguishable from
fascism
.
8 To this extent the social ecology critique of
spiritual ecofeminism overlaps and reinforces its
critiques of deep ecology and the influence of "New Age"
occultism on the ecology movement and society generally.
The criticisms of spiritual ecofeminism are well
founded although there is a tendency to fail to
acknowledge the real importance of this activity as part
of women’s lives. Spiritual ecofeminism often gives women
a coherence and validation to their experiences otherwise
overwhelmingly lacking in their everyday life. The great
danger though is the extent to which these beliefs have
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the effect of reinforcing patriarchal mythoiogies and
acceptance of a kind of fundamental ontological difference
between women and men which then has a direct bearing on
the structure of society and the potentials of women to
act politically. if women are viewed as having a unique
access to certain values such as "caring" and "empathy"
simply as a result of their physiology, then this is the
most troubling of essentialisms because the implication is
that there are unchangeable or fated roles for each sex to
Play in society. In this form of essentialist ecofeminism
the call for elevation of women's values does little to
challenge the existing practices of men, and reinforces
the division of the sexes into "spheres," the very problem
that generated the feminist movement in the first place.
This implicitly undermines claims contained in the early
feminist insight that the "personal is political." it
must be generally acknowledged then that the criticisms
against spiritual ecofeminism have a large element of
truth in them, especially as they highlight the potential
for undemocratic politics based on a hierarchy of
spirituality. At its worst spiritual ecofeminism invites
a politics of cultism whose basis of authority is the
charismatic personality, a conseguence not unforeseen by
theorists of modern society and politics.^
However, and only after full recognition of the
reactionary implications of any politics based in
spiritual authority, other elements of spiritual
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ecofeminism provide important alternative understandings
and potentials for movements of political resistance which
wish to abolish domination as a social organizing
principle. The authentic insights of spiritual
ecofeminism, such as the recognition of the importance of
myth in the formation of a social order, and the reality
of the difference in perception between most women and
most men, touch upon themes of the early critical
theorists and call for further development. This has been
attempted by some who identify themselves with spiritual
ecofeminism, but also, in significantly different ways, by
others who identify themselves as deconstructionists,
post-structuralists, post-modernists, or simply feminists
who wish to avoid the implications of the claims deriving
from essentialist assumptions and mystical authority.
Rational Ecofeminism
The term "rational ecofeminism" is used by Stephanie
Lahar to distinguish other ecofeminist theorists' projects
from those of the spiritual ecofeminists . ^ ^ Rationalist
ecofeminists and other feminist theorists provide
theoretical resources which may help address gaps in the
philosophies of radical ecology and in the work of the
critical theorists. Ynestra King was one of the first
individuals to attempt to pull together aspects of
critical theory, radical ecology and feminism into an
"ecofeminism. "
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In her early ecofeminist articles King attempted to
connect the feminist movement with the ecology movement on
a basis that was theoretically more intimately and
coherently structured than simply as an "alliance of
convenience." Observing that all human beings are natural
beings and that western culture is founded on the
"repudiation and domination of nature" she pointed out
that the ecology movement was not necessarily feminist and
that ecologists should understand that any attempt to
address the crisis of nonhuman nature would only succeed
if it connected the domination of nature with the
domination of women. She asserted that a primary reason
for "woman's" oppression is the association of woman with
nature and that the hatred of both could be shown to be
intimately connected and mutually reinforcing. King
attempted to indicate why feminism and radical ecology
need each other and how they can be brought together in a
theory of ecological feminism or ecofeminism.
King borrows heavily from Bookchin's social ecology
with its understandings of domination and hierarchy,
however, she contends that social ecology is incomplete
without a fuller inclusion of the issues addressed by
feminism
. She asserts that the concerns of ecofeminism
center around Western industrial civilization's opposition
to nature and the "dialectical" interaction by which it
reinforces the subjugation of women. She argues
ecofeminism should reject hierarchy because no hierarchy
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exists in nature and instead there should be an attempt to
reestablish healthy, balanced ecosystems" which will
provide "ecological diversity" instead of the biological
simplification processes which typify consumer market
society. This re-establishment of balanced ecosystems
should be by means of, and result in, a decentralization
of political power; a politics that is "founded on common
interests yet celebrates diversity." For the human
species to survive it must achieve a new understanding of
the relationship between humans and nature, and of the
nature of the human body, by rejecting the "nature-culture
dualism" which now dominates conceptualization. King
states the unifying moment of the ecology and feminist
movements when she claims, "The ecology movement, in
theory and practice, attempts to speak for nature--the
other that has no voice and is not conceived
subjectively in our civilization. Feminism represents the
refusal of the original 'other' in patriarchal human
society to remain silent or to be the 'other' any
longer
.
"-*-2
King gives an account of the development of "Western
industrial civilization" that is partly based on Carolyn
Merchant's work. In King's interpretation, a "dualistic
Christianity" overthrew an earlier belief system that
included goddess religions, paganism and animism. With
the subsequent "disenchantment" of nature the conditions
were present for "unchecked scientific exploration and
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technological exploitation." Increasingly, nature became
"other" to be dominated, objectified and subordinated.
Women also had previously been objectified and
subordinated in patriarchal society, as well as having
been identified with nature, thus both women and nature
were "original others." King relies on Simone de
Beauvoir ? s work as an explanation of the process of
linking women and nature and to show how the work of
civilization itself can be shown to represent a movement
away from nature, Woman, and Mother
.
13 According to
Beauvoir's account, the oppression of nature and woman is
an attempt by males to forget their mortality—all that is
limiting, bodily, earthy. One response to this nature-
culture dualism is for feminists to struggle for equality
with men, to also make civilization. King rightly
indicates the limits of this type of feminism whether in
its liberal or socialist forms. This type of feminism
does not question the nature-culture dualism, retaining
the fundamental opposition of the human and the natural as
it attempts to severe the connection between women and
nature. This acceptance of the masculine nature-culture
dualism results in a feminism that also tends to accept
masculine identified goals as the only legitimate goals of
culture. This has now been recognized by feminism as a
fundamentally flawed conception of women's liberation, and
is often referred to as "equality feminism." A mirror
opposite feminism, the simple inversion of equality
461
feminism, also fails to challenge nature-culture feminism.
This feminism simply seeks to reinforce women's
identification with nature in an attempt to revalue that
identification and retain its opposition to the male
values of patriarchal rationality. This corresponds to
those radical and cultural feminisms, including the
spiritual feminisms emphasized by many self-identified
ecofeminists, who view males and females as essentially
different in their consciousness as a result of their
physical-biological differences. This is the most common
form of the feminist version of biological essentialism.
King claims this position also does not question the
nature-culture dualism and fails to recognize that
"women's ecological sensitivity and life orientation" is a
socialized perspective which could be eliminated through
alternative socialization, including the restructuring of
women's "day-to-day lives ." 14 Thus, King would choose a
direction for ecofeminism which would recognize nature-
culture dualism as a cultural construction, allowing for
the conscious adoption of some aspects of the woman-nature
connection but without accepting masculine definitions of
the purposes and values of civilization. Therefore,
embracing aspects of the woman-nature connection is seen
as an initial step which might eventually provide the
grounds for envisioning and ultimately creating a free,
ecological society.
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King believes ecofeminism should include a self-
consciously ecological perspective which would inform
feminist analysis the way class and race have increasingly
come to inform feminism. 15 Likewise, she claims ecology
must become more self-conscious of feminist perspectives
m its analyses. Of course this raises the question of
which feminist analyses provide the appropriate
perspectives for radical ecology and vice versa. The
intersection of feminism, ecological science, and radical
ecology is a much more complex and ambiguous space than
King indicates. For example, her claims about the
findings of ecological science as well as her claims about
"the ecology movement" are largely filtered through social
ecology. One such claim is that ecological science
indicates there is no inherent hierarchy in nature but
that instead it is hierarchy in human society which is
projected onto nature. She also claims that a "basic
principle of ecological science" is "unity in diversity,"
and that diversity in nature is both necessary and
enriching. These claims are the same as those of social
ecology, as is King's use of the term "harmony" to
describe the most desirable relationship between humans
and nature, and among humans.
It is questionable whether the term harmony or its
correlate "balance" are actually appropriate terms for the
findings of ecological science. It should be recognized
that it is necessary to allow some "slippage" between the
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terminology and categories of ecological science and their
translation rnto the language of social and political
theory, but in this case there are certain philosophic
resonances that should inspire caution rather than
unreflective adoption. Even if the terms are used in
ecological studies it must also be recognized that these
sciences are subject to the same problematics of masculine
conceptualization as all other sciences. ^ The terms
"harmony" and "balance" have the unmistakable ring of
politics most closely associated with the tradition of
idealism, especially its Platonic version. if women are
to self-consciously choose to be identified with nature it
should be with the fullest possible knowledge of the
ambiguity of these concepts, the actuality of the
ecological relations to which they refer, and with some
awareness of their implication in the "logic of identity"
and identification. These observations imply there are
several considerations which must be further explored
before the claims of feminism and radical ecology can be
said to intersect, and even more importantly, whether they
can continue on the road of resistance together or whether
there will remain theoretical and political conflicts
which cannot be resolved with current resources. Some of
these considerations will include: an appropriate
understanding of the limits of the concepts and emphases
of ecological science; the relation of the belief in
scientific objectivity to "women's knowledge," especially
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as it has been theorized in "standpoint theory"; and the
relationship of alternative forms of knowledge to science
(which may also challenge Habermas- critrgne of Adorno).
First, a brief comment on the terms used by those who
identify with the philosophy of social ecology and who
tend to use these terms in Bookchin's idiosyncratic
manner. Such terms as harmony, balance, diversity, and
mutuality lack the specificity needed to describe the
processes found in "ecosystems" or ecological complexes,
and moreover have been severely restricted in Bookchin's
writings by setting them in opposition to other terms like
conflict, competition, parasitism and so on. This is not
to dismiss the importance of these terms in offering an
alternative to the social Darwinist and social biologistic
interpretations of natural processes that have dominated
political ideology and rhetoric for at least the last
century or two, but it is to call attention to the
frequently one-sidedness of these terms as they have
entered into the discussions of radical ecology. An
example of an alternative terminology which is more
ecologically accurate and provides for a perhaps less
philosophically loaded potential can be found in William
Ophuls' and A. Stephen Boyan's Ecology and the Pol i tics of
Scarcity Revisited . Ophuls' original publication in the
late 1970s needed to be updated to indicate the continuing
and worsening ecological conditions of the earth, but also
to correct some of the serious misreadings of his early
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attempt to relate the ecological crisis to political
Philosophy. The revised version includes additional
confirmation of the ecological trends toward crisis, but
it also provides clarification of the connections between
politics and ecology, and suggests some helpful categories
of analysis borrowed from the rapidly expanding field of
ecological science
.
17 One particular concept seems
especially important in the present context, that of the
"climax” condition of ecosystems. As the authors explain,
the climax ecosystem is a result of the process of natural
succession, which is a consequence of the biosphere's
status as a "dynamic and open steady-state system." There
is now a standard narrative of ecological succession.
Over long periods of time essentially bare rock becomes
covered with lichens and mosses, then other microorganisms
and insects gradually break down the rock into minerals
and other compounds which become available for larger
plants, even trees, and eventually animals, which then
inhabit the once "barren" landscape. Gradually, early
life-forms are replaced by others with habits more suited
to the new conditions. The transformations of habitat is
called ecological succession. As the "orderly succession"
takes place, simpler ecosystems tend to be replaced by
those which are increasingly complex, and in the "final"
stage there is a temporary though frequently long-lasting
condition called the climax ecosystem. Although this
climax condition may last for many thousands of years it
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Will be eventually disturbed by stresses such as fire,
earthquake, climate shifts, or-and of increasing
importance— human beings. Humans have become expert at
breaking climax communities and reaping the benefits of
the stored energy potentials these communities represent.
Humans have also become expert at harnessing the life-
forms of the early succession processes, the pioneer
species which rapidly convert sunlight through
photosynthesis into more humanly usable forms. It is the
consequences of these activities that are so devastating
for the biosphere, "The dilemma is clear. Humans must
have productive ecosystems in order to survive, but high
productivity requires simple and even dangerously fragile
ecosystems. Further, since the biosphere is highly
integrated, other ecosystems are also simplified, natural
cycles disrupted, materials lost, and the whole system of
the biosphere rendered less stable ." 18 The general trend
of this human activity, the "maximization of productivity
as narrowly defined by economists, " leads to the
inevitable conclusion that the ecosystem as a whole will
collapse. Of course, maximization of productivity is the
corollary of capitalism’s maximization of profit, but
productivity maximization is also the intent of those
socialist philosophies that attempt to simply—more
efficiently, rationally, or "equitably"— do what
capitalism does. Humans break or simplify climax
ecosystems and thereby endanger their own survival. The
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authors go on to explain that there is no single climax
condition, but a variety of climax states whose specific
characteristics are dependent on variations of
microclimate, distribution of species, soil composition,
and so forth. Some areas never reach full climax,
sometimes because of natural conditions like frequent
hurricanes, but especially because of human intervention.
There are even areas which have been in a state of
"anthropogenic subclimax" for thousands of years, probably
including the North American great plains and areas of
Australia where indigenous peoples have used fire to alter
succession patterns thereby inducing more humanly
beneficial plants and animals. Anthropogenic subclimax
can exist m even more intensely productive forms, such as
in Asia, "Paddy land, which has been cultivated for
millennia, is another human-made subclimax, one that
mimics a natural marsh ." 19 There are other examples of
long-term or sustainable anthropogenic subclimaxes but
they are now the exception. In most cases humans have
simply reduced local ecosystems to a level below human
sus tainabli ty and moved on, frequently leaving behind
conditions of desertification that cannot return to
conditions similar to the earlier climax conditions for
tens of thousands of years. These events are not limited
to "Western industrial society" but were also typical of
many ancient peoples, including the Greeks who have been
so often held up by philosophers of various stripes,
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including some ecofeminists, as providing insight into how
to live "harmoniously" with nature. 2° The point of this
example is to show that the implications of the findings
of ecological science, even when it is not limited by
reductionist, idealistic or masculine controlled concepts
and explanations, provides complex and somewhat ambiguous
political potentials. Since climax conditions are the
"end" toward which ecosystems trend, if we want to
maximize the "naturalness" of our relations with nonhuman
nature there seems to be strong support from ecological
science for the deep ecology emphasis on wilderness
preservation and expansion. It is exactly on the basis of
these "climax" observations and there relationships to
biodiversity, biospheric survivability, and evolutionary
continuity, that many Earth First! activists make their
claims. But any human civilization beyond the neo-
neolithic will require some simplification of ecosystems
below full climax conditions. This does not mean however
that we must sacrifice other species or the general
vitality of the biosphere. The long-term sustainability
of the anthropogenic subclimax systems characteristic of
Asian paddy iand, the Australian outback, and perhaps the
English countryside until recently, provide examples of
ecological and human sustainability which can be viewed as
a starting point on which to improve. The general
approach is related to a concept of mimesis, as Ophuls and
Boyan describe, "The basic strategy of all these
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compromise systems is to study the nature of the climax
and then, instead of breaking it completely, to mimrc it
closely or to insert humans into the process as careful
parasites that preserve the host while siphoning off as
much food as possible." 2 ! And, the authors warn, this
mimetic process is only appropriate for some parts of the
Planet, many others are too fragile for any cultivation,
since they provide too little surplus "production" for
human cultivation, and should be set aside as a "source of
biological capital ." 22
Related to the problems of the appropriateness of the
use of the terms of harmony and balance and their
resonances with philosophical idealism, are concerns
Patricia J. Mills has raised about Ynestra King's
"abstract pro-nature stand ." 23 King uses the language of
Bookchin's social ecology in claiming that the "systematic
denigration" of women, people of color, working-class
people and animals is based on a "dualism" at the "root of
Western civilization ." 24 King claims this "mind-set
hierarchy originates in human society with the domination
of human by human and more specifically by men over women.
She claims the various movements against domination or for
liberation are "internally related" and can be resolved by
a "world-wide, pro-life, movement ." 25 It is this language
of "pro-life" that has troubled Mills and resulted in her
critique of King's "abstract pro-nature stand."
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s argument is a critical appropriation of the
work of the early Frankfurt theorists, especially ^ Qf
Marcuse and Adorno. Her examination of ecofeminism is
relies on the relationship of the domination of nature to
the domination of woman which appeared in the early
theorists' works. However, her criticisms have been
rejected in a recent comprehensive work by Val Plumwood.26
At issue is the attempt to "synthesize" feminism and
radical ecology into a more adequate theoretical basis for
resistance to domination, a more theoretically and
politically developed position King called ecofeminism.
What Mills questions is the manner in which this synthesis
is achieved in King's work. It is claimed there are two
basic problems with King's ecofeminism. First is the
problem of the abstraction of "good" parts of various
theories and their subsequent fusion without adequate
examination of the contradictions and tensions between the
theories from which the various concepts are abstracted.
Secondly, there is not adequate attention given by King to
the regressive" or violent aspects of nature: nature "red
in tooth and claw." The absence of consideration of the
violence and conflict within nature results in a
"harmonistic" view of nature such as when King makes
claims about the possibilities or potential for
reconciling humans with non-human nature. Mills
emphasizes this point with respect to a key issue of
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feminism, reproductive
appeared in the context
freedom, especially as this has
of decisions about abortion.
Val Plum»°°d has subsequently criticized Mills, but
“ 13 n0t Cl6ar that Plumwood has rightly understood the
critique of King. Plumwood's arguments are indicative of
a general tendency in her work which has opened her own
position to the criticism that it remains one-sidedly
"cultural" without adequate attention to the material
aspects of society and life
.
27 As Mary Mellor has
indicated,
clearW . r ^ ^ the author Camwood]early sets out the material basis of male-femaleculture nature dualisms, she sees their centrality asbased upon a cultural rather than a material Ydomination
. Consequently, the political challenge
offered by the end of the book is a cultural one; weare to reject the "master's story" of conquest and
control, capture and use, destruction and
incorporation. Instead we are to create a new storydrawn from the subordinated and ignored parts ofWestern culture such as "women's stories of care."
„ ^.
The " we " here are new social formations built on
radical democracy, co-operation and mutuality".
However, what the material basis of those formations
are supposed to be is unclear. This is unfortunatebecause the basis of a material analysis and a more
material, political conclusion permeate Plumwood's
book.
The problem of the "materiality" of critique is also
important in Plumwood's defense of Ynestra King. In
summarizing Mills's critique of King, Plumwood states,
"Mills has argued that those ecological feminists who
reject the negative value that western culture has
attributed to the sphere of nature (which I have argued
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above is the core assumption of all ecological feminrsms)
have adopted an 'abstract pro-nature stance. '"29 How is
the "rejection of the negative value" of the sphere of
nature to be understood here? Plumwood believes that
Mills's proposal to "take account of the regressive moment
of nature" in order to retain a basis for defending
women's reproductive freedom, especially that of abortion,
will result in a failure of the ecofeminist project.
Plumwood’ s emphasis is on rejecting the "western
construction of nature as an inferior sphere of
exclusion." In rejecting "abstractly pro-nature
ecofeminism, " Plumwood claims Mills's argument would
result in the abandonment of oneself to "necessity." This
"necessity" would include acceptance of whatever may
happen, without resistance, or, to follow Barry Commoner's
maxim, accepting that "nature knows best." Plumwood
asserts that it is not a matter of choosing between
treating 'nature 1 as our slave or treating it as our
master." But is this what Mills is arguing, and is
Plumwood s attempt to address the problem a true
resolution of the difficulty?
What seems to be involved here is an apparent
misreading of Mills's argument resulting from a lack of
understanding of the developments in the critical theory
of the early Frankfurt School. Plumwood seems to be
criticizing Mills for a one-sidedness no one "influenced
by the Frankfurt School" would be likely to make, at least
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not in the simplistic, unnuanced manner Plumwood charges,
"In short, What is involved is not, as assumed in Mills's
argument, a simple reversal of the value of nature which
embraces the category of nature without further
deconstruction. At issue is the specifics of the use of
the category of nature and how it must be theorized in any
attempt to bring together the insights of feminism and the
radical ecology movement. As Plumwood says, "We do not
have to assume that nature is a sphere of harmony and
peace, with which we as humans will never be in conflict.
A rejection of the western treatment of nature implies a
careful, critical and political look at the category of
nature . " 30
Plumwood rightly states that the "assignment of
women's reproductive activity to the sphere of nature" has
been used to enforce the inferior status of women, and
that this is one of the issues at the heart of
nature/culture dualism." What is problematic about her
argument, however, is the inadequate analysis of the
categories used in the critical theory inspired argument
including: the status of "negative dialectics"; the
treatment of the category of nature in this tradition; and
how these relate to Plumwood' s own use of the concepts of
dualism and hierarchy. It is a fundamental error of
analysis to assert that Frankfurt School influenced
critical theory would be guilty in any simple sense of
accepting any treatment of these issues from within a
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"dualising framework which creates an opposition between
the body and free subjectivity. "31 Piumwood makes counter
recommendations about the appropriate direction for
ecofemmism (as if these were absent from Mills's
argument)
. Her recommendations include the assertion that
a critical ecological feminist position would conceive
human identity in "less dualistic and oppositional ways,"
and that "both women and men are part of both nature and
culture," and so forth. This indicates a fundamental
misunderstanding of Mills's critique and of the early
Frankfurt critical theory. 32 of particular concern is the
lack of an indication of an adequate appreciation of the
role of the concepts of "identity" and "non-identity" in
the works of critical theory. This is revealed in
Piumwood' s evaluation of the Dialectic of En 1 i ahfpnn^ni as
simply being about a masculine and instrumental
rationality and its relation to the treatment of nature,
without indicating the problematic status of all these
terms
.
33
This apparent misreading by Piumwood and the status
of her alternative, can only be fully established and
adequately evaluated by reexamining Mills's original
critique of Ynestra King. If Piumwood' s reading is shown
to be inadequate it will still then be incumbent on
Frankfurt School influenced critical theory to develop
radical ecological or ecofeminist theory in the areas
which also remain inadequately developed in Piumwood'
s
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alternative. In other words, can the potential of
Pluinwood concepts of "radical democracy, co-operation
and mutuality,
" or something like them, be more adequately
developed by means of the categories of early critical
theory and their subsequent transformations?
In reexamining Mills's argument it is important to
first clarify the object of her critique, she was not
criticizing ecofeminism in general, which is implied by
Plumwood's comments, but instead had restricted her
remarks to the works of only two individuals who made
early attempts to combine the insights of both feminism
and the ecology movement, one of whom was Ynestra King.
Mills's critique begins with a review of the work of Isaac
Balbus and focuses on his recommendations for attempting
to provide a "neo-Hegelian" theoretical basis for the
"reconciliation" of humanity with nature, of culture and
nature. Mills argues against Balbus 1 s assertion that the
work of Horkheimer and Adorno is simply a footnote to
Hegel. She alternatively proposes that the "problem of
the domination of nature" is "most powerfully" articulated
by these two and especially by Adorno in his later
individual writings
.
34 The relationship between humans
and nature is complex and the overcoming of the domination
of nature in its various forms will be correspondingly
complex, "Within their critique of the domination of
nature Horkheimer and Adorno distinguish the rational
mastery of nature from its irrational forms, and they
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relation
contend that a new and qualitatively different
between humanity and nature is possrble. However, they
also retain a tension between the liberatory and
repressive aspects of nature. "35 it is the absence of
recognition of the "tension" between different aspects of
nature, and the subsequent claims of any philosophy or
theory which relies on some notion of a "nature in-itself"
that is fundamentally good or positive, which produces a
problematic "abstract pro-nature stance," according to
Mills. Advocates of a "naive” reconciliation of humanity
with nature fail to consider the extent to which nature,
m its various forms (non-human nature, society, the
individual psyche)
, because of previous domination, also
can be dangerous, distorting and compulsive. The
domination of nature is an irrational extension of a
tendency of nature which humans share as part of nature.
It is in the extension of domination in the form of the
mstrumentalization of reason that reason is reduced to
functioning merely as means and thereby loses its aspect
of self-reflection. The domination of nature as the "lack
of self-reflection" can only be overcome, argue the
critical theorists, by the "remembrance" of nature,
While these theorists search for a new relation to
nature in terms of the historical possibilities of
nature, they also analyze the regressive moments of
nature that led to the rise of fascism. For
Horkheimer and Adorno, German fascism, with its cry
for a return to "blood and soil, " was a form of
nature's revenge on history: the "revolt of nature"
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against domination was transformed undern expression of the return of represseddistorted and savage form
.
36 P
fascism into
nature in
Nature "itself" does not then hold out
emancipation or freedom, only the "memory"
the promise of
of nature can
provide the alternative vision that opens onto a future
free of domination. This aspect of self-reflection, the
self-reflection of humans as nature, will include the
tensions and complexity of the relationship between
"freedom and barbarism," but, even so, an emancipatory
promise remains as one aspect of the dialectic of
enlightenment. As the critical theorists explained, "By
virtue of this remembrance of nature in the subject, in
whose fulfillment the unacknowledged truth of all culture
lies hidden, enlightenment is universally opposed to
domination ." 37 it is the acknowledgment of this
complexity in Bookchin's philosophy of social ecology
which Mills finds better developed than in Balbus's neo-
Hegelianism. However, Bookchin comes to rely on a nature
that is a subject "in-itself, " Mills argues, which fails
to retain a "conceptual distinction between human self-
consciousness and nature" as the critical theorists do.
Mills asserts that this point of disagreement between
social ecology and critical theory is the point of "the
most fundamental issue raised by critiques of the
domination of nature: the question of the relation between
human self-consciousness and nature ." 38
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To the extent Ynestra King's argument relies on this
social ecological assumption it too is subject to
criticism, but Mills's crrtique goes beyond this
similarity. Mills argues that King appropriates aspects
of social ecology and critical theory without confronting
the contradictions which result. Mills's charge that
King's position is an example of the abstract pro-nature
stance can be examined in light of this further
understanding of the relationship between social ecology
and critical theory. Mills argues that King's endorsement
of the identification of women with nature, because of
women's historical position and in an attempt to combat
the domination of both women and nature, has at least one
unfortunate implication in that it tends to make women
uniquely responsible for the liberation of all life.
Mills makes a distinction between the early and later
essays of King, but the problems remain unresolved even in
the later attempts. In the early essay King says, for
example,
The ecology movement, in theory and practice,
attempts to speak for nature--the "other" that has no
voice and is not conceived of subjectively in our
civilization. Feminism represents the refusal of the
original "other" in patriarchal human society to
remain silent or to be the "other" any longer. Its
challenge of social domination extends beyond sex to
social domination of all kinds, because the
domination of sex, race, and class and the domination
of nature are mutually reinforcing.^^
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What women should say for nature or others and how
they should say it is not addressed by King except that
she claims ecofeminism is a "vantage point" from which to
speak
.
40 The similarity of this ecofeminist vantage point
to the complexity of "feminist standpoint theory" will be
discussed shortly, but King's additional claims must first
be further emphasized. In regard to the use of the idea
of harmony as metaphor for reconciled nature, King states,
"The goals of harmonizing humanity and nonhuman nature, at
both the experiential and theoretical levels, cannot be
attained without the radical vision and understanding
available from feminism." King also asserts that the
domination of women by men is at the root of all social
domination, as is argued by social ecologists,
Ecofeminism draws on feminist theory which asserts that
the domination of woman was the original domination in
human society, from which all other hierarchies--of rank,
class, and political power— flow." This seems to be an
overstatement about feminist theory, although until
recently an accurate generalization of the assumption of
most feminist argument. The political and theoretical
position that feminism is based on the assertion or
recognition that male domination was the original or
founding form of all domination is now receiving
criticisms from within feminist theory itself, and is not
implied in the work of the early Frankfurt theorists.
King does indicate that the identification of women and
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nature by radical and cultural feminists has in many cases
resulted in the "romanticization of women as good," which
she says fails to recognize the complexity of women's
implication in domination
.
4
0ne of Mills's primary objections to King's later
essays is that in her attempt to rectify earlier problems
King identifies what needs to be accomplished in combining
radical ecology and feminism, but then never provides the
concepts and theoretical mediations necessary. For
example. King identifies the need for a dialectical
ecofemmist theory, "An ecological feminism calls for a
dynamic, developmental theory of the person—male and
female—who emerges out of nonhuman nature, where
difference is neither reified nor ignored and the
dialectical relationship between human and nonhuman nature
is understood." 42 And again King calls for theory but
does not provide it, "An analysis of the interrelated
dominations of nature
—
psyche and sexuality, human
oppression and nonhuman nature— and the historic position
of women in relation to those forms of domination is the
starting point of ecofeminist theory." 43 In detailing the
list of philosophical and political problems which must be
addressed, King also highlights the issues of science and
knowledge, "A related critical area for a genuinely
dialectical practice is a reconstruction of science,
taking into account the critique of science advanced by
radical ecology and feminism." 44 But again there is no
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attempt to offer the concepts required except in general
reference to various and contradictory theoretical and
political practices.
This lack of theoretical or conceptual mediations to
address the philosophical and political problems King
recognizes has the effect of putting the problem of saving
the world on the backs of women without the support of a
coherent theory of ecofeminism. It is this combination of
unique responsibility with a vague and general endorsement
of "nature" which results in Mills's concern with the
"abstract pro-nature stand" of this version of
ecofeminism. Mills's concern with King's tendency to
place the whole burden of resolving ecological and social
domination on the backs of women can be supported simply
by citing King's unambiguous assertions, "Practice does
not wait for theory it comes out of the imperatives of
history. Women are the revolutionary bearers of this
antidualistic potential in the world today." If there is
any doubt as to how strongly to interpret this statement
she later adds,
We thoughtful human beings must use the fullness of
our sensibility and intelligence to push ourselves
intentionally to another stage of evolution. One
where we will fuse a new way of being human on this
planet with a sense of the sacred, informed by all
ways of knowing--intuitive and scientific, mystical
illici rational. It is the moment where women recognize
ourselves as agents of history
—
yes, even as unigue
agents--and knowingly bridge the classic dualisms
between spirit and matter, art and politics, reason
and intuition. This is the potentiality of a
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This is the project of
Plumwood
' s characterization of Frankfurt School
critical theory as simply concerning itself with
instrumental reason, and as endorsing a nature-culture
dualism (which she finds in evidence in Mills's critique
of King), is a gross oversimplification of critical
theory's understanding of the "dialectic of enlightenment"
and a misreading of Mills's critique. As was previously
indicated, Plumwood' s own work is open to the criticism
that it one-sidedly emphasizes the cultural aspects of an
ecofeminist politics of transformation. With these
criticisms of both King and Plumwood in mind an attempt
can now be made to address the problems of dualistic
thinking by developing concepts capable of adequately
representing the cultural and material possibilities of
radical ecological change. Before turning to feminists'
and critical theorists' attempts to use the "concept" of
mimesis to resolve some of these problems we need to first
take a brief diversion to the issues surrounding the
concept of "feminist standpoint theory" and its
relationship to women's experiences and the related
possibilities for an "objective" science, and an
efficacious social theory.
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Feminist Standpoint Theory
The concept of a feminist standpoint theory was first
developed in the early 1980s, initially by Nancy Hartsock.
The concept has evolved over time but many of its most
characteristic features remain. Feminist standpoint
theory is based on an analogy to Marx’s theory of a
proletarian standpoint which provides privileged access to
a more adequate understanding of the workings of
capitalism than is possible from the perspective of the
capitalist. The claim is that there are systematic
distortions, misrepresentations, and "perversity" in the
view of the world from the position of those who dominate
others, and that the experience of the dominated and
oppressed provide a perspective from which can be
developed a more adequate theory of society and the
economy. Feminist standpoint theory's attempt to
transform these insights for feminist purposes has come
under attack for alleged problems of "naturalism" and
"essentialism, " and more recently for its inadequate
psychological/psychoanalytical grounding. In what follows
I want to first present a brief summary of the main claims
of the theory, followed by some of the criticisms and
responses to these claims, and finally look at some
implications for "objectivity" and a feminist science,
which has so far been most fully developed by Sandra
Harding
.
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Hartsock initiated the development of feminist
standpoint theory in response to a call for a
specifically feminist historical materialism ." 46
Hartsock viewed the feminist standpoint as "an important
epistemological tool for understanding and opposing all
forms of domination .
"
47 if this claim is accurate then
feminist standpoint theory should have something important
to say about the difficulties radical ecologists have had
m developing their own adequate basis for knowledge
(however unacknowledged this has been in much of their own
literature)
. Hartsock explains that she is expanding on
the fundamentally Marxian argument that the "socially
mediated interaction with nature in the process of
production shapes both human beings and theories of
knowledge." To achieve this she relies on the category of
labor" but in an appropriately expanded form, which she
believes will aid in overcoming the omnipresent dichotomy
of nature and culture. She claims traditional Marxism
does not adequately addressed the situation of women's
oppression because it tends to collapse women's
experiences into a mere extension of proletarian
experience. Alternatively, a feminist reevaluation of
these claims will take Marx's critique in new and fuller
directions,
I will explore some of the epistemological
consequences of claiming that women's lives differ
structurally from those of men. In particular, I
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will suggest that like the lives of ^
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Hartsock provides clarification of the meaning of a
"standpoint," emphasizing the ways the relations between
humans and their understandings of the natural world
become systematically different when derived from the
respective views of those who dominate and those who are
dominated. One way the mystification of reality occurs in
the descriptions of the world by the dominant class or
group is through the categories used to explain the world.
For example, the description of capitalism becomes
mystified when presented in categories of "exchange," but
the mists and mystery of capitalism become increasingly
clarified when beginning from categories developed out of
the workers' level of production. After appropriate
quotes from Marx, Hartsock summarizes.
Only by following the two into the realm of
production and adopting the point of view available
to the worker could Marx uncover what is really
involved in the purchase and sale of labor power,
i.e.—uncover the process by which surplus value was
produced and appropriated by the capitalist, and the
means by which the worker is systematically
disadvantaged.
^
By fully comprehending that "material life structures
understanding" it can be shown how the perspective of the
capitalist and his exchange mentality results in a series
of hierarchically structured dualisms. In addition, this
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perspective inverts the real world and makes it "perverse"
in its pursuit of profits for profits' sake. The
perversity of the telos of profits is seen from the
alternative perspective, "The real point of the production
of goods and services is, after all, the continuation of
the species, a possibility dependent on their use."^ A
standpoint thus provides a way of recognizing the workings
of various ideological productions which both attempt to
legitimize the position of the dominant class and make it
"real" by actually controlling the "means of mental and
physical production." A standpoint is an achievement
which reveals the inner workings of this process in its
distortions and perversity, but it is importantly an
"achievement, " not simply an unmediated given which is
obviously present for purposes of resistance: "The
standpoint of the oppressed represents an achievement both
of science (analysis) and of political struggle on the
basis of which this analysis can be conducted ." 51
Therefore, there is no simple access to the proletarian or
the feminist standpoint; they require conceptual
mediations developed within the process of political
struggle
.
Objectivity and Standpoints
One of the most able defenders of standpoint theory
over the last decade or so has been Sandra Harding.
Criticism of standpoint theory has come from two or three
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principle directions. Non-feminist, traditional science,
critics have made charges that feminist standpoint theory
falls into the traditional problems of relativism.
Harding has answered these objections with the concept of
"strong objectivity" which uses the fact that all
"knowledge" is historically or socially situated as a
resource m scientific methodology rather than as a
problem to be eliminated through ever more vigilant
policing, and neutralizing of subjectivity. Traditional
science claims to achieve "knowledge" rather than mere
opinion by becoming more "value-neutral," and understands
the subject of knowledge" as universal, that is, it has
no fixed historical or social position. Feminists
understand this as the "disembodied" subject of
traditional science and positivism. Feminist and other
histories of science have disclosed that instead of being
value-neutral, traditional science tends to reflect or
represent certain class, gender and race assumptions found
in the dominant class or groups in society. Typically,
traditional science reflects desires, values and interests
of capital, and of white males. Alternatively, Harding
argues, in an extension of Hartsock’s earlier work,
beginning thought from the lives of the marginalized
produces knowledge that is less partial and distorted than
when begun from the activities of the dominant class or
groups. The value or interest in "liberation from
domination" then serves as a guide for the development of
488
standpoint methodology. This means that standpoint theory
takes the traditional scientific methods of problem
selection, research program design, concept construction,
development of hypotheses, and so on, and puts them in the
service of liberation movements. For Harding this means
our understanding of scientific method and of objectivity
must be transformed. For example, by starting thought
from the experiences or activities of the marginalized a
different set of problems to be explained presents itself
when compared to the problems resulting from those who
have an interest in continuing domination, oppression, and
exploitation. Harding claims dominant groups are unable
to generate what are the most critical questions about
their received beliefs because the very pervasiveness of
assumptions of racist and sexist systems, for example,
make the beneficiaries blind to those assumptions. For
traditional science, to start from overtly socially
situated or political" positions is to introduce bias
into the method of science. For traditional scientists,
it is politics and history that science attempts to
escape. Harding responds that it is precisely this belief
in the value-neutrality of science that is one of those
blinding assumptions which can be brought to light with
standpoint theory. By making these socially-historically
situated assumptions visible, more consciously part of
science, less partial and distorted knowledge can be
developed. Harding importantly adds that this also
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implies that the greater number of marginalized positions
which can be represented in the scientific coimaunity the
more accurate will be the picture of "reality" which can
be developed. This places feminist standpoint theory in
coalition with other standpoint theories and therefore
with democratic politics. It is only by providing access
to these structures of knowledge generation that the most
objective (the least partial and distorted) knowledge can
be systematically developed. This implies there would be
more than one feminist standpoint in this research program
as well, since the experiences and activities vary for
women depending on many factors in addition to gender,
class and race, such as place, age, sexual preference, and
so forth. This is not relativist, argues Harding, because
some "situations" are scientifically better as starting
points; they make it possible to systematically question
the process of concept formation and assumptions about the
subject of knowledge. Some situations, those of the
marginalized, allow more critical questions which in turn
shape the selection of scientific problems and research
agendas
. Traditional science relegates these areas to the
pre-rational and outside scientific investigation,
claiming they are properly understood as consisting merely
of competing opinions rather than as a resource for
knowledge development. Traditional science believes
starting from marginalized lives does not produce more
value-neutral knowledge, that is, it does not produce
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"objective" knowledge in the traditional sense-but again,
this is impossible. Traditional science itself did not
and does not produce this objective knowledge. Standpoint
theory produces a more self-reflexive form of knowledge,
less partial and less distorted and therefore more
objective: strongly objective, rather than the weak
objectivity of the un-self-reflective traditional science.
Harding recognizes that this means making the
"subject of knowledge" an object of study just as all
other objects are studied scientifically. This subject-
object of study will produce conflicting accounts of the
objective world because the positions from which they
start are frequently in conflict. What is involved here
is what Harding calls the "logic of multiple subjects.
This means women do not have any unique ability to
generate knowledge, but rather knowledge is generated from
the "position" which begins from the lives of the
marginalized. So, men also can generate feminist
insights
.
In summary, for standpoint theory, subjects of
knowledge are always already also objects of knowledge.
To achieve maximally critical study of objects, begin from
the perspective of the marginalized position. This means
standpoint theory aligns itself necessarily with democracy
advancing projects; epistemologically, scientifically,
morally, and politically . 53 The strong objectivity of
standpoint theory makes it possible to systematically
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identify desires, interests and values affecting the
choices and methods of science. Standpoint theory demands
self-reflexion on the values and interests which enter
into problem identification and concept construction.
Value-neutrality is a myth and a mystifying illusion, and,
alternatively, values and interests do not necessarily
have "bad" scientific effects. While some values and
interests aid domination and oppression, others may serve
democracy and liberation.
Questions have been raised about this formulation of
standpoint theory and have been elaborated elsewhere
.
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The remainder of Section III will note some of these
concerns and at least one new one. These concerns
include, first, how the subject investigating the lives of
those in marginalized positions can put herself in that
position sufficiently to generate the appropriately
critical questions, to be able to "see" the problems.
Second, what is the practical content of the normative
values of terms like "democracy" and "liberation"?
Certainly they will differ from the liberal and
traditional socialist understandings, but what are some
present visions of the transformed meanings of these
political concepts? Finally, how can standpoint theory
and other insights from the lives of those not in the
dominant class or groups be applied specifically to the
concerns of radical ecology? To borrow from the title of
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a well known Native American story, "Who Speaks for
Wolf "? 55
Before turning to these final concerns in the next
two chapters, an example of the alternative science which
might develop from this understanding of science and
objectivity is appropriate.
Practicing Science
Evelyn Fox Keller also has examined the relationships
between gender and science and has generated insights and
proposals into the possibilities of a new and more
objective" understanding of science. In her early work
as a mathematical biophysicist she encountered an
upsetting fact; science as it was then being practiced was
"bound up with the idea of masculinity ." 56 Like many
other scientists
,
the work of Thomas Kuhn challenged her
previous understanding of science and put the socially
constructed character of science in the forefront of
considerations about what good science is. 5 ^ Kuhn and
other historians of science had shown that extrascientif ic
factors influenced such aspects of science as choice of
problem and theory, concept formation, acceptable
evidence, and so on. This meant that the proposition that
science is ethically neutral or lacks any specific
"interest" was in fact a reflection of a particular
ideology. Feminist historians and sociologists of science
have since used the category of gender to investigate the
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partiality and distortions introduced in the prevailing
concept of science. Keller has also attempted to find a
way between the two most common feminist critiques of
science. The first, as Harding pointed out, simply sees
the need to include gender in what is otherwise an
unchanged science, but this alternative has no systematic
way of addressing gender influences on the practice of
science. The other is the radical critique of science
which, however, "fails to account for the effectiveness of
science ." 58 Rather than radically separating the concepts
of science and gender, Keller attempts to examine what she
calls the "science-gender system." Traditional
understandings of science discount the influence of gender
on the actual practice of science, while many radical
"social-constructionist" critiques of science cannot
adequately account for the "success" of science. "The
fact that Boyle's law is not wrong must, however, not be
forgotten. Any effective critique of science needs to
take due account of the undeniable successes of science as
well as of the commitments that have made such successes
.
c: Qpossible." The interests of the scientific community
are those of the individuals who make up that community,
which has largely meant white, middle-class males. But
one interest this group shares with most other humans is
the "shared commitment to the possibility of reliable
knowledge of nature." In order to obtain that reliable
knowledge some adherence to certain procedures such as
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"experimental replicability and logical coherence are
necessary if the "scientific venture" is to succeed. To
uncover how gender impacts science and how it may more
consciously be used to transform science is the task
Keller sets for herself. in examining these questions
Keller seeks to reveal how social, political and
especially emotional commitments of individuals manifest
themselves in the "social and linguistic practices that
help determine, within the scientific community, the
priority of interests and the criteria of success."^
Keller embraces the pursuit of scientific knowledge as a
reclaimed universal goal, but only to the extent that
claims about the characteristics of science which are
labeled "constant and indispensable" are subjected to
thorough examination and when found to be particular,
limited, historically situated and contingent, to be
recognized as such. This, Keller believes, must result in
a changed science, one reflecting different interests and
goals, and which will be presented in a different
language
.
Keller's examination of the relation of gender and
science begins from some basic observations. Although
most cultures have attempted to seek "reliable knowledge
of the natural world, " how they have gone about that has
varied, as has their very understandings of knowledge and
nature. Across cultures, one of the most common metaphors
of knowledge is that of sexual relations. Keller's
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analyses of various historical examples of the use of
sexuality as a metaphor for correct procedures of gaining
knowledge are important and insightful and deserve
inclusion in any extended examination of the possibilities
for alternative understandings of the limits and
potentials of a new science. However, this is not the
primary focus here and it must be regrettably passed over
to get at the more immediate concerns.
In addition to the historical examination of
metaphors of gender and science, Keller also examines the
psychological underpinnings of the idea of objectivity in
science. She begins by noting that the desire for
objectivity in science has traditionally meant the attempt
to separate out from the object those projections of
subjects involved in scientific investigation. It is the
inclusion of these subjective projections which
constitutes the unwanted "cultural bias" into what should
otherwise be the "objective" characteristics of the thing
under study. The modern scientist recognizes that earlier
attempts to attain reliable knowledge of nature, including
magic, astrology, and alchemy, as having in fact consisted
in large part of projections of human "hopes, desires and
fears onto the natural world. What Keller is proposing
is that modern science continues this practice of
pro j ection,
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Keller then examines aspects of subjectivity
including the ways that particular concepts are developed-
-self and other, subject and object, femininity and
masculinity and how these are socially mediated,
especially "first and most critically" by the family.
Keller relies especially on the psychoanalytically
inspired "object relations theory" as it has been
developed in the interests of feminism by such individuals
as Nancy Chodorow, Dorothy Dinnerstein, Jessica Benjamin,
and Jane Flax . 62 One aspect of Keller’s examination of
the relationship between concept formation and
psychological development is the differences in
understanding of objectivity which can be related to the
processes of acquisition of gender identity. Keller
analyzes "objectivity" as it takes place in two forms
which parallel gendered understandings of psychological
"autonomy." The two forms she labels "dynamic" and
"static" objectivity. She understands static objectivity
as the pursuit of knowledge that begins with the splitting
or severing of subject from object. This splitting has
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the disadvantage of not involving any complex process of
"disentangling" of the subject and object. By dynamic
objectivity she understands,
(A) form of knowledge that grants to the world aroundus its independent integrity but does so in a waythat remains cognizant of, indeed relies on, our
connectivity with that world. In this, dynamic
objectivity is not unlike empathy, a form ofknowledge of other persons that draws explicitly onthe commonality of feelings and experience in orderto enrich one's understanding of another in his orher own right.
Keller claims that dynamic objectivity, although
based on 'continuity, " also recognizes difference between
self and other, allowing the possibility for insight into
the "nature of self and other" when trying to
disentangle them. She claims the state of awareness or
perception necessary to achieve this disentangling of self
and other is most closely related to the "state of being
in love." The subject must achieve an intense interest in
the object, so that self-interest recedes to the point of
"total absorption in the object before one," a state of
awareness not only common to those who are in love but
also one "very familiar to young children." But this
awareness of the object is not simply an infantile
fascination with the other, rather it retains the self and
other distinction in the service of the pursuit of
"objective knowledge of the world. Keller compares the
focused awareness necessary for "perception of an object
in its own right" in science with that of poetry and other
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arts. The difference in the relations of subject and
object in this common perceptual mode is a result of the
goals for which the observations are made and knowledge is
gained.
In present practice, science typically pursues purely
instrumental goals, the "ob j ect- for-use .
" Rampant
instrumental! zation of thought can be seen it the
pathological uses of this focused perception and are
easily identifiable, but it goes beyond this to more
"normal" behavior,
e need not look as far as the pathology of sadismfor evidence of the cognitive use of perception inthe interests of domination or, more generally, fordefensive or offensive purposes. Such evidence is
suggested by the manner in which many quite normalindividuals approach the new and unknown, as well asby the language they use to describe these
encounters. In particular, I have in mind the
aggression expressed in the common rhetoric of
science
.
bb
Keller then highlights some of the metaphors of
aggression used in science and documented extensively in
the feminist literature .
^
The further point is made that
science as a social institution then tends to select those
individuals whose emotional needs are met by this rhetoric
of domination and aggression. This produces certain types
of knowledge and power relative to the objects of
knowledge and to the new and unknown.
It is Keller’s contention that science does not have
to put itself in the service of instrumentalism,
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understood as power to dominate
understanding of the methods of
There is an alternative
science which still
produces reliable knowledge about the world but does so by
respecting the integrity of that which it studies. The
structure of knowledge based in the will to dominate is a
particular and ideological understanding of knowledge,
which derives from social relations,
The need to dominate nature is, in this view, aprojection of the need to dominate other humanbeings; it arises not so much out of empowerment as
out of anxiety about impotence. The feelings ofpower such domination brings are not only like the
sense of power that can be derived from subjecting
others to one's will; they are the very same
feelings. In this sense, then, the dream of dominion
over nature, shared by so many scientists, echoes thedream that the stereotypic son hopes to realize byidentifying with the authority of his father .^ 0
Alternatively, there is another basis for reliable
knowledge, While some scientists see their endeavor in
predominantly adversarial terms, as contests, battles,
exercises in domination, others see it as a primarily
erotic activity ." 69 Keller cites several scientists, both
male and female, who attribute loving and erotic attitudes
to their work as scientists. One of the larger points
being made is that the community of scientists who
determine what is "good science" tend to self select in
becoming members of the community, and this selection is
tied together with certain emotional and cognitive styles.
The emotional and cognitive styles then also result in the
selection of "compatible scientific styles of work,
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methodologies, and even theories ." 70 Keller then asks
what the consequences for science and for the content of
knowledge would be if the scientific community had other
emotional needs and cognitive styles, that is, a
"discourse predicated on different norms-on an ideal of
dynamic rather that static objectivity." Keller then
examines specific examples where "erotic rather that
adversarial terms" have been used in the pursuit of
scientific knowledge.
Exemplary of the alternative understanding and
possibilities of science is Barbara McClintock (about whom
Keller has written extensively)
,
who received the Nobel
Prize for her work in plant genetics
.
71 Her discovery of
genetic transposition" established that genetic elements
can move in large organisms (greater than single cell) in
an apparently coordinated way from one part of a
chromosome to another, thus challenging the orthodoxy of
modern genetics. What Keller finds most interesting about
McClintock, besides that she does not view herself as
fighting for a feminist science, is the alternative vision
of science she holds and how this translates into
differences in methodology, concepts, and theory
development. Keller views this alternative vision of
science as being based in a "respect for difference." 71-
This alternative view of science, claims Keller, can best
be explained using gender as the fundamental category of
analysis
.
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McClintock criticizes mainstream science for an
inadequate humility as it fails to appreciate the "a
priori complexity that vastly exceeds the capacities of
the human imagination." Nature has a vast resourcefulness
which is capable of addressing and exceeding almost any
questions humans can ask of it. This presently results,
according to McClintock, in an inadequate scientific
methodology. Traditional, mainstream science seeks
confirming evidence for what researchers believe is an
answer they already have. The consequence of this
approach is that disconfirming evidence is treated most
often as a mistake or error rather that as the possibility
of discovering something unique and new. Keller argues
that McClintock' s preferred approach results in a demand
of scientific observers that they pay special attention to
the exceptional case.” This means a "respect for
individual difference" inhabits the heart of this
alternative vision of an adequate science. In
McClintock' s case it meant focusing attention on an
"aberrant pattern of pigmentation on a few kernels of a
single corn plant" and the subsequent six years of
research to explain the observation
.
73 In this
understanding of science the unique or exceptional is not
seen simply as an example that proves or disproves a
general law, but as an opportunity to make those
exceptions or differences meaningful "in and of
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themselves." This is a fundamentally different
understanding of the purposes of science
In this respect difference constitutes a principle
or ordering the world radically unlike the principle
™%£:i 8i°Vr dlchotomization (subject-object, mind-‘atter, feeling reason, disorder-law)
. Whereas these
oppositions are directed toward a cosmic unity
typically excluding or devouring one of the pair,toward a unified, all-encompassing law, respect fordifference remains content with multiplicity as an
end in itself. /4
In this understanding of science there is a larger
system of order but one not reducible in principle to a
single law. Keller argues that the uniqueness of each
organism indicates that the order of nature transcends
human capacities of ordering. Instead of collapsing the
individual into a mere example of a general law,
preservation of the individual and recognition of their
uniqueness become equally important aspects of the
activity of science. Keller claims McClintock's
description of her activities of observation can be best
understood as a respect for difference that requires the
highest form of empathy, that of love, "Love that allows
for intimacy without the annihilation of difference. I
use the word love neither loosely nor sentimentally, but
out of fidelity to the language McClintock herself uses to
describe a form of attention, indeed a form of thought." 77,
Keller claims this is all linked to the aims and
goals of science. Change the aims and goals, and the
methods, concepts and theories will also change. The
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challenge then is to rename nature, to begin at the
starting point of science. Barbara McClintock, as an
example of a "successful" scientist, allows Keller to
claim that an alternative understanding of science can
still yield scientific results, "To McClintock, science
has a different goal: not prediction per se; but
understanding; not the power to manipulate, but
empowerment
--the kind of power that results from an
understanding of the world around us, that simultaneously
reflects and affirms our connection to that world.
Finally, Keller reemphasizes the point that
McClintock denies her work is "woman's work," but rather
views it as an alternative theory within the basic
framework of good science. The point here is that science
may be more pluralistic" and open to alternative theory
construction than is usually represented by the "ideology"
of science which currently prevails in theories of its
legitimacy, if not in its actual practice. However,
Keller goes further, beyond McClintock' s self-
understanding, to assert that the increased inclusion of
those who have a different relationship to the object of
their study will have a transforming effect on the
institution of science and what it considers legitimate,
successful and "good" science. The consequence of
inclusion of more women and others who relate to nature in
this alternative way will be something other than merely a
"complementary" understanding to the existing
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ideologically masculine science, what will happen is more
than the mere addition of women's vision to that of men.
Keller believes there will be a
, "thoroughgoing
transformation of the very possibilities of creative
vrsion, for everyone. It implies that the kind of change
we might hope for is not a direct or readily apparent one
but rather an indirect and subterranean one ." 78 she
believes a fundamental ally in this transformation is
nature, which constantly challenges any terms used to name
it. What is required in a new science, she believes, is
the focusing of perception on the unique responses nature
provides to our questions, "Paying attention to those
responses 'listening to the material '
--may help us to
reconstruct our understanding of science in terms born out
of the diverse spectrum of human experience rather than
out of the narrow spectrum that our culture has labeled
masculine
.
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CHAPTER 10
ECOFEMINISM AND SUBJECTIVITY
Although the call to develop scientific theory and
political thought from the position of the marginalized
may sound straightforward, and there are examples of
important insights from these positions, it is not at all
clear how adequate social and political theory can be
consistently developed from the standpoint of women or
others who are marginalized. How are we to write or speak
or act from the position of the other, and what
considerations— linguistic, political, sexual, racial,
class, species, and so on—must be included in any such
attempt? In this chapter the term/concept of mimes i s will
provide the focus around which both critical theory and
feminism can be examined for useful insights to be applied
to the development of a radical ecological, ecofeminist
consciousness. Adorno, among the critical theorists, went
the furthest in developing the idea of mimesis in relation
to critical consciousness. Not only in Dialectic of
Enl i ghtenment but also in later works the idea of mimesis
is a crucial element in the constellation of negative
dialectics
.
1 Within feminism there has been a growing
interest in the use of mimesis to help illuminate the
problems of women's domination by men. Among those
feminist theorists the one who most self-reflexively uses
mimesis in her work is Luce Irigaray. Several critics
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have examined the role of mimesis in Irigaray's wort and
see it as central to an adequate understanding of what she
is attempting to achieve.
Mimesis and Political Philosophy
In one of the earliest, if not the earliest, works of
political philosophy, Plato's Republic, mimesis plays a
central role in the constitution of the just political
system. Although there are technical arguments over how
many types of mimesis exist in Plato, it is unarguable
that Plato does use mimesis as a principle of exclusion. 2
As Socrates argues, the leaders of the just polity must
only behave in ways that reflect the goodness, courage,
honesty, and so on. appropriate to their position in
society, making it unacceptable for them to represent
themselves otherwise, whether in daily life or even
dramatically on stage, in comedy or tragedy. Therefore
Plato prohibits, in the ideal republic, the taking on of
the role of inferior sorts, such as women, in whatever
appearance, whether young or old, in love, sickness or
childbirth. (395e) The man of good character will
impersonate only others of good character, even if these
others have temporarily succumbed to the misfortunes of
illness, love or drink, thereby appearing, for the moment,
irrational. (396d) The good man basically will play only
one role, that of he who is of good character, and will
not play a "multiplicity of roles." Story-tellers and
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poets who promote development of the good character will
be allowed to stay while the others, especially the
tragedians— those who represent the less than most noble
and rational of characters-must leave. Mimesis, or what
is usually translated as "representation," appears then at
the heart of the education of the guardian class, and only
a proper mimesis will be allowed. Representations of
inferior characters, such as women, slaves and beasts,
will be excluded. 3
In Book 10 of the Republic, Plato explains why
mimesis by painters and poets must be rejected, why the
painting of a bed is misleading and a distraction from the
desired focus on the true form of the bed. The painter
and poet, the artist generally, makes only the appearance
of the thing, not the true, real object. So the art of
mimesis or representation is far distant from truth, and
deals with mere appearance. (598b) The poets and similar
artists must be excluded from the just state because their
representations excite the emotions and encourage
irrationality, thus undermining the basis of the just
state: Reason. The poet, painter, and others who evoke an
emotional response set a bad example for the lover's of
truth who must rely solely on reason to gain access to the
true knowledge necessary for the properly run polis. The
poet also frequently encourages the memories of suffering,
which, says Socrates, leads to a kind of embracing of
victimization, the wallowing in irrationality, laziness
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and cowardice. (604d) So the poets must be banned, not for
mimesis itself, but for specifically what is represented:
suffering, irrationality and the instinctual desires which
lead those of good character away from knowledge and
truth. Plato and Socrates leave open the possibility of
the return of the poets, but their return may only occur
if it is adequately justified, in prose form, and these
purveyors of mimesis will find themselves confined to a
restricted style
.( 606-608
)
4
Critical theory and feminist attempts to resurrect
the idea of mimesis from its political banishment can be
seen as challenging the exclusionary moves made repeatedly
since the earliest of political philosophy. Although
similar in their concerns, the attempts to redeem the idea
of mimesis by critical theory and feminism are different
both in their analysis and in their specific applications.
It will be helpful to look at these treatments of mimesis
by different writers, since the idea of mimesis and the
alternative notions of subjectivity which flow from them
speak to new and different political possibilities. The
influence of Walter Benjamin on early critical theory
provides an initial basis for examining this constellation
of mimesis, subjectivity and alternative politics.
Additionally, feminist understandings of the concept will
more fully round out the concept's potential. Finally, and
still further developed in the next chapter, Adorno's
Aesthetic Theory and its central category of mimesis may
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provide some leads for a future radical ecological or
ecofeminist politics.
Benjamin and Mimesis
Adorno appropriated Walter Benjamin's understanding
of mimesis and transformed it from a largely mystical or
theological notion into one of the central elements of
negative dialectics. As has been noted by several
commentators and critics of critical theory, even though
the concept of mimesis has been most closely linked to
aesthetic philosophy, beginning with Plato and Aristotle,
the critical theorists used the concept to travel a much
more anthropological and socio-historical path.^ As
discussed earlier, Horkheimer and Adorno used the idea of
mimesis as a route into understanding the "dialectic of
enlightenment with its beginnings in the magic of the
shaman's imitation of nature. The discussion of mimesis
Dialectic
—
o_f
—
Enlightenment was prefigured in Benjamin's
work but developed much further, first by the two critical
theorists and then by Adorno alone. However, Benjamin's
early presentation of the idea helps illuminate its later
manifestations
.
In his short essay "On the Mimetic Faculty" Benjamin
begins not with an appeal to Greek discussions of
literature but to Nature: nature itself produces
similarities. For Benjamin the mimetic faculty is a
subterranean force within even the most developed forms of
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human activity, including language. The very ability to
perceive similarities or resemblances is a manifestation
of "the powerful compulsion in former times to become and
behave like something else. "6 This compulsion to imitate,
to be like the other, is exhibited in the earliest of
human behavior, including child’s play, where the child
not only imitates adults, in language and in social roles
such as doctor or teacher, but even as objects like a
train or windmill. The mimetic faculty is one of the most
basic of human activities, and is present generally in
nature. According to Benjamin, this "gift" of recognizing
and producing similarities has changed historically, from
early forms of dance and magic to modern forms of language
and technological reproduction. After this brief
examination of the history of mimesis, Benjamin asks what
has become of the mimetic faculty and what remains of its
potentials. Has it increasingly decayed from its
ubiquitous place in the magic and enchantment of ancient
peoples, or has the mimetic faculty merely been
transformed?
Benjamin addresses the question by discussing the
historical transformation of the mimetic faculty, and its
ability to recognize and produce "nonsensuous similarity."
For ancient peoples even the sky provided opportunities to
exercise this ability, as is seen in the various forms of
astrology and in magico-religious ritual which was
supposed to influence the powers of the heavens.
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Language, both spoken and written, says Benjamin, is
connected to the mimetic faculty. From the recognition
the onomatopoeic character of some spoken words, to the
representational quality of hieroglyphs, ideographs, and
ultimately poetry, "nonsensuous similarities" are in
evidence
.
7 In summary, Benjamin argues that this
faculty" leads from mimetic magic to the flash of
recognition of our similarity to the "other" which
manifests itself through language.
of
It seems fair to suppose that these were the stagesby which the mimetic gift, which was once the
foundation of occult practices, gained admittance to
writing and language. In this way language may be
seen as the highest level of mimetic behavior and the
most complete archive of nonsensuous similarity: a
medium into which the earlier powers of mimetic
production and comprehension have passed without
residue, to the point where they have liquidated
those of magic.
The question for critical theory and radical ecology is
whether mimesis has indeed passed into language without
residue, and, if not, whether the mimetic faculty can be
resurrected and be put to use in a manner which overturns
the culture of domination.
Michael Taussig has attempted to use Benjamin's and
the early critical theorists' ideas about "the mimetic
faculty" to explore the relationship between colonizer and
colonized, of Western/European "civilization" and the
others it has attempted to dominate. Taussig
characterizes the mimetic faculty as "the nature that
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culture uses to create second nature, the faculty to copy,
imitate, make models, explore difference, yield into and
become Other." This capacity should be understood as a
form of "sympathetic magic" when speaking of practices
where "the wonder of mimesis lies in the copy drawing on
the character and power of the original to the point
whereby the representation may even assume that character
and that power ." 9 One of the central questions for
Taussig originates in the discourse of postmodernism's
concerns with the issues of "essentialism and
constructionism." in his "anthropological" investigations
Taussig primarily concerns himself with the "social
constructions of sex, race, nationality, and identity.
He probes the history of mimesis and the "mimesis of
history," the telling of the story of history as it is
reflected back by those who have become its "objects."
For Taussig then the investigation of mimesis is an
investigation into the possibility of social
transformation,
If I am correct in invoking a certain magic of the
signifier and what Walter Benjamin took the mimetic
faculty to be--namely, the compulsion to become the
Other--and if, thanks to new social conditions and
new techniques of reproduction (such as cinema and
mass production of imagery)
,
modernity has ushered in
a veritable rebirth, a recharging and retooling (of)
the mimetic faculty, then it seems to me that we are
forthwith invited if not forced into the inner
sanctum of mimetic mysteries where, in imitating, we
will find distance from the imitated and hence gain
some release from the suffocating hold of
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This is an invitation to get past the dualism of
essentialism and constructionism, and much of the empty
debate of contemporary social and political theory. (This
invitation to release through imitative distance is also a
theme of Irigaray's work, as will become clear later.)
Taussig borrows from both Adorno and Benjamin in this
attempt at theoretical transformations. Taussig examines
modern technological reproduction as well as the magic of
contemporary shamen to understand the mimetic faculty, "My
concern is to reinstate in and against the myth of
Enlightenment, with its universal, context-free reason,
not merely the resistance of the concrete particular to
abstraction, but what I deem crucial to thought that moves
and moves us--namely, its sensuousness, its mimeticity
.
"H
Taussig quotes Adorno on Benjamin's writing style, the
question of style existing at the heart of Adorno's own
concerns with the form of presentation of philosophy,
(Benjamin's) thoughts press close to its object, seek
to touch it, smell it, taste it and so thereby
transform itself. Through this secondary
sensuousness, they hope to penetrate down to the
veins of gold which no classificatory procedure can
reach, and at the same time avoid succumbing to the
contingency of blind intuition. The radical
reduction of the distance of the object also
establishes the relation to potential praxis which
later guided Benjamin's thinking.
^
In addition to addressing the potential to transform
thought through mimetic representation, Adorno also, in
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the quoted essay, is critiquing the classificatory thought
that is positivist science just as he would do
persistently throughout his life. Here is where the idea
of the mimetic provides both a critique of the positivist
understanding of knowledge and the potential for
philosophic writing that will have implications for
political practice.
Again, Taussig's concerns were also the concerns of
the critical theorists as is evident in his attempts to
draw out the theoretical underpinnings which motivate his
work. Indicating the close relation of Adorno to Hegel,
Taussig emphasizes Adorno's reversals of the relationship
of universal and particular, and how mimesis becomes a key
element in Adorno's critique, "For Adorno and, I think
Hegel (with different consequences), the sensuous moment
of knowing includes a yielding and mirroring of the knower
in the unknown, of thought in its object. This is clearly
what Adorno often has in mind with his many references to
mimesis, the obscure operator, so it seems to me, of his
entire system ." 13 This "dialectical" way of knowing
involves a "yielding" to the other, the immersion of the
self in the other, a loosening of boundaries of identity.
As Taussig indicates, "This strange mixture of activity
and passivity involved in yielding-knowing, this bodily
mirroring of otherness and even ideas, is in the center of
much of Horkheimer and Adorno's elusive discussion of
mimesis, and precisely in the activist possibilities
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within such yielding lie serious issues of mimesis and
science, mimesis as an alternative science ." 14 But
mimesis is no simple path to correcting domination, rather
it has also been used to install and intensify domination.
The most often cited demonstration of the repressive power
of mimesis is that of anti-Semitism as Horkheimer and
Adorno repeatedly emphasized in the early work of critical
theory. Racism is also infused with the mimetic, where
stereotypic imitation becomes a means of domination and
repression, an indispensable element in the formation of
the racist consciousness. Anti-Semitism and racism share
with fascism the use of mimesis to direct the mimetic
faculty, as the critical theorists analyzed it under the
idea of the "organized control of mimesis." As nature
rebels against its repression it is channeled in ever new,
ever old directions useful for domination. Taussig
identifies the uniqueness in the early critical theorists'
analysis.
What makes Horkheimer and Adorno's thesis distinctive
is that far from being side effectual, racism is seen
as a manifestation of what is essential to modern
civilization's cultural apparatus, namely continuous
mimetic repression--understanding mimesis as both the
faculty of imitation and the deployment of that
faculty in sensuous knowing, sensuous Othering. A
question then arises in this version of the history
of the senses--from mimesis to the organized control
of mimesis--as to whether the mimetic faculty can
escape this fate of being used against itself,
whether it could be used against being used against
itself? 15
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Can mimesis escape its fate in the "administered
society of late capitalism where commodity fetishism
takes on ever greater dimension, becoming truly global,
threatening the existence of complex life on the planet,
as the heat of exchange "warms" the earth? is it possible
to develop a new science, an alternative symbolic order,
an other subjectivity which does not succumb to the
alienation" and "objectification" Marx spoke of? Does a
new or old mimesis offer access to an alternative to the
various forms of identity thinking, manifested as racism,
sexism, class conflict, and ecological destruction?
Mimesis and Psychology
Before going on to some feminist encounters with the
idea of mimesis in addressing the problem of domination
and patriarchy, it is important to note a problem in
recent attempts to develop a "post-Freudian" and "post-
Lacanian" theory of psychoanalysis, and therefore a
problem in developing alternative theories and practices
of women's subjectivity or consciousness. An important
reason for the turn to Lacanian psychoanalysis by many
feminists and deconstructionists has been Lacan's
development of an understanding of subjectivity that
addresses problems he saw with Freud's notion of the
Ego . 10 Lacan develops the idea of the "mirror stage" (or
mirror phase) of development to help explain/understand
the formation of the Ego or the "I". One important
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interpreter of Lacan has even concluded, "Some critics
have called the concept of the mirror stage Lacan's myth
(just as the instinct was Freud's, or the collective
unconscious was Carl Jung’s), other commentators have
described the mirror stage as Lacan's only piece of
'empirical' data. " 17 it is in the relation between
empirical" data and the idea of mimesis that a
fundamental problem may exist. As Elizabeth Grosz has
demonstrated, Lacan’s understanding of the mirror stage is
indebted to an article on mimicry and psychology written
by Roger Caillois. In Lacan’s "Mirror Stage" article he
develops his idea of the organization of an I by the
infant, an organization which occurs even before it has
the ability to use language. This "primordial form" of
the I is based on the image (or imago ) the infant forms of
itself, an image that is "fictional" but which will have
enduring effects on the subsequent "social determination"
of the agency of the ego. Lacan's claim that this pre-
linguistic self-image has determinate effects on the human
organism is supported by reference to effects of visual
identification in other species, specifically female
pigeons and migratory locusts. This observation about the
effects of psychic organization reverses the usual
understanding which asserts that organismic development
precedes psychological. Lacan mentions that the female
pigeon must see another member of its species at the
appropriate time as "a necessary condition for the
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The
maturation of the gonad of the female pigeon
same effect may be induced, he notes, by simply placing
the pigeon before a mirror. Lacan generalizes from this
empirical observation to make larger claims for the
phenomenon, "Such facts are inscribed in an order of
homeomorphic identification that would itself fall within
the larger question of the meaning of beauty as both
formative and erogenic." 19 When this observation is
broadened furthered to include identifications in a larger
field it raises other issues and questions circulating
around the ideas of self and other, "But the facts of
mimicry are no less instructive when conceived as cases of
heteromorphic identification, in as much as they raise the
problem of the signification of space for the living
organism--psychological concepts hardly seem less
appropriate for shedding light on these matters than
ridiculous attempts to reduce them to the supposedly
supreme law of adaptation."^ 0 Lacan seems to be saying
that the whole representation of the not-I, of all of
space and its occupants, is bound up in this mimetic
process. This may have important implications for the
radical ecological understanding of "self-identification"
especially as it has been articulated by deep ecologists.
(See above Chapters 3-5 on deep ecology.)
Grosz' further observations seem to uncritically
follow Lacan's subsequent citation of Caillois on mimicry
and psychology. The statements by all three analysts
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which follow from the observations of Caillois on mimesis
then become, at least, unsettled if Caillois's claims are
taken at face value. As Grosz interprets it, Caillois's
exploration of the relationship of mimicry and spatiality
was a "powerful influence on Lacan's notions of the mirror
stage, the order of the imaginary, and psychosis ." 21 i n
the original essay, Caillois examined the behavior of
insects, specifically the way they "mimic" other insects
and their natural environment. This exploration of
mimesis then provided a model or "analogue" for the
understanding of forms of psychosis. The analysis results
from what he claims mimesis reveals about the relationship
of an organism to the space it occupies, "Mimesis is
particularly significant in outlining the ways in which
the relations between an organism and its environment are
blurred and confused the way in which its environment is
not distinct from the organism but is an active internal
component of its identity ." 22 This seems like a very
promising observation, especially with respect to the deep
ecology concerns with identification, and in fact is at
the basis of insightful observations by Caillois, Lacan
and Grosz
.
23 However, it is the additional claims by
Caillois which are problematic and which Grosz does not
challenge. As Grosz explains,
Caillois claims that mimicry does not serve any
adaptive function. Its purpose is not to ensure the
survival of the species through disguising the
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insect, hiding it from its predators. Mimicry doesnot have survival value, for most predators rely onthe sense of smell rather than of vision. Mimicry
a "luKurv^o/e
the dark
' Calllois insiders mimicry
.
excess over natural survival,
survival h/VT3 ° f self-P r°tection or species. He abandons naturalistic explanations to
characteristic °f “T? ^ P^ology! The miLsL
h! ^ ^ certain species of insects has to1 istinctions it establishes between itselfand its environment, including other species.lmicry is a consequence not of space but of the
represent at. i on of and captivation by space.
(Here we have the beginnings of a "constructionist"
argument about the relationships between identity and
difference
.
)
Grosz cites in a footnote the basis for Caillois's
determination that mimesis has no adaptive value, that the
to camouflage itself does not further the survival
of the individual and the species. The passage from the
article on mimicry and psychosis provides empirical
observations as evidence for its conclusions. Caillois is
quoted directly,
Generally speaking, one finds many remains of mimetic
insects in the stomachs of predators. So it should
come as no surprise that such insects sometimes have
other and more effective ways to protect themselves.
And conversely, some species that are inedible and
would thus have nothing to fear, are also mimetic.
It therefore seems that one ought to conclude with
Cunot that this is an "epiphenomenon" whose
"defensive utility appears to be nul ." 25
However, the conclusions derived from these empirical
observations are illogical and are better explained by
modern ecological understandings of mimesis and its
relation to evolution.
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There are a variety of ways to understand mimesis and
its role in adaptation for both individual and species
survival. One form of mimesis is Batesian mimicry,
involving false warning coloration of species which works
to its advantage against predators. A distasteful or
poisonous model is mimicked by a species that a predator
would otherwise find edible and therefore seek out.
Examples include viceroy butterflies which mimic
distasteful monarch butterflies; clearwing moth mimics of
bees and wasps, and so on. The mimic gains advantage as
the predator learns to avoid the distasteful or poisonous
model, however, the model is disadvantaged because the
predators’ encounters with the edible and harmless mimics
increases the time required for the predator to learn of
the model's potential harmfulness, thus resulting in the
consumption of the less than desirable model. The
learning time for predators depends largely on the ratio
of mimics to models, indeed if mimics outnumber models at
a specific time predators may not learn to avoid the
models. This explains why the mimics are usually less
numerous than the inedible model. It also helps explain
why mimics frequently mimic several model species.
Another type of adaptive mimicry, called "Mullerian
mimicry, " occurs when two species which are both
distasteful or dangerous mimic one another, such as bees
and wasps, which both have characteristic black and yellow
banding. Predators will encounter both species more
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frequently than they would one species alone, therefore
reducing the learning time necessary for the predator to
avoid harm.
A third type of mimesis, "molecular mimicry," occurs
with some parasites which disguise themselves as part of
their hosts, "In this phenomenon, antigenic determinants
of parasitic origin (known as eclipsed antigens) resemble
host antigens to such an extent that they do not elicit
the formation of host antibodies. This, of course, allows
the parasite to dwell safely inside the host’s tissues in
a more or less uncontested fashion, protected from the
host's immune response ." 26
The presence of mimetic insects in the stomachs of
predators is not scientific proof or even a reasonable
argument against the adaptive function of mimesis.
Contrary to viewing it as an epiphenomenon with a "nul
defensive utility," mimesis has a very broad explanatory
power in species evolution. The question for Lacanian
psychoanalysts and those who develop a metapsychology from
his observations then is, how does this change the status
of mimesis and "identification" in "the mirror stage, the
order of the imaginary and in psychosis?" How does an
alternative understanding of mimesis, one which recognizes
its "natural" adaptive function, affect the possibilities
of new subjectivities and a new relationship to nature?
Additionally, it should be noted, the focus by
Caillois on the visual as the site of mimesis fails to
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adequately account for other mimetic adaptations such as
the calls of birds and other auditory imitative behavior
such as bullsnakes
' mimicry of the rattler. Vision and
image are only one, although important, aspect of mimesis
in evolutionary adaptation
.
27
Feminist Mimesis
The use of the idea or category of mimesis by women
in the development of feminist theory has varied greatly,
but it may be helpful to examine two basic ways it has
been of use. The first consists of those who retain the
largely aesthetic understanding of mimesis, the second
goes beyond this to link the body or materiality to
mimetic behavior and so comes closer to the strategy of
Adorno who tends to combine the aesthetic with the
material," natural, or "anthropological" understandings
of the term. Even when the category remains largely
aesthetic it still has considerable critical power to
reveal the usually hidden or unconscious processes of
exclusion, marginalizing, or "othering" characteristic of
patriarchal and dominating society. For example, Julia
Kristeva achieves significant insights into the workings
of language and the possibility of the "speaking subject"
by examining "mimesis and the poetic language inseparable
from it .
"
28
Other women have also focused on the traditional
notions of mimesis to provide critical analyses of
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literary works and their relationship to politics and
gender. Marjorie Graber has produced an excellent study
on the idea of the hero, where she claims that "greatness"
is an effect of mimesis. She combines analyses of the
Wizard
.
_
Qf Qz
, baseball, Charlotte's Web , and other
examples (including references to the Qdvsspy ^
. to show
how the idea of the hero is related to the attempt to "go
home again, " with the resulting play of phallic and
maternal figures. As the hero attempts to return home,
there is a deep ambiguity which arises in relation to the
longing for origins. This is exemplified in the story of
a certain hero and his relationship to the female spider's
web (the web eventually raising "Wilbur the pig" to the
status of cultural icon), "It is clear that the spider's
transgressive and sexualized power, and, indeed, her
relationship to the psychoanalytic figure of the phallic
woman, renders her potentially threatening, as well as
nurturant .
"
29 Graber concludes that imitation of
greatness has become a staple of politics, whereby
greatness is now "manufactured" by "spin-doctors," the
politicians' image consultants. Greatness and the
manufactured hero of politics are about the "fantasy of
wholeness" which is also a "fantasy of control" through a
powerful all-knowing agency or subject, divine or
otherwise. Graber links the literary fantasies to the
political, "It seems clear that anxieties about greatness
in literature are closely tied to anxieties about
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national, political, and cultural greatness, and that the
more anxious the government, the more pressure is placed
upon the humanities to textualize and naturalize the
category of the 'great .'" 30
An even more radical challenge to existing political
arrangements, beyond deconstruction of the images and
texts of the phal logocentric order, come from analyses
which use the category of mimesis to examine the idea of
subjectivity how it is constituted, possible
alternatives, and how they might be brought into being.
This can be seen in the work of those who challenge the
idea of mimesis as imitation, that is, of mimesis as a
problem of representation of the truth. Plato's concerns
were those surrounding the deceptive quality of mimesis,
mimesis as imitative representation. Those who assumed
the position of others risked losing their true selves to
the irrationality which essentially marked those in
inferior social roles, such as women. Beyond the danger
of becoming too much like inferior beings, there was also
the danger of accepting the poet's or artist's version of
the truth. Poetic truth did not come through knowledge but
was merely a belief which happened to be true. This
presented the danger that those educated for political
power might come to believe truth can be arrived at
through deceptive means as well as through the light which
reason sheds
.
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The relationship of truth to representation goes to
the heart of the so-called
"postmodern" concerns of recent
social and political theory, especially as they have
appeared within feminism. One version of the challenge to
received understandings of subjectivity, and to
subjectivity's relationship to mimesis, can be found in
Ruth Leys' s essay on gender and the "subject of
imitation ." 31 Leys draws on psychoanalysis to achieve
insights she believes are not available to those who rely
on 'object relations theory," or those who simply reject
the work of Freud, Lacan and others
.
32 Leys claims an
adequate psychoanalysis takes seriously the idea of the
unconscious. She believes that without a strong
understanding of the unconscious, feminist theories tend
to relapse into dichotomous structures of analysis, such
as those of Catherine MacKinnon and others who
fundamentally see violence as a simple relation between
the internal and the external, of victim and victimizer,
"a point of view that inevitably reinforces a politically
retrograde stereotype of the female as a purely passive
victim ." 33 Leys ' s own analysis focuses on the problem of
dissociation or multiple personality disorder, and
specifically on the role of hypnosis or "suggestion" in
the history of identification of the "disorder" and in its
place in the history of psychoanalysis. Her analysis
relies on the work of psychoanalytic philosopher Mikkel
Borch-Jacobsen and the central role he attributes to the
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coming into being of the
process of mimesis in the
"sub j ect . "34
As Leys presents her study of the role of hypnosis in
the treatment of dissociation, she aims at uncovering
alternative understanding of the concept of
an
identification. She believes the question of how the
process of identification takes place runs through recent
feminist discussions of sexual identity and difference.
What she attempts to do is bring the categories of
psychoanalysis into that discussion, but this is not the
same analysis as that of either Freud or Lacan. She
borrows from Borch-Jacobsen ' s critique of Freud where he
asserts that before there is a subject who has desire for
some object there is a process of mimetic identification.
He claims it is not the "primordial" process of desire
which is at work in creating the desiring subject,
What comes first is a tendency toward identification,
a primordial tendency which then gives rise to a
desire; and this desire is, from the outset, a
(mimetic, rivalrous) desire to oust the incommodious
other from the place the pseudo-subject already
occupies in fantasy .... If desire is satisfied in and
through identification, it is not in the sense in
which a desire somehow precedes its "gratification, "
since no desiring subject (no "I," no ego) precedes
the mimetic identification: identification brings the
desiring subject into being, and not the other way
around . 33
A compelling reanalysis of a central scene of Freud's
development of psychoanalysis best demonstrates what
Borch-Jacobsen means. The example is Freud's observations
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on his grandson's game of "fort-da" played with a wooden
spool tied to a string. The child throws the spool out of
sight ("Fort") and then expresses pleasure when the spool
is retrieved and is once again present before him (da)
.
The child repeats the action over and over, delighting
each time in the reappearance of the toy. Freud is
perplexed that the child would cause his own discomfort
only to be able to then achieve pleasure. Freud
interprets the spool as a desired object, a substitute for
the primary desired object of the mother. Freud accepts
as explanation that the child is achieving mastery or
control over the pain it experiences when its desires are
unmet. The child masters the object rather than be forced
to passively submit to it. As Borch- Jacobsen
parenthetically summarizes Freud's position, "By
sacrificing myself freely to the law or the destiny that
determines me from the outside, I make it mine and thus I
determine myself: this well-known schema of speculative
dialectics no doubt counts for something in the
fascination that this text has held for certain French
psychoanalysts
.
Borch-Jacobsen has an alternative, at least as
plausible, interpretation of the scene. Rather than see
the act as that of moving within a paradigm of domination,
from the passive to the active pole, does it not make more
sense to see the game as a process of identification? The
child identifies with the position of the mother, "It
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9 t0 bS obvious
' mdeed, that when the child abandons
his toys (what he 'has'), he is treating them the way his
mother treats him. m this sense, by throwing his toys
away he is not so much sacrrficing the mother as hrmself:
he himself is drawing away from himself by playing the
mother's role (the 'active role'). "37 This understanding
of identification and the place of the subject disrupts
accounts of desire in psychoanalysis in both its Freudian
and Lacanian forms. This is an alternative understanding
of subject formation beyond an economy of pleasure, "There
is no goal orientation here, no calculation, no economy,
at least not at first: desire is not oriented by pleasure,
it is (dis) oriented by mimesis--and thus it lies beyond
the pleasure principle ." 38 Mimetic identification is what
Qr i ent 's desire
. This also means that the subject is an
effect of the process of mimetic identification.
Preceding all phases of development as theorized by Freud
is a period of "transitivist indistinction of self and
other, " the period of mimetic identification before a
subject, before the distinction between self and other,
mimic and model. This mimetic identification cannot be
remembered because there was no "specular distance" from
which the subject might observe the action which could
later be represented, "The representation involved (or
that does that involving) does not belong to the order of
the specular, the visible, the theoretico-theatrical (it
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IS not mimesis as mimesis has been understood since Plato
and Aristotle ) .
"
39
The point of Leys
' s examination of multiple
personality disorder in the context of Borch- Jacobsen
'
s
critique of traditional psychoanalysis is to illuminate
the relationship of "violence and female subjectivity ." 40
Leys makes several summary observations. First, she
believes too much reliance is placed on a notion "of the
already-constituted female subject" in which violence
comes in from the outside to split apart what was a
"functional plurality of component parts." This involves
a sexual coding" of gender, in her opinion, in which the
female subject is represented as a passive or innocent
victim. Alternatively understood, the effect of mimetic
identification for victims of violence is seen in an
inability to represent the violent act because there may
be no "subject" who was standing outside the act, no
spectator who could represent it like an unfolding drama.
Like Freud’s patients who come to the deepest point in
analysis where they cannot represent the critical scene of
trauma, but can only repeat the experience, the victim
"experiences the suffering again ." 41
Additionally, and more generally, Leys is arguing for
recognition of a deep ambiguity at the beginnings of
subjectivity, "Thus one major implication of my argument
is that identification, including identification with the
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mother, IS never a matter of pure pleasure: negativity and
ambivalence are constitutive of subjectivity or
This means for Leys that she cannot accept
Julia Kristeva
' s analysis of the pre-Oedipal, mother-child
relationship as governed, in a heavily Lacanian influenced
fashion, by the "Imaginary Father." Leys explains her
reservations which result from the alternative theory of
distance from Kristeva is to say that on the mimetic
paradigm love and hate conflict— emerge prior to the
point where we are used to locating them, not between
subject and subject, or subject and object, .. .but at the
very moment of the mimetic installation of the subject on
a constituitively abyssal ground ." 43 Leys further
believes that the theory of mimetic identification leads
to a "Foucauldian" understanding of power relations and of
potentials for production of female subjectivity. That
is, the "gendered subject" can best be viewed as the
effect of "paranoid identifications with mimetic rivals"
whose status itself is determined by "a ’subjugating' law
there is no possibility of any naive return to a utopian
politics that existed before the "Law" or any which would
immediately emerge with "revolutionary overthrow." How
exactly this psychoanalytic interpretation of mimetic
identification jibes with Foucault's social theory is not
explained, as it must be if it is to retain coherence.
mimetic identification, "another way of expressing my
in the Foucauldian sense ." 44 This implies for Leys that
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This may be difficult considering Foucault's
the psychoanalytic project. 4 ^
antagonism to
Irigaray and Mimesis
Finally, Luce Irigaray has followed a "strategy of
mimesis" m the attempt to begin a challenge to the
current order, a challenge which might make possible "her
aim to effect a shift in the position of the subject of
enunciation ." 46 in other words, Irigaray' s project is to
help make it possible for women to speak for themselves as
themselves, when throughout social, political and
philosophical history they have been silenced, spoken for
and spoken about. Central to the conceptual apparatus
Irigaray uses and opposes is Lacanian psychoanalytics.
Irigaray is notorious for the difficulty involved in
unpacking her language and style. Instead of making this
a too simple suimnary of her concerns, for our present
needs we can focus on her understanding of mimesis in
relationship to the possibility of female subjectivity and
do this through the elaborations of her writings by both
sympathetic and critical commentators.
Without going into an endless analysis of Irigaray'
s
relationship to Lacanian psychoanalytics and Derridean
deconstruction, the place of mimesis can be
unsystematically viewed for resemblances to the other
perspectives of mimesis already examined and yet to be
developed
.
47 Without explicating the debate within
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feminism over psychoanalytics generally and the
reappropriation of Lacanian psychoanalytics specifically
it is still helpful to establish some basic understandings
of the categories and contexts which lead to the adoption
of a strategy of mimesis. Rosi Braidotti has provided
many helpful insights in her interpretations of Irigaray
and helps to establish some basic outlines of the
discussion, "For Irigaray, as for most poststructuralists,
the subject is not a substance but rather a process of
negotiation between material and semiotic conditions that
affect one’s embodied, situated self. In this perspective
'subjectivity' names the process that consists in
stringing together--under the fictional unity of a
grammatical I different forms of active and reactive
interaction with and resistance to these conditions ." 48
Several points should probably be made about this
observation. The subject is a process, or better yet,
this understanding of subjectivity is concerned with the
"process of becoming-subject." The subject mediates
between the "materiality" of the embodied being and the
structures of language, and it does this in time, that is,
the subject is fundamentally historical and material. The
representation of the subject in language is through
reference to an "I" which is fictional, that is,
established through the fantasies produced by desire. As
Braidotti interprets this, the process involves a constant
shifting and negotiating of willful choice and unconscious
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sustains the enti
drives, "It implies that what re process
of becoming-subject is the will to know, the desire to
say, the desire to speak, as a founding, primary, vital,
necessary, and therefore original desire to become ." 49
Leaving aside for the moment the possible conflict or
compatibilities between this understanding of the founding
moments of subjectivity and those implied or expressed by
Borch- Jacobsen, the strategy of mimesis still does not
self-evidently follow from Braidotti's observations.
However, the necessity for the mimetic strategy can be
seen as the consequence of the Lacanian understanding of
the place of the subject in language and the resulting
impossibility for "woman" to speak at all. Irigaray (like
Derrida) interrogates the history of philosophy and the
philosophy of history to show what has been excluded or
marginalized. The excluded other is found to have the
uncanny function of serving as the pivot or hinge of the
philosophies, that is, the philosophy's "coherence"
depends on that which it excludes. Irigaray seems to take
this practice of following the trail of the marginalized
and excluded further than Derrida by refusing to stop at
the recognition of the aporetic gaps in philosophical and
literary texts, refusing to accept the silences and
exclusions as a functioning of the "feminine," as the mark
of the possibility of masculine or phallic philosophy.
Irigaray attempts to further interrogate this abyssal
center of philosophy seeking to liberate the excluded
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other from its servitude. Irigaray's project does not
stop with the recognition of the functioning of the
feminine, of "woman" and women in philosophy, literature,
and politics, but attempts to establish the possibilities
for a truly female subject who can speak for herself. she
recognizes that subjects are formed in a complex system of
"structuring effects" through "variables" such as, "sexual
morphology," cultural identity, age, religion, and so on.
However, for Irigaray as for most feminists, sexuality has
a privileged place in the history of these structuring
effects. As Braidotti indicates,
Irigaray also acknowledges the privileged position
granted to sexuality in Western practices of
subjectivity. Sexuality is site of resistance and
contradiction, and because the implications of the
phal logocentric institutionalization of sexuality are
so much more negative for women, feminists cannot
afford to merely cast off their sexed identity: they
to critically and thoroughly repossess
it . DU
Feminist analyses of western civilization, and
especially society under capitalism and continuing
Patriarchy, have shown how women have been systematically
denied a voice in their own self-becoming. In the
analyses which rely on the structural linguistics
influenced understanding of Lacanian psychoanalytics,
"woman" has been found to serve as the condition of
possibility of language itself, and cannot itself be truly
represented. For Irigaray then the mimetic strategy
involves occupying the masculine position in order to
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disrupt its claims and open a space for what is supposedly
unrepresentable, the female subject. It is an attempt to
raise a voice for those who cannot speak for themselves—
not yet. This is a strategy of an alternative structure
of representation, as Braidotti has explained,
In my reading of Irigaray's strategy I have argued
at her notion of "mimesis" amounts to a collective
repossession by women of the images and
representations of "Woman" as they have been coded inlanguage, culture, science, knowledge, and discourse
and consequently internalized in the heart, mind,body, and lived experience of women. Mimetic
repetition as a textual and political strategy is the
active subversion of established modes of the
representation and expression of women's experience.
In this respect the redefinition of the subject
Woman/women as both representation and experience
amounts to no less than a change of civilization, of
genealogy, of a sense of history. Feminist
countergenealogies are the inroads to a new symbolic
system by women. ^
The strategy of mimetic repetition is rooted in the
psychoanalytic understanding of how to treat a disturbance
of the patient or analysand which has resulted in the
inability of the individual to fully experience what life
has to offer. Freud's "talking cure" is the attempt to
raise to consciousness what has been repressed into the
unconscious but which still manifests itself in a
symptomology that makes it impossible for the patient to
adequately function. ^ For the analyst then the process
of relieving the patient from the burden expressed by
dysfunctional symptoms is centered around allowing the
repressed contents of the unconscious to resurface to the
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level of language. Margaret Whitford has argued that a
psychoanalytic interpretation helps explain Irigaray’s
strategy of mimesis,
n the individual psyche, unconscious phantasy isdetermining to the extent that it remains
unconscious. When in the psychoanalytic process itachieves an access to consciousness via language'w a ngaray refers to as symbolization or "the
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The current symbolic order is based on the male's
acquisition of language which occurs with the development
of the individual male Ego. This process is fundamentally
dependent on the child's relationship to its parents.
Without going into the details of the psychoanalytic
account of the process, and without simultaneously noting
additional or counter-tendencies resulting from Borch-
Jacobsen's account of this process, it can still be said
that under existing socio—historical conditions the
process of identity formation for the male child involves
the exclusion and separation of the mother from his
"imagined" or fantasized identity. Whitford concludes
that this is at the root of current social and political
problems, "The scission of epistemology from its sources
is linked to a model rationality (symbolized as male) in
which the symbolic female is dominated or repressed, and
'transcended'. Irigaray suggests that this has led to the
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apotheosis of rationality-modern technology-and to
apparently unstoppable processes of destruction . "54 The
rationality Whitford speaks of is a specific model based
on the process of exclusion,
a
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adequate conceptualization,m , psychoanalytic terms, the male does notrepress or split off the female/unconscious, butacknowledges or integrates it.^
The strategy of mimesis then involves occupying the
male position in order to disrupt it thus making a space
for possible other, female subjects. This strategy also
is necessary in another sense, implied in Whitford'
s
observation that simple opposition to the male form of
rationality would be dangerous and ultimately
counterproductive. Simple opposition would merely amount
to women returning to their place in the male order of
exclusion. To simply proclaim a female rationality
incommensurable to male rationality would be to reenact
the dominant symbolic order based on the process of
exclusion
.
As Whitford mentions, mimesis also serves an
"ecological" function,
We might note also that of the terms Irigaray uses:
mimesis, mimetisme, masque, etc., one of them,
mimetisme, usually translated mimeticism, comes from
the domain of animal ethology and means 'camouflage'
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more clearly, Whitford believes Irigaray understands
the feminine as receptacle for the natural world, the male
psyche's attempt to distance itself from nature,
t is significant that Irigaray stresses that nature(the natural world) is not respected. This is not
fmf yha t- VerS1°n ° f ecofeminism (though it is thattoo
,
but. part Of her argument about the symbolicdistribution, and the allocation of the "lower
unctions" to women. The symbolic distribution islerarchical
. What is being disrespected is thoseparts of himself that the male imaginary has splitoff and projected— into the world, on to women
.
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At the risk of repeating the same point again,
another observer of Irigaray' s mimetic style, Judith
Butler, has clearly and concisely presented the core of
Irigaray' s observations on the operations of Plato's
philosophy of
observing the
regarding the
language,
exclusion. Butler begins the exposition by
similarities between Irigaray and Derrida
role of exclusion in philosophy and
For both Derrida and Irigaray, it seems, what is
excluded from this binary is also produced by it in
the mode of exclusion and has no separable or fully
independent existence as an absolute outside. A
constitutive or relative outside is, of course,
composed of a set of exclusions that are nevertheless
internal to that system as its own nonthematizable
necessity. It emerges within the system as
incoherence, disruption, a threat to its own
systematicity
.
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Butler's analysis concentrates on Plato's Timaen, and
a passage, "which is about the very problem of passage:
namely, that passage by which a form can be said to
generate its own sensible representation." 59 As Butler
translates Plato’s passage, there are three "nature's"
involved in the reproduction, or the representation, of a
Form, "The first, which is the process of generation; the
second, that in which the generation takes place; and the
third, that of which the thing generated is a resemblance
naturally produced." Plato then asserts as example that
we may "liken the receiving principle to a mother, and the
source or spring to a father, and the intermediate nature
to a child .
" ( 50d)
~
u What becomes disruptive for Plato's
explanation of reproductive mimesis, what becomes central
to Irigaray's mimetic strategy, is the proclaimed
unrepresentability of the mother/receptacle
. Butler
summarizes
,
In effect, the receiving principle potentially
includes all bodies, and so applies universally, but
its universal applicability must not resemble at all,
ever those eternal realities ( eidos ) that in the
Timaeus prefigure universal forms, and that pass into
the receptacle. There is here a prohibition on
resemblance (mimeta ) , which is to say that this
nature cannot be said to be like either the eternal
Forms or their material, sensible, or imaginary
copies
.
But this "unrepresentable" cannot be identified with the
mother, the womb, or any other "thing" which can be seen,
anything which is "specular." So the "feminine" is not
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representable at all.
in fact "conflate" the
feminine or receptacle
(Butler observes that Kristeva does
unrepresentable or
"unthematizable"
with maternal/nurse figures
.) 62
Butler then asks how language attempts to capture that
unrepresentable feminine "outside" of linguistic
representation, "Is it not the case that there is within
any discourse, and thus within Irigaray's as well, a set
of constitutive exclusions that are inevitably produced by
the circumscription of the feminine as that which
monopolizes the sphere of exclusion ?" 62 in Plato's
attempt to exclude the feminine/female from the field of
representability he initiates a tradition of western
philosophy where the male subject is viewed as self
producing,
(Irigaray's) reading establishes the cosmogony of theForms in the Timaeus as a phallic fantasy of a fully
self-constituted patrilineality, and this fantasy of
auto genesis or self-constitution is effected through
a denial and cooptation of the female capacity for
reproduction. Of course, the "she" who is the
"receptacle" is neither a universal nor a particular,
and because for Plato anything that can be named is
either a universal or a particular, the receptacle
cannot be named. 4
But this is the aim of Irigaray's strategy of mimesis, to
name the unnameable, or at least the unnameable within
this all pervasive "phallic" order. As Butler indicates,
Plato is himself forced to name the unnameable under the
threat that a multiplicity of names may be assigned to it.
Just prior to Plato's exclusion of the receptacle of
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representation from the order of the representable, he
indicates that a man must control his passions or
appetites. If he is unable to control this "evrdence of
the soul's materiality" he risks succumbing to the
irrationality of the material, and therefore he will
increasingly resemble women and even "beasts." The male
serves as the model which is only inferiority represented
in women and animals. But an inferior copy still has some
resemblance to the original and so invites some naming.
The "feminine" invites philosophical contradiction. Plato
claims the nature which supports the process of
representation has no form, no ontological status, and so
cannot properly be represented in language, yet he names
this "receptacle" or space. If no name were provided then
the system of representation would be threatened.
Precisely because this receptacle can only occasion aradically improper speech, that is, a speech in which
a -Ll ontological claims are suspended, the terms by
which it is named must be consistently applied, notin order to make the name fit the thing named but
precisely because that which is to be named can have
no proper name, bounds and threatens the sphere of
linguistic propriety, and, therefore, must be
controlled by a forcibly imposed set of nominative
rules .
^
Irigaray's strategy then is to inhabit the language
of the philosopher in order to reveal what remains as the
condition of its own possibility even as it is excluded
from representation. The strategy is to mime the passages
which operate to exclude the feminine and present woman as
549
an inferior copy. The point is to show how what is
excluded as unrepresentable is already within the system
of representation. Mimetic representation will be
repeated, reproduced, copied until "this emergence of the
outside within the system calls into question its
systematic closure and its pretension to be self-
grounding. "66 In miming the philosophers and
psychoanalysts Irigaray both violates the "prohibition
against resemblance" and the "notion of resemblance as
copy. The system of representation is shown to be an
effect of power, "Insofar as the Platonic account of the
origin is itself a displacement of a maternal origin,
Irigaray merely mimes that very act of displacement,
displacing the displacement, showing that origin to be an
effect of a certain ruse of phallogocentric power.
"
66
Irigaray is playing with representation, using mimesis to
disrupt the prevailing order and to make a space for an
alternative representation from which women are not
excluded, To play with mimesis is thus, for a woman, to
try to recover the place of her exploitation by discourse,
without allowing herself to be simply reduced to it... so
as to make ’visible, ' by an effect of playful repetition,
what was supposed to remain invisible: the cover up of a
possible operation of the feminine in language." 69
However, Butler is not satisfied with the strategy,
for it seems in its miming to reenact the logic of
identity it seeks to challenge. Why should the "feminine"
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be identified with the space of unrepresentability?
Butler insistently recalls the consequences of Plato's
exclusions which go beyond the feminine,
exc^usion
C
n?°
graPhY intelliSi*ility depends on thel of women, slaves, children, and animals,
where slaves are characterized as those who do notspeak his language, and who, in not speaking hislanguage, are considered diminished in their capacity
or reason. This xeno phobic exclusion operatesthrough the production of racialized Others, andthose whose "natures" are considered less rational by
virtue of their appointed task in the process oflaboring to reproduce the conditions of private life.This domain of the less rational human bounds thefigure of human reason, producing that "man" as one
who is without a childhood; is not a primate, and so
relieved of the necessity of eating, defecating,
living and dying; one who is not a slave, but always
a property holder; one whose language remains
snd untranslatable. This is a figure of
bi s embodiment
,
but one that is nevertheless a figure
of a body, a bodying forth of a masculinized
rationality, the figure of a male that is not a body,
a figure in crisis, a figure that enacts a crisis it
cannot fully control . 70
Butler wonders if Irigaray's strategy, which tends to
keep in place a heterosexual economy, might present the
possibility of not only the feminine "penetrating" the
masculine order of representation, but also the feminine
the feminine, and the masculine the masculine, to the
point where the status of the terms of feminine and
masculine begins to destabilize. The destabilization of
reason's claim to represent itself would then come from a
variety of directions,
To the extent that a set of reverse mimes emerge from
those quarters, they will not be the same as each
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pnH ttnc 6/ will come from many quartersa d those resignifying practices will converge inK the self- repncating°pSp^0nsreason s mastery. For if the copies speak nr ifwhat is merely material begins to signify^ thestenography of reason is rocked by the crisis onwhich it was always built 71
Mimetic Possibilities
The question now is, how do these observations by
feminist theorists of representation and female
subjectivity along with those feminist challenges to the
dominant ideology of science come together in a way which
addresses the concerns and claims of ecofeminism?
Further, how might Adorno's development and transformation
of Benjamin's understanding of mimesis stimulate new
possibilities for radical ecology? How can the complex
critique of male domination be articulated with radical
ecology s central concerns about the destruction of
nature? Can the idea/ term/concept/process of mimesis
enlighten us about the process of the domination of
nature, especially those conjunctions of dominations which
include women? Can the nature that is used by culture to
create second nature be transformed once more to become
the "culture used by nature to restore nature, " to end its
unnecessary destruction, and pointless suffering?
The strength of feminism has been its ability, based
on its recognition of the unfreedom and suffering of
actual women in their day-to-day lives, to generate a
552
variety of analyses which have revealed the depth and
breadth of the domination of women under social systems
controlled by and for the benefit of men. Further, women
with feminist commitments have been able to show an
adequate answer to the problem does not consist in a
"liberal" solution of equal inclusion in the existing
system. The problem of domination goes to the very
structure of language and beyond to the unconscious
imaginings of both men and women, to how we become
gendered subjects capable of speech, and to the question
of how the images, concepts and practices of society can
be changed. Central to this desired change is the
impossible image of the new world of the future to be
formed in the present. What image (s) will spark the
imaginations, open the unconscious, and provide the energy
to motivate other individuals and new generations to
continue hoping and struggling for a changed world, a
world where suffering recedes and the ideas of freedom and
happiness can truly fulfill themselves in concrete
reality?
To ask these questions might seem to have already
surrendered to an optimism contradicting so many
representations of critical theory as the "Melancholy
Science ." 72 What I want to examine here is the similarity
of Adorno's concerns to many of those voiced by feminism
and ecofeminism. This is not an attempt to claim that the
concerns or the concepts and terms used are the same, that
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there is an identity between them, but it does seem
correct to claim that the similarities are not fortuitous
but result instead from the fact that they are related
through the objects of their studies. This would be
perfectly in keeping with Adorno's temperament and his
belief that "Truth is objective, not plausible ." 73 As
Susan Buck-Morss has indicated,
The uniquely individual experiences of critical
subjectivity ran parallel because they focused onparticulars which reflected the same objective
reality, and it followed that collaboration waspossible among intellectuals even when they worked
alone. Nothing pleased Adorno more than when a
riend came to similar insights independently, for he
considered it a validation of their correctness.
What needs to be examined here is Adorno’s
74
understanding of how the idea of mimesis helps illuminate
an understanding of aesthetic phenomenon, including the
relationship of aesthetics to: the domination of nature,
subjectivity, and new possibilities (the not-yet)
Often mimesis seems to be equated with aesthetic
behavior, as when the mimetic is represented as
representation in poetry, painting, or music themselves.
Adorno does not collapse mimesis into aesthetics,
Aesthetic behaviour is neither mimesis pure and
simple nor the repression of mimesis. It is a
process set in motion by mimesis, a process also in
which mimesis itself survives through adaptation.
This process shapes both the relation of the
individual to art and the historical macrocosm. It
congeals in works of art in so far as they represent
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Mimesis "survives" in the form of aesthetic behavior,
but it is not unchanged, and this raises the question of
the possibility of recuperation of the mimetic impulse,
and of what forms a recovered mimesis might take in
relation to a world freed of domination. Negatively, the
triumph of one transformation of mimesis, "instrumental
rationality," is the death of reason more broadly
understood,
Thinking begins to turn around in circles when it
shrinks back from the task of sublimating mimeticbehaviour. The deadly dichotomization of emotion andthought is a historical result that can be undone.
Rfiiio devoid of mimesis negates itself. (Ends, the
raison d'etre of raison
,
are qualitative and the
mimetic faculty is a qualitative faculty.) This
self-negation of reason, it should be added, is
historically necessary: as the world objectively
loses its openness, it tends to have less and less
need for spirit, which is defined by its openness;
indeed, the world has become quite intolerant of
spirit
.
b
The intolerance for openness to otherness or the non-
identical is a manifestation of "reified consciousness."
Fredric Jameson has helpfully located within negative
dialectics the place of the critique of capitalism Adorno
borrows from Marx, and shown that it is intimately
connected to a certain understanding of the psychology of
the individual and to the figure of mimesis.' 7 Capitalism
as it consolidated itself especially from 1945 to the
1960s was also gaining increased control over
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subjectivity,
between figure
As Jameson argues, Adorno's writing moves
s of private property and personal identity,
The figures of the tendential restriction of the
the'Iocial divisS; Tj^ increasin9 Penetration by
Capital itself h m labor ' re 3 oln the language ofc u i , and Adorno can speak of an "ora^niccomposition of capital" within the psychic sub”nat is to say, an increasingly higher Dercentanp n-Fmental machinery and instrumental operations asopposed to living human labor, to the free
subjectivity whose role is ever more diminished Nowhuman creativity shrinks to machine-minding andreason to a fitful organic impulse. 7 ^
Reification for Adorno however, again, should not be
viewed as identical to the crude or orthodox Marxist
understanding of "alienated objectification of
subjectivity" exemplified in the factory setting alone,
although it is that too. Martin Jay makes clear that
Adorno s understanding of reification owes as much to
Nietzsche as Marx in that reification is better understand
throughout Adorno's writings as "the suppression of
heterogeneity in the name of identity." 79 Mimesis
provides an avenue of resistance to reification,
resistance to the near total suppression of otherness
which still assumes the name of reason, but which has
become a reason turned against itself, reduced to mere
means. How can mimesis resist the logic of identity, the
collapse of the unique characteristics of the particular
or the individual into a positivistically manipulable
variable? As Adorno explains, mimesis must become an ally
of the new, "At the same time thrill is mimetic behaviour:
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it responds to abstractness in mimetic ways. Now, it is
only through the new that mimesis can be so firmly wedded
to rationality that it will not regress, for ratio itself
becomes mimetic through the thrill of the new ." 80
course "the new" has also become an integral part of
capitalism, especially "late capitalism" with its
increasing reliance on fashion--change of style;
Of
In its original economic setting, novelty is thatcharacteristic of consumer goods through which theysupposed to set themselves off from the self-sameaggregate supply, stimulating consumer decisions
subject to the needs of capital
... .Art has
appropriated this economic category. The new in artis the aesthetic counterpart to the expanding
reproduction of capital in society. Both hold outthe promise of undiminished plenitude
.
81
The ever recurring image of the advertiser is the
appearance of the new product which in its fantastic
representation quenches the ideal consumer's never ending
thirst for more. Capitalism portrays the answer to the
end of suffering as the latest consumer item, art offers
an alternative reality. Of course nothing would ever be
so simple for Adorno as to say that the realization of the
new would be Utopia, for "The new is the longing for the
new, not the new itself. This is the curse of everything
new. Being a negative of the old, the new is subservient
to the old while considering itself to be Utopian ." 82 How
is the time after suffering to be represented? Here is
the problem of representing the unrepresentable again, but
this is an unrepresentable future not the unrepresentable
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before the (male) subject. What light is shed by mimesis
on the problem of the unrepresentability of the Utopian
future?
The utopia of undiminished plenitude is the image art
offers against the repetition of the same and suffering
within the logic of identity and the domination of nature,
but mimesis, as Adorno presents it, is at the core of
art's mission, "Mimesis is the ideal of art, not some
practical method or subjective attitude aimed at
expressive values. What the artist contributes to
expression is his ability to mimic, which sets free in him
the expressed substance .
"
8
8
Adorno attempts to explain
this freeing of the substance of the artist (which is not
the same as subjective expression as usually understood in
aesthetic philosophy)
,
and he does this through discussion
of the "linguistic character of art" (which should not be
confused with language as one medium of aesthetic
expression) . The "linguistic construction" in art
including writing such as by James Joyce, may develop to
the point where discursive language is "subordinated" to
"attempts to move from communicative to mimetic
language ." 84 The "speechless" language of art is a moment
in art that has "priority" over even the "significative"
in poetry, music, sculpting, for example. In art work,
for example Etruscan vases, this key element is present in
an individual form, "As for those vases, their similarity
to language seems to say something like 'this is me' or
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'here I come', asserting a selfhood which is not carved
out of the interdependent totality of being by identifying
thought but stands on its own. In the same way, a
speechless animal, say a rhinoceros, seems to be saying 'I
am a rhino. "’*5 This declaration on the part of the art
work like that of the individual animal is an assertion of
Its uniqueness and of its participation in "spirit," as
Adorno explains,
f*
S
f
rt w°rks were re-enacting the processthrough which the subject comes painfully into being.They do so by adapting themselves to the subject by
means of the structural properties they acquire. Artpossesses expression not when it conveys
subjectivity, but when it reverberates with theprimal history of subjectivity and ensoulment. Anykind of emotional tremolo that wants to capture this
is a pale surrogate of this primary trembling. 86
What is being imitated is the process which brings
into being the unique and therefore inimitable. In
addition, in Adorno's theory of aesthetics, mimesis has an
ambivalent relationship within art, it is the basis for
the critical subjectivity made possible by "authentic"
art, but it also participates in that adapting function
imposed by society's domination of the individual,
This modification of mimesis is the constitutive act
of spiritualization in art, prior to any reflection
upon spirit which develops spiritualization further.
Spirit is already posited in this modified mimesis by
the work; perhaps spirit even occurs in the original
form of mimesis itself, which would make mimesis the
physiological progenitor, as it were, of spirit. On
the other hand, modified mimesis has to bear some of
the blame for art's affirmative essence because it
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”akln3 it; controllable within aP ity without really changing it
.
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For Adorno then, art remains within the sphere of
"universal alienation" but it is at least partially less
alienated to the extent that "in art everything passes
through spirit" so that it is "humanized in a non-
repressive, non-violent way." Art is forced to use the
means of domination of nature to some extent in order to
express the possibility of an alternative existence
without domination, alienation or suffering. Expression
m art then is part of the attempt to create a new
subjectivity, "The emancipation of society from the
predominance of material, economic conditions aims at
creating a true subject which has been stymied so far.
Seen from this point of view, expression reflects not only
the subject's hubris but also its just complaint about the
failure of subjectivity, expression being the cipher for
the possibility of that subjectivity ." 88 This cipher or
hieroglyph of subjectivity is an image of a future
possibility, where suffering is absent and pleasure and
happiness reign. The moment of joy in art has a certain
playfulness to it which, although it does not indicate art
can be reduced to a form of play, implies for Adorno that
freedom from repression will have certain childlike and
"clownish" aspects,
The attraction clowns have for children is the same
as the attraction art has for them. Both kinds of
attraction are rooted out by the world of adults,
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'
What can be taken from these observations by Adorno
and feminists who are trying to find alternatives to the
present order of dominating subjectivity? First, mimesis
Plays a fundamental role in the emergence of subjectivity.
When combined with the discussion of mimesis in Di a i»rH r
Qf Enlightenment
, passages on mimesis in Aesthetic T h „„ r ..
and elsewhere reveal a consistent concern with mimesis as
a primordial influence on if not foundation for
subjectivity. Mimesis has evolved through human history,
and also natural history, in various directions from magic
to science, art and elsewhere. In its metamorphoses
however it retains a moment which challenges the
overwhelmingly repressive uses to which it has been put.
Examples of this moment can be found in areas of life
which resist assimilation into the logic of identity and
domination
.
Adorno focused on art and critical philosophy as two
of these areas in mutual need of each other. Critical
philosophy and art formed the basis of his understanding
of negative dialectics, which retains the hope of an
alternative future, one freed of unnecessary suffering and
open to the possibility of true happiness. Feminist women
have focused their concerns on similar areas but even more
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persistently on the problem of the domination of women and
the practices of resistance which remain and which retain
potentials for further development. Therefore, it is now
time to turn to some feminist concerns which have more
immediate ethical and political implications. Some of
these observations about a possible alternative ethical
basis for political action have been well developed, some
have only been vaguely outlined or suggested. However,
two areas which have been of consistent or recurring
importance have been the issue of "animal rights" and that
of the mother-child relationship. A guiding question for
examining these issues is, "How can the above observations
on mimesis and subjectivity aid in addressing these two
concerns?" Finally, what are the more politically
specific ramifications of "mimetic subjectivity" for
radical ecology and its place in democracy?
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CHAPTER 11
ECOFEMINISM AND POLITICS
Ma] °r diff iculties have developed for ecofeminism
around the attempt to derive political guidance from the
combination of radical ecological and feminist insights.
These difficulties in relation to some of the more
specifically political implications of ecofeminism will be
emphasized in this chapter. An obvious connection between
feminism and radical ecology has been women’s involvement
m the "animal rights" movement. Many ecofeminists now
reject the arguments put forth by the earlier defenders of
animal rights and have turned to alternatives which
circulate around the idea of an "ethic of care." A second
area of concern has been the politics of motherhood or the
mother-child relationship, which has been central to
feminist and especially psychoanalytically inclined
feminists theoretical development.^- However, the
analysis of motherhood takes on an added level of
complexity when ecofeminists' concerns about the long-
standing association of women with nature are included,
especially as these impact issues of reproduction. The
obvious problematic metaphor frequently used in connection
to this complex of issues is "Mother Earth." Finally,
although there has been increasing attention paid to
practical political considerations, the "tactics" of
ecofeminism, this now must be more directly related back
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re, especially from
to the insights derived elsewhe
cultural or radical feminism, if ecofeminism is to retain
its philosophical and political coherence. To that end,
new theories of radical democracy may provide important
clues to the formation of a coherent and effective radical
democratic ecological/ecofeminist politics.
Women and Animals
There has been widespread rejection by ecofeminists
of the major theories based in either utilitarianism or
Kantian ethics which defend "animal rights." For example,
Deborah Slicer has shown how two of the most influential
of these theorists, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, have
failed to adequately take into account the context of
moral decisions about animals, as well as not being able
to include the specificity of concrete individuals in
their reasoning. These utilitarian and rights arguments
®quent ly narrow to questions about choices between
certain classes of animals versus the human benefits from
sacrificing the animal, such as whether medical research
should be done on animals in order to save or prolong a
single human life. As Slicer puts it, they demand a
response to the question "Your daughter or your dog ?" 2
Slicer associates these arguments with the "justice
tradition" or the "ethic of justice, " which relies on some
essential, or "lowest common denominator" criterion by
which to make the judgment about which animals deserve
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moral or ethical consideration. The animal rights
defenders are then criticized for the ethical
inconsistencies associated with essentialism,
"Singer and
Regan, like their mentors the utilitarians and Kant,
respectively, have an
• essentialist
' view of the moral
worth of both human beings and animals. This means that
they propose a single capacity—the possession of
interests— for being owed moral consideration ." 3 The
problem of essentialism in these cases, argues Slicer, is
related to the lack of context and individual specificity.
Certain relationships between the individual and others
are bracketed out of consideration, such as those of
family and friendship. The individual being under
consideration is also abstracted from any specific history
either of the situation or their identity, "Specifically,
animal rights theories reduce individuals to that
atomistic bundle of interests that the justice tradition
recognizes as the basis for moral considerableness. In
effect, animals are represented as beings with the kind of
capacity that human beings most fully possess and deem
valuable for living a full human life."^ Slicer notes how
these arguments retain features of a "masculine" sense of
self which attempts a radical separation from all that is
"other, " a self which is unable to "recognize and respect"
the other if it differs from what is deemed essential to
the "human." This moral tendency has been shown to go
beyond animal rights theorists to include many who
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identify themselves as deep ecologists in their claims to
seek to protect what they identify as part of themselves.
In this form of deep ecology, the masculine self simply
expands to include certain other beings, but which remain
morally defensible only in terms of the extent they are
like the self . 5 Generally, this involves the
"assimilation of the other into the sameness of the self"
where specific differences are erased. Alternatively,
Slicer argues that difference rather than sameness can be
the basis of a more adequate ethic, "There is no reason
why animals’ differences, independence, indifference
cannot be grounds for caring, for relationships
characterized by such ethically significant attitudes as
respect, gratitude, compassion, fellow or sisterly
feeling, and wonder ." 5 This is an attitude she also
associates with competent scientific practice, including
some forms of animal research such as that done by Jane
Goodall
.
The justice tradition influenced arguments have
further characteristics of masculine self-identity.
Animal rights defenders tend to extract the moral
situations from specific contexts in an attempt to
establish ever more general, abstract and universal
principles for decision making. Many details of the
supposedly representative moral situations they examine,
such as the "historical, social, economic, familial," and
so on, are simply omitted . 7 This is purposely done to
572
eliminate consideration of specific differences in order
to be able to acknowledge the criterion that is necessary
for an appropriate moral decision. That quality which is
the
.'same" in relation to principies of morality achieves
a higher status than the other non-essential or different
aspects of the situation. This has the intended result of
establishing that there are some beings worth greater
moral consideration than others. Slicer believes any
feminist or ecofeminist ethic must not succumb to the
"logic of domination" which she believes characterizes
this form of argumentation, one which ultimately seeks a
justification of some "subordination." Slicer draws on
Karen Warren's explanation of this logic of domination and
how it is based on dualistic and hierarchical thinking.
Slicer believes that despite the beneficial effects which
have been achieved by the animal rights theories, they
have been shown to be too limited for the needs of
ecofeminism, "Singer and Regan retain an unfortunate
logic of domination' in their respective theories. Their
atemporal, abstract, and acontextual characterizations of
issues, of the values at stake, and of appropriate
resolutions grossly oversimplify some of these highly
complex issues, including the research one ." 8 However,
Slicer leaves undeveloped her call for an ecofeminist
ethic which can integrate "affective responses" into its
considerations. She does not deny that general principles
are needed to guide moral decisions, but she insists that
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affective responses" also are appropriate and helpful in
resolving moral and ethical dilenrtas in everyday life
where specific individual identities and context are
important. Without developing her argument further she
still asserts that, "An ecofeminist ethic will emerge out
of individuals' concrete relationships and experiences and
will recognize a variety of affective responses along with
formal and abstract principles, all in their appropriate
contexts. "9 slicer then calls for other "feminist voices"
to articulate the grounds for this ecofeminist ethic,
which she believes can be developed in response to her
"gut feeling" of antipathy toward the animal rights
arguments
.
As clues to this future ecofeminist ethic, in
addition to work by Karen Warren and Marti Kheel, Slicer
also mentions Sara Ruddick's writing on "maternal
thinking." Before taking up the ethical possibilities of
maternal thinking" it may be illuminating to discuss
another feminist's analysis of the animal rights issues,
one which makes explicit reference to Horkheimer and
Adorno's critical theory.
Josephine Donovan also includes in her examination of
the animal rights theorists the ecofeminist critiques
which reject the masculinist rationalism of the justice
tradition in favor of some reliance on "sentiment or
emotion." (Already obvious from these two examples is the
tendency of the arguments between ecofeminists and animal
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rights theorists to dichotomize.) After noting the
validity of criticisms of the ecofeminist positions which
tend to essentialize women's ways of knowing, Donovan
concludes, "One cannot simply turn uncritically to women
as a group or to a female value system as a source for a
humane relationship ethic with animals. "1° Donovan like
Slicer finds Regan's extension of natural rights theory
inadequate for addressing moral dilemmas. However, she
emphasizes that Regan actually argues against Kant who
claimed "animals
... are there merely as a means to an end.
That end is man.-H Kant argued this position as a result
of attributing to rational beings an "absolute worth":
rational beings are an end in themselves. Rationality was
deemed the basic criteria for treatment; the possession of
reason determines "inherent value.” If a being possesses
rationality it is a moral agent and should not be treated
as a means. Regan, argues Donovan, rejects Kant's and
nearly all of the Enlightenment thinkers' exclusive
identification of rationality with human beings, and
instead replaces the criteria of rationality with that of
"complex awareness." However, this is in effect, claims
Donovan, a way of reinvoking the rationality criteria by
merely extending its applications to some other beings.
She believes this does not provide an adequate basis for
resolving some common moral or ethical dilemmas, "This
criterion leaves open the question of severely retarded
humans, humans in irreversible comas, fetuses, even human
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infants. Regan's criterion in fact privileges those with
complex awareness over those without ." 12
Donovan argues that Peter Singer's utilitarian
position actually provides alternatives which "cultural
feminism" may be able to "reformulate" to establish a
viable ecofeminist ethic. The key concept of the
utilitarian argument is not a reliance on rationality or
complex consciousness, but "on the capacity to feel—or
the capacity to suffer-as the criterion by which to
determine those who are entitled to be treated as ends ." 13
The acknowledgment of the capacity to suffer as the
primary criterion for judgment of ethical or moral value
is traced back to Jeremy Bentham
.
14
singer has elaborated
this position which fundamentally claims that what applies
to both humans and animals with respect to moral
consideration is what they have in common, which is
sensibility" or "the capacity to feel pain and experience
pleasure." In Donovan’s summary of the utilitarian
argument for animal rights the essence of the position is
that pain and suffering are bad and should be prevented
or minimized, irrespective of the race, sex, or species of
the being that suffers ." 15 The fundamental problem with
this position, she counters, is that Singer assumes that
similar suffering must be valued egually. "Equal
valuation" would require the adding-up of suffering on the
various sides of the moral situation and coming down on
the side which "suffers most." This requires a
576
"quantification of suffering" (suffering's
"mathematization") which, claims Donovan, also leads to
the "scientific modality" or consciousness which
"legitimates animal sacrifice. "16 Donovan therefore
rejects Singer's utilitarian theory of animal rights as
simply another form of the "mode of manipulative mastery"
and instead turns to "cultural feminism" for ethical
insights
.
Donovan summarizes what she believes to be the
essence of cultural feminism's contribution to
ecofeminism, "From the cultural feminist viewpoint, the
domination of nature, rooted in postmedieval. Western,
male psychology, is the underlying cause of the
mistreatment of animals as well as of the exploitation of
women and the environment." 17 Donovan notes that there
has been a long-standing tradition of critique of "the
logical fallacies inherent in the scientific
epistemology, " but indicates it was Horkheimer and Adorno
in Dialectic of Enlightenment who "first made the
connection between what Husserl called the
mathema t i s a t ion of the world' and the derogation of women
and animals.
"
±8 Donovan's attention to the critical
theorists, in the present context, must be emphasized and
expanded upon.
In Dialecti c of Enlightenment it is pointed out that
"In the impartiality of scientific language, that which is
powerless has wholly lost any means of expression." 1 ^
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Among the powerless are women and animals whose
subjectivities and experiences aroP e
' according to Donovan,
erased or converted into manipulable objects. "20 This
conceptual model then views all individuals, whether
human, animal, or other, as mere examples in a
"repeatable, replaceable process. "21 Donovan's quotes of
the critical theorists show how scientific epistemology is
part of the "material conditions of social domination"
Where scientists in physiological laboratories force now
defenseless animals to give up information from their
mutilated bodies. The authority to inflict this pain
comes from the power of Reason which belongs to "man"
alone. Those who do not meet the standards of Reason are
inferior and only capable of knowing "irrational terror."
The emotional consequence of this was that the (male)
scientist was not to feel compassion for the irrational,
no empathy for his victims. The responsibility for
compassion and empathy, made necessary by the division of
labor required for social domination, was placed with
women. The process of consolidating the division of labor
included the gendered division of social labor whose long
history has been punctuated by especially significant
moments of domination. One important moment is emphasized
both by early cultural feminists and by the critical
theorists--the witchhunts. As Donovan indicates, the
control of "witches" was a symptom of the early modern
period of history when there developed "the new need to
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erase and subdue anomalous, disorderly (and thus feminine)
nature. "22 As Horkheimer and Adorno also argued, these
actions served to consolidate certain social powers and to
abolish surviving forms of alternative social
possibilities,
"The witchcraft trials which the associated
feudal racketeers used to terrorize the masses when they
felt themselves threatened, served at once to celebrate
and to confirm the triumph of male society over
prehistoric matriarchal and mimetic stages of
development. "23 Donovan connects these observations with
cultural feminism's additional critique of the "Cartesian
masculinization of thought." However, we can concentrate
here on the additional meditations of the critical
theorists on the connections made between the "dialectic
of enlightenment" and women, animals, and the domination
of nature. The critical theorists claim the "truths"
achieved in laboratories of animal research are frequently
applicable to humans, but to humans who have been
distorted as much as the animals sacrificed. The facts
and figures.
The behaviorists ... force from defenseless animals in
their nauseating physiological laboratories stresses
the contrast quite adroitly. The conclusion they
draw from mutilated bodies applies not to animals in
the free state but to man as he is today. It shows
that because he does injury to animals, he and he
alone in all creation voluntarily functions as
mechanically, as blindly and automatically as the
twitching limbs of the victim.
^
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Just as the animal subjected to laboratory research
becomes an object for the repetition of acts of domination
and a sign confirming that power, so too "woman" signifies
the triumph of male domination.
She became the embodiment of the biological functionthe image of nature, the subjugation of which
constituted that civilization's title to fame. Formillennia men dreamed of acquiring absolute masteryover nature, of converting the cosmos into oneimmense hunting-ground. It was to this that the ideaof man was geared in a male-dominated society This
was the significance of reason, his proudest boast . 25
After the witch trials and with the consolidation of
capitalism and the bourgeois class, women's culture
becomes even more clearly a signifier of the domination of
nature,
The bourgeoisie profited from female chastity and
propriety--the defense mechanisms left by matriarchal
revolt. Woman herself, on behalf of all exploited
nature, gained admission to a male-dominated world,
but only in a broken form. In her spontaneous
submission she reflects for her vanquisher the glory
of his victory, substituting devotion for defeat,
nobility of soul for despair, and a loving breast for
a ravished heart
.
25
Therefore any turn to women "as they are," or as they
occupy the space of "woman, " for ethical guidance is
problematic, as their "subjectivity" is infused with the
practice of domination. Even notions of the female
traditionally associated with art and beauty are
manifestations of the domination of nature, "Woman has
been made the caretaker of all things beautiful. The
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modern female puritan eagerly took up the office. She
identified herself fully with the status quo, with nature
domesticated, not red in tooth and claw. "27 Too easily
women have identified not with the wildness of nature, its
independent moment of resistance to domination by men, but
instead with the nature men have mastered, a nature
"harmonized and beautified" to reflect the needs of the
dominating class. However, even in these "harmonized"
forms nature retains a moment of resistance to domination.
Although art, beauty, and women do not immediately reflect
a truth outside the structures of domination, they retain
a double message which still might be heard, "Art, custom,
and sublime love are masks in which nature reappears
transformed into her own antithesis. Through these masks
she acquires the gift of speech; out of her distortion
emerges her essence ." 28 Even though there are the
distortions of domination which appear in all
manifestations of culture there remains the independent
moment of nature, the irreducibility of the object.
However, even as they seem to be opening to theoretical
possibilities of escape, the critical theorists (in an
expression which lends credence to charges of extreme
pessimism and hopelessness made so frequently against the
founders of critical theory) lament the extent to which
nature has been processed through the machines of
domination, "The earth, now rational, no longer feels the
need of an aesthetic reflection. The demonic element is
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wiped out by directly applying the desired imprint on
mankind. Domination no longer needs numinous images; it
produces them itself on an industrial scale and uses them
as a more reliable means of winning over the masses ." 29
In these reflections, the critical theorists link
together women, animals and the working class as objects
of the domination of nature, each manifesting in a
particular way what they have in common. Beyond any
simple economistic reduction, all of society operates
under the same principle of the "logic of identity" whose
"progress" consists of the elimination of the unique and
the individual, attempting to establish a world where
every object, every animal and human being, becomes
another example of the general truth of domination. The
process becomes ever more efficient, and ever more
effective at colonizing any deviation. The critical
theorists presented the culture industry (now probably
more readily understood by its self-label as the
entertainment industry")
,
as one example of this process,
The culture industry, like science, seeks a standard to
work to outside itself... in facts. Film stars are
experts; their performances are protocols of natural
behavior, a guide to approved responses. Producers and
script writers produce models for proficiently adjusted
conduct ." 30 If the logic of identity results in a
"totally administered society, " from where will the models
for an alternative future come? Nature perhaps? No, at
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least not the nature "red in tooth and claw" which is
beyond good and evil,
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as in every animal, sound evenm one s own rationalized and broken heart. Thetendencies revealed by such a voice are blind, yet
ubiquitous. Nature herself is neither good, as the
ancients believed, nor noble, as the latterday
Romantics would have it. As a model and goal itimplies the spirit of opposition, deceit, and
bestiality. Ji
However (in a negative or negating moment always
hovering just beyond their most pessimistic claims),
nature may be able to serve as a model to the extent it is
remembered. Only when seen for what it is, does nature
become existence's craving for peace, that consciousness
which from the very beginning has inspired an unshakable
resistance to Fuhrer and collective alike. Dominant
practice and its inescapable alternatives are not
threatened by nature, which tends rather to coincide with
them, but by the fact that nature is remembered ." 32 This
remembering of nature is expressed, for example, by
remembering those who have suffered from oppression
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throughout history, "One of the basic human rights
possessed by those who pick up the tab for the progress of
civilization is the right to be remembered.
.. This right
demands that the marks of humiliation be committed to
remembrance in the form of imagine. "33 The imagined
image is a reminder, a reminder of "past historical
suffering." 34 The images of the future will be negatively
permeated by past suffering; the not-yet of nature
continues to be indebted to the effects of past
domination. Even images of natural beauty, or aspects of
nature appreciated as beautiful, involve history which
makes remembrance possible,
There is no beauty without historical remembrance...
Although nature here appears untamed and removed fromhistory, this appearance belongs squarely to our ownhistorical epoch, arising in critical opposition to
social trends at a time when the network of social
relations is so tightly woven that the individual
rightly fears it may suffocate. By the same token,
there is no room for natural beauty in periods when
nature has an overpowering presence for man, as seems
to be the case with peasant populations which are
known to be insensitive to the aesthetic qualities of
natural scenery because to them nature is merely an
immediate object to be acted upon. 35
Perhaps the dream of a time when wilderness will be so
pervasive that its name is unnecessary will never come, at
least if we have the courage to never forget the current
state of the planet.
This discussion of natural beauty and its historical
relation to the domination of nature prompts the question-
-how then can the alternative to domination be
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aesthetics: to art and the critical evaluation of art
Adorno argues that a critical philosophy attempts to put
into concepts the process by which works of art attempt to
speak of an alternative world.
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Beauty in nature becomes a point for "second
reflection" about the direction of reason. Although a
moment in the process of self-reflection, the beautiful in
nature does not then become the principle of aesthetics,
"The beautiful in nature is different from both the notion
of a ruling principle and the denial of any principle
whatsoever. It is like a state of reconciliation." 3 ^ For
Adorno the "essence of natural beauty" is the "anamnesis"
of "something that is more than just for-other .
”
33 What
natural beauty suggests is an independent moment of nature
irreducible to an object for human use or conceptual
captivation. Neither does it mean that critical
reflection on art and its relationship to the beautiful in
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nature involves some "pointing" to a metaphysical
transcendence of material life. Ra ther
, art may provide
glimpse of a possibility which also appears in the
beautiful in nature. It is a glimpse of the possibility of
being more than just for-other. Art provides an image
which is denied in a society reduced to instrumental
rationality, to a world become means,
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.
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But then how does art function to provide images for
imitation, what is the process of mimesis released in this
understanding of aesthetics? What is the relationship
between mimetic acts in the present and the future
utopia? Adorno argues against any aesthetics which
attempts to assert that art should function to represent
the world as it is,
(Art works) transcend longing because they relate to
real historical being into which are etched the
outlines of want or neediness. By retracing these
outlines, art goes beyond mere being, passing over
into objective truth, for want implies the overcoming
of want. That which is--as an in-itself rather than
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We mUSt reverse the copy theory ofealist aesthetics: m a subtle sense reality oughtto imitate art works, not the other way around. 4 °
Art works are constellations of existing elements,
but not simple reproductions of existing relationships.
The mimetic moment in the new constellation of elements is
not an act of simply copying or mirroring of reality but
results in a displacement of current relationships. Art
works are indicators of possibility, of the not-yet,
By their presence art works signal the possibility of
the non-existent; their reality testifies to the
feasibility of the unreal, the possible. More
specifically, in art longing, which posits the
actuality of the non-existent, takes the form of
remembrance. Remembrance joins the present to the
past. Ever since the Platonic doctrine of anamnesis,
the yet-to-come, the potential, has taken on the form
of a recollective dream. Remembrance alone is able
to give flesh and blood to the notion of Utopia,
without betraying it to empirical life. All this, by
the way, does not mean that illusion is absent: what
is being dreamt does not exist: indeed, it never did
exist. Still, spontaneous recollection brings to
life empirical existence when it is harnessed to the
imagery of art. 4 ^
Art illuminates the possibility of a nature which
does not yet exist nor has it ever existed, a nature made
possible through the mediation of subjectivity. However,
this subjectivity is also not of the present, at least not
in its dominant forms, not in any form which can be simply
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copied. The transformation of subjectivity will involve a
complex relationship of creation and destruction, of life
and death, just as works of art destroy as they create.
Works of art succeed to the extent they betray mimesis,
"They kill what they objectify, tearing it away from its
context of immediacy and real life. They survive because
they bring death. This is particularly true of modern
art, where we notice a general mimetic abandonment to
reification, which is the principle of death. Illusion in
art is the attempt to escape from this principle ." 42 The
"escape" from the principle of death, from reification,
that reduction of life into a mere object, a thing, the
reduction of the other into yet another example, depends
on some possibility of humans acting otherwise. This is
what is meant when Adorno speaks of the possibility of
reconciliation.
Spirit tones down its antagonistic essence and
becomes conciliatory. This differs from what
classicism meant by reconciliation. Reconciliation
here refers to the mode of conduct of works of art in
so far as they become conscious of the non-identical
in their midst. By following the dynamic of self-
sameness to the end, art works assimilate themselves
to the non-identical. This is the stage of
development mimesis has reached today.
Reconciliation as method or mode of conduct is
discernible at the present time in those works which
have abandoned the traditional idea of
reconciliation, works where the form prescribes
intransigence .... The utopia anticipated by artistic
form is the idea that things at long last ought to
come into their own. Another way of putting this is
to call for the abolition of the spell of selfhood
hitherto promoted by the subject . 44
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The overcoming of the spell of selfhood as it appears in
the present dominant subject will require delving deep
into subjectivity's self-understanding and touching it
where mind and body meet/
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hetlC mode of behaviour assimilates itself tothat other rather than trying to subdue it. It isthis constitutive orientation of the subject towards
objectivity which joins eros to knowledge
.
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The possibility of an other subjectivity will make the
cells of the organism tremble.
If it is a not-yet subjectivity which the existing
subject shudders to encounter, then the question for
feminism and ecofeminism is whether the alternative
knowledge and ethics which they offer can serve as models
of a mode of behavior which is mimetic without reverting
to mere repetition of the existing system of domination,
the mere continuation of instrumental rationality and
reification behind a new mask.
(Earth) Mothers’ Standpoint
Sara Ruddick has attempted to build on the insights
of Hartsock, Harding and others who have elaborated a
feminist standpoint theory of knowledge and politics.
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Ruddick has specifically looked at the possibilities
generated in the relationship of "maternal thinking" to
feminist standpoint theory
.
45 Ruddick relates her own
biography and tells of how she began to encounter deeply
politically committed feminist texts which forced her to
begin to abandon what she calls her earlier "pluralist-
beliefs, the "idea that there were many perspectives and
hence many truths ." 46 Becoming active in a women's peace
group, she began to see how the "defense" establishment
and much of society were dedicated to "organized,
deliberate violence." It was in this context she
encountered feminist standpoint theory and attempted to
apply it to her previous understandings of maternal
thinking. Hartsock's claims for feminist standpoint
theory were related to the epistemic advantages of
starting from "women's work" especially as it has been
conceptualized as caring labor." Ruddick' s own concerns
with motherhood and especially the mother-child
relationship prompts her to inform the reader that
"maternal work" does not exhaust the category of caring
labor, but that it is a "central part of caring labor" and
therefore "maternal thinking" should be considered a
"constituent element of the standpoint that Hartsock
envisions ." 47 In bolstering the claim that motherhood
involves caring labor, Ruddick explains that care workers
are "immersed in the materials of the physical world,
"
including human and other bodies. To provide care these,
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usually female, workers depend on "practical knowledge of
the qualities of the material world." In explaining the
relationship of care giving to gendered thinking, Ruddick
repeats Hartsock's object relations theory inspired
description of the "abstract masculinity" which
"characterizes dominant views ." 48 Ruddick emphasizes the
need to recognize the difficulty of articulating an
alternative to the dominant, masculine, worldview,
"Maternal thinkers know that they have learned to speak in
the dominant languages, as do all members of a culture.
To articulate maternal thinking they have had to cling to
realities that they were in danger of forgetting and at
the same time forge a way of thinking that is new ." 49
Maternal thinkers, as care workers, join with other
standpoint theorists to "articulate an engaged vision"
which must be "struggled for and represents an
achievement ." 50 The possibility of a new way of thinking
therefore can be linked to caring work,
Caretakers work with subjects; they give birth to and
tend self-generating, autonomously willing lives. A
defining task of their work is to maintain mutually
helpful connections with another person—or animal
—
whose separateness they create and respect. Hence
they are continuously involved with issues of
connection, separation, development, change, and the
limits of control .... Their task, as they have learned
from the work of training children, is to articulate
conditions of respect for unpredictable and as yet
unimagined difference and variety among and within
people . 51
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It would be all too easy to see this as another case
of "complementary" spheres of activity, but Ruddick does
not see this way of acting and thinking as simply the
polar opposite of masculine thought, "The values of care
do not stand to dominant values of abstract masculinity as
the one reality stands to appearance; standpoint theorists
know this, of course, but any dualistic formulations tend
to reduce the richness and unpredictability both of the
world and of the ways in which we think about it. "52
Ruddick then has the task of developing the ethical
implications of this maternal thinking, and she does this
by linking it with the emerging discourse on the ethic of
care. ^ Criticism of the ethic of care as it has been
developed by ecofeminists has centered on the problematic
relationship of the ethic to "context" or "contextual
detail." As Tom Regan has complained.
Thus it is that a feminist ethic that is limited to
an ethic of care will, I think, be unable to
illuminate the moral significance of the idea that we
(human) animals are not superior to all other
animals... For where the care is unequal, and the
vocabulary of duties and rights has no voice, one's
ethical options seem to be exhausted. 5 ^
There is substantial truth to the criticisms of the
care ethic as this ethic has so far been presented,
especially within ecofeminism. However, the critics seem
to be insensitive, or uncomprehending, of some aspects of
the argument. The basic complaint, as it is almost always
presented by those who support a moralist argument of
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rights, is that the lack of moral rules invites the
disaster of moral relativism "a radical relativism of
values, where concepts of good and bad, right and wrong,
admit only of individual interpretations-becoming, in
fact, a mere registering of preferences—neither a
person feelings nor beliefs can provide ultimate answers
to moral questions. "55 whether a "radical relativism" of
values is inherent in the ethic of care does indeed need
to be addressed, but the demand for "ultimate answers,"
whether moral or otherwise, merely echoes the abstract,
ahistorical thought feminists have so convincingly
critiqued in so many contexts, and misses the point about
the inadequacy of abstract or universal rules for deciding
what is always an infinitely complex actual situation
where moral choices are made. An additional complaint
lodged against some versions of the ethic of care argument
is that if it is interpreted primarily as calling for a
"preservation of a web of relationships" then it will have
the politically conservative tendency of preserving
relationships of domination out of a tendency of the
"caregiver" to prefer those closest and most familiar. An
ecofeminist ethic then must answer to the charges of moral
relativism and its implicit, and sometimes
unselfconscious, acceptance of relationships of domination
and oppression.
Additionally, Dennis and Kathleen Johnson have
objected to the dualistic thinking which continues to
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care cite a
exist when the advocates of an ethic of
concern for difference in opposition to an alleged concern
for sameness by the "rights" supporters. As the Johnsons
have indicated, "Here we find an ostensible defense of
non-dualistic thinking based on an untenable dualism
between identity (or 'sameness') and difference ." 56 The
claim to moral superiority by the rights supporters then
is based on these inadequacies of the care ethic, "Our
focus on the morally relevant features of disparate
individuals is designed not as a reductive analysis of
their essential natures but simply as a means of avoiding
the vacuous proposals of 'life-based ethics' or the
conservatism of an ethic of care ." 57 Any alternative to
the moral rights position which addresses the problem of
"moral relativism" must also avoid the "intellectual trap"
of condemning the dualistic logic of sameness and
difference while affirming this dualism by its simple
reversal. To uncritically accept difference, or
diversity, as the criterion for moral decisions creates
ethical dilemmas which simply mirror those which result
from the valuing of sameness.
Although not advocating an ethic of care, Adorno's
own ethical concerns may provide a depth of insight which
may be lacking in the rights versus care argument as it
has thus far been developed in the ecofeminist literature.
The ethical dimension of Adorno's work has been most
persuasively developed by Drucilla Cornell . 58 Cornell
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examines the implications of Adorno's critiques of Kant
and Hegel by first distinguishing between morality and
ethics.
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the repressive aspects of competing moral
Cornell's subsequent interpretation of Adorno’s
"ethical message" then can also be read as an implicit
critique of those animal rights theories based in
categories taken from Kant and Utilitarianism.
Adorno begins with but goes beyond Hegel's critique
of Kant. He focuses on the repressive aspects of the
Kantian subject, as Cornell explains,
The Kantian subject, as a being of the flesh, falls
prey to the endless striving to subjugate his own
impulses and thus to secure the possibility of moral
action. Reason is geared solely to the preservation
of the subject, equated here with consciousness;
because of Kant's separation of consciousness from
the flesh, the subject is pitted against the object,
which includes that aspect of the subject conceived
empirically. Conceived in this way, the subject-
object relationship necessarily gives rise to the
master-slave dialectic. The master-slave dialectic
is played out in our relations to nature, taken here
to mean both against the external world of things,
and against our internal "nature" as physical, sexual
beings
.
60
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Hegel
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s
"system" was an attempt to address these
Kantian "repressions" and the consequences of
Enlightenment thought more generally which had produced "a
radical divide between subject and object, mind and
nature, and body and soul ." 61 in Hegel's works the
resolution of this division would then be a "state of
reconciliation" or "Absolute Knowledge" which would
consist of "self-recognition in absolute otherness."
Adorno however understands reconciliation differently,
"The idea of reconcilement forbids the positing of
reconcilement as a concept ." 62 The nonviolative
relationship to the other cannot be reduced to a static,
or transcendent concept, "The ideal of reconciliation can
be shown or disclosed but not conceptualized ." 63 This
understanding of reconciliation is useful in addressing
the moral rights defenders’ concerns about the tendency
for those who endorse difference as the basis for ethics
to be caught up in dualistic (and hierarchical) thinking.
This is also, simultaneously, an even more direct
challenge to the search for "sameness" as the criteria for
judgment. Cornell summarizes this ethical difference
Adorno represents, "Reconciliation is the art of disunion
that allows things to exist in their difference and in
their affinity. Adorno, then, is a philosopher of
reconciliation in a very specific sense. His defense of a
reconciled state is presented in the name of the plural
and of the different." 6 ^ In order to "decode" Adorno's
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"ethical message" Cornell elaborates on different elements
of his work which he does not systematically separate, but
which might be understood as the "constellation of ethics"
m his writing. The three elements Cornell examines are
the "unleashing of difference in identity," the "dialectic
of natural history," and Adorno's concerns with
reconciliation
.
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Adorno’s understanding of the non-identity of subject
and object was discussed previously, but some of Cornell's
observations on this aspect of negative dialectics may
help put the ecofeminist rights versus ethics debate in
another perspective. Cornell interprets Adorno's negative
dialectics as developing further the insights from Hegel's
dialectics, or as she describes negative dialectics, "Non-
identity, in other words, is dialectics taken all the way
down. Hegel's "reified Geist" or "deified subjectivity"
fails to achieve the "reconcilement" at which his
philosophical system aimed, "The attempt to achieve pure
self-recognition in absolute otherness, in other words,
violates the Other by denying its otherness to the
Concept. Without the closure of the circle, the Concept
can no longer fully incorporate objectivity as its own
expression. The object, in other words, escapes ownership
in its nonidentity with the Concept ." 66 There is then a
"constitutive outside" to any concept, or conceptual
system, a "nonidentity" which disrupts the system. This
nonidentity or negativity "is the escaped otherness"
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inherent in the logic of identity, "The object can neither
be grasped in its entirety by the Concept nor can it be
known in its immediacy. This understanding of
nonidentity and negativity includes negative dialectics
itself, "For Adorno, then, negative dialectics is not a
method; nor is it simply material reality, as if material
reality in its contradictoriness could be presented to us
without mediation through concepts. Negative dialectics
IS instead the 'truth' of an unreconciled reality, or
antagonistic entirety." As Adorno stated, reconciliation
would be the overcoming of both negativity and the need
for negative dialectics, "Regarding the concrete utopian
possibility, dialectics is the ontology of the wrong state
of things. The right state of things would be free of
it .
”
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The "paradox" of negative dialectics then is that
representation of negativity, of the non-identical, cannot
be accomplished by simply presenting it as concept.
Likewise, the truth" of nature cannot be experienced
immediately, or at least it is not available for simple
translation into language, into concepts. However, the
idea of constructing a "constellations of elements" to
illuminate a specific "image" of the non-identical
resurfaces at this point, this time as an aspect of
mimesis as it manifests itself in the writing of
philosophy and political philosophy. Cornell understands
the "constellation" as a metaphor for the process of
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decoding the "relational object" one wishes to understand.
The object can only be known in its "context," which
however should not be understood as simply external to the
object. Adorno makes the point, "Becoming aware of the
constellation in which a thing stands is tantamount to
deciphering the constellation which having come to be, it
bears within it ." 69 Whether we are attempting to
interpret fascism, advertising, animals as food,
endangered species, or whatever, the interpretation must
be sensitive to the "context" in which it is found, that
constellation which is "relational" and historical to its
core, and which is never simply "outside" the interpreted
object. The interpretation or deciphering of the object
involves the "mimetic capacity" which includes "modes of
behavior" capable of being "receptive, expressive and
communicative in a sensuous fashion ." 70 These modes of
behavior, which are the exercise of the mimetic abilities
of humans, are the keys to overcoming the "spell" of a
rationality which has turned on itself, threatening the
survival of the self for which it evolved. The only
escape from the total instrumentalization of the world is
to redevelop what has been repressed in the "logic of
domination"--mimetic capacity. This specific
understanding of the relationship of mimesis to
rationality is the key to understanding Adorno's critical
theory, and may provide a possibility for radical ecology
to overcome basic blocks to the achievement of ecological
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consciousness and an ecological society. Cornell
summarizes the role mimesis plays in Adorno's critical
theory,
Mimesis, m other words, is the capacity to identify
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?' and in appreciation, rather thanthe ability to identify as, as is characteristic ofinstrumental logic. In this sense, knowledge through
constellation does not privilege the subject'spurpose over the object's "right" to be what it hasbecome. In Adorno, mimesis is connected with the
attitude toward the other he associates with utopiaMimesis lets the object be. By so doing, mimetic
capacity foreshadows the nonviolative relationship tothe other, beyond the heterogeneous and beyond whatis one's own, that can only be fulfilled in a
redeemed world. /J-
Cornell adds that this "identification with" (I
identify with the wolf) as opposed to "identification as"
(I identify it as a wolf) should not be understood as a
"return to intuition or immediacy." All identification
and interpretation is mediated, and constellations can
only be understood as a certain "misrecognition" that is
inherent in "identity-logical thinking." There is no
exhaustive or final interpretation of the object or its
context, "For Adorno, the re-experiencing of the object as
nonidentical is the experience of misrecognition, in which
the subject literally runs up against the limits of
conceptualization and is opened to the Other as other, the
unassimilated. We can only know the object as it is in
its different contexts, never immediately or as it is in
its true reality." 7 ^ This is not a recipe for relativism,
because relativism relies on a "philosophy of
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consciousness" position which privileges the subject over
the object and understands the "object as a mere
derivative of the subject ." 73 What is achieved in the
mimetic construction of constellations is not merely the
expression of a particular subject, but is a release of
the "substance" or content of the object. Remember, there
is no radical separation of subject and object in
(negative) dialectics, nor should the "interrelatedness of
all things" be forgotten
.
74 This way of understanding the
ethical implications of negative dialectics even appears
to echo the self-justification of some "animal rights"
defenders who object to the charge of abstractness and
decontextualization.
Evolutionary theory leads us to expect continuities,
not sharp breaks. It implies that, if we examine
nature with an unbiased eye, we will find a complex
pattern of resemblances as well as differences. We
will find in humans, traces of their evolutionary
past, and in other species ... traces of
characteristics that may be more or less well
developed in us. This is true of those
characteristics that make us "rational," no less than
the others . 75
(However, again note the animal rights defender's focus on
rationality as the principle criterion of concern.) The
negative dialectical self-reflection required to interpret
"objects" in their constellations has the effect not only
of releasing the "substance" of the object, but of making
us aware of our fundamental infusion with the rest of the
world, "Cogitative self-reflection yields a knowledge of
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oneself as other, nonidentical, which in turn opens the
self to the nearly suppressed mimetic capacity, the
ability to identify with others through access to the
other in oneself ." 76
In a world of domination and repression the substance
released in the self-reflective interpretation of
constellations will reveal the moment of suffering. it is
this realization which forms the basis for the "ethical
message" of Adorno's negative dialectics, and which has
implications for social and political practice, "The
physical moment tells our knowledge that the suffering is
not to be, that things should be different. Woe speaks,
’go.’ Hence the convergence of specific materialism with
criticism, with social change in practice ." 77 And
contrary to the charges of pessimism against Adorno in
particular, unhappiness at the suffering of others should
not be the basis of despair but of hope. It indicates we
still retain some of that capacity to feel for others and
to long for a change, "Conscious unhappiness is not a
delusion of the mind's vanity, but something inherent in
the end the one authentic dignity it has received in its
separation from the body. This dignity is the mind's
negative reminder of its physical aspect: its capability
of that aspect is the only source of whatever hope the
mind can have."^^ The question which has dogged those
sympathetic to critical theory is how Adorno's
interpretation of "negativity" can be turned into a
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politics which is not simply philosophical interpretation
or aesthetic esotericism. The same old point needs
repeating every so often, "The philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point,
however, is to changp it."^°
Cornell repeats the charges against Adorno. In
examining the "ethical, legal, and political significance
of liberal and deconstructionist accounts of justice and
right" she concludes that Adorno is left with "only
negative dialectics" and no possibility of a "positive"
representation of politics,
T° pretend that in this fallen world we could give an
affirmative account of the conditions of truth or ofjustice would only further perpetuate the violence ofidealism. Even in art, the possibility of redemption
can only be shown negatively. To try to abstractly
portray the conditions of redemption, to give form tothe hope of reconciliation as if it existed now, only
promotes accommodation to a fallen world. As a
result, Adorno does not reflect on the conditions ofjustice and the relation of these conditions to
positive law, either through a quasi-transcendental
inquiry or through empirical analysis. Such a
reflection is foreclosed by his negative dialectics.
Even if his negative dialectics carries within it an
ethical message that can be decoded, this message
cannot be translated into an account of justice and
its relation to law . 80
Cornell's understanding of the meaning of "justice"
here is important, for she defines a "positive" account of
justice as being, "the elaboration of justice as a given
set of descriptive conditions." Abandoning negative
dialectics, Cornell then turns to Derridean deconstruction
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and its emphasis on the necessity of judgment in any
interpretation of laws to argue that "justice" can never
be reduced to merely following the rules ." 81 she also
emphasizes her concern with maintaining the "divide
between law, established norms, and Justice" so that given
laws are not equated with justice as such
.
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It then must be asked, do the analyses of the roles
of mimesis m critical theory, ecofeminist, and radical
ecological interpretations of nature provide any comfort
for the hope of creating a new politics? Can a new
politics be imagined which could provide direction to the
social practices of radical ecological consciousness and
its hope for the end of suffering and the beginning of
happiness?
(Eco) Feminist Politics
Before examining recent attempts to retheorize
politics, by individuals sympathetic to feminism, it must
be reemphasized that any attempt to begin to locate a
radical ecological politics which might begin to address
the multiple crises of nature that now confronts the
planet will run up against the limits of conceptuality,
and invite the danger of cooptation by the logic of
identity and domination. Cornell also emphasizes this
problem in her criticism of those who cling to the
Habermasian inspired critical theory and who fail to
absorb the claims by Irigaray and other philosophers
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concerned with the place of "the feminine" in any
symbolic/conceptual representations,
"No one emphasized
the limit of traditional philosophical discourse in the
expression of political critique more militantly than
Theodor Adorno. Feminism is radical because it demands
that we re-think the ’origins' and the ’limit’ of
philosophical discourse, even as we are challenged to do
so philosophically. "83 In what follows it should be kept
m mind that m the attempt to glimpse what-has-never-been
and what-is-yet-to-be existing concepts and logics fail
us. This understanding of politics then is not to be
viewed as a utopian vision of the end times but as a
humble suggestion about where to begin again.
With the collapse of socialism worldwide and the
remaining "communist" countries exhibiting all the
characteristics of brutal repressions, radical social and
political theorists have increasingly turned to an
examination of the potential of some liberal democratic
and civic republican ideas in the hope that these retain
some transformative or "revolutionary" possibilities.
Chantal Mouffe, for example, has attempted to address "the
need for a new form of identification around which to
organize the forces struggling for a radicalization of
democracy." The need for new forms of political
identification is a result of the fact that the old
arguments developed out of "class politics" have become
problematic, especially for feminists, ecologists and
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others who do not fit neatly into the categories of
economism. Crucial to establishing any radicalization of
democracy is a redefinition of citizenship which
recognizes its "intimate link" to any preferred future
social, political, cultural, and economic community.
Mouffe argues that any adequate understanding of
citizenship must go beyond those offered by either the
liberal or civic republican traditions even in their more
recent neo-liberal and communitarian forms
.
84 Without
fully restaging Mouffe' s explication and criticism of
liberal and communitarian arguments about the relationship
of citizenship to the political community some basic
points need repeating. As Mouffe summarizes the argument
of John Rawls and other liberals, their idea of
citizenship "is the capacity for each person to form,
revise and rationally pursue his/her definition of the
good." Citizens then pursue their self-interest while
respecting the "rights" of others to do the same.
Communitarians criticize this understanding as paying to
little attention to the "constitutive community" which is
central to establishing the identities from which the
beliefs about self-interest and the good are generated.
The critique asserts that the liberal self enters into an
"instrumental community" of previously defined interests
and identity. However, as Mouffe indicates, the approach
the communitarians endorse as an alternative to the
liberal community of instrumentalism, "is the revival of
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the civic republican view of politics that puts a strong
emphasis on the notion of a public good, prior to and
independent of individual desires and interests ." 85
Mouffe believes the fundamental problem with the
communitarian perspective is the threat to "individual
liberty which a "substantive" conception of the public
good would entail. Mouffe sees a great danger in those
critiques of liberalism which tend to degenerate into an
endorsement of a "pre-modern" politics, and in their
failure to acknowledge the "crucial contributions of
liberalism" including, "the defence of pluralism, the idea
of individual liberty, the separation of church and state,
the development of civil society," all of which help to
constitute modern democracy. This "controversy" can
perhaps then be understood as yet another form of the
recurring dilemma between "individual liberty" and
"political participation ." 86 in searching for a radical
intersection between the concerns of liberty and democracy
Mouffe surprisingly turns to an argument which usually is
seen as reinforcing conservative values. After examining
Michael Oakeshott's discussion of the modern state, Mouffe
concludes that his idea of the " respublica " is worth
recovering, "Oakeshott insists that the participants in a
fiflci-etas or cives are not associated for a common
enterprise nor with a view to facilitating the attainment
of each person's individual prosperity; what links them is
the recognition of the authority of the conditions
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specifying their common or
-public' concern, a
-practice
of civility.- "87 A description of this resoubl i ra or
public concern therefore must be elaborated, "It is a
practice of civility specifying not performances, but
conditions to be subscribed to in choosing performances.
These consist in a complex of rules or rule-like
prescriptions, which do not prescribe satisfactions to be
sought or actions to be performed but 'moral
considerations specifying conditions to be subscribed to
in choosing performances.'" 88 What holds the community
together then is not a "substantive common good" but a
"common bond" which is elaborated as "moral considerations
of public concern." These considerations then become the
"conditions" within which public or political discourse
takes place. The "rules of civil intercourse" form the
common concern and bring the citizens together, "The
identification with those rules of civil intercourse
creates a common political identity among persons
otherwise engaged in many different enterprises." 8 ^
Politics then is not seen as something done to express
interests of those with pre-political identities, but
rather it is about the formation of identities themselves,
Politics is to a great extent about the rules of the
respublica and its many possible interpretations, it
is about the constitution of the political community,
not something that takes place inside the political
community as some communitarians would have it.
Political life concerns collective, public action; it
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The citizen of the radical democracy would experience
a constant conditioning tension between their identity as
a citizen and their other identities, such as feminist,
ecologist, mother, artist, and so forth. In addition,
"identity as citizen" itself will be multiple as there
will not be any single authoritative interpretation of the
"respublica .
"
Therefore, what Mouffe offers for consideration is an
understanding of politics and citizenship which is deeply
implicated in processes of identification. She also
insists the construction of the identities in community as
citizens is not to be viewed as a form of "alliance," "For
it is not a matter of establishing a mere alliance between
interests but of actually modifying the very
identity of these forces." Furthermore, this politics
will affect the identities and interests of all citizens,
"The creation of political identities as radical
democratic citizens depends therefore on a collective form
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Of identification among the democratic demands found in a
variety of movements: women, workers, black, gay,
ecological, as well as in several other 'new social
movements. This "radical democratic conception of
citizenship" then must be articulated with a "radical
democratic interpretation" of the ideas of liberty and
equality which when transformed could take into account,
"the different social relations and subject positions in
which they are relevant: gender, class, race, ethnicity,
sexual orientation, etc "93 The tenslons between the
principles of liberty and equality, on the one hand, and
citizen and other individual identities, on the other,
also imply there is no "true democracy" which can ever
come into existence, "This is why a project of radical and
plural democracy recognizes the impossibility of the
complete realization of democracy and the final
achievement of the political community. Its aim is to use
the symbolic resources of the liberal democratic tradition
to struggle for the deepening of the democratic
revolution, knowing that it is a never-ending process.
Kirstie McClure has taken up these ideas from Mouffe
(and from Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau’s earlier work) and
used them to address the history of "pluralism" and how
these new theoretical tools can be used to radicalize
pluralist democracy, particularly as it is constituted in
relation to the public/private split in liberalism. 95 She
argues that understandings of liberal democracy as a
610
pluralistic process of interest- jerest adjudication have changed
and have had the consequence of challenging,
sometimes explicitly often unselfconsciously, the Uberal
theory of the "subject of rights" in relation to state
authority The classic Uberal subject retains rights
against which the state must not impinge; the identity of
this subject exists prior to the state and prior to any
political participation. This liberal subject is known
characteristically as the "autonomous self" or "unitary
subject." m her examination of the radical potential of
the idea of pluralism, McClure is attempting to address
the criticism of defenders of feminism who believe the
"autonomous individual is a necessary requisite to
political agency. "96 This is true, she argues, only to
the extent that the relationships of public to private and
state to citizen accepted by liberal ideology remain in
Place. The radicalization of our understanding of these
relationships will be an element in the simultaneous
transformation of the categories of politics and the
identities of the political actors. As McClure indicates.
Today's erasure of the boundaries between public and
private is accomplished not through the incursion of
public authority into a pre-existing private realm, but
through a 'proliferation of new political spaces. '"91 The
new political spaces make "cultural representation and
social practices" the multiple sites of political
struggle. This understanding of political struggle means
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that claims by the "pluralist social subject" should be
addressed not to the authority of the state but at
multiple sites, which include not only traditional
political spaces but also the "social" and the "cultural,"
for example. This new, radically democratic struggle
"opens the possibility of a quotidian politics-a politics
which extends the terrain of political contestation to the
everyday enactment of social practices and the routine
reiteration of cultural representations ." 98 The
politically transformative possibilities thus envisioned
are not simply another form of "interest group politics,"
but are expressed in a language close to that of the
theorists of mimesis, "It suggests the possibility of a
politics that begins not with the object of constructing
similarities to address rights claims to the state, but
opens rather with the object of addressing such claims to
each other, and to each 'other', whoever and wherever they
may be .
"
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McClure elaborates on the implications of her
position for addressing concerns about political agency.
This radical democratic politics does not restrict the
understanding of political "agency" but rather extends it
in all directions,
Not only is its agency affirmed by recasting "the
social" as a terrain of political contestation; it is
extended further by insisting that its multiple
identities are themselves not given as "natural
kinds" but contingently constructed and reconstructed
612
par^SPatIorirthe1ocUXCp“ct?Ls
0
?h
eS “d thr°^h
these codes are enacted in daily life,100°
U9h whlch
These political identities then are not given but are
"What one enact*' and which are enacted by "strategies of
subversive repetition." The social codes are varied
through the "performative reconfiguring (of) such
constructions" which thereby increases the "political"
participation of these radical democratic subjects, "In
short, by recasting their production and reproduction of
their own 'identities' as political investments, it
constitutes their participation in culture itself as a
political commitment."
The formation and re-formation of identities is a
political act and helps constitute the political as such.
In a slightly different context, and with reference to
both Adorno and Irigaray, Cornell also seems to indicate
where the politics of mimesis intersects a new practice of
radical democracy,
But this understanding of the subject does not mean
that we have to choose between the politics of
identity or the politics of difference. This other
subject returns us, instead, to the theatricality of
the enactment of a mimetic identification as the
basis for feminist politics, an enactment which is
always toward the future, because it enacts as
constituted what has yet to be. 101
What will become important then for the practice of a
radical ecological politics which is critically self-
reflexive is the taking up of the challenge of radical
democracy and of feminist theory to self-consciously
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These new
transform ourselves with new identities,
identities, and the new agents of politics they
constitute, must include that openness to the other which
Adorno calls for in his hope for the not-yet. Although
not immune from stereotypic representation and self
projection, attempts have been made by radical ecologists
to develop a sensitivity to others in the world, and to
practices representing the interests of those others who
speak in other languages and muted voices. In the
collaboration IHinklng Like a Mountain, the rituals and
procedures for participation in a "Council of All Beings"
are offered. In the "Guidelines for a Council of All
Beings Workshop" within the section entitled "Identifying
with Another Life-Form" the initial phases of the process
are summarized, "Through mourning and remembering, the
workshop participants have opened to the universality of
the life within them. They are ready to shake off their
solely human identification and for a while imaginatively
enter the experience of another life-form." The people
involved then are urged to go out and "let themselves be
chosen by another being, an activity the participants
often call a "Vision Quest" in which, "The participants
are finding an ally to speak for in the Council ." 102 A
description of how participants might be guided in their
identifications is included, "Ask them to request this
being's permission to enter it, so they can imaginatively
sense its body from within. Finally, let them ask the
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being how it wishes to be represented and what symbolic
form can be made as a mask to be worn in the Council."
Then masks are made, meditation is encouraged, and the
participants practice "speaking for" the being which has
opened to them. "The Council of All Beings" is then held.
There are alternations between humans and others, taking
turns speaking and listening, until the council finally
dissolves, sometimes in laughter, other times in sorrow or
silence, or in some complex combination of emotions. The
people then release the adopted life-forms and thank them
for allowing the identifications. Then comes a time to
reflect on the experience and to make plans for future
actions and subsequent meetings.
615
ENDNOTES
See Nancy Chodorow, Ihe Renrodnct- i on nf Mnt-herinr.
Prfncoe n
' Marx l sm and Domination (Princeton:i eton University Press, 1982)
.
Slxcer, Deborah, "Your Daughter or Your Doq’ AFeminist Assessment of the Animal Research
' Issue?"Vos Spring, 1991, Vol. 6 No. 1, pp. 108ff.
Slicer, Hypatia, p. 110.
Slicer, Hypatia, p. ill.
Slicer, Hypatia, p. 111. She quotes Marti Kheel, "Theliberation of nature: A circular affair,"
Environments 1
—Ethics
,
Vol. 7 No. 2, 1985, pp. 135-49Jim Cheney, "Ecofeminism and deep ecology,"
Environmental Ethics, Vol. 9 No. 2, 1987, pp. 115-45
and Karen Warren, "The power and promise of
ecological feminism," Environmental Ethir.s Voi 12
No. 1, 1990, pp. 125-46.
Slicer,
Slicer,
Slicer,
Slicer,
Hypatia,
Hypatia,
Hypatia,
Hypatia,
p. 112.
p. 113.
p. 114.
p. 116.
Donovan, Josephine, "Animal Rights and Feminist
Theory, " Eoofeminism; Women, Animals, Nature . Greta
Gaard, Ed. (Philadelphia: Temple University Press,
1993), p. 168.
Donovan, Animal Rights, p. 170. Originally, Immanuel
Kant, "Duties to Animals and Spirits," as cited by
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley and
Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983),
p. 177.
Donovan, Animal Rights, p. 170.
Donovan, Animal Rights, p. 171.
14
15
Donovsin, Animal Rights, p. 171. Jeremy Bentham,SST^?, frinr1pl" nf H^ 1 - ^
p ' 172 ' Peter sin9er ' toimalLiberati on, (New York: Avon, 1975), p. 8. Josephine
onovan, feminist Theory (New York: Ungar, 1987),
pp • 3 1 — G 3 .
1
6
Donovan, Animal Rights, p. 172.
1
7
. Donovan, Animal Rights, p. 174.
1
8
Donovan, Animal Rights, p. 174. Edmund Husserl, The
Crisis?
—oL—
L
urQpean—Sciences (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1970), pp. 23ff.
. Donovan, Animal Rights,
and Theodor W. Adorno,
(New York: Continuum,
20
. Donovan, Animal Rights,
21
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
22
. Donovan, Animal Rights,
23
. Horkheimer
p. 176.
and Adorno,
24
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
25
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
26
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
21
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
28
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
29
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
30
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
31
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
32
. Horkheimer and Adorno,
pp. 174-75. Max Horkheimer
Dialectic Of En l i ghtenment
1987), p. 23.
p. 175.
Dialectic, p. 84.
p. 176.
Dialectic, p. 248. Donovan,
Dialectic, p. 245.
Dialectic, p. 248.
Dialectic, p. 249.
Dialectic, p. 249.
Dialectic, p. 249.
Dialectic, p. 251.
Dialectic, p. 252.
Dialectic, p. 254.
Dialectic, pp. 254 -255.
617
33
Rolf Tiedemann, Eds.,
Routledge, 1984), p.
C.
72.
34
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 96.
35
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 96.
36
. Adorno, Aesthetic, pp. 98-
37 Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 110.
38
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 110.
39
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 191
.
40
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 192.
41
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 192.
42
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P. 193.
43
. Adorno, Aesthetic, pp. 194
44
. Adorno, Aesthetic, P- 455.
45
. Ruddick, Sara, Maternal Th
Press, 1995)
.
46
. Ruddick, Maternal
,
P- 127.
47
. Ruddick, Maternal, P- 130.
CO
Ruddick, Maternal P- 131.
criticize object relations theory as relying too
much on an analysis of psychological development of
boys and girls which seems to depend on the family
relationships typical of modern capitalist society
or which exist "only in cultures which give
excessive privilege to those characteristics" of
"abstract masculinity" like separateness. Ruddick,
Maternal, p. 268.
49
. Ruddick, Maternal, P- 133.
50
. Ruddick, Maternal, P- 133.
51
. Ruddick, Maternal, P- 131,
618
52
53
54
Ruddick, Maternal, p. 135.
J
«?hi5Jr0nt° P r°vided some early reflections on theic of care debates. See "Women and Caring: WhatCan Feminists Learn about Morality from Caring?", inGender /Body/Know) edgp, Alison M. Jaggar and Susan R.tsordo, Eds. (New Brunswick and London: RutgersUniversity Press, 1990)
.
Johnson, David Kenneth, and Kathleen R. Johnson, "TheLimits of Partiality: Ecofeminism, Animal Rights,
and Environmental Concern, " Ecological FPininism
Karen J. Warren, Ed. (London and New York:
Routledge, 1994), p. 113. Originally in Thomas
Regan, Xhe Thee
_Gene
.ra tion : Reflections on thp
Coming—Revolution (Philadelphia: Temple Universitv
Press, 1991), p. 96.
55 Johnson and Johnson, p. 113.
5 6
. Johnson and Johnson, p. 114.
57 Johnson and Johnson, pp. 114-115.
5 8
. Cornell, Drucilla, "The Ethical Message of Negative
Dialectics," 2he Philosophy o f the Limit (New York
and London: Routledge, 1992)
.
59
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 13.
60
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 14 .
61
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 14.
62
. Cornell, Ethical, p.
Dialectics, p. 145.
15. Adorno, Negative
63
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 16.
64
# Cornell, Ethical, p. 16.
65
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 17. Cornell moves back and
forth between the more current term "communicative
freedom" (from Michael Theneuissen) and Adorno's
reference to "reconciliation." The discussion of
communicative freedom precedes that of
reconciliation, pp. 15-16. Cornell subtly,
throughout her essay, is critical of interpretations
of Adorno which attempt to reduce negative
dialectics to a pessimism and a "philosophy of
619
76
77
78
79
80
81
whn
P
rtl»I
° r
^°Pelessness • she quotes Adorno, "He
,M .
dles ln despair has lived his life in vain "
hlt
n
word
M
"
1'^LLa
h
p - 167) she says She takes him at
sho.nn k ”^
en he argues that his melancholy scienceuld be placed in the region of philosophy devoidthe teachln9 the good life." Adorno indicated
life^nri’th
6 connection between hope for the goodand e present state of suffering, "what wouldappmess be that was not measured by theimmeasurable grief at what is." (Minima Moralia,
66
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 19.
61
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 19.
<T> 00
Cornell, Ethical, p. 20
.
69
. Cornell, Ethical, p . 23
Negative Diel^r-t- i c s
, p .
10
' Cornell, Ethical, p . 23;
71
. Cornell, Ethical, p . 23
12
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 24.
13
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 24.
74
. Cornell, Ethical, p. 24.
75
. Rachels, James. Created
Implications O f Darwinism
. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), p. 166. Quoted in Johnson
and Johnson, p. 111.
Cornell, Ethical, p. 25.
Adorno, Negative, p. 204.
Adorno, Negative, pp. 203-204.
Marx, Karl, "Theses on Feuerbach," in Robert C.
Tucker, Ed., The Marx-Enaels Reader
,
Second edition
(New York: W.W. Norton, 1978), p. 145.
Cornell, Ethical, p. 181.
Cornell, Ethical, p. 182.
620
82
83
.
84
.
85
.
86
.
87
.
88
.
89
.
90
91
.
92
.
93
.
94
'
95
'
96
.
97
.
98
.
100
.
101
.
Cornell, Ethical, p. 182.
C
°™fhtDJU°illa ' "Rethinking the Time of FeminismContenti on s (New York and London-Routledge, 1995), p. 149 .
M
pontf
cl)“ta1 ' "Democratic Citizenship and thelitical Community,” Dimension s of Rad-i,-^
Verso^^992
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 226.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 228.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 232.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 232.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 233.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 234.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 235.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 236.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 236.
Mouffe, Citizenship, p. 238.
McClure, Kirstie, "On the Subject of Rights:
Pluralism, Plurality and Political Identity, "
Dimensions of Radical Democracy , chantal Mouffe, Ed(London and New York: Verso, 1992)
.
McClure, Rights, p. 120.
McClure, Rights, p. 122.
McClure, Rights, p. 123.
McClure, Rights, p. 123.
McClure, Rights, p. 123.
Cornell, Drucilla, "Rethinking the Time of
Feminism, " Feminist Contentions . Linda Nicholson,
Ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 1995), p. 155
621
102 Seed,
New
John,
Society
.Thinking
—t i ke a
Publishers
,
Mountain (Philadelphia
1988 ), p. 109 .
622
PART III.
CONCLUSION
623
CONCLUSION
THE ECOLOGICAL SUBJECT AND THE SPIRIT OF REVOLUTION
Radical ecological thought and the tradition of
critical theory can be fruitfully articulated together by
exposing the works of the philosophers of the ecology
movement to critique and conversely by supplementing the
work of the tradition of critical theory with the insights
of radical ecologists. A critical theoretical approach to
the philosophies of radical ecology reveals the extent to
which they have failed to adequately develop the concepts
of an "ecological society" and an "ecological subject"
which might bring it about. The tradition of critical
theory supplies a needed corrective to the sometimes
regressive, sometimes anthropocentric, positions of deep
ecology, social ecology and ecofeminism. But if the
tradition of critical theory is to be true to itself it
must open onto the truth of the ecology movement also. The
"truth" of the movement can be located in two areas.
First, the ecology movement has developed genuine insights
into the possibilities of a "mimetic" relationship with
nature that do not simply regress behind the categories of
modern science nor simply assimilate themselves to an
affirmation of the present culture of domination. Second,
there exists the possibility for constructing a vision of
a concrete historical subj ect/agent of social
transformation which does not merely collapse the concept
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Of the revolutionary subject into the category of
currently given empirical individuals, or succumb to the
conception of a meta-subject "above" the everyday
struggles of actual living human beings.
By examining the aspects of the various philosophies
of ecology through the categories of methodology,
subjectivity, and politics, the various aspects of the
constellation which is presently called "radical ecology"
or the green" movement can be shown to be in a fruitful
tension. This movement contains potentials and
possibilities for both transformation toward a future
ecological community a.nd regression to further barbarism,
to use the words of the early critical theorists, and it
is only by becoming more self aware of these tensions and
possibilities that radical ecologists can make appropriate
theoretical and political choices.
Deep Ecology
Within the philosophy of deep ecology there is both a
deep insight into the possibilities of a non-dominating
relationship to nature as well as a disturbing tendency
toward misanthropy. This tendency extends beyond its
merely polemical use to an unfortunate essential blindness
towards the categories of its own analysis. The work of
Arne Naess serves as the philosophical foundation of much
of the "deep ecology" element of the radical ecology
movement. Naess's work reveals both the power and
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limitation of the deep ecological approach. However, the
methodology and subsequent claims of deep ecology has not
enabled it to escape from traditional philosophical
procedures and their limitations. The "deep questioning
method" is little more than philosophy as traditionally
conceived. It does not of necessity lead to foundational
truth, but rather tends to return to long-standing,
fundamental problems of ontology and epistemology. The
deep ecology concept of identification with nature is also
problematic, and remains unresolved even in the work of
those who follow Warwick Fox in his attempt to develop a
"transpersonal ecology." The concept of identification
must be rearticulated to distinguish between a
"projective" identification which, against the intentions
of the radical ecologist, simply maps the prevailing
categories of nature onto the world, and what may be
called "mimetic identification" which understands nature
differently from what is possible in current scientific or
romantic concepts of nature. Mimetic identification has
already been adopted as the basis for some innovative
remedial and reconstructive ecological work, and while not
achieving the ecological equivalent of the theological
terms of "resurrection" or "reconciliation, " at least this
approach does not reduce nature to the categories of an
instrumental rationality. Mimetic identification attempts
to overcome the present conceptual system which has
resulted in the domination of nature, which advances the
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goal of simplification or reduction of nature solely for
the purposes of human production and consumption.
The deep ecological subject attempts to deeply
identify with the ecocommunity of which it is a part, but
often this is achieved at the price of a mystical or
metaphysical regression, leaving the ecological subject no
rational basis for making moral or ethical distinctions
between forms of life. Life as a whole is given absolute
value and in this way devalues all individual life and the
uniqueness of particular beings. The insights gained by
seeing the world through categories of ecosystem and
species may at the same time reduce the capacity to
recognize the uniqueness of each member of the
ecocommunity, especially the individual human beings who
are collapsed into a single essential category, the human
species, whose members are posited as having a universal
character, typically represented as fundamentally selfish,
destructive, and self-destructive. In failing to
distinguish analytically the internal differences between
human beings, especially with respect to the institutions
and systems they have created, the deep ecologist does not
provide a systematic analysis of the different effects
which result from decisions by different individuals
within human society. The CEO and the assembly line
worker at a chemical company do not share equal
responsibility for the decisions about polluting the
environment. Although as a practical matter the deep
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ecologists of Earth First! do know who is responsible for
decisions such as clear cutting, as is clear in their
Journal, they have not made a coherent theoretical link
between their ecological and their political claims, or
when they have, it has appeared in an all too reactionary
and even racist form. For many who identify as deep
ecologists, human reason is perceived as essentially the
same as instrumental rationality leaving as the only
apparent alternative for understanding the "truth" of
nature a reversion to mythic explanations and mythic
solutions
.
Deep ecological politics has prided itself on
development of mythologies of the eco-warrior, eco-heroes
and eco-martyrs, thus opening the possibility of achieving
the same paradoxical impact on the environment that the
early critical theorists attributed to the dialectic of
Enlightenment. The deep ecologists’ overriding practical
goal is to attempt ecosystem preservation based on an
approach to political action which tends to repeat the
patterns of domination lying at the source of the
ecological crisis. In their analysis of ecosystems, the
deep ecologists have a complex, advanced, empirical
understanding of the intimate interdependence of human and
non-human nature, but in their analysis of society they
tend to simply project the categories of first nature onto
society (second nature) and so dishonor what should be
their fundamental insight: the irreducible uniqueness of
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species,each species and each individual within the
including those belonging to the human species. Deep
ecologists frequently fail to honor the unique otherness
of the individual human being. Recognition of individual
human value should be compatible with their concern for
the individual members of other species and for nature as
a whole. Deep ecology must develop a social analysis that
is able to generate social insights which attain the same
advanced level of its insights into the appropriate
ecological relationship to "non-human nature." For this
reason deep ecology must turn more self-consciously and
self-reflexively toward the insights of feminist theories.
Social Ecology
Social ecology continues to be burdened by its
lingering anthropocentrism, a manifestation of the
Humanism present in the tradition of anarchism from which
it has evolved. Bookchin's categories are social
categories. The natural world is interpreted through
these social categories and thereby reduced to the social,
the social categories themselves ultimately reflecting a
particular and perhaps idiosyncratic understanding of
Reason. The collapse of nature into categories of reason
is the recurring problem of identity thinking, the
conceptual domination of the other. This tendency
manifests itself in Bookchin's work centrally in his
understanding of the relationship of subjectivity to
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evolution where
"subjectivity" is found to exis
everywhere in nature. In this way human reason
the standard for the future ecological society.
t
becomes
His
program of social transformation can be viewed as an
updated version of an idealized notion of the Greek polis.
Lrke nearly all socialist projections, it is a vision of
efficiency and rational domination in the service of a
material abundance which then becomes the basis of human
emancipation. it seeks an indirect resolution of the
conflict between human and nature by attempting to resolve
social injustice first. Bookchin's ecologically aware,
libertarian anarchist is to achieve freedom and justice
through the rational dissolution of "hierarchy," and after
this has occurred ecological remediation will be possible.
The social ecologist's assumption that subjectivity
is the telos of nature is simply an expression of the
hubris of human reason. It fails to recognize the
uniqueness of each member of the ecocommunity and the non-
teleological aspects of natural evolution. Man again
becomes the measure of all things, and the development of
"subjectivity" the highest goal of nature. The ecological
aspect of libertarian anarchism is an honest and explicit
acknowledgment of the constitutive precedence of non-human
nature, and distinguishes it from early forms of
philosophical idealism. However, for evolution to be read
teleologically, biological and other physical sciences
must be forced into a narrowed interpretation that, rather
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than adequately integrating empirical knowledge of
evolution into a general theory of human development,
converts biological categories into indicators of moral
necessity. Social ecology's analytic category that most
obviously conflates biology and sociology is "symbiosis."
The biological category "symbiosis" takes on social
characteristics as "mutual aid." Here Bookchin is
following Kropotkin. This philosophic strategy reduces
the real conflicts and antagonisms of the natural and
social worlds to matters of redefinition, it displaces
natural or ecological struggles, shifting their meaning to
questions of "social justice."
Bookchin' s concept of municipalism is provocative and
well supported by a counter-history of the development and
destruction of civilizing tendencies. The fundamental
difficulties emerge (besides in the inadequate response to
the deep ecologists' insights into the necessity of the
expansion of "wilderness") in social ecology's inadequate
conception of technology and technological development.
What criteria exist for technological development which do
not simply repeat the criteria of rational domination?
How is the teleological development of subjectivity to be
viewed as anything other than human instrumental reason
intensified, taking the form of the rational domination of
social processes? Simply appealing to democratic
procedures does not assure that nature will be viewed as
anything other than the mere object of human purposes. Is
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the teleology of nature simply an extension of the idea of
self-preservation, thus inviting an intensification of
instrumental reason, which would merely constitute the
perfection of the practice of the domination of nature?
Ecofeminism
Ecofeminists do not have a common unified position
and methodology, or even a common analysis of the ecology
crisis. There are not even the commonalities that might
be found between deep and social ecology. Ecofeminism is
an element not only of the constellation "radical ecology"
but also of feminism. When brought within the
interpretive framework of critical theory, ecofeminism
becomes an exceedingly complex web of structures and
potentials difficult to disentangle theoretically.
However, much of ecofeminist thought still revolves around
the central radical ecological categories of nature and
subjectivity, but which then attempt to include the
concept of gender in their analyses. An examination of
the concept of "the feminine" by feminists and
ecofeminists has revealed the historical association of
women with nature, and the historical devaluation of
women's subjectivity with respect to male subjectivity.
Much of the discussion of "women's experience" involves an
attempt to establish the implications of the relation of
that experience to the (masculine/patriarchal) idea of
subjectivity. One "goal" of feminism has become the
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redefinition or resymbolization of the relation of women's
experience to the concept of subjectivity. Becoming a
subject is a fundamentally problematic process for those
of the human species identified/classified as women and as
"other" in the androcentric or "phallocentric" world.
Those who attempt to recover a prior or pre-his-toric
subjectivity frequently turn to cultural anthropology for
empirical and philosophic support. This ecofeminism
hypothesizes a pre-patriarchal culture that honored women,
included goddess worship, and was organized through
matriarchal, or at least matrilineal, relationships. One
of the most problematic developments in this area is that
of spiritual ecofeminism which has failed to address the
problems of hierarchy which result from political
interpretation by a single "spiritual" authority. This
results in a political authority that is derived from
spiritual authority, and a pre-modern rather than a post-
modern political agency. This understanding of the
relationship of politics to spirituality collapses the
political back into the spiritual or religious. This
produces a fundamentally hierarchical and anti-democratic
politics, reducing the political consciousness of the
individual subject and making her subservient to a higher
interpretive authority. Instead of representing feminine
sensitivity and spirituality it reproduces the typical
structures of power only in disguise.
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However, when traditional categories and concepts are
retained, ecological and political practices tend to be
guided by Enlightenment or rationalist impulses.
Rationalist ecofeminism attempts to provide enlightened
guidance of social development. This ecofeminism
parallels very closely mainstream feminism which insists
that women's reason is equally human reason and therefore
entitles women to equal access to all rational democratic
institutions and the legitimate exercise of power.
Unfortunately this form of feminism seems to be largely
content with acquiring for women the same powers of
domination of nature which have for so long been uniformly
controlled by men.
Much of recent feminism's concerns with subjectivity
and identity revolves around the status of "the feminine"
and its critical potential for restructuring symbolic and
political orders. Efforts in this area attempt to
transform the relations of women to society and politics
by transforming the categories and concepts of Western
philosophy and political thought. One especially
significant effort along these lines has been that of Luce
Irigaray and her interpreters and critics. This radical
alternative form of feminism includes post-structural,
deconstructive treatment of the concepts and categories of
philosophy and political thought. However, the approaches
to feminism and ecofeminism that challenge the entire
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framework of philosophy and political thought have yet to
establish other than a negating practice. In addition,
radical forms of feminism and ecofeminism are forced to
face the same charges Habermas makes against Adorno
concerning the relation of philosophy to itself and
political practice, that is, does the negativity of the
critique preclude political action other than that based
on some mystical or metaphysical notions of peace,
reconciliation, or freedom.
One interpretation of this critical or "negative"
thought asserts that participation in politics in the
present liberal, parliamentary framework only serves to
strengthen the bindings of oppression and domination.
Those who oppose the atomistic individualism typical of
this form of politics contend that political practice
should instead be conceived as an attempt to construct
alternative subjectivities and identities. However,
efforts at (re) constructing identities have also had
unexpected consequences, as feminism generally has found,
when attempts to analyze women’s experiences begin to
include other categories such as race and class. It has
become apparent that "women's experience" cannot be
collapsed into a single descriptive category, but can only
be adequately approached through the recognition of the
uniqueness of individuals' experiences, while recognizing
that this does not lead to the production of a
philosophical or political "nominalism" because of the
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necessary inclusion of social and historical context in
the analysis. Interpretation of these experiences is
further complicated by the frequent occupation by women of
multiple categories of oppression and domination. Radical
ecological insights force these analyses to recognize that
under conditions of unfreedom "subject positions" of
individuals or groups are established through a symbolic
order in which social identities are at least partially
constructed from categories of nature. The presently
dominant or "hegemonic" symbolic order has been
interrogated by "postmodern or poststructural" critics who
have exposed the workings of these constructions of
subjectivity. Adorno developed a very similar questioning
of the dominant conceptual process and its relationship to
subjectivity. He critically examined the conceptual
operations by which the non-identical is reduced to the
identical, incorporating it into the system of domination,
and thus extending instrumental rationality to the point
of its culmination in a "false totality." In efforts
which echo many of the critical theorists' insights,
feminists and ecofeminists have attempted, both in their
philosophic examinations and political actions, to
challenge imposed identities.
One area in particular where ecofeminism has begun to
challenge earlier environmental values is that of animal
rights. The challenge has been made through attempts to
elaborate on the idea of an ethic of care, first discussed
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by Carol Gilligan in her work on the differences in moral
reasoning between women and men. The animal rights debate
is a manifestation of the larger challenge in philosophy
and politics to the "justice tradition" which seeks to
define universal moral principles rather than develop an
understanding of ethical obligations traditionally
associated with a theory of "the good life." Ecofeminists
have rejected the moralist animal rights claims for being
abstract, ahistorical, and decontextualized, and thus
offering little effective guidance for the many moral
dilemmas faced in everyday life. Alternatively, by
focusing on the everyday ethical decisions women
frequently make, exemplified in Ruddick's understanding of
"maternal thinking, " a truly practical guide to moral
principles may potentially be developed.
The attempts at redefinition or revaluing of women's
differences from men and among themselves has been a very
hazardous process, particularly when confronting the
category of "nature." Feminist critique of Western
philosophy fundamentally challenges its analytic
categories, and therefore what has historically been much
of feminism's own epistemological status. Few have pushed
this critique as far as Luce Irigaray with her strategy of
mimesis with its attempt to resymbolize the "feminine" and
so create new possibilities for women's subjectivity.
Others, such as Judith Butler, question why women should
solely occupy the space of the "other" in this analysis,
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suggesting that other others, including nonhuman others,
must also be resymbolized creating multiple strategies of
mimesis which might disrupt the current system of
domination
.
Although outside the discussion within ecofeminism,
Drucilla Cornell has attempted to draw out the ethical
implications of Adorno's negative dialectics. Cornell
concludes that Adorno's negative dialectics fails to
provide guidance for the crucial political questions
concerning law and justice. The problem for feminists,
ecofeminists and radical ecologists generally is to find
the links both theoretically and practically which can tie
the ethical insights which are generated when examining
the idea of mimesis to the politics of radical democracy.
An extension of the works of Mouffe and McClure, by
combining them with the insights of Cornell on Adorno's
ethics and Irigaray on the strategy of mimesis, may
provide some of those mediating links between "mimetic
ethics" and radically participatory democracy.
Critical Theory and Radical Ecology
Critical theory offers both a framework and a
tradition of critique which help illuminate what otherwise
remains opaque in the often contradictory elements of
radical ecology examined in this work. However, for its
part, radical ecology does provide empirical information
and practical orientation lacking in the tradition of
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critical theory. Radical ecology is an historical and
empirical corrective, or developmental supplement, to the
insights of early critical theory. Critical theory itself
lacks unity, as can be seen in the conflicting positions
of Marcuse, Habermas and Adorno. Marcuse foresaw the
potential of the women's and ecology movements, but
remained largely in the rationalist and humanist
conceptual framework with its tendency to elitism and
anthropocentrism. in Marcuse's work the position of the
proletariat is simply, somewhat too expediently, replaced
by the most advanced form of resistant consciousness
existing at any given historical moment. In this way what
is fundamentally an orthodox Leninist Marxism is retained
although in a slightly altered form. Vanguardism remains,
in Marcuse's critical theory, now in the privileged
location of the contemporary intellectual strata.
Habermas's critique of Marcuse's call for a New
Science and New Technology as the basis of a truly
liberated society must be reconsidered. Critical
theorists from Horkheimer through Habermas have agreed on
the basic social and economic influences on the actual
practice of science and technology, that is, social and
economic structures are fundamental determinants of the
objects and purposes of science and technology.
Habermas's assertions about evolution and "technological
progress" cannot sustain his critique of Marcuse and early
critical theory. Natural evolution has not come to an
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end, but takes on new forms in the dialectic of history
and nature. A clearer understanding of our present
predicament comes from understanding that evolution has
become primarily devolution, through the destruction of
species and the potential destruction of entire
ecosystems, including the irrevocable disintegration of
planetary ecology. it is possible this devolution may
result in a final catastrophic global ecological collapse,
destroying human "civilization" if not the species itself.
Habermas's critical theory and its assumption of
technologically productive "progress" is fundamentally
challenged by the empirical evidence of ecological
destruction. The understanding of science which Habermas
relies on is also challenged by the critique of dominant
views of science offered by those feminists, including
Hartsock, Harding, and Keller, who have developed
alternative understandings of objectivity, and who have
shown that "reliable knowledge of nature" can be produced
without limiting science to the role of shop foreman in
the full extension of the domination of nature through
instrumental rationality. Other more "erotic" methods and
theories of science also produce reliable knowledge of
nature and could be encouraged with a fundamental change
of society.
From an ecological perspective, technological
development must be viewed within a framework much more
closely approximating Adorno's view of history. Modern
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ecological history is the history of catastrophe.
Habermas’s position, viewed from the perspective of
radical ecology and ecofeminism, appears both
anthropocentric and androcentric. It is fully within the
tradition of Western philosophy, a tradition extensively
and importantly critiqued and deconstructed by feminism
over the last few decades
.
When ecological remediation and reclamation take
place, not primarily for purposes of human aesthetic
appreciation or simple human self-preservation, but in
response to the needs of an ecosystem as a whole and of
its individual members, then a fundamentally different
approach to nature is taking place. Remediation and
reclamation are not reducible to functions of the human
system of production or commodity consumption. The human
needs of self-preservation or aesthetic pleasure in these
new ecological orientations are not central motivations
for the interventions and non-interventions into
ecosystems. These ecological activities demonstrate a
perspective which views humans as only one element of the
ecological community. This ecological perspective
attempts to recognize the fundamental contiguity of humans
and nature rather than attempting to find the definitive
point of their separation. Human interests are preserved
only to the extent they are part of the interests of the
ecocommunity as a whole. Nature is not viewed as a
collection of objects for manipulation and control, but as
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a profound process that develops in not entirely
predictable directions, and which exceeds conceptual
possibility. Ecosystems tend to approach climax
conditions, only interrupted by extraordinary and
cataclysmic events of various kinds, and the movement
toward climax conditions can be encouraged by human
actions in reversal of our historical relationship to
nature so far. The categories and concepts which guide the
radical ecologists' interaction with nature tend to
develop differently than those of a science and technology
harnessed to the ideology of industrial production and
continuous growth. If science shifts from a positivist
acceptance of facts as given, toward a self-
reflectiveness; if interventions into natural processes
take place with the intent of reversing the destructive
effects of industrial production; if scientist as well as
non-scientists view themselves as unique parts of nature
becoming aware of itself, rather than as superior beings
with only the interests of their own self-preservation to
limit their powers of domination and suppression of
everything "other"--then, is this not a new science and
new technology, based, if not on a Marcusean "logic of
gratification, " then on a self-reflexive eco-logic?
However justified or unjustified Habermas's
theological reading of the early critical theorists, the
actions of radical and not so radical ecologists, who
attempt to repair, recover and reconstitute natural
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ecosystems, da approximate a redemption of the claims of
the concept of "reconciliation" as Adorno interpreted it.
The reading of Adorno which understands him as calling for
a mystical or metaphysical resurrection of nature is
unfortunate at best and a cynical distortion at worst. To
analytically reduce an entire body of work to metaphysics
and theology on the basis of the use of the concept of
reconciliation is a destruction of thought no less
complicit with the forces of domination than one that
reduces all thought to instrumental rationality. Adorno
was neither mystic nor theologian. It is too easy to pull
isolated quotes from a work, "reconstruct" it along
reductionist lines, then attribute to it a set of
paradoxes or aporias which find their sole solution in a
"paradigm shift."
But regardless of the unwarranted attack on Adorno,
the theory of communicative action seems increasingly
problematic itself. If the limitations, which Habermas
acknowledges, are taken seriously, the best that can be
hoped from his change of paradigm is a gradual increase in
the uncoerced mutual understanding of those involved in
expert discourses. If the theory of communicative action
is "true, " consensus understandings reached within
"expert" discourses should trickle down to the level of
everyday life, thus reducing social injustice. However,
it is still unclear how this trickle down ethics alone can
have a significant impact on the ecology crisis. Only if
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enough people were to recognize their self-interest in
preserving at least a minimally viable global ecosystem,
would democratic institutions begin to contain the
economic and political systems responsible for the
destruction of the environment. At any rate, this hope of
communicative rationality would seem to be unable by
itself to provide the motivation for individuals to act
within the limited time available to combat ecological
catastrophe, an event some analyses view as imminent.
However difficult it is to comprehend the concepts
contained within the work of the early critical theorists,
especially those of Adorno, they seem to offer more
fertile ground for the development of radical ecological
thought than does the framework of communicative action
alone. The non-concept of mimesis may be of crucial
importance in the development of an adequate philosophical
and practical approach to the problems of ecological
destruction and catastrophe. Development of a non-
destructive mode of ecological interaction with nature can
only be fully achieved by human beings who are capable of
individually interpreting their everyday life activities
from the perspective of ecological subjects and then
representing them in a radically democratic manner. Until
the planet and the social system residing on it have
achieved a new ecological equilibrium, the truly
ecological subject remains imaginary or utopian, but
utopian in the sense of an "exact fantasy."
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What is now needed is an "exact fantasy" as Adorno
used the term and Buck-Morss has explained it . 1 What is
needed is the translation of the facts of ecology, of
nature, into words which themselves provide an image, but
this image is that of a future possibility, one where the
"reconciliation" of humans with nature will have taken
place. This exact fantasy is accomplished through a
mimetic transformation, not to be understood as a mere
copying of the given, but as its metamorphosis,
accomplished through the translation of existing elements
into the image of the desired future. For the radical
ecologist, the imagined future of a planetary ecological
climax becomes the model for mimetic self-transformation.
The idea of an ecological society is an anticipation
of a situation of reconciliation, an anticipation of the
development of possibilities and potentials existing
latently in the present damaged life, an anticipation of
the elimination of reification and the flowering of
otherness. The ecological subject will not be an absolute
subject, for it recognizes what is non-identical to
itself. It will not attempt to reduce the other to its
own concepts, or to the needs of a production apparatus.
The ecological subject's attitude toward the other is a
willingness to let it be. The future ecological society
assists the development of the other which occurs through
its own impulses, in its own time. This will bring into
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being a different world, one where the blossoming of what-
we-are-not will reveal who we truly are.
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